POLISH 'NORMALIZATION': THE LINKS BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY IN POLAND 1981-1987.

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Appendices

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ABBREVIATIONS

AL	*Armia Ludowa*, People's Army Communist Underground up to 1945.
CBOS	*Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej*, Center for Public Opinion Research (4/9/1982-).
CMEA	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (also COMECON).
CKKP	*Centralna Komisja Kontroli Partyjnej*, Central Party Control Commission.
CKR	*Centralna Komisja Rewizyjna*, Central Audit and Review Commission of the PZPR.
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
FJN	*Front Jedności Narodu*, Front of National Unity, 1948-1981.
FRG	Federal Rebublic of Germany.
GUS	*Główny Urząd Statystyczny*, Main Statistical Office.
ILO	International Labour Organization.
IMF	International Monetary Fund.
KC	*Komitet Centralny*, Central Committee.
KOK	*Komitet Obrony Kraju*, National Defence Committee.
MFN	Most Favoured Nation.
MO	*Milicja Obywatelska*, People's Militia.
MSW	*Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych*, Ministry of Internal Affairs.
NSZZ	*Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy*, Independent Self-governing Trade Union.
OPZZ	*Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków*, All-National Confederation of Trade Unions.
POP	*Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna*, Party Primary Unit.
PRL	*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*, Polish People's Republic.
PRC	People's Republic of China.
PRON	*Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narorowego*, Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.
PZPR	*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*, Polish United Workers Party.
SB	*Służba Bezpieczeństwa*, Secret Services.
TGO	*Terenowe Grupy Operacyjne*, Field Operation Groups (Oct. 1981).
TKK	*Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna*, Solidarity's Interim Co-ordinating Commission (22/4/1982).
WKO	*Wojewodzki Komitet Obrony*, Regional Defence Committees.
WRON	*Wojskowa Rada Ocelenia Narodowego*, Military Council of National Salvation.
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization.
ZOMO	*Zmotoryzowane Oddziały Milicji Obywatelskiej*, Motorized Detachment of the People's Militia (1957-).

ABSTRACT

Polish history to date has been dominated by a primacy of external relations over domestic affairs. Poland's geo-political position in the centre of Europe has meant that it has always had to take into account the intentions of its neighbours to the east and to the west. German and Russian designs over the Polish nation have inevitably associated its internal fate to the very survival of the nation as a whole, with the result that throughout the ages, a close link has appeared between the domestic and foreign variables shaping the life of this country. In the twentieth century, this remains a crucial determinant in analysing the processes taking place there. The present study aims at highlighting the perceived inseparability of domestic and foreign inputs into the socio-political life of the Polish nation. In particular, the period following the imposition of a state of war in the PRL on December 13, 1981, would seem to present a prime example of how this link can be demonstrated.

Chapter 2 traces back the major determinants which shaped the 1980s' events in the PRL and their significance for the post-1981 period. Polish policy-making was characterized by a tripartite set of relationships: a link between domestic and foreign policy, a strong connection between political and economic interests and a western and eastern-oriented policy-making. Of all the actors present on the Polish stage, the Catholic Church has grown to play a fundamental role in the life of the country, a factor of pluralism which seems abnormal in a society submitted to Marxist-Leninist principles. Any serious analysis of the Polish nation cannot exclude its importance, especially in recent times, and it is for this reason that its role is here discussed at length. With the August 1980 Agreements began the '500' days of the Solidarity movement. The impact of these events was of enormous importance, not only for the PRL, but also for the Soviet Union. Soon, it became clear that an end would be put to the Polish experiment in democracy. Though an usual degree of tolerance characterized the Soviet Union's reactions to the Polish events, behind the scene, it strove to put the Polish house into order. With the deterioration of the internal situation in the PRL, a climax soon was at hand. Faced with no other alternative, the Polish authorities, answering Moscow's desires, and acting under a facade of 'co-operative intent' prepared their next move. When a state of war was proclaimed

in December 1981, it took practically everyone by surprise at home and abroad.

Known as the 'War' by the Poles, the state of war saw the military appearing on the Polish political stage. Chapter 3 looks at the mechanisms and determinants which resulted in the militarization of Polish society and the internal and domestic consequences of this unprecedented military take-over in a Soviet bloc country. It analyses the aims of the Jaruzelski régime and highlights the bankruptcy of the Polish Communist Party. The impact of Polish domestic events on the PRL's foreign policy-making was enormous. It is argued that, with the December 1981 proclamation, Warsaw was compelled to re-assess its external relations both in the East and in the West. Faced with isolation from non-communist countries, the PRL sought, in the first months of martial law, to regain the confidence of the Kremlin leaders. At the same time, it had to cope with the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed against it by the West, with the US leading the onslaught. Despite its phillipics, Warsaw was careful in the beginning to avoid severing all its links with capitalist countries. But such efforts proved unfruitful, even despite a certain lack of unity in the Western camp.

With the imposition of a state of war, the Polish military authorities proceeded to consolidate their power over society. At the same time, their domestic policies continued to have important foreign implications. In Chapter 4, attention is focused on the 'fraternal context' and examines the immediate reactions of the PRL's allies. Succession problems in the Soviet Union contributed to undermine Warsaw's ability to undertake fundamental steps in improving the internal situation. The overall aim was to restore 'socialist normality' and ensure the stability of the country within the Soviet bloc. Moscow's restraint and caution underlined the fact that it saw Jaruzelski's *coup d'état* as a temporary measure, designed to pave the way for the restoration of orthodox Party rule. The first months of martial law witnessed efforts by the authorities to eliminate any organized oppositional structure and its determination to reinforce its repressive policies. Such policies directly affected the PRL's relations with its former Western economic and diplomatic partners. Needing more than ever financial aid from the capitalist countries, Warsaw was faced with the dilemma of reconciling its economic needs

with the the political necessities of returning to the *status quo ante*, a situation the Western governments were unwilling to support.

The decision to suspend the stringencies of the state of war in December 1982 changed little to the overall situation. The process of restoring the primacy of the Party was proceeding at a slow pace. Jaruzelski's calls for a 'national reconciliation' went unheard for the majority of Poles. Without public support for its policies, the Polish régime was compelled to strengthen its position and do little else besides. The decision to suspend the state of war is examined in chapter 5. Though it was an attempt to convince the outside world that the situation was returning to normal, it failed to achieve this goal. After a period of forced inactivity, underground 'opposition' began to reappear on the political stage. The second papal visit, in June 1983, was an attempt by the authorities to support their claims, at home as well as abroad, that their policies had been vindicated. It also opened the road to the formal lifting of the state of war.

After some eighteen months of martial law rigours, the decision to de-militarize the country, indicated that the régime was now feeling confident enough that the worst had been weathered. It now began in earnest the process of 'internal and external normalization'. On the Western front, the situation remained unchanged. Chapter 6 examines the Polish ruling establishment's vain efforts to implement a coherent policy in this respect and its endeavours to extricate the PRL from its international isolation. It pays also special attention to two crucial events affecting the internal situation in the country, namely, the 1984 People's Council elections and the death of father Jerzy Popiełuszko, an event which represented a turning point in the PRL's history. The same year, it became increasingly clear that the Western sanctions were beginning to outlive their usefulness. Contacts between the PRL and Western officials improved slightly, especially in the wake of the 1984 amnesties. But still, it was far from satisfactory to Warsaw. Showing no signs that he was prepared to implement far-reaching reforms, Jaruzelski's intransigence to Western demands for a dialogue between the authorities and the Church and Solidarity, ensured that the process of external normalization would be a slow one. Though the country had been pacified, it was still far from having been 'normalized'. The Western stand inevitably forced the PRL to look eastward. Though the process of external normalization was

primarily directed at the West, it was also aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. With the stabilization of the internal situation, Warsaw sought to regain its coveted number two place within the socialist community. On the whole, however, the Kremlin leaders, beset by succession problems, were only concerned that the situation in the PRL should remain stable. Meanwhile, the Jaruzelski régime was at pains to form a coherent policy-making.

With the advent of Mikhaïl Gorbachev, the primacy of external relations in the PRL's policy-making once again surfaced in all its importance. Chapter 7 describes the consequences the new Soviet leadership had on Soviet-Polish relations and the effects the new mood in the Kremlin had on the internal processes in the PRL. For the first time since December 1981, the Polish leadership was forced to radically alter its domestic policy-making and adapt it to the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. For Moscow, the best way to ensure that the Polish problem would not impede the domestic developments in the USSR was to allow the Polish General a greater level of independence in the running of internal Polish affairs. Gorbachev promptly pledged full support for Jaruzelski, and ensured the return of the PRL as the Soviet Union's closest ally. The 10th PZPR Congress marked the apotheosis of the normalization policies in the PRL and an alignment by Warsaw on the new directions set by Soviet policy-making. After nearly 5 years of rule, the Jaruzelski régime was still in a quandary as to how to implement the necessary changes in Polish society and ensure the continuity of the system. The first signs appeared that the leadership was considering greater public participation the running of the country, but this 'liberalization' was taking place against a background of reticence by the ruling establishment to relinquish any of its control and power over society. Continuing economic problems were making the more urgent radical structural changes in the PRL. With a new détente emerging between the superpowers, the PRL's task to regain its international status was eased. Following new amnesties, the Western powers decided to slowly lift the curtain of isolation over the PRL.

With *perestroïka* and *glasnost* shaping the internal developments in the Soviet Union, the Polish régime followed the lead by implementing its own version of the 'socialist renewal'. The implications of the Gorbachev phenomenon opened new ways for the Polish régime to deal

with the stagnant situation in the PRL. The domestic situation was still causing problems to the Polish leadership, with renewed attempts to counter the Polish Church's influence in Polish society, and the realization that all efforts to muzzle the 'opposition' had failed. The third papal visit emphasized the continuing deadlock between the authorities and society. Just as external factors greatly influenced the conduct of the PRL's internal policy-making, the evolution of the internal situation played an important role in solving the continuing deadlock in Warsaw's relations with the West. Chapter 8 highlights this link and describes the Polish leadership's successful bid to return the PRL on the international stage in 1987. It was only in 1988, however, that the authorities finally began making concrete steps to achieve a compromise with Polish society. With the signing of the April 1989 Agreement, the Polish political scene saw the re-appearance of Solidarity as a legal organization, allowed to conduct its own campaign in view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. By itself, the Round Table had a significant effect on Western perceptions and attitudes to the PRL, and foreshadowed a general Western re-assessment of its policy towards the Soviet bloc. The more recent developments in the PRL, once again have ramifications extending well beyond Polish borders. In many ways, what is now happening in the PRL is of great importance, not only for the future of the European continent, but also, in particular, for Gorbachev and his policies. Perhaps never before since 1945, has the fate of the Polish nation been so crucial to the Kremlin leaders.

Który skrzywdziłeś człowieka prostego
Śmiechem nad krzywdą jego wybuchając,
Gromadę błaznów koło siebie mając
Na pomieszanie dobrego i złego,

Choćby przed tobą wszyscy się kłonili
Cnotę i mądrość tobie przypisując,
Złote medale na twoją cześć kując,
Radzi że jeszcze dzień jeden przeżyli,

Nie bądź bezpieczny. Poeta pamięta.
Możesz go zabić - narodzi się nowy.
Spisane będą czyny i rozmowy.

Lepszy dla ciebie byłby świt zimowy
I sznur i gałąź pod ciężarem zgięta.

Czesław Miłosz 1950

(You who wronged a simple man,
Bursting into laughter at the crime,
And kept a crowd of fools around you,
Mixing good and evil to blur the line,
Though everyone bowed down before you
Saying Virtue and Wisdom lit your way,
Striking gold medals in your honour
And glad to have survived another day,
- Do not feel safe. The poet remembers.
You can slay him, but another is always born.
The words are written down, the deed, the date.
You could have done better with a winter's dawn,
And a rope, and a branch bent down beneath your weight.)

These words have been carved on the Gdańsk monument outside the Lenin shipyards in memory of those workers killed during the 1970 troubles.*

* Czesław Miłosz, 'Który Skrzywdziłeś', Swiatło dzienne, *Poezje*, Czytelnik, Warszawa, 1988. The English translation is from Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe*, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 384.

Kto się dziś jeszcze w dzieje nasze wczyta
Powie o polskiej "pospolitej rzeczy"
"Niepospolita".
C. Norwid (1795-1862)

(If still today, somebody would read [*wcyta*] into our history, he would see that the 'Common-Polish-Wealth' was not common.

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 *Thesis.*

For now over 200 years, and apart from a short interlude of 21 years of independence, Poland's fate has hung in foreign capitals. To this day, Poland's internal affairs have been dominated, to various degrees and according to the times, by external pressures. Ever since the First Partition (1773), the main political debate in Poland has centred around ways of resisting and eventually throwing out of the country the oppressive invaders, in other words how to regain independence. Years of oppression made particularly intense the Romantic experience in Poland, with its fascination for folklore, historical traditions, medieval legends, the supernatural, heroes and heroines larger than life, and the cult of freedom. To this day this has remained a lasting characteristic of the Polish national consciousness. This romantic vision (also referred to as Idealism) frequently used to explain the Polish insurrectionary tradition, found in Positivism its greatest adversary. The so-called realists rejected the poetry and drama of the Romantics and turned instead to social and economic themes, often advocating a conciliatory, more constructive and pragmatic approach to the nation's ills. Ever since, the Polish

political debate has been divided between these two camps. Despite their differences, whether Positivists or Romantics, Poles have always associated their lack of independence and sovereignty to their country's geo-political position and to the nature of their neighbours.[1] The country's destiny thus became intertwined with changes in the international scene and in particular on the European continent. This relation, therefore, between Poland's domestic affairs and the wider stage of international developments has become a complex and separate factor in the history of the Polish nation. Indeed, one may identify the origins of this enduring trait in the year 1386 when Jadwiga of Anjou married Jagiełło, Grand Duke of Lithuania. This single union implied much more than the usual type of dynastic marriage so often celebrated in European history. It gave rise to enormous changes in both countries. Their formal Union into the Polish Commonwealth, sealed by the Treaty of Lublin (1569), was in itself, and to use a fashionable term, a complete 'restructurization' of the internal lives of both nations. Ever since, the great periods of Polish history have always witnessed a strong link between domestic and foreign variables. The two centuries of war with the Turkish Empire were identified as a religious duty. It differed from the Crusades by taking place on Poland's borders and thereby was touching upon the very survival of the nation. The period of the Partitions (1775-1795) also emphasized the inseparability of domestic and foreign determinants in the Polish struggle to regain its independence and found its best description in the famous slogan *Za wasza wolność i naszą* - for your freedom and ours. The most extreme form of the foreign-domestic linkage was to be found in the Messianic interpretation of Poland's role in the international affairs of the time. More recently, the short existence of the independent Poland of

Marshal Józef Piłsudski (1921-1939) demonstrated the crucial importance of external developments for the future of the internal well-being of the Polish nation. Thus, this *prymat polityki zewnętrznej* or primacy of external relations, is an unusually determinant factor in explaining and understanding the internal developments of this country. This persistent primacy of external over internal developments has been and remains the major characteristic of Polish policy-making.[2] Its permanence stems from a Polish tradition whereby, for centuries, Poles have been linking the fate of their internal affairs with external ones. This can of course be explained - but only partly - by Poland's geo-political position on the European continent. This was, however, a sufficient but not a necessary cause. One can easily think of states whose position on the map resembled that of Poland's, and where in fact this tradition does not exist. For instance, in the case of the independent state of Hyderabad, in the British Indian Empire, the foreign-domestic linkage was hardly noticeable, domestic events in the state being of no interest to the British (unless they affected British interests outside the state). The Polish *prymat polityki zewnętrznej* may also be explained - though more vaguely - by the specific Polish national character, shaped, among other things, by centuries of fighting to preserve the national identity of a nation repeatedly invaded and subjected to geographical, cultural, political, and military assimilation by the invading powers.

On the eve of the year 2000, the link between foreign and domestic policy remains unchanged. The Polish People's Republic (PRL[3]) forms part of a political bloc led by the Soviet Union, where the lesser countries can be compared to vassals in their relation with their Soviet overlord. Accordingly, the influence of Moscow's policies on

the PRL has meant that Warsaw's room of manoeuvre had always been fairly limited, and at times, totally constrained. Soviet tutelage remains the norm. At the same time, to seek an explanation of developments in the PRL solely in terms of Soviet policies, would be too limited to fully understand the existing complexities which shape the nature of the country's internal and external developments. The exclusive focus on the Soviet Union as the arbiter, for instance of the foreign policy process, precludes the analysis of otherwise interesting problems. It ignores areas where the interest of the Soviet Union and its allies converge; it excludes by definition any change that the individual Eastern Central European states (ie. the European countries presently members of the Soviet bloc) might be relatively successful in legitimately implementing to defend their own interests in the 'bargaining process' with the socialist alliance. Last, but not least, it excludes all possibility that events and policy concerns in East Central Europe might have a reciprocal modifying impact on Soviet policy.[4] It is for this reason, therefore, that socialist Poland policy-making in the 1980s must be seen above all in the light of a complex relationship between foreign and domestic policy issues. It will be argued here that the link between domestic and foreign policy-making in the case of the PRL is essential to study if a thorough analysis of the country's internal and external politics is to be attempted. Unlike other countries, it is difficult to have a clear picture of Poland without grasping the importance of this link. Even the slightest internal or external event has its importance for the fate of this country, much more for instance, than in the case of Great Britain or France. Even if we dismiss this comparison, since these are independent and sovereign states, it is easy to see that the foreign-domestic link in Romania and Bulgaria is

insignificant when compared with the PRL. The difference may be a matter of degree but this distinction alone is very important. In Romania, often described by Western analysts as possessing 'an independent foreign policy', this so-called greater 'independence' in the conduct of foreign affairs has meant very little for the internal life of the country (except perhaps for the Ceaucescu dynasty). Just as for Bulgaria, the link between domestic and foreign policy remains practically non-existent. In the PRL, on the other hand, it would seem to be an intrinsic factor essential in determining and explaining the social, political and economic life of this country.

This thesis is thus an attempt to highlight and demonstrate this perceived inseparability of the two sets of policy-making and their interdependence on one another. Its central purpose will be to look at the relationship between Polish foreign and domestic policy-making in the aftermath of the 1980s events up to the present time. Covering a period starting in December 1981, with the imposition of a state of war in the PRL, and ending seven years later (1987), with the return of normal (ie. pre-December 1981) diplomatic and economic relations with non-communist countries, this study will attempt to highlight the correlation between the PRL's objectives at home and abroad.

From the beginning, it was clear that the topic in question would be a very large one indeed to tackle. Recent developments in the PRL and the rest of the socialist bloc have further made this study, almost a never ending task to accomplish. All the same, the conclusions drawn seem to be confirmed rather than refuted and therefore the self-imposed limitation on the scope of this study should not be seen as detrimental to the value of the dissertation as a whole. For the purpose of a case-study into the domestic-foreign

linkage, the period under consideration would therefore appear to be well-suited for such an analysis. Domestic developments within the country had a profound impact on the nature of Polish foreign policy and similarly the impact of the latter determined significant aspects of the domestic policy-making. The régime's attempts to regain a more respected international image were pursued alongside an internal desire and need to return to 'socialist normality'. Because of the slowness of this process of 'internal and external normalization', the evolution of the policy-making has been fairly easy to follow and has showed a clear relationship between domestic and foreign objectives. For the PRL, in the aftermath of the imposition of a state of war, the Kremlin leaders had to rely on the ability of General Jaruzelski to re-assert the Polish Communist Party's primacy over society. At the same time, the Polish leadership engaged in an 'external normalization' of its relations with non-communist countries (at the beginning, the PRL also had to pursue such a policy *vis-à-vis* its Eastern European allies). Both objectives became inter-locked and were actively pursued by the Polish régime from January 1982 to December 1987, and indeed later on.

The study of Soviet type political systems is often handicapped by the inevitable constraints resulting from a lack of access to needed materials. Yet, this has not and should not preclude any attempts to analyse them. It is for this reason, despite the fact that much information remains still uncovered, that the conclusions one can draw from analysing Polish policy-making in the 1980s, do justify the analysis presented here. While numerous studies of the foreign policy-making in communist countries have been produced over the years[5], those works concerned with a study of the domestic input into foreign

policy have often only briefly touched upon the other side of the relation, namely the impact of the foreign input into the domestic context and the nature of the interdependence between the two processes. In particular, the case of the PRL has not been examined in any great detail as far as this relation is concerned. Possibly to date the most interesting analysis relevant to the PRL would be that of J.F. Morrison's short but helpful study of the PRL's foreign policy.[6] Morrison identifies the main determinants of the country's foreign policy-making and draws attention to the close relationship between foreign and domestic policies. While aware of the particularity of Poland's geo-political position, he makes the valid point that the combined effects of international changes and the domestic developments in the country since the Second World War have greatly influenced the nature of the PRL's policy-making vis-à-vis the international community and most significantly toward the Soviet Union. These various inputs have not changed the basic political framework but they have showed that in certain circumstances, the PRL's policy-making can be said to be displaying a distinct national flavour (the Gomułka line in the 1950s and the early Gierek years for example), where its interests may rejoin those of the Soviet Union. The signature of the Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the PRL concerning the Basis for Normalizing their Mutual Relations on December 7, 1970, recognizing among other things the Oder-Neisse line as the PRL's Western border, was the culmination of a major objective of the post-war Polish communist government. This goal, however, had required the continued support of the PRL's Eastern neighbour, itself eager to have the European geo-political configuration recognized by the West for reasons which differed from the PRL's own desire to settle the 'Western Territories' question *de*

jure. In fact in some instances Soviet foreign policy may actually support and strengthen Polish policy objectives even if these may not be identical with the Kremlin's perceived policies. The PRL's position in the socialist community actually enables it to force some degree of compromise on the part of the Soviet Union especially due to its military-strategic importance within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.[7] For Moscow, the PRL is both a vital strategic country for Soviet military planners and the WTO's most vulnerable link. East Germany obtains most of its oil from the USSR via a pipeline which runs across Polish territory. The economic and military link between the USSR and the GDR also depends on the Polish rail system. Any major internal disturbances in the PRL may therefore always jeopardize not only this link but also the security interests of the whole socialist bloc. This has not, however, stopped the successive PRL leaderships from regarding as one of their primary foreign policy objectives, the maintaining of contacts with the West. In fact if one looks at the 1970s, it is easy to notice the rise of the PRL's standing both in relation with the Soviet Union and the West in general, a situation greatly determined by the climate of *détente*. While it is not the aim here to analyse this period[8], it is interesting to note how closely related were the PRL's foreign and domestic policies during that time. The opening to the West and the massive influx of foreign investments were the inevitable results of a domestic concern to improve the everyday life of the Poles through a programme of extensive modernization and thereby demonstrate the viability and strength of the ruling communist system. At the same time, this economic foreign policy orientation meant that when the gross mismanagement of the Polish economy started producing its drawbacks, the country was already plunging into the depths of a catastrophic debt problem

resulting in a rapidly deteriorating domestic situation: "the Polish crisis [was] the first crisis of a consumer society, where there [was] nothing to consume".[9] To this day the PRL's foreign economic policy in the 1970s has left its sequels, so much that it is hard to visualize how the country will manage to extricate itself from its present economic problems before the end of the century. Yet it is currently and will remain for a long time, an intrinsic preoccupation of the régime to solve the economic crisis and through it, to try and contain the ever-present volatile character of the Polish society, to pursue a policy, both in the political and economic fields, largely dependent on a successful foreign policy orientation, both in the East and the West. In fact, the Polish domestic situation and the legacy of the 1970s has made almost unavoidable the need for the leadership to pursue an active Western foreign policy. Of course this is heavily dependent upon many factors such as the willingness of the West to develop diplomatic and economic contacts and the extent to which the Soviet leadership will allow 'experiments' within the socialist bloc, both in the domestic and foreign contexts. In the end, however, the nature and vigour of the PRL's foreign policy will always be dependent upon the *asymmetrical interdependence* between socialist Poland and the Soviet Union. This will continue to remain the crucial parameter from which to observe the PRL's successes and/or failures.[10]

It may be argued that in the case of the PRL, the study of its foreign policy can only be reduced to an analysis of the *implementation* of foreign policy decisions as communicated by Moscow and therefore can reveal very little of any significance. Add to this the fact that the traditional character of foreign ministries as institutions - stability and repetition - is probably the most

enduring feature of socialist states, and one can see the difficulty in analysing the PRL's foreign policy. While the foreign policy process in the European countries within the Soviet sphere of influence is heavily burdened by geo-political and ideological constraints and may display little independence in its formulation, the degree to which compliance with Moscow is followed has often varied. Indeed, at times, this compliance has even turned out to be more of a burden than an asset for the Soviet Union. In the case of the PRL, as far as economic, ideological and political matters are concerned, it was nearly always more of a burden for the Kremlin leaders. More generally though, the PRL's role as a Soviet proxy was somewhat more ambiguous: it simply never really seemed to be either a burden nor an asset.[11] This partly explains why Polish internal developments have often determined many facets of the country's relations with its eastward neighbour. Moreover, the PRL's foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis the Western democracies have had a profound domestic significance which in turn contributed in altering in part its standing with the Soviet Union. The foreign policy field is therefore not an area to be dismissed as non-informative of contemporary Poland. On the contrary it provides an interesting and revealing medium through which it is possible to identify crucial determinants of the PRL's policy-making.[12]

1.2 *Method.*

As it is not the goal of this study to provide a theoretical framework of analysis due, among other things, to the recognized difficulties of generalizing about a state's foreign policy over a long time, the intention here is rather to concentrate primarily on the *linkage* between the two sets of policy-making discussed above. For

this purpose, the method of analysis will draw some guidance from Rosenau's concept of linkage politics.[13] The conceptual framework offered by Rosenau is not meant to be exhaustive or self-limiting and will be used only to identify certain essential elements and present them in a clear light. Consequently, the study will attempt to identify the main sequences of behaviour inherent in the linkage between the foreign policy and the domestic dimensions. In identifying the various linkages, six main sequences will be implied throughout the text. Here are some examples contemporary to the period under consideration:

a) ***Inputs***, or the initial stage of a linkage - eg, the imposition of a state of war in December 1981.

b) ***Outputs***, or the terminal stage of a linkage - eg. Poland under martial law up to July 1983.

c) ***Policy Outputs, direct or indirect***, or the sequences of behaviour that originate within a polity [ie. the national political system as opposed to the society of which they are part] and that either culminate in or are sustained by its environment - eg. the militarization of Polish society.

d) ***Environmental Inputs***, or the behavioural sequences in the external environment to which the polity outputs give rise - eg. the threat of a Soviet invasion.

e) ***Environmental Outputs, direct or indirect***, or the sequences of behaviour that start in the external environment of a polity - eg. Western sanctions against the PRL following the imposition of a state of war.

and finally,

f) ***Polity Outputs***, or the behavioural sequences within a polity to which environmental outputs give rise - eg. The gradual release of political prisoners in the PRL.

These sequences of behaviour will be identified primarily through the perceptions, the attitudes, and actions of the ruling Polish political establishment although great care will also be made to include into the study the other crucial actors involved (the Church and the opposition). The theoretical framework thus may look something like the following diagram:



In the interest of clarity the second schematic representation that follows attempts to sum up the methodological framework along which lines the study will evolve. Here only specific determinants have been included as an example. The model should be read as showing one possible way of demonstrating the interplay between domestic and foreign variables and should be only seen in a broad sense. The interaction between the two has been captured in a schematic form recalling a double-helix:


Domestic Variables
Foreign Variables
Rise of Solidarity
Possible WTO intervention
Imposition of martial law
Militarization of society
Western sanctions. Eastern orientation
"Normalization"
Continual socio-political & economic problems
International isolation
Programme Formulation
Lifting of martial law restrictions. Amnesties
Easing of Western sanctions
"Post-normalization phase"
Pseudo socialist normality
Regaining of international status (West & East)
"Odnowa"
Socio-political reforms
Debt problem
(...)
Polity
Environmental Outputs/inputs
Environmental Outputs/inputs

It might be argued that the relation between foreign and domestic variables as it is presented here is another version of the action-reaction model of international politics.[14] While opponents of this model might point out that this is only one aspect of a more complex relationship, the model hereby suggested is not meant to describe solely a causal relation between events. It simply hopes to serve as a guide for the understanding of the complex relationship between foreign and domestic policy in the PRL.

1.3 *General Remarks on Foreign Policy Making.*

Domestic policy essentially takes place within the the boundaries of a given state. It is above all an internal process. On the other hand foreign policy is a political process which takes place *between* states (foreign economic policy is regarded here as part and parcel of this process). Both types of policy-making are regulated by different aspects and exhibit different objectives and methods of attaining them. Foreign policy is primarily intended to affect, and is limited by, factors outside the national political system (although of course internal determinants play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy objectives). This distinction however, is subject to several grey areas: the dichotomy alluded to above is valid only to a certain point. How are the two interrelated? What similarities or distinctive features can one identify between the two? What is the relationship between the foreign policy of a given state and the domestic policy of other states? One way of answering these questions is to look at the objectives of foreign policy formulation. When such objectives are identified, they will cast a light on the degree of the relationship between foreign and domestic policy and enable us to compare the two more adequately.

Bearing in mind that they are primarily directed at the outside world, there are basically three types of objectives which can be pursued by an active foreign policy: fundamental, middle-range and immediate. **Fundamental objectives** are objectives without which all other cease to exist and accordingly they become those for which maximum expenditure from the state can be expected (Survival of the nation, the defence of the state's sovereignty and integrity; ideological aims may also be included in this category). **Middle-range objectives** are less urgent by virtue of their aims. At the same time they cannot be ignored. *Politically* they may be concerned with the acquisition of new territories, about issues of national security. *Materially* they may include concerns for economic matters, for the general growth and development of the nation as a whole. *Ideologically* they may be concerned with the maintenance or spreading of ideals relevant to the ideological nature of the state. Lastly, such middle-range objectives also include the desire to develop the image of the country and its *prestige*, in itself a very important aspect of any foreign policy strategy. It should be noted here that *nation-state* security or the protection of the state from threat or use of force against it, is only one of three sub-types of security concerns. The other two are *régime security* (the pursuit by the state's ruling elite of safety in their position of political dominance or the search for legitimacy) and *system security* (the safeguarding and improvement of the state's capacity for mobilization of human and non-human resources and for value allocation). As the Polish case in the 1980s amply illustrated, each of these three aspects of security had both domestic and external perspectives.[16] **Immediate objectives** represent short term goals. The state is primarily concerned with the realization of certain ends requiring immediate action as in the case of crisis

situations for instance. These are usually at the forefront of a state's foreign policy priorities.

It is easy to see from this summary list of objectives that foreign policy aims rejoin, to a large extent, many domestic policy concerns. In fact the main difficulty of trying to differentiate between the two precisely hinges upon their similarity in terms of objectives. Further still, very often, foreign policy orientations have a clear domestic goal: raising the prestige of the state abroad for instance enhances the policy-makers' own standing at home and contributes to the strengthening of their legitimacy (real or perceived). At the same time, foreign successes may act as a substitute for unsuccessful domestic policies. Since domestic interests among the population rank, unsurprisingly, markedly higher than external ones, successful developments in the external sphere are a potentially strong source of support in favour of the ruling elite: they can be presented in such a way as to raise the government's image and standing within the country, in the knowledge that few will be fully aware of all the issues. Emotional issues concerning the sovereignty of a country can only too often be manipulated in order to distract the nation from domestic issues and/or influence it in a determined way. The Falklands War is a prime example of this, both from the Argentinian and British sides. The degree to which this holds true depends therefore largely upon the state's own successes and failures in specific fields and at specific times. The less successful are the domestic policies, the more important are the results of foreign policy activity for the rulers, either to contrast domestic difficulties with foreign successes or to explain domestic problems in the light of foreign developments.

This brings us to consider the general influences on foreign policy making which hold true for all types of society with an active foreign policy. First of all there are the *influences of the past*, one of the most important constraints on governments. They either set limits to the policy making or stimulate developments. Second, there is *the quest for security*, or the sum of security policies. These tend to blur foreign policy matters with that of defence. Thirdly, there is *intelligence*. 'No foreign policy can be stronger than the information it is based upon'. Once intelligence has been 'collected', 'analysed' and then 'disseminated', it will start affecting foreign policy making. Finally *leadership* can play a crucial role in the conduct of any state's foreign policy.

While these factors represent broad influences on foreign policy, more specific determinants can be identified. Basically they come under two categories, external and internal. There are four main external factors influencing foreign policy making: International law, international morality, external commitments and interdependence. While the first two have effectively a limited if not sometimes almost irrelevant influence, the last two are important. They comprise alliance restraints, investments limitations, the protection of one's own residents abroad, duties with respect to international organizations. All states are nowadays interdependent, some more than others. It involves some costs and depends essentially upon the nature of the relation between the states concerned. Internal determinants affect the making of foreign policy by determining what the state can do. An analysis of its capabilities determines a state's power. Four main conditions will determine this: geographic conditions (location; terrain; borders; space, etc.); material conditions (natural

resources; industrial development; capital; technology, etc.); human resources (population size; national character; ethnic and political homogeneity, etc.); organizational capabilities (political institutions; adaptability; military preparedness, etc.). Finally a mention should be made of the importance of values in the shaping of foreign policy. While it may be difficult to pin down exactly what a particular ideology really is, ideologies possess certain characteristics: by nature they are authoritarian, they are highly systematized, very distinctive and deny the values of other ideologies. In relation to policy making, ideology (or the practical application of general rules) fulfils certain basic functions. It offers a specific view of history, presents an explanation of current events, lays down a set of values according to which the individual must live his life, offers a social goal, lays down priorities and justifies the loyalties of the people in the state. As a tool to study foreign policy, ideology should neither be under-emphasized, or seen as the sole factor determining policies. When ideology has only a minor role in justifying certain actions before they take place, it may have an important role in justifying the result after the actions themselves. On the whole, however, ideology can be more adequately described as 'the decoration of policy'. It fulfils a very important role for the ruling elite as a justification tool.

Bearing all the above in mind it is thus clear that the following thesis will be prone to several limitations. A reliance on policy outputs as the best indicators of the system's performance may, to some, appear too limited. There is also the problem concerning the central relation analysed here, namely, the foreign policy-domestic policy linkage. It is for these reasons, among others, that it is

important to stress again that the aim here is less to demonstrate a direct causal link between domestic and foreign policy making than to present a broader understanding of the different ways in which these two sets of policy-making interact in the case of the PRL. The fact that there can be no certain expectation that the linkage in question will be found to be either predictable or consistent does not nonetheless mean that it can be ignored. Indeed, it is hoped to make convincing the argument that, in the period under consideration, the foreign-domestic link in the PRL's policy-making was a determinant factor for a complete understanding of the country's behaviour and actions. To assume that it did in fact exist is different from demonstrating it.

1.4. *Dramatis Personae.*

In the period under consideration, one can identify four groups of actors who play a definite role in the PRL's socio-political life. Their respective importance varied with events, but all of them had a crucial part to play as the situation evolved. These groups can be summarily broken down into five distinct categories:

a) The ruling establishment in the PRL;

b) The Polish Catholic Church;

c) The 'opposition';

d) The Soviet Union;

e) The West.

Each of these groups (I stress the notion of grouping since in each, it is easy to see differing views and opinions) may be best identified in light of their respective aims. This differentiation may be of course open to criticism since very often their respective goals and

interests can be identical or at least similar. However, for the purpose of presenting the actors of the Polish scene, the following general comments may be nonetheless useful. Identifying the aims of these groups has the advantage of providing the base for a clearer comprehension of their actions, either as initiatory or as responses to particular happenings.

For the ruling establishment, embodied by the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), the one main enduring aim has been to stay in power. Its role within the Polish state has been the function of international realities, not domestic ones. Through ideological justification and the use of forceful means to rule, it seeks to ensure its own durability and stability. "The Party is the decision maker and the watchdog, the executive and the legislator and the control mechanism over the public and the private aspects of societal existence".[16] Its degree of tolerance for oppositional views to its legitimacy have varied, but on the whole, it has always sought to eliminate any potential opponents.

The Polish Catholic Church has traditionally adopted an attitude of prudence. Particularly since the communist take-over after the Second World War, it has feared upheavals that might sweep away the gains it had managed to achieve. It has repeatedly demonstrated a concern to consolidate its position and defend its acquisitions. This has led it to adopt at times an attitude of compromise with the authorities in order to be able to act as freely as possible within the PRL system. It has sought to introduce a societal plan in accord with the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. Lastly, though this should not be seen as a short-term objective, it has sought to make some progress in the christianization of Russia (the introduction of Catholic

institutions, missionary activity, support for the Orthodox Church, help for the Uniates, etc.).

Political opposition is a notion deriving from a political system which is ruled by the principle of choice, competitive elections, in other words, a parliamentary system. These things are therefore incompatible with the hegemony of a single party. Thus when the term 'opposition' in the PRL is used, one has in mind a certain range of independent thinking and action which has its own institution and personalities and not a societal group in the Western democratic sense. The term 'civil society' is often used to describe the existence of extensive groups and networks organized independently of the authorities, fighting in their own respective way against the model of social organization imposed by the PRL's rulers. In the PRL, the 'opposition' comprises various tendencies, often at odds with one another on certain specific points, the main differences concerning the means rather than the ends. However, one long-term goal has always united them, namely, the independence of Poland as a state. A second long and short-term objective has been Freedom. A prevailing view has been that since those general but definite aims are realizable only in the absence of the Soviet Union, progress can only be made by small steps, in an evolutionary manner.

For the Soviet Union, the main aim is that the PRL should remain in the socialist bloc. During the Polish crisis, it was determined to stop the 'Solidarity infection' from spreading. At the same time, it was anxious to avoid direct intervention even if this meant the need for some compromise between the ruling establishment and the population at large. As long as the PRL remains stable and projects the image of a loyal ally in ideological, political and military

events were for some, an ideal opportunity to destabilize the Soviet empire. Others pinned hope in the first signs of a new socio-political movement arising in the whole of Central Eastern Europe. Yet, it remains true that for most Western states, upheavals behind the 'iron curtain' are a source of great concern for the safety and stability of Europe as a whole, although this preoccupation may be stronger among non-governmental agencies such as commercial banks which have invested capital in this area of the globe, than for governments. On the whole, Polish affairs remain of circumstantial interest for the West. Nonetheless, "in the international context, a source of Poland's misfortune is that the country is too small to impress the major actors in European politics, yet too big to be left alone".[17] To the annoyance of some European powers, more motivated by their own interests of the preservation of the *status quo*, than by any moral criteria applicable to a nation constantly suffering the effects of their indifference, the 'Polish question' remains to this day as actual as ever - much more than is often admitted.

1.5 *Sources.*

Standard techniques of scientific research in the case of the PRL are naturally difficult to apply. Nowhere is this more true then when one attempts to gather Polish material. Although recent times have witnessed a marked 'liberalization' of the press and publication houses in so far as what is now being published in the country was unthinkable only two-three years ago, this 'Polish *glasnost*' still represents only a minor step on the road to full democratization of the printed word. More often than not, political analysts studying the PRL have to wade through kilograms of material, deciphering all along, the veiled hints, the oblique references, the hollow metaphors, the

hundreds of omissions, all of which speak louder than the actual superficial content. It is imperative to stress here the overall unsuitability of Western terminology to describe the situation in Soviet-type systems. This is most strongly apparent with regard to economic data. The propensity of Western analysts to discuss the economic situation in a country like the PRL, drafting 'capitalist wording' on a system where they are meaningless (apart perhaps from the import-export distinction), had all too often rendered a very inaccurate and sometimes distorting picture of the real situation. For political scientists, the main problem has been to come to terms with the official language and its plain disregard for truth. This reality should be underlined. In a closed society where a single all-pervading ideology dictates all of society's values, there is an inherent need for lies. Lies remove constraints: logically, from a false proposition one may draw either a false one or a true one; from a true proposition, only a true one can follow, and this immediately implies a constraint when this implication is transposed to a Soviet-type system. Since communist authorities abhor all constraints, it follows naturally that they should encourage the 'institution of lying'. It is for this reason that a 'double-language' has emerged in Soviet type systems. A lack of accurate and reliable information therefore plagues the would-be Western researcher accustomed to the facility of studying his own country un-hindered by the kind of restrictions found in Soviet-Bloc countries. Inevitably, at times, a certain measure of frustration and disappointment may arise in the course of the research. It is of course true that any study of the contemporary foreign and domestic policies of a given country is often a thankless task. Though there may be an abundance of material available, its nature often lacks the needed historical distance for an in-depth

analysis. At the same time, official documents may also not be available for consultation and therefore a lot of research work will involve a great degree of subjective analysis and the forming of conclusions which only time will confirm. Apart from official statements, ie. emanating from the ruling establishment, there is little elsewhere to look for authoritative commentaries or for other sources of independent information. For Poland, this is a problem which in many ways is not insurmountable as for instance in the Soviet Union. However, it remains obvious that in studying such traditionally 'discreet subjects' as foreign policy, and especially in the Polish case, a great deal would have to be hypotheses based on a subjective analysis of the facts available. In this respect then, this thesis does not claim to have found magic sources of information. On the other hand, a careful analysis of primary source materials, here the flood of official statements and speeches, can all the same reveal many interesting facets of the policy-making process in the PRL. I have therefore based my research primarily on the contents of articles in Polish newspapers or journals printed in the PRL which form here the bulk of my primary sources. Contrary to what might be expected, they do not all reflect similar views, even if on the whole, the censorship office work ensures a certain uniformity of information. In the case of such publications as the Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the censor's deletions are indicated in the text. Other available material published in the PRL appears with the mention 'for internal use only', meaning that it is restricted for viewing within the publishing institution in question, as is for instance the case for the Press Bureau of the Polish Episcopate. The reading of the official press is often monotonous, repetitive and tedious, 'the quality far from equalling the quantity'. Yet, quite a lot can be

gleaned from this 'brick' language, enough to substantiate the present study. I have also relied to various degrees on numerous discussions with Poles during the year I spent in the PRL, gaining thereby often new revealing insight on particular questions, something not otherwise obtainable. This inevitably also lead me to consult the so-called *niezależne* (independent) or *Drugi obieg* ('second circulation') publications, which have flourished in the PRL to a level unparalleled in the whole Soviet bloc. Although this *bibuła* (the name given to underground pamphlets before the advent of Piłsudski's Poland) should technically be regarded as secondary sources, they form an essential part of the needed material to study contemporary Poland. Without it, no accurate picture of the PRL can be satisfactorily drawn. All translations are mine apart from the various quotations taken from Russian sources (and not available in Polish) and the occasional use of a fitting English translation. Western secondary sources were used selectively to enhance certain particular points. In cases where particular information was not available to me, I have relied then on such 'banks of information' as the *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* publications and *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin* (London).

Chapter 1 Notes.

1. Some commentators sometimes make the distinction between the idealist and realist schools in Polish politics (for instance, Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics: Idealism versus Realism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967). Idealism and realism are terms which imply too many definitions and for this reason are perhaps less informative than the positivism/romanticism distinction. Though this last distinction has equally not always been easy to sustain, on the whole it does convey more accurately these two main currents of Polish political thought. Mickiewicz (1798-1855) differentiated between the use of force in accordance with one's aims (positivism) and the aims according to one's force (romanticism): *Mierz siłę na zamiary nie zamiar podług sił!*

2. Adam Bromke's *The Meaning and Uses of Polish History*, Eastern European Monographs, Boulder Colorado, 1987.
3. I have used the Polish acronym PRL (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa*) to stress the distinction between Poland in the sense of a nation, and Poland as ruled by its present political system.
4. Edwina Moreton, 'Foreign policy perspectives in Eastern Europe', in Dawisha Karen and Hanson Philip, *Soviet-East European Dilemmas. Coercion, Competition and Consent*, London, Heinemann for the RIAA, 1981, pp. 172-194.
5. To list all of them here would be too long. However, some in particular deserve a mention: Adomeit and Boardman, eds., *Foreign Policy-making in Communist Countries*, Saxon House, Farnborough, 1979; Seweryn Bialer's, *The Domestic Content of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 1981; M.J. Sodaro and S.L. Wolchnich, eds., *Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980s*, London, Macmillan, 1983; Sarah M. Terry, *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, Yale University Press, 1984.
6. J.F. Morrison, 'The Foreign Policy of Poland' in *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe*, Ed. Kuhlman, Leyden Sijthoff, 1978, pp. 129-165.
7. Edwina Moreton, 'Foreign Policy Perspectives in Eastern Europe', in Dawisha and Hanson, eds., *Soviet-East Europe Dilemmas. Coercion, Competition and Consent*, Heinemann for the RIIA, 1981; K. Gerner, *The Soviet Union and Central Europe in the Postwar Era: a Study of Precarious Security*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Aldershot, Gower Publishing Co., 1985; P.H. Lange 'Poland as a problem of Soviet Security Policy, *Aussenpolitik*, 32, 1981.
8. A. Korbonski, 'Soviet Policy towards Poland', in S.M. Terry, ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, Newhaven and London, Yale University Press, 1984; a good and detailed narrative of the events leading up to the Solidarity era can be found in Blazynski's *Flashpoint Poland*, Pergammon, London, 1979.
9. Ivan Svitak, *Telos*, Winter, 1982-83, p. 195.
10. A. Korbonski, 'Eastern Europe as an internal determinant of Soviet Foreign Policy', in Bialer's *The Domestic Content of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder, Colorado, 1982.
11. A. Korbonski, 'Eastern Europe: Soviet asset or burden. The political dimension', in R. H. Linden, *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe: New Approaches*, Praeger, New York, 1980.
12. For a discussion of Eastern Central European capacities to act as influence inputs into the Soviet Union, see in particular, Z. Gitelman, 'The diffusion of political innovation: from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union', *Sage professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, 3(27), 1972, pp. 5-35; Korbonski, *op. cit.*, note 10, and W.C. Potter, a) 'Innovation in Eastern European policies' in Kuhlman, 1978 *op. cit.*, see note 5, and b) 'External demands and Eastern Europe WestPolitik', in Linden R.H., 1980, *op. cit.*, note 10.
13. J. N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, Frances Pinter, London, Revised and enlarged edition, 1979..
14. R. H. Rosecrance, *Action-Reaction in World Politics*, International System in Perspective, Westport, 1977.
15. The use of this tripartite concept of security in Eastern European states is developed in detail in, Ronald H. Linden, 'The security bind in East Europe', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26 No. 2, June 1982, pp. 155-189.
16. Ivan Volgyes, *Politics in Eastern Europe*, Chicago, Illinois, The

Dorsey Press, 1986, p. 127-128.
17. A. R. Rachwald, 'Poland between the Superpowers: Three decades of foreign policy', *Orbis*, Vol. 20(4), Winter 1977, p. 1061.

> *It is difficult to understand the history of a nation that for nearly three hundred years [...] has been in a hopeless position and whose only chance has been the stubbornness of people offering resistance to save the country from spiritual death.* [1]

CHAPTER 2.

THE ROAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF A STATE OF WAR

The 1956 Polish events heralded a series of domestic crises which have been regularly shaking the PRL since the end of the Second World War. The recurring nature of the 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980 crises has rightly earned the PRL the attribute of the most volatile and unstable country of the socialist bloc. With the extraordinary events which led to the legalization of the first independent trade unions in Eastern Central Europe since the end of the war, the PRL became the centre of international attention. The impact of the 1980 events went well beyond Polish borders, with their implications not being solely confined to the Polish domestic environment. At the same time, all along, question marks appeared, underlining the uncertainty concerning the future of the 'Polish experiment'. Already by the beginning of 1981, the first signs appeared that Soviet patience - until then remarkably controlled - was wearing thin, and that soon the day of reckoning would come.

2.1 *The 1970s and Beyond: Determinant Factors.*

Since 1970, one can identify several distinctive periods of the PRL's contemporary history. Each one presented its own characteristics and despite the inevitable continuity one would

expect, each new period markedly differed from its previous one.

1970-1976. The first one, starting in 1970 and ending in June 1976, saw the fall of Władysław Gomułka and his replacement by the new head of the PZPR, Edward Gierek. His pragmatic and somewhat more open style allowed him to consolidate political power and restored a measure of stability and purpose to Polish society.[2] Under his leadership, the PRL underwent profound changes both in the domestic and external spheres. At the beginning of 1971, the new PZPR leader faced four main tasks: he had to consolidate his position within the Party, alleviate continued workers' unrest, increase popular support and finally he had to gain the confidence and support of the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist bloc. Gierek's policies aimed at steering the PRL away from the inward looking, 'self contained' policies of Gomułka by re-opening its markets and re-establishing firmer economic relations with the West. One of the main points of the new Polish economic policies which were initiated at the turn of the 1970s, had been the official acceptance of the fundamental principle that the economy had to serve the needs of society, including the goal of bringing about a continual and systematically felt improvement of the material and cultural living conditions of the masses. Gierek was hoping to create a consumer society on the base of which he would build a 'Second Poland'. While the Polish Catholic Church argued that there could only be one Poland, the Party was now seeking to explain how a system basing its existence on a materialistic ideology was incapable of producing the goods needed by society. Thus, one of the goals of the ruling establishment under Gierek was to reconcile Poles with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The main practical way of achieving this was through a

restructurization of the economy by increasing both investment and consumption through large injections of Western technology, financed almost exclusively by Western credits and external sources. A rate of economic growth which became one of the highest in the world in the early 1970s (11% when the world average was 6%) created a dramatic consumer boom and contributed to raising standards of living (+ 40% in the first 5 years) in an unprecedented way; the growing climate of détente provided the opportunity for an opening to the West in all fields and significantly accentuated the PRL's stature on the international level. In this respect the signing of the Helsinki Agreement in 1975 provided the Polish leadership with a framework of crucial importance in its attempts to balance the image of a country faithful to the socialist bloc and that of a willing and able partner determined to intensify all kinds of communication processes with the West.[3] East-West *détente* had began in earnest in December 1970, when the Polish-West German Treaty was signed. It gave *de jure* recognition by Bonn to the PRL's post-war frontier on the Oder-Neisse. At the same time it removed the one profound justification for the alliance with the Soviet Union. However, by the mid-1970s hopes for a continued improvement in socio-economic aspects of Polish life were dashed, mainly through gross mismanagement of the national economy and irrational planning. Gierek's main aim had been to convince the Polish nation that communism was compatible with high standards of living, comparable with those found in the capitalist countries but he apparently ignored the advice of his advisers who were somewhat less optimistic on the feasibility of this project.[4] In order to achieve this, he launched his own brand of *Westpolitik*. Favouring an import-led growth of the economy, the Polish government hoped to raise the Polish society's living standards as well as providing the

necessary infra-structure to develop an export-oriented national capability, capable of competing on world markets. Export hopes were pinned on raw materials, coal and lignite, sulphur and copper and agricultural products like sugar, meat and other foodstuffs. Industry too was to play a bigger part, in particular shipbuilding and ship repair services, building equipment and the budding electronics industry. By the end of Gierek's time in office, the PRL had borrowed the equivalent of $ 20 billion, a sum equal, in real terms, to that received by some Western European states under the Marshall Plan.[5] But already by 1973, the Polish leadership were becoming aware of the pitfalls entailed in such a strategy which, in the absence of strict regulations, was beginning to create increasing deficits in both trade and current accounts. PRL relations with the West have always been asymmetrical - just as with the Soviet Union. The PRL is substantially more vulnerable to changes in market conditions or policy in almost any one of her Western trade partners than vice-versa. In the 1970s it sustained a large proportion of its imports of Western technology through trade surpluses in two main commodity goods, energy and food. But its vulnerability to market conditions ensured that import changes from Western countries became far more critical to its economic well-being than to theirs.[6] The failure of exports to grow in line with expectations (the so-called import-export gap) compelled the Polish government to impose cuts in imports and investments. Soon, sharp food price increases followed. By then the population was growing increasingly disillusioned with the vision of the 'Second Poland' Gierek had promised them. The price increases triggered a wave of serious domestic unrest. The June 1976 events announced the end of a dream for the Gierek régime. They highlighted the latter's inability to implement a rational programme of economic

development and provide adequate measures to offset the growing inadequacies of the national economy. The stage was set for a new period in Poland's post-war history. Growing domestic difficulties and the developing climate of *détente* between East and West combined to foster the foundations of a "deep transition of the [Polish] political system".[7]

1976-1980. The next five years witnessed desperate efforts by the PZPR to halt the steadily deteriorating situation within the country. Growing indebtedness to the West, deteriorating conditions in the world economy, corruption on a huge scale and at every level, continuing planning inefficiency, domestic instability, all accelerated the day of 'reckoning'. The PRL's economic crisis paralleled a crisis of political authority as the PZPR became totally divorced from the realities of everyday Polish life and entered a stagnant period. On September 23, 1976, a Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) was formed, to defend and help persecuted workers by providing them with legal, financial and medical aid. It began publishing information on persecution and assistance and acted as an intermediary in collecting and distributing funds donated to help the persecuted workers.[8] This was one of the first concrete indications that the Polish society was determined to organize itself against the ruling élite. Throughout the next four years, oppositional activity increased noticeably. Based primarily upon the disseminating of uncensored information and publicizing abuses of law, gross incompetence and private profiteering of public officials, it forged the social links useful for the creation of Solidarity in 1980. Another important event was the election of Cardinal Wojtyła as the new Pope in 1978. His visit to the PRL in the Summer of 1979 was an extraordinary event which transformed Polish society:

> It acted as a catalyst on a number of processes which were changing the position of the Polish society and its view of itself. It brought to a head the growing sense of the power of that society in the face of coercion, a sense that had been evolving over a dozen years at least. It brought millions together at rallies and open-air masses: people came forward and counted each other. ... It was the crowning element in a build-up of the Polish presence in the world. The Polish question once more hovered over the international stage.[9]

1980-1981. In July 1980 new food price increases for meat were announced. This triggered the first strikes in Gdańsk and the Ursus tractor factory in Warsaw. On August 14th, the 17 000 workers of the Lenin shipyards stopped working. Four days later they had adopted a charter of 21 points asking, among other things, for the right to strike and to form independent trade unions. Soon the movement had swept the whole of the country forcing the authorities to negotiate with the strikers. In August the government commission and the Interfactory Strike Committees in Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Jastrzębie signed a series of agreements thereby answering the workers' demands.[10] In an unprecedented step for a communist régime, the existence of an independent trade union was officially sanctioned by the authorities. By September 1981, the Polish workers' movement had moved beyond the Gdańsk Charter to become institutional, both in independent trade unions and the trade-union federation Solidarity. (It should be stressed here that the term federation should not be understood in the western sense. Solidarity was organised on the basis of regions and not of trade. This was particularly noticeable when the banners unfurled during demonstrations always bore the name of a region rather than the name of a particular workforce). In August 1980 Solidarity had an estimated 190 000 members; by November its membership had swelled to 10 million of the Polish work force. The Polish workers' victory was due to the fact that their challenge

to the communist régime had been much more difficult to counter than previous eruptions of discontent. A second factor was that they had learned from the experiences of 1956, 1970 and 1976 when their confrontation with the authorities in street demonstrations had quickly turned into violence and defeat. Their use of sit-in tactics in 1980 were most helpful in this respect. Another important factor for the workers' victory was that for the first time in Polish history, the two streams of the opposition to the authorities became effectively joined, namely, the workers and a widespread movement of intellectuals. It is worth noting that for all the novelty such an alliance was creating, conflicts did occur, even if on the whole, they should be regarded as minor ones against the contemporary background. The workers-intelligentsia alliance did not go smoothly all the time. One may recall for instance, the accusation of 'acting like a dictator' thrown at Wałęsa when he decided in 1980, that two academics, Bądkrowski and Gruszewski, should be on Solidarity's presidium. These same voices were claiming then that the intellectuals were not needed.'[1]

In 1980, the unthinkable had become reality. It will probably remain one of the greatest paradoxes in modern history, that in a state whose political system professed to represent the so-called 'working class', it was this very 'working class' which rose to challenge the *raison d'ètre* of those who had now ruled the PRL for some 35 years in their name. In this sense, Solidarity had been the Polish Crondstadt for the régime. Like the *szlachta*, the Polish nobility who had in the 16th century coined the famous slogan, *nic o nas bez nas* (nothing concerning us can be settled without us), the Polish workforce, in the second half of the 20th century, expressed

its determination to be involved in the shaping of its own destiny.

While the West apparently welcomed the rise of Solidarity (though perhaps more for what it stood for than for its potentially explosive consequences), the Soviet bloc looked at the Polish events with growing apprehension. Moscow in particular feared that the collapse of the PZPR and its capitulation to demands for a more open society could infect other countries in Eastern Central Europe. The Solidarity events represented for the Soviet leadership a clear deviation of the socialist norm and a true danger of directly affecting Soviet domestic affairs. This concern by the Kremlin was all the greater because of the worker roots of the movement and its potential attractiveness for the rest of the socialist bloc. As Roman Laba described it,

> Solidarity [was] the ultimate refutation of the Leninist model of the state. It [could] also be perceived as a refutation of the operative intellectual justification of the Leninist system - namely, the belief that the working class, acting alone [was] capable of serving its immediate material interests and incapable of anything beyond limited trade unionism.[12]

Although the "threshold of Soviet tolerance for developments in the PRL was relatively high"[13], the Soviet leadership grew increasingly nervous. Following Kania's re-election as First Secretary of the PZPR at the 9th Extraordinary Congress in July 1981 [14], Soviet media activity subsided for a few weeks. On June 5, 1981, the PZPR Central Committee received a letter from its Soviet counterpart (it was made public on September 17). In it the Polish leadership was accused of losing control over the mass media and failing to oppose the enemies of socialism. This, the letter continued, resulted in a wave of anti-communism and anti-sovietism. At the time, Kania's standing with the Soviet leaders was very low and all indications were that he would soon be replaced. Amid rumours of imminent direct Soviet military

intervention, changes within the Party hierarchy were implemented and General Jaruzelski found himself at the head of the PZPR. Following the first (and last) Solidarity Congress in the Autumn of 1981, the internal situation grew worse, due in part to the authorities' bad will in their negotiations with the trade unions, and in part to the growing dissension and lack of unity among the Solidarity leadership. Impeded by its growing inability to absorb the huge growth in membership, as well the failure to politically socialize its expanding membership (I mean here the failure by the Solidarity leadership to clearly define a concrete socio-political programme understood and acted upon by the workers), the trade union soon became prey to personality conflicts. Jaruzelski, already pressed by Moscow to redress the situation, was further pressurized into action by Solidarity's National Committee ultimatum, threatening to call for a national referendum. In it, the public would have been asked to decide whether the communist government should be replaced by a provisional one unless the regime acceded to its demands for free local elections or not, to give its opinion on a proposal for union-state management of the economy and the drawing of new pro-trade union laws to be passed by the end of the year. External and internal pressures combined to hasten the impending climax.

1981-1983. On December 13, 1981, a state of war was declared throughout the country. The question whether, and in what manner, an independent working class movement could be integrated within the social and political structure of state socialism, had finally been answered. During the 17 months of the duration of martial law, the military régime proceeded to ban all 'illegal' independent organizations and implement the foundations for a return to socialist

normality. While repression dealt expediently but not entirely effectively with Polish society, Jaruzelski used every opportunity to reassure his 'fraternal allies' that the situation was now under control. The Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) toiled to re-assert control by the authorities and supervised a thorough crackdown on Solidarity and all other forms of opposition. At the same time, the economic situation remained unchanged and despite initial aid from the CMEA countries, the PRL was forced to try to renew its contacts with the West, primarily in order to obtain the necessary credits vital for its development as well as for repaying a steadily growing debt. Its hard-currency foreign debt was now reaching phenomenal heights with a total debt of $ 28.77 billion ($ 15.5 billion to banks). It owed some $ 23 billion in long- and medium-term to Western countries.[15] The military solution further excluded any rapid improvement in this sphere. Naturally the martial law episode had isolated the country on the international arena and increased thereby its dependence, economic and political, on the Soviet Union.

1983-1987. With the lifting of martial law, little changed. It wasn't until the summer of 1984 that the first signs of a thaw in PRL-West relations appeared. Even so, the catastrophic state of the economy remained unchanged as the external debt continued rising, with Warsaw even unable to pay the interest on the principal. Numerous re-scheduling agreements were passed with Western banks and governments, but with apparent insignificant influence on the overall state of the Polish economy. Domestic reforms of the economy have failed to be decisive, partly because of the authorities' apprehension in elaborating too drastic measures susceptible of causing domestic unrest, partly because of the very limited scope of the reforms

themselves. While oppositional activity has continued underground on a comparatively large scale considering the difficult conditions created by martial law, its effects remained limited. One has to wait until 1987 to see the 'opposition' attaining new heights of real influence and action. The enthusiasm and commitment of the 1980s has been replaced by a greater degree of political apathy within the Polish society. This period of reduced activity, however, came to an end most significantly in May 1988 with important industrial unrest in some major Polish cities. Again in the Autumn of 1988 new strikes shook the country. The most immediate effect has been the wholesale removal of the entire Polish cabinet later in the year. The extent of the Summer and Autumn 1988 troubles, though important as they were, was far from resembling the 1980 events. A lot had changed since December 1981. This time much of the credit went to young workers, the so-called post-Solidarity generation. As such they expressed the impatience of a part of society which had become somewhat disillusioned with the efforts of compromise by the Solidarity leadership and best illustrated by Wałęsa's attitude in his contacts with the authorities. At the same time, they forced the authorities into altering their stand against the 'opposition'. The moral bankruptcy of the Jaruzelski régime and its inability to improve the situation, together with the general apathy, had resulted in a stagnant situation between the ruling establishment and the population. For the régime, inability and uncertainty in implementing long-needed reforms have stalled hopes for a rapid improvement. Further, there remains the crucial question as to how far it can pursue a policy of compromise with the people without endangering its own existence. The imposition of martial law had been one of a series of devastating blows to the Party's credibility in the 1980s. That changes have to be implemented became evident, for society

as well as for the PZPR. By the beginning of 1989, it looked as if the régime had finally accepted that it had to come to a compromise with those forces traditionally opposed to its policies. In an unprecedented way, on February 6, 1989, there opened in Warsaw a 'Round Table', where representatives of practically all sides in the Polish society met to discuss ways of co-operating to solve the PRL's outstanding problems. The re-legalization/legalization of Solidarity once again, after several years of 'illegality', was on the agenda.

Developments in the neighbouring Soviet Union have had much to do with the PRL's domestic and foreign affairs. With the arrival of the Gorbachev team in the Soviet Union, there seems to have developed a greater degree of initiative within nearly the whole of the socialist bloc. Gradually the East Central European leaderships are being rejuvenated and a new breed of leaders emerging. Their ability and margin of manoeuvre will still, to a large extent, be shaped by developments in the USSR. Already there are signs that the Gorbachev card is also being played in Hungary. For Jaruzelski, the Soviet 'new thinking' has been both an asset and a burden. It had given him greater possibilities for independent action and for the pursuing of the Polish 'renewal', with the support of Gorbachev. At the same time, it has put pressure on him to pursue a policy of constructive dialogue with those very forces which, not long ago, he was sending to internment camps. The arrival of Gorbachev and his increasing denunciations of the Stalinist era, has also further contributed to erode the Polish régime's capital of what it can give to appease Polish society. Despite all this, it seems that in the second half of the 1980s, the PRL had finally regained its place as the number two in the socialist bloc. This was amply evidenced recently, in July 1988,

when Gorbachev paid his first official Party-state visit to the PRL. Then the Soviet leader said of his Polish colleague that he was 'a great friend'. He envied the Poles for having "at this difficult stage for Poland a man of great moral capacity, enormous intellectual capabilities, who loves this land, a great internationalist".[16] The relations between the two countries had witnessed a turning point with the signing, in April 1985, of a Polish-Soviet treaty of co-operation on cultural matters. The concern of both parties to clarify some aspects of their joint history, was seen as heralding a new era of Polish-Soviet relations. It remains to be seen how far this will be the case. With the failure of a first economic reform, the apparent ineffectiveness of a second, and the irrelevance of a 'stage of consolidation', the Polish economy remains in shambles. A resumption of normal contacts with the West in 1987 may give the General some short-term help, but in the long-run, he will need a lot more than just Western credits to pull his country out of the catastrophic situation in which it finds itself presently.

2.2 *Some remarks.*

Each period mentioned above can be characterized by three definite sets of interrelationships:[17]

1. *Domestic and Foreign Policy.* While it is obvious that in any sizable state, the external and internal policy processes are interwoven to different degrees, the case of the PRL shows a very clear and mutually dependent relation between the two. The domestic policies of the 1970s relied heavily upon a fundamental foreign policy re-orientation to the West. In the 1980s, the impact of Polish foreign objectives and constraints had a direct effect on the internal policies of the country. The dominant presence of neighbouring Soviet

Union has always ensured that Polish policy-making has thrived to respect Moscow's wishes and interests. But when interests for the two countries rejoined, the PRL showed definite signs of pursuing a Polish policy as opposed to a Soviet one. The direct effect of this has been used by the authorities predominantly for internal purposes.

2. *Economic and Political Interests.* For a centrally planned economy like the PRL's, 'economic successes' are of a vital political importance for the leadership. The more successful the leadership is, the more will its legitimacy be accepted. The crisis in the PRL in 1980/81 clearly showed this: it wasn't purely an economic one but also a political crisis. It had its roots in a gradual de-politicization of the Polish society prior to 1980 and a re-orientation of the Polish people towards a consumer-type society. Alongside this, there was also a deep crisis of confidence between the people and the ruling élite. The PZPR not only failed to win over the populace by dialogue and consensus but also failed to bridge the growing gap between the rank and file and the party rulers. In the PRL, and indeed in every Soviet-type political system, the pursuit of legitimacy plays a major part in governmental planning. A certain degree of economic success ensures stability at home and creates an environment where the Party's leadership is less likely to be challenged. In more recent years, and especially since the Solidarity events, political and ideological arguments have fallen on deaf ears with the result that the régime, in spite of itself, has found itself compelled to deliver the economic goods if it hoped to regain popular confidence. Naturally this has remained a very difficult task and all the signs point to its ineffectiveness. Amid the catastrophic economic situation, only drastic improvements in everyday life will bridge the gulf separating

the rulers from the ruled. However, with the evolution in the population's consciousness and its distrust of the ruling élite, political gains will be extremely hard to achieve, even if economic improvements arise.

3. *Western and Eastern-oriented policy-making.* The PRL belongs to the socialist bloc. This reality ensures that the nature of its policy objectives can never fully be discussed without a consideration of Soviet interests. The nature of the régimes is similar in both countries and their relations resemble that between a vassal state and a centralized autocracy. In such circumstances, the PRL's main attention will predominantly be focused toward the East. However, by its very position and historical traditions, Socialist Poland cannot ignore the proximity of Western Europe. Culturally Warsaw is closer to Paris than it is to Moscow. This has meant that in many respects, the PRL stands astride East and West, being psychologically close to the West and physically attached to the Soviet empire. Thus the PRL has repeatedly sought to balance its objectives between East and West. On the one hand, careful not to upset Moscow, the PRL has attempted to keep and expand ties with capitalist countries while stressing its loyalty to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Polish efforts to retain continued Soviet support for its policies and the desire to occupy the coveted place of 'number two' in the bloc, have been balanced by a careful handling of PRL-West links. This Western and Eastern-oriented characteristic of the PRL's policy-making was best encapsulated by a respondent to the *Doświadczenie i Przyszłość* (DiP - Experience and Future) discussion group, who said that,

> Poland cannot afford to cut its ties with either side (East/West). The ties to the East cannot and must not be broken. The same applies to our bonds to the West. The first split would upset the European balance of power and would have catastrophic political consequences. The second would contradict the whole of Polish cultural tradition and Polish

> history: it would strike at Poland's national identity, leading to serious social upheaval. It would also be harmful to Poland's economy. We therefore have to maintain a specific form of equilibrium that distinguishes us from some of our political partners, but in no way threatens them.[18]

2.3 *The Polish Catholic Church: the background.*

One of the most important actors on the Polish scene is undoubtedly the Church. It may therefore be useful at this stage to peer into a short historical account of its role in the PRL. Although this will not have the pretension of being a complete picture, it nonetheless should give part of the essential background needed to fully analyse the period under consideration.

In 1926, Roman Dmowski, the founder of the National Democratic Movement and Józef Piłsudski's lifelong rival and detractor, made the following remark:

> Catholicism is not adjunct to Polishdom, merely colouring it in some special way, but is inherent in its very core and to a large extent constitutes its very essence. Any attempt to divide Catholicism and Polishdom, to separate the Nation from the religion and the Church, then, strikes at the very essence of our Nation.[19]

Nearly twenty years before the advent of communist rule in his country, Dmowski had identified a possible situation which materialized itself in the post-World War II period. Ever since the PRL's provisional government declared the 1925 Concordat null and void on September 12, 1945[20], Church-State relations in the PRL have been a long story of conflicts. Overall the new communist régime concentrated on three main areas in order to break the opponent it saw in the Polish Church: a) to cut off the Church's relations with Rome, b) to undermine the homogeneity of its clerical structure and lay organizations and c) to speed the secularisation of the PRL. Bearing this in mind, one may then identify in the post-war era three main

periods of Church-state relations up to the imposition of a state of war in December 1981: 1947-1956, 1956-1970 and 1970-1981. In the first period, the Church fought off attempts by the government to destroy it as an independent organization. The Church press was banned, its land confiscated. By 1953, several hundred priests and eight bishops had been arrested. The Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński was jailed. The Church managed to survive this onslaught and went on, in the second period, to resist successfully all government's efforts to circumscribe its religious and educational activities. In 1956, the Polish primate was released and the 1953 Church-state agreement which had given the authorities the right to appoint bishops was abolished. A new agreement was signed by which the state recognized the Church's right to administer its own affairs while the Church agreed to respect existing laws and regulations. Yet, the thaw in Church-state relations was ephemeral, and administrative pressure now replaced the terror which had been used to break the autonomy of the Church. In 1970, the new Party First Secretary, Edward Gierek, showed signs that he was prepared to 'normalize' relations with the Church although the tactics now used were aimed at bypassing the Polish hierarchy and establish links with the Vatican. In December 1977, the first meeting between the Pope and a PRL Party leader took place in the Vatican. Throughout this third period, the Church insisted on the unhindered exercise of religious rights and came to be the rallying point and defender of human rights activists.

In 1978, the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II radically altered the balance of power between the State and the Church. It is often said that the election of a Polish Pope and his subsequent visit to Poland in the summer of 1979 had an enormous

impact on and was even the catalyst to the rise of the independent trade union Solidarity. Undoubtedly, the prestige of the Polish Catholic Church was enormously enhanced and since the vast majority of future Solidarity members were practising catholics, the new Pope became their embodiment of hope and gave many the confidence required to lose their fear of the régime. For many Poles, centuries of humiliation and oppression had now been put right by the election of a Polish Pope. As Helena Szczepańska, who had looked after Karol Wojtyła as a baby, was reported to have said: "This is the reward for so many sufferings, deportation, massacres, all the indescribable torments of the twentieth century. We have been rewarded for not having lost hope".[21] The Pope's visit to his native Poland in June 1979 convinced the Polish people that they could organize the independent trade union: "it was precisely the experience of organizing the Pope's visit which became the psychological experience which facilitated the birth of Solidarity".[22] From then on, the Church found itself a new role in that of a mediator between the régime and the Polish people. It should be noted that the millions who gathered around the Pope during his first visit were not only believers. The visit was an opportunity for many to demonstrate their opposition to the régime and the totalitarian system as a whole as well as an occasion to display their immense pride in the fact that a Pole was the head of the Catholic Church. The Pope's election and visit also represented a milestone in the acceleration of the erosion of the Party power base which had by now well and truly lost 'the battle of souls'.

The unique position of the Polish Catholic Church in the socialist bloc has been the subject of admiration and incomprehension. Its existence and activity represents a factor of pluralism which seems

abnormal in a society which is submitted to Marxist-Leninist principles. The extent to which this apparent paradox is a reality is one of the main differences between the PRL and other Eastern Central European states. In a political system advocating atheism as the state religion, nearly 95% of its population have been baptized as Catholics (by 1978) and a 1983 census counted some 34½ million baptised Poles out of a population of 36½ million.[23] How has it been possible that despite attempts at destroying its influence, the way it was achieved in Czechoslovakia for instance, the Polish Church withstood all attacks against its autonomy and even reinforced its position as a major factor in the PRL's public and political life?[24] To study Poland and especially its more recent history it is essential to grasp the significance of the Church's role throughout the centuries. In Poland's history, the Catholic Church has traditionally come to represent resistance to foreign dominance and oppression by non-catholic powers (for instance, the 18th century partitions between protestant Prussia and orthodox Russia).[25] One is reminded here of Mickiewicz famous verse describing his country as *Polska Chrystusem Narodów* - the "Christ of Nations". As such, Catholicism soon became analogous to Polish patriotism and the Church the rallying point for all national sentiment. After the Second World War, the Polish Catholic Church emerged with its authority perhaps greater than ever. The Church had shared the sufferings imposed on the Polish nation and had itself lost more than 2500 members of its clergy.[26] Furthermore many priests had participated in the fight against the German invader and joined the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*).[27]

Although the Church's involvement in the country's public life was not new and reflected its traditional view of its role as the

spiritual and moral guardian of Poland's destiny, the Church's approach to social problems and issues has always been basically indirect until the establishment of the Solidarity trade union. Since the 1960s the Church has gradually assumed more and more the role of champion of human rights of all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliations.[28] In the past it had often refused to interfere in the political process conducted by other established institutions. However, with the advent of the 1980 social upheavals and the rise of Solidarity, it changed its methods of action and heavily contributed in the process of negotiations between the government and the workers. This represented a new and major development in the PRL's political life. Further, the growing dissent within the Polish population in the late 1970s and early 1980s found an echo in the values upheld by the Church which it came to regard as the only moral authority in the PRL.[29] This convergence of views had a tremendous impact on later developments and contributed to cement a formidable alliance against the authorities. It should be stressed that the Church's role was very much limited to that of advising and despite its probable sympathies, it took great care to avoid being identified with the independent unions in any political sense. Yet the signing of the Gdańsk agreements in 1980 had required a direct intervention on the part of the Polish primate: the authorities had agreed to the setting up of a three-men arbitration committee under Cardinal Wyszyński's authority in order to break the deadlock in the Gdańsk negotiations. This committee successfully influenced both Lech Wałęsa and the government negotiators.[30]

Under Stanisław Kania, the new Party First Secretary, an important development happened in Church-state relations: after an interruption

of 13 years the Joint Commission of the Government and the Episcopate resumed its work. Set up in December 1957, it had met only seven times before being discontinued by the authorities in January 1967. On the other hand during its short revival, it convened five times between September 1980 and March 1981. This reflected in part the régime's attempts to use the influence of the Catholic Church to persuade the workers' unions to moderate their demands. What was significant at the time was the shifting of the balance of power in the PRL. The Party's disintegration was creating an enormous political vacuum which the newly registered union (January 1981) eagerly began filling. As the strength and confidence of Solidarity grew, so did the polarization. The primate's efforts at calming his flock's excited spirits were becoming more and more difficult. In a new climate of almost unrestricted freedom of speech and publication, and the existence of a 10-million strong organized union, it was inevitable that the Church's role as the traditional refuge and sole basis for legal opposition should diminish. And the more this was the case the less would the Church have a direct influence on internal developments. Until the signing of the August Agreements in 1980, the Church's position and function had been exclusively defined in terms of its relationship with the state and the Party. It was now finding itself in a novel position, where the most important problems for the religious institution had been discussed, and in some cases solved by other social groups without the direct participation of Church officials. For the first time, the Church had ceased to be the sole representative of the interests of the whole nation in dealing with the Party.[31] The illness and subsequent death of the Polish primate (on May 28, 1981), coupled with the attempted assassination of the Pope in Rome (May 13)[32], contributed to erode some of the influence

the Church had been perceived to have had over the previous months.

Nonetheless, the Polish episcopate continued to pursue a policy of mediation between the PRL government and the independent trade unions. On November 4, 1981, a meeting took place between the new primate, Cardinal Glemp, General Jaruzelski and Lech Wałęsa. For the authorities this encounter served as an exchange of views on ways of of overcoming the crisis and the possibility of forming a Front of National Accord that would serve as a permanent forum for dialogue and consultations among political forces on the basis of the PRL's constitutional principles. While the Church hierarchy welcomed the meeting and attached great importance to it, it was careful to stress its own non-political involvement in the current crisis:

> The Church and the episcopate are not a political force. On the other hand they have a moral authority. It is for this reason that their representatives, by their participation in the meeting which concerns the whole nation, are fulfilling a special mission, not a political one. ... The whole of the Episcopate expresses the certainty that there will be national understanding, both in the form of finding a solution to concrete problems and in the creation of a new necessary structure, one which would make possible the concentration of all efforts by the citizens and would guarantee for the future, that misfortune will not repeat itself.[33]

The meeting achieved very little but was symbolically extraordinarily significant: by gathering Glemp, Jaruzelski and Wałęsa together it was consecrating the equal or at least comparable status of the Church, the Party and Solidarity in determining the future of the PRL's socio-political life. In a state where the omnipresence and 'leading role' of the Communist Party was supposed to be the norm, the November 1981 meeting was truly remarkable and reflected explicitly the institutional divisions within the country.

The last direct involvement of the Polish Church prior to the imposition of a state of war took form in the sending of separate but

related letters by Primate Glemp to all deputies of the Sejm, to General Jaruzelski, to Wałęsa and to the Independent Student Union on December 7. The primate appealed to the deputies to refrain from passing the recently proposed legislation giving the government extraordinary powers in dealing with social problems. Such a law, he argued, would make it possible to restrict civil rights (including the right to strike) and would undermine the unity of the nation. The letter to Jaruzelski contained a call for the continuation of the trilateral talk on ways of finding solutions to the current crisis. Glemp again stressed the need for a dialogue between Solidarity and the régime in his letter to Wałęsa. Finally he appealed to the Students' Union to end protests at universities and colleges, for the sake of preserving the accomplishments achieved by the union in defending justice and freedom for science and research.[34]

The picture of Lech Wałęsa wearing on his lapel a reproduction of the celebrated Black Madonna of Częstochowa or his use of an oversized pen bearing the image of John Paul II when he signed the August agreements, bore witness to the importance the leader of the independent trade unions attached to the Catholic faith. Throughout the '500 days', evidence was abounding of the Polish Catholic Church's influence and presence during this crucial period. The Church's role as a mediator was accepted by everyone, Solidarity activists and Party members alike, yet the momentum gained by the unionists soon overshadowed the importance and traditional function of the Polish Church. While Primate Glemp did make attempts to convince the authorities and Solidarity of the necessity for a dialogue, his own contribution was often muffled by the clamour of competing interests and viewpoints. The apparent regression of the Church's authority,

especially since the summer of 1981, explained perhaps partly by the new primate's rather uncharismatic stand (to follow into Cardinal Wyszyński's footsteps was not an easy task), must have been somewhat worrying for the Church hierarchy. At the same time, the Church's own experience throughout the centuries had amply demonstrated the old English adage of 'wait and see'. As the recognised moral guardian of the nation, the Polish Church's traditional posture had always emphasized the necessity for outliving all potential dangers to its homogeneity and slowly but surely strive for gains and hold on to them. From the beginning, it had consistently called for patience and restraint and although the Church did gain substantial benefits as a result of Solidarity's pressure (the inclusion in the Gdańsk Agreements for a live broadcast of the mass on the national radio network is one good example) it sought to limit its own contribution to the political turmoil of the times. Inevitably involved, the Church sought to portray itself as a neutral actor and while this may have resulted in its losing some of its authority and influence to the advantage of Solidarity, the new force in the PRL's life, subsequent events confirmed that while social movements may come and go, the Polish Catholic Church remains an immutable factor in the society's destiny.

2.4 *Tertium non datur.*

As Sun Tzu once said, "all warfare is based on deception".[35] The road to the imposition of martial law by the Polish military was a well-orchestrated process which took practically everyone by surprise. Deceived in expecting a Warsaw Pact intervention, the West looked on helplessly as Polish tanks rolled through Polish streets. The Polish 'opposition' left itself wide open to the military's round-up that

preceded the announcement that a state of war had been declared in the PRL. For the authorities, apart from from a few mishaps, the operation was swiftly conducted with a minimum of casualties. By then the options left to Jaruzelski had been reduced to a choice between having someone cleaning his house or doing it himself. He chose the Polish solution to a Polish problem. As he confided in an interview, this had been his most difficult decision as a mature man and soldier:

> It was a very dramatic decision. But the further we are removed from this date, the more I am certain that it was a necessary and correct decision. Poland was threatened with a catastrophe. It could have set all of Europe or maybe even the whole world on fire.[36]

By Autumn 1981, all the signs seemed to converging in one direction, namely, that a climax to the Polish experiment in trade union democracy was in the making. Relations between Solidarity and the authorities were growing worse by the day with rising fears of an imminent confrontation.

On November 27, 1981, the last Central Committee plenum sat before the dramatic turn of events of December.[37] It did not meet again for another three months, not until February 1982. The VIth KC Plenum was meeting amidst a continuing deteriorating domestic situation. Even the Party was not left unruffled by the turn of events, with reported disagreement occurring within its ranks opposing the 'hardliners', led by Olszowski, and the 'moderates' headed by Jaruzelski. No agreements between the authorities and the independent trade unions were being foreseen either. In fact the ruling élite appeared to be deliberately dragging its feet, perhaps a conscious move to resist the further erosion of its power and control over society and a reflection of its increasing inability to formulate a coherent policy in the face of seemingly unsolvable problems. The summer of 1981 had been a landmark

in this respect: not only did it consecrate the extraordinary success of the Solidarity movement, but it also testified to the organizational collapse and the morale degeneration of the Polish Communist Party whose hold over the primacy and monopoly of power had been seriously compromised. It is true that more than a month after the Solidarity Congress, rifts among the union leadership were also surfacing and this had the effect of weakening the movement's unity.[38] Nonetheless, the whole period was characterized by the apparent helplessness of the Party apparatus to come to terms with the overall situation.[39]

Replacing Stanisław Kania by General Wojciech Jaruzelski as the new head of the PZPR during the October plenum (16th-18th), changed little. However, evidence that the situation was edging towards a climax was demonstrated by some of the actions taken by Jaruzelski only a few days after his nomination (by that time he was combining the three most important positions in the country: First Secretary, Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, historically an unparalleled attribution of power for an Eastern Central European leader). His appointment to the premiership in February 1981 can be said to have marked the beginning of the military's ascendancy in the PRL's politics, culminating in the establishment of its almost total domination of the policy-making and society in the course of 1981. Throughout the months which preceded the imposition of the state of war, the military gradually took over functions traditionally reserved for the Party. On October 23, Operational Army Groups or TGOs were being dispatched to over 200 communes and rural towns, ostensibly to check up on food distribution and assist the local authorities in maintaining public order. As subsequent developments testified, these

measures were implemented largely as a preliminary step in preparing the ground for a military take-over. The deployment of these army groups was primarily an action to desensitise the population to military actions in general and also a method of gauging public reaction to them. According to a bulletin from the Information Bureau of Solidarity, on September 30, 1981, A. Siwak, a Politburo member, informed those present at a meeting of a Party branch union in Krosno that a six-man Committee of National Salvation had been set up and was headed by Jaruzelski and General Kiszczak. It was also mentioned that special units of the army and the militia had been assigned the task of suppressing expected popular resistance. The Polish leadership would wait another two months before using these forces, until popular support for Solidarity had weakened enough to ensure the success of the operation.[40]

The operation was repeated the next month, but this time it took place in all major towns and voivodeships. While the authorities were clearly engaging in such moves as a prelude to the implementation of a state of war, their actions and intentions appeared to have been carefully disguised behind what has been described as "a facade of co-operative intent".[41] If one rightly assumes that the decision to impose a state of war had been taken months before its actual implementation, then it becomes quite apparent that the régime carefully prepared its final move against Solidarity, both on the domestic and the international level. The first signs of this strategy appeared when, on October 30, 1981, General Jaruzelski proposed the broadening of the National Unity Front. As Thomas Cynkin writes, "this represented the initiation of a deliberate policy of deception on the part of Jaruzelski, with the connivance of the Soviet leaders, to lull

Solidarity and the West into a false sense of complacency as a counterpart to the plans the Party was meanwhile hatching towards the implementation of martial law".[42]

This policy of deception was expanded when on November 4, 1981, in an unprecedented meeting, General Jaruzelski, Archbishop Glemp and Lech Wałęsa agreed to discuss the October proposals. The meeting alone was enough to fuel rumours of an impending settlement. On November 10, the PRL formally applied to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. There was an economic rationale behind this application: by adhering to the IMF, the PRL wanted to utilize its financial resources in order to reduce the shortage of credits necessary for the functioning of the economy. It also hoped to use the prestige and the IMF advice to implement its new economic policy. Socialist Poland would be particularly interested in receiving credits from the IMF since they represented financial aid at the time unavailable on the capital markets. The costs of the credits would be less than those of commercial banks. It was also hoped that the PRL's membership in the IMF would enable it to participate in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] and benefit from sources of credits, even long-term ones in the field of investments, and particularly in agriculture.[43] But the application to join the World Bank was less understandable since the PRL would not be able to qualify for loans under this organization as its GNP *per capita* exceeded the maximum limit fixed by the World Bank. What was here significant related to the historical Soviet opposition to such moves by its socialist allies, effectively *de facto* vetoing any attempts by the Eastern Central European Countries to involve themselves as members of Western economic organizations (Romania being

the exception). However, in 1981, this reticence seemed to have been waived, or at least this was the impression given. IMF membership for the PRL required the authorities to reveal data normally considered to be state secrets: central bank reserves accounts, monetary flows and so on. It would also indirectly encourage a Western orientation of the economy. Seen by the West, such a move might have been interpreted as a genuine effort to resolve the Polish crisis in a manner highly favourable to the governments and banks concerned. However, the fact that negotiations for the PRL's entry in IMF were expected to last several months, and would surely be interrupted by the imposition of a state of war in the PRL, cast doubts as to whether this was not simply a way for the PRL's authorities to mislead the international community as to the course the crisis was taking. Nothing revealed more the extent to which this was successful than the American agreement on a $ 100 million package for the PRL by the Commodity Credit Corporation *two days before the imposition of a state of war*![44]

The VIth Plenum also gave some indication that the Jaruzelski leadership was now seriously considering the military option. The following excerpts from Jaruzelski's final speech at the plenum clearly pointed this out:

> Let all those who dream of a Poland without Socialism, without the Party, know that the Party is an organic and unshakeable part of the working collective, its ideological and political vanguard. This is how it has been and how it will be. ... There are only two ways for Poland and the Poles, ..., one leads straight to doom through further strikes, tension, chaos, anarchy and lawlessness: through destroying the country, with ever worse living conditions for millions of people, through smashing respect for social order, kindling psychoses, hatred and aggression. That road ends in confrontation. ... The second road will lead gradually to overcoming the crisis. ... This is the way of national accord. ... The process of disintegration must be stopped. Otherwise it should inevitably lead to confrontation, to *a state of an emergency-type (Do stanu typu wojennego)*. At the same time it is necessary, in line with the resolution of today's plenary meeting to give an appropriate course to the draft of the law "on Emergency

Measures of Action in the Interest of Protecting the Citizens and the State.[45] (My italics)

It should be noted that this threat was not the first of its kind. During the night of March 29-30, 1981, a government emissary was sent to Cardinal Wyszyński with the warning that in the event of the general strike planned for the 31st not being called off by midnight on the 30th, the Council of State would proclaim martial law.[45] More recently, in an interview for the Paris monthly *Kultura* by Colonel Ryszard Kukliński who defected in early November 1981, it was learned that the idea of martial law had been first enunciated on August 24, 1980. According to him, the first Soviet reconnaissance groups entered the PRL on February 14, 1981, followed on March 27 by the arrival of a further 30 KGB functionaries specialized in defence and planning matters.[46] A study of Soviet decision-making concerning the Polish crisis showed that the USSR had undertaken the costly preparatory process for intervention twice prior to the imposition of martial law, once in December 1980 and again in March 1981. In deciding what do to in the PRL, according to this analysis, the Kremlin leaders were guided more by calculations about their own particular interests - that is by power relations within the Politburo - than by considerations of internal repercussions arising from their actions. The most telling evidence of conflict in the Politburo over the military intervention in the PRL was the thorough reshuffle of the Soviet Ground Forces High Command which took place in December 1980 and January 1981. From Brezhnev's point of view, allowing the Polish reform movement to go on for a time, was, at the time, preferable to intervention.[47] With hindsight many other signs showed that the Polish authorities had also taken early steps with a view to a confrontation: the military call up period was lengthened for those who were due to

finish in the autumn of 1981; a large proportion of the military units that were later to be used as support groups for the police in their dealings with the Solidarity movement and the striking workers were moved to isolated camps; the separation, into special units, of those conscripts of the 1981 call up who had membership of the free trade unions.

In fact, the closer we approach the actual declaration of a state of war, the more alarmist became the official line. On November 28, 1981, speaking on Warsaw television, Marian Wozniak, Central Committee Secretary, said that,

> Social unrest is being unceasingly fanned. Strikes are being organized and continued. This already constitutes *a direct threat to the existence of the state.* Forces hostile to Socialism, acting to the detriment of the real interests of the working people and of the state, are embarking on further actions with the aim of blocking and sabotaging the government's efforts and delaying the implementation of the anti-crisis programme.[48] (My italics)

The same day the chairman of the government planning commission, Zbigniew Madej, speaking a couple of hours later on Polish radio, showed how much the possibility of a state of war was being discussed by the leadership:

> If the economy is anarchized to such an extent that *we have to resort to confrontation based on force, then we will have to resort to this.* But no-one will resort to it of his own free will because *a war economy is also a decaying economy* as many of us know from experience. Consequently a *war economy* cannot be salvation for ever. *A war economy might be a necessity, a periodic necessity,* but when all is said and done, one must try to make sure that an economy flourishes.[49] (My italics)

The VIth KC Plenum's final resolution stressed the overriding theme which prevailed throughout the session, namely that the continuing unrest was presenting a direct threat to the Polish nation. The veiled references to the eventuality of a Soviet invasion, probably under the cover of a Warsaw Pact intervention, were legion at this time. Yet,

and however real this possibility was (the massive naval and military manoeuvres in the Baltic - ZAPAD-81 - lasting 9 days at the beginning of September 1981, was seen as a preparation for what might be), the nation tended to regard this threat as more of a propagandist exercise on the part of the authorities to frighten it into submission. This does not mean that the Solidarity leadership had no consciousness of this danger. On the contrary, this was even the subject of bitter discussions among the leaders of the union who were often divided as to the correct position to adopt on this matter. While Wałęsa and the moderates within Solidarity tried to pin the discussion down to matters concerning the union and the Gdańsk Agreements, many of the delegates, disillusioned by the government's bad faith, kept raising issues which went beyond these confines. One of the documents in the final resolution of the Union's Congress in October 1981 was a message to the workers of Eastern Europe which spurred a vilifying campaign from the PRL's allies in the Soviet bloc, with the Soviet Union claiming that the Congress had been "an anti-socialist and anti-Soviet orgy". It is believed that the presence of this text in the final resolution was the result of intensive debating at the Congress, with the more extremist members of Solidarity insisting and obtaining its inclusion in the final draft.[50] While Solidarity was mindful of the Czech and the Hungarian precedents, the possibility of outside intervention would have represented the end of everything it had managed to achieve in the last few months and as such had to be ignored, at least on the surface, for fear of constraining even further its scope and decisiveness of action. It must be also added that the Solidarity leadership's current perceptions of world affairs were giving them some indication that any Soviet invasion was unlikely or at least highly debatable for the Kremlin: international pressure

might be a strong deterrent for the Soviet Union against intervention, especially since it was already heavily involved in Afghanistan; the presence of a Polish Pope in Rome and the military involvement of the Red Army whose battle against the mujahedins appeared to be turning into a Soviet Vietnam, further contributed in giving Solidarity its apparent sense of over-confidence. Indeed, apart from the Politburo in-fighting mentioned above, there were numerous additional factors which contributed to Moscow's relative passivity towards the PRL, especially during the two months preceding the imposition of a state of war: a) there were Soviet worries about the military success of the operation and uncertainties about the reliability of the Polish armed forces; b) there seemed to be an absence of any new ideas among the Soviet leadership as to what to do: "The most striking conclusion to draw from Poland was that the Soviet Union was not any better prepared for the Polish crisis than was the Polish government or the West";[51] c) there was the question of the economic and logistics burden of a military intervention. If an invasion of Czechoslovakia had required a combined WTO force approaching some half a million soldiers, and considering that resistance had been minimal, then Soviet military planners considering the PRL, with twice the territory and almost double the population, had to envisage the use of a force of even greater dimensions. the more so since all the signs showed that determined resistance was likely to greet the intervention; d) diplomatic and strategic considerations on the international level, particularly with the US as there was the need for the Kremlin leaders to turn their attention to relations with Western Europe in view of Brezhnev's impending visit to Bonn (November 22-25) and to the resumption of US-Soviet arms limitation talks in Geneva (November 30). An invasion might also have strengthened NATO's unity on the Pershing

Missiles issue. There was also some concern that a WTO intervention would encounter Chinese opposition and reinforce the growing links between the Carter administration and the PRC. e) the influence of the Polish Catholic Church and the Vatican. Moscow was conscious that the Church might induce fierce resistance against an intervention, while the Vatican might well have encouraged the Church to take sides in the resulting conflict. The Pope had even allegedly intended to fly to his homeland in the case of an invasion.[52]

At the end of the VIth KC Plenum, the final resolution recognized the need to equip the government with full powers and asked the Party members of the Sejm to seek a bill on this matter. These powers would include the banning of all strikes, of all gatherings except religious services, the transfer of civil court cases to military tribunals, the suspension of some censorship laws deemed too lenient and the tightening of restrictions on telecommunications and international travel. Already the day before, the TGOs had been removed from the countryside and dispatched to all major cities, one further step towards the impending climax. As if to confirm the firmness of tone expressed throughout the plenum, the authorities were soon able to test their resolute attitude by conducting what became a warm-up operation prior to the imposition of a state of war. On December 2, a combined force of army and ZOMO units (a special branch of the police used in crowd control) stormed the Warsaw Firemen's Academy. It had been occupied since November 18 by students demanding that their school be attached to the Ministry of Education rather than to the Interior Ministry. The action was an operational success for the authorities and was significant on two major accounts. In the first instance, and this would be of great importance in view of later

events, it had showed that the riot police and the army could co-operate successfully and that a politically sensitive objective could be cleared with minimum violence and more significantly without provoking social unrest. Secondly, by causing the angered reaction from the Solidarity leadership and their understandable yet ill-tempered statements at the Radom meeting of the union's presidium the next day, the military authorities were later able to justify their 'well-founded' decision to impose a state of war. What was surprising was the marked contrast to the spontaneous unrest which had been triggered in March by the Bydgoszcz incident. In December 1981, the public's reaction was low-key in comparison. For the authorities it indicated that a more passive national mood was prevailing at the time and that there seemed to be a growing resignation to their use of force. Answering questions in an interview conducted by Oriana Fallaci, Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczysław Rakowski described the Radom Conference as the turning point:

> The momentus of rupture was Radom, not before, when the Solidarity Congress had asked for free administrative elections, etc. Radom simply scared us. Because Radom was not only words.[53]

On December 7, the authorities released an edited recording of the Radom Conference which suggested that the union leaders were bent on bringing about radical changes in the PRL using, if necessary, violence to attain these aims. In their efforts to discredit their leaders and divide the Solidarity rank and file, the authorities tried to make capital use of these tapes, laying in the process the groundwork for the crackdown of December 13.[54] In his autobiography, Lech Wałęsa explained the unfortunate tone of the Radom meeting as unavoidable:

> We had no chance of escaping martial law. Not one. Its imposition had been prepared ages ago; all that was needed was a good excuse to install it. Whatever we might have

> done, they were going to declare it, but they still needed to make us responsible. Therefore I chose the following variant: At Radom I became the most radical of all radicals, I let myself be carried by the atmosphere in the room so as not to be excluded from future events. Probably, I would not have been interned had I not pronounced that speech.[55]

Solidarity's '500 days' came to a brutal close ten days later. An extraordinary period in Polish contemporary history ended when General Jaruzelski imposed military rule over the country. It signified that the independent trade union had partly failed to achieve its aims (while 'material defeat' was inevitable, it may be argued that in many respects the 'Solidarity experience' had been a spiritual success). This was partly because it had underestimated the ruling apparatus' ability to respond to the deteriorating situation and partly because it had overestimated its own possibilities of manoeuvre. The organisation had failed to develop constructive and partial approaches to ensure concrete remedial measures to the Polish crisis. A conflict soon arose between those advocating a compromising attitude towards the authorities and those proclaiming such attempts as weaknesses on the part of the union. By overrating its own political position the union made a fundamental error of judgement when it came to the perceived capabilities of the armed forces. Despite the remarkable but short-term achievements of the Solidarity movement, the inexorable logic of *Realpolitik* saw to it that this would only be an ephemeral experiment. In retrospect, however, one can say that the one significant result of the Solidarity era has been to change the political awareness of the Polish society, a far cry from the initial victory aspired to, but nevertheless a significant enough achievement for Poles. It is often said that Solidarity won a moral victory even if it was defeated politically:

> Since the first Gdańsk Agreements, the Party won a political battle but lost a moral one. On the other hand, Solidarity achieved a moral victory though it lost the political

> battle. From this war no-one came out the winner: the victors are the subject of a quasi-universal reprobation, and the vanquished are entering through the main door in the world of human fraternity.[56]

Adam Michnik described the Solidarity events as the landmark signalling the beginning of the destruction of the communist system. He also pointed out that one of the greatest achievements of Solidarity had been "to educate our communists".[57] Writing in February 1982, he summed up the situation in an admirably simple, yet accurate, way:

> Solidarność knew how to strike but not how to be patient; it knew how to attack head-on but not how to retreat; it had general ideas but not a programme for short-term actions. It was a colossus with legs of steel and hands of clay: it was powerful among factory crews but powerless at the negotiating table. Across the table sat a partner who could not be truthful, run an economy, or keep its word - who could do but one thing: break up social solidarity. This partner had mastered that art in its thirty-seven years of rule. This partner - the power élite - was morally and financially bankrupt, and because of its political frailty was unable to practise politics of any type. Solidarność took this political weakness for overall weakness, forgetting that the apparatus of coercion which has not been affected by democratic corrosion can be an effective instrument in the hands of a dictatorship that is being hounded. The Polish communist system was a colossus with legs of clay and hands of steel.[58]

Clearly passion had come to replace reason (the Solidarity Congress was the catalyst) and when the PRL's political leaders found themselves with their backs against the 'Soviet wall', they acted decisively, perhaps for the first time since August 1980: either they did nothing and their fate would be sealed by the 'fraternal assistance', or they decided to deal with the crisis themselves. For the Polish leadership, the choice stopped there. They put into action the vast means of repression at their disposal and embarked upon an historical act which the Polish nation will remember as the 'War'.

Chapter 2 Notes.

1. Kazimierz Brandys, *A Warsaw Diary 1978-1981*, London, Chattos & Windus, 1984, p. 147.
2. Adam Bromke, 'Poland under Gierek. A new political style', *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1972, pp. 1-19.
3. Karl E. Birnbaum, *The Politics of East-West Communication in Europe*, Saxon House, 1979, particularly pp. 45-59.
4. *Raporty dla Edwarda Gierka*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa, 1988.
5. *Polska 1985, Spojrzenie na Gospodarkę*, Libertas, London, 1986, p. 43.
6. Sarah M. Terry, 'The implication of interdependence for Soviet-East European relations: a preliminary study of the Polish case', in R.H. Linden, *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe: New Approaches*, Praeger, 1980, pp. 187-266.
7. Jadwiga Staniszkis, 'The evolution of forms of working-class protest in Poland: sociological reflections on the Gdańsk-Szczecin case, August 1980', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, April 1981, p. 204.
8. Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR. Workers' Defence Committee in Poland 1976-1981*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985.
9. Adam Zamoyski, *The Polish Way*, London, John Murray, 1987, pp. 389.
10. *Protokoły Porozumień Gdańsk, Szczecin, Jastrzębie. Statut NSZZ "Solidarność"*, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, Warszawa, 1981.
11. *The Book of Lech Wałęsa, A Collective Portrait by Solidarity Members and critics*, Allen Lane, London, 1982, pp. 196-197.
12. Roman Laba, 'Worker roots of Solidarity', *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1986, p. 47.
13. Seweryn Bialer, 'Poland and the Soviet Empirium', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1980, p.536. Also, Charles Gati, 'The Soviet Stake in Europe. Russia at the crossroads: the 26th CPSU Congress', in S. Bialer and T. Gustafon eds., London, George Allen and Unwin, Rand Corporation, 1982, pp. 178-191.
14. This Congress was unprecedented in communist annals; delegates to the session were elected democratically and the Congress itself elected the PZPR leadership through secret ballots. What more, 90% of the old KC failed to be re-elected.
15. *The Economist*, 13 February 1982, p. 13.
16. *Libération*, 16-17/7/1988.
17. The following is based partly on the distinctions made by Roger E. Kanet, 'Poland, the Socialist Community, and East-West relations', in Simon M.D & Kanet, *Background to Crisis: Policy and Process in Gierek's Poland*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1981, pp .371-401.
18. *Poland. The State of the Republic. Two Reports by the Experience and Future Discussion Group (DiP)*, Pluto Press, Michael Vale ed., London, 1981, p. 111.
19. Roman Dmowski, *Kościół, Narod i Państwo*, 1926; extracts translated in Adam Bromke's *The meaning and uses of Polish history*, Boulder East European Monographs, No. 212, Boulder, 1987.
20. Diplomatic relations between Poland and the Vatican were established on February 10, 1925, after a Concordat had been signed between the Holy See and the Polish government.
21. Quoted in *The Pope from Poland: An Assessment*, The Sunday Times, Collins, London, 1980.
22. Ronald C. Monticone, *The Catholic Church in Communist Poland, 1945-1985*, East European Monographs, Boulder, Columbia University

Press, New York, 1986.

23. *Histoire Religieuse de la Pologne*, under the direction of Jerzy Kłoczowski, Le Centurion, Paris, 1987, p. 530.
24. Even more revealing, especially since the figures come from an official poll, 62% of PZPR members declared in 1987 to adhere to the Catholic faith, and 82% to be sending their children to religious classes; *Le Point*, No. 821, 13 June 1988, p. 76.
25. *Histoire Religieuse...*, *op cit.*, p. 477.
26. On the role played by priests during the Second World War see, Stanisław Podlewski, *Wierni Bogu i Ojczyźnie*, Instytut Prasy i Wydawnistwo. Novum, Warszawa, 1982.
27. For an extensive discussion of the evolution in the Church's position on human rights, see Adam Michnik, *Kosciół, Lewica, Dialog*, Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1977.
28. This view is not new of course, but this perception was greatly enhanced in the late 1970s.
29. Hansjakob Stehle, 'Church and Pope in the Polish Crisis', *World Today*, Vol. 32, April 1982, p. 141.
30. See on this point and for an excellent overview of the Catholic Church's role in contemporary Poland, Bogdan Szajkowski's *Next to God...Poland*, Frances Pinter, London, 1983.
31. For the majority of Poles, apart from the distress at the news of the assassination attempt, few doubted the role of the Soviet Union in this affair, which to this day has still not been really clarified. For a detailed account behind the would-be assassin's motives, see Claire Sterling's *Time of the assassins*, London, Sydney, Melbourne, Angus & Robertson Publishers, 1984.
32. Communiqué after the 181st Polish Episcopate Conference, November 26, 1981; *Biuro Prasowe Episkopatu Polski* (thereafter referred to as *BPEP*), Pismo Okólne, No. 49/81/692.
33. *Next to God...Poland*, *op cit.*, pp. 140-141.
34. *The Art of War*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.
35. *Rzeczpospolita*, 6/2/1986.
36. For a list of all KC plenums December 1981-December 1987, see Appendix.
37. Lech Wałęsa, *Un Chemin d'Espoir*, Paris, Fayard, 1987, pp. 357-370.
38. Quantitatively, the literature on the Solidarity events was enormous but unfortunately a great deal was more the result of a momentary interest in the crisis and consequently it lacked an in-depth knowledge and appreciation of the events. I have listed here a selection of books which in my opinion were the most interesting and stimulating accounts of this period. *Solidarność, Geneza i Historia*, Jerzy Holzer, Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1984; *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Jadwiga Staniszkis, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984; The Polish Drama: 1981-1982, Jan B. de Weydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, Kevin Devlin, Lexington Books, Toronto, 1983; *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*, 1981, *op cit.*; *Poland 1981. Toward Social Renewal*, Peter Raina, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1985; *The Polish Challenge*, Kevin Ruane, BBC, 1982; *The Polish Revolution, Solidarity 1980-82*, Timothy Garton Ash, Jonathan Cape, London, 1983.
39. *Bulletin Agencja Solidarność*, AS. No 44.
40. Thomas M. Cynkin, *Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis*, MacMillan Press, London, 1988, p. 181.
41. Ibid, p. 185.
42. Pawel Majda, 'L'importance du Fond Monétaire International pour la Pologne et les autres pays de l'Europe orientale'. in *Revue*

d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. XIII, No 4, décembre 1982.
43. *Soviet and American Signalling...*, *op cit.*, p. 201.
44. *Nowe Drogi*, November 1981, pp. 38-39.
45. *Next to God... Poland*, pp. 122-123
46. *Kultura* Nr 4/475, 1987, pp. 3-37.
47. R. D. Anderson, 'Soviet decision-making and Poland', *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1982, pp. 22-36.
48. *BBC Summary World Broadcasts*, EE/6893/C/15, 30th November 1981 (thereafter referred to as *SWB*).
49. *SWB* EE/6894/C/9, 30/11/1981.
50. For the full text as well as the Congress's programme, see *L'Alternative, Pologne: le dossier de Solidarité*, Maspéro, Paris, 1982.
51. Marcin Sar, 'The evolution of centripedal fraternalism: the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe', *Annals of the American Association of Political Science Studies*, September 1985, p. 98.
52. Neil Ascherson, *The Polish August*, Hammondsworth, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 223.
53. *The Times*, 22/2/1982.
54. Throughout January appeared a series of articles on this topic in *Trybuna Ludu*.
55. Lech Wałęsa, *Un Chemin d'Espoir, ..., op cit.*, pp. 369.
56. Józef Tischner, *Ethique de Solidarité*, Paris, Critérion, 1983, pp. 16-17.
57. *East European Reporter*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1988, p. 26.
58. Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.

W innych krajach, jak słyszę, trzyma urząd drabów
Policyjantów różnych, żandarmów, konstantów
Ale jeśli miecz tylko bezpieczeństwa strzeże
Żeby w tych krajach była wolność - nie uwierzę.

Adam Mickiewicz, 1834.[1]

(In countries other than Poland, I hear, the government provides for thugs, various policemen, gendarmes, constables, where security is kept by the sword; that there, freedom exists, of this I will never be convinced.)

CHAPTER 3

THE 'WAR'.

The mere fact that Soviet tanks had not entered Polish territory at the head of a WTO invasion, and that instead it was the Polish military which undertook the task of returning the PRL onto the path of 'socialist normality', seemed to indicate that an internal solution had been deemed more satisfactory to resolve the Polish crisis. The Polish card, much to the surprise of most analysts, had been played by Moscow. But what may have looked like a solution to a specific Polish problem was in fact a solution to the wider problem of the security and stability of the whole Soviet bloc. It differed from the Czech or Hungarian examples mainly in its form and unorthodox implications. By allowing a Polish military take-over, the Kremlin was acknowledging the complete rout of the PZPR. Unwilling to draw the Soviet Union into a costly invasion, it had decided to commit one of the cardinal sins in the Marxist-Leninist book: to permit that the military supersede

the Party.

The militarization of Polish society had numerous effects on both the PRL's domestic and foreign policy-making. Internally, the state of war had been implemented with the main objective of giving the authorities an ideal opportunity to pacify the country and restore 'socialist order'. Despite the severity of the war-like conditions, this process was a slow one, relying on force rather than on a well-worked out strategy. Externally, the PRL found itself completely isolated (except with the 'fraternal camp') in the wake of Western economic, diplomatic and political relations. After the brightness of the Solidarity era and the hopes it had engendered, a great ominous darkness fell over the Polish nation.

3.1 *The Domestic Dimension of Martial Law.*

Almost eight years have now passed since what has been without any doubt one of the most important events in post-war Central East European history. On December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, addressed the Polish nation and proclaimed the imposition of a state of war. In an unprecedented manner, the Polish leader was introducing a *coup a la Brumaire* in the heart of Europe, a feat made more extraordinary by the fact that it was taking place in one of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

That the military coup of December 1981 was undertaken with the tacit approval and support of the PRL's eastern neighbour is a certainty. Even if hard data on the exact level of this 'aid' remains unattainable, it is obvious that it would have been highly unlikely that the decision to militarize the social, political and economic life of the PRL could have been taken without prior consultation

between Warsaw and the Kremlin. The mere 'miraculous' filling up of Warsaw's shops with Soviet and East German food within days of the proclamation of the state of war was one, among many other indications, that the fraternal neighbours had been consulted before hand.[2] Indeed, it is in fact unimaginable that the second largest army of the Warsaw Pact would have been able to undertake such a complex and well synchronized operation without prior knowledge, approval and operative support of the Soviet Union. Yet at the same time there can be no doubt that the *implementation* of martial law in the PRL was a genuine Polish affair. As one observer astutely described it, it was a "specifically Polish solution to a task which had been assigned by the Soviet Union".[3] In this sense the Polish Winter was markedly different from the Hungarian Autumn or the Prague Spring. The tanks of the Red Army were not to be seen in the streets of Polish cities.[4] Further, in the case of the PRL, the military take-over resulted in relatively fewer deaths when compared with the Czech and Hungarian tragedies. Official figures put the deathtoll at some fifteen people.[5] Of course these deaths cannot bring any comfort to those involved but they underlined the difference in human cost between a strictly Polish affair and a massive intervention from the Warsaw Pact troops. In fact the speed with which the Polish army took control of the country demonstrated not only the well-planned character of the operation[6] but also the concern by the military authorities (by that time party and governmental decision making were virtually non-existent) to avoid at all costs a bloodbath. In all probability its consequences, both domestically and internationally, would have been incalculable. Some doubts must be voiced as to the exact role played by the army and the militia. To this day it is still not entirely clear who controlled who and what exactly was the relation between the various institutions

(Party-state-military) involved in the repression after the declaration of the state of war. In any event December 1981 marked the active involvement of the Polish military in the domestic affairs of the country, thereby elevating it to the foremost political actor in the PRL. Party-military relations in Poland since the end of the Second World War have moved from a stage of *co-optation* to *subordination*, *accommodation*, and eventually *participation*.[7] By the end of 1981, a new stage could be added: *domination*.[8] Although the state of war was imposed out of a predominantly domestic concern on the part of the ruling elite, foreign policy considerations played an important part in the fateful December decision (the decision had in fact been taken several months before and its implementation had depended largely on the evolving situation). In this case the most obvious influence came from the Soviet Union. Despite the appeals to patriotic values in Jaruzelski's proclamation of a state of war, the strong and repeated references to the Polish *raison d'état* highlighted the other eventuality which might have taken place. If this had been the case, there is no doubt that the Polish leadership would also have suffered the consequences of a WTO intervention. Though obvious, this is a factor which should not be underestimated in trying to analyse the decision-making process which led to the militarization of the Polish society.

Ever since 1980, the PRL's fate had been attentively watched by the West. During the months which preceded the imposition of martial law, and especially after the Solidarity congress, the possibility of a Soviet Pact intervention captured everyone's imagination. This was so much the case that this concentration of world's opinion's attention on the eventuality of a Soviet invasion contributed both to lower the

general interest in the fate of the PRL and to make any other solution seem relatively acceptable. Because of that, the proclamation of a state of war was seen generally by Western governments as a lesser evil than a full scale intervention by the Soviet Union and its allies.

At 06:00 on December 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski announced that the State Council had declared, under Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Polish Constitution[9], a state of war for the whole country. The announcement, broadcast live, came some six hours after units of the riot police and the security forces had effectively captured practically the entire Solidarity leadership in one nationwide swoop. When the Poles woke up that day, they found themselves isolated from the rest of the world. In an unprecedented manner for a communist state, the military was taking over power in a desperate and final bid to restore 'normality' to a country which General Jaruzelski described as being on "the edge of the abyss".[10] In December 1982 the film *Apocalypse Now* was being shown in Warsaw[11] and for a moment it appeared that the action was taking place outside rather than on the screen.

Before examining the causes and effects of the proclamation of the state of war, it may be interesting to note that legally speaking the application of martial law may be the effect of two situations. Firstly it can interpreted as a **State of Emergency** (*Stan wyjątkowy*) or a "situation resulting from a decision by higher state authorities (head of state, Prime Minister) that brings various limitations of political and personal freedom in connection with a dangerous internal situation caused by actions, political demonstrations, terrorist actions, strike waves, attacks on the police, and other acts that

threaten the security of the state and public order".[12] The Poles also use the term *Stan Wojenny* or **State of War**. In accordance with the Constitution, the Council of State may introduce the state of near war on the whole or part of the country's territory and proclaim full or part mobilization. The introduction of a state of near war is, as a rule, linked with a declaration of a state of war. The state of war may be introduced by a law (**Martial law**) or decree that describes in detail the legal consequences.[13]

One commentator argued that the imposition of a state of war was not a *coup d'état* but "a legal act by a totalitarian system incapable of solving a political crisis by democratic means".[14] He supports this view by citing the existence, since a decree of November 21, 1967, of a secret institutional body called the *Komitet Obrony Kraju* or KOK (since 1981 KOK has in fact made public the announcement of its working sessions). On the basis of that decree a network of military and civilian cells was organized and covered the whole administration from top to bottom throughout the country. This network was constructed in such a way that the life of the country could be switched over from peace to emergency operation at short notice without any special organizational changes.[15] Whatever the legal implications, the Polish military conducted a nationwide operation which effectively gave them the reins of power, setting the scene for a return to 'socialist normality'. Martial law was devised in such a way as to leave the authorities free to apply forms of repression of whatever scale and duration they considered necessary. Law was to become an instrument of pacification and of normalization, a means of crushing all independent social initiatives, restoring the monopoly of the Party and strengthening its position.[16] There is a school of

thought in the underground opposition which claims that in effect it was Solidarity itself which enabled the authorities to act in the way they did in 1982. This claim is supported by the fact that throughout the country, Solidarity activists were implicitly deterred, by the union's leadership, from using violence. After the Radom conference notes were circulated to this effect in all major and even less important factories and institutions. Despite some exceptions this self-limitation was observed and, so the argument goes, the régime was fully aware that the real possibilities of violent confrontation were minimal. Therefore, Solidarity's own stand on this question allowed the Jaruzelski leadership to act in the way it did with the confidence that there would be little opposition to the imposition of a state of war. It was clear throughout that Solidarity had never had any intentions of waging a physical battle with the authorities. Yet, since the military manual is full of so-called contingency plans, it is practically certain that some preparations at least were made by the Polish military in the eventuality of a civil war breaking out. Equally, it would be underrating the Solidarity leadership by crediting it with being unaware of the possibility of the use of force by the ruling establishment. Nonetheless, the imposition of a state of war seemed to have taken Solidarity leaders completely by surprise. Writing from the internment camp where he was at the time, Michnik had concluded that:

> It was clear that the system would not willingly give up one iota of its power and that conflicts were therefore unavoidable. We thought, however, that things would run a different course. We did not believe that the power structure would seek to resolve social conflicts with military force by substituting the argument of force for the force of the argument.[17]

Speaking nervously on television (observers noted the trembling of the General's hands throughout the broadcast), Jaruzelski repeatedly

appealed to the nation's patriotic values.[18] In retrospective, the régime's manipulation of national symbols as a means to persuade that the interests of the Party were identical with Polish national interests was relentless throughout this period.[19] Never reminding the public that he was head of the Polish Communist Party, he described himself instead as "the chief of the Polish government", as "a soldier who remembers well the cruelty of war" and addressed his audience as "brothers and sisters", "brother-peasants", "citizens of the older generations", "Polish mothers, wives and sisters", as "fellow-countrymen". Stressing the Polish *raison d'état*, he emphasized the critical state of the country, which, had it lasted longer, "would have led to a catastrophe, to absolute chaos, to poverty and starvation". "The self-preservation instinct of the nation must be taken into account", he added. What was obvious throughout the speech was the recurrent theme stressing the PRL's independence and sovereignty. Playing on public apprehensions, his performance suggested that the decision to impose a state of war on the country had been determined as a choice between two evils, and while the present situation could not be interpreted as satisfying, it represented the penultimate option before what everyone had been led to believe would happen, namely, the possibility of a Soviet invasion: "We are a sovereign country, so we must get out of this crisis by ourselves".[20] By implicitly identifying the imposition of a state of war in the PRL with the beginning of a period of stability and internal peace, Jaruzelski was acknowledging, in his own way, Orwell's interchangeable 'Newspeak' formula: "Peace is War, War is Peace".

It should not be surprising, however, that most people saw the decree proclaiming a state of war as a bitter reminder of *Targowica*, a

symbol of national shame.[21] One can suspect that, while obviously the General had been given by Moscow the go-ahead to resolve the Polish crisis, presumably because from the Soviet point of view this still represented the last but one option, Jaruzelski still had every cause for concern should the operation reveal itself a fiasco. "Not days but hours separate us from a national catastrophe" he said, a catastrophe which almost certainly would also have involved the whole of the current Polish leadership as well, not a prospect he could look upon with serenity. In the end, however, it is perhaps unrealistic to claim that the whole operation had been little more than a gamble both for the Poles and the Soviet Union. There probably were few doubts, both in Warsaw and in the Kremlin, that the 'socialist pacification' of the country would be a success. The only grey area concerned the human costs and the extent of the international community's outcry. Apparently, huge field hospitals were prepared in the vicinity of major towns in the anticipation, not of hundreds but of thousands of casualties. Barracks were also emptied to make room for an expected increase in the numbers of prisoners to the tune of *350 000 people*.[22] Whereas such preparations seemed to have indicated that the régime was expecting a 'bloody operation', it should be stressed that this was part of a deliberate campaign to strike fear within the Party apparatus and members of the Party, terrifying them in closing ranks against the Solidarity 'menace'. The military take-over would then be seen as a needed and greeted with relief. Bearing in mind this last point, it seems that there were three principal objectives which motivated the Polish authorities into imposing military rule in Poland:

a) First of all, it was obvious that they were aiming at restoring

the basic elements of the political *status quo ante*. Only by restoring the primacy of the Party and its control over society, as well as strengthening the state apparatus could any centralized reforms be implemented with any chance of success. It must be stressed that by this time the 'leading role of the Party' had been seriously eroded and that as a political force, it had virtually ceased to exist. The morale of the Party was seriously affected as well by a prevailing fear among Party activists who saw (and were made to believe) in Solidarity a movement intent on physically eliminating them, recalling the fate of those Hungarians who had been lynched in the streets of Budapest some twenty six years earlier. As David S. Mason aptly described it, "by imposing martial law, the army had provided a crutch to the injured Party. But the Party was still not able to walk without at least leaning on the army".[23] It must also be added, however, that the increasing place of the military within the Party structure at nearly all levels was further accentuating the demoralization within the Party. It has been suggested that the encroachment by the army in the political life of the nation, displacing the PZPR as the main decision-making body, was creating a new cohesive group within the Party, defined through common experience, easy identification, and a strong *esprit de corps*, thereby introducing a new and significant factor in the PRL's politics.[24]

b) Secondly, and naturally, the aim of martial law was to force the Polish society into submission. There can be no doubt that the imprisonment (the authorities called it internment) of all leading activists within the Solidarity union was a primary goal of the military. Once the head of the opponent was removed, the body would be left helpless. As such, this objective also attempted to stop and

contain the recent movement of social self-organization. In the aftermath of the state of war, it was clear that this goal was not as successful as expected: regional Solidarity leaderships were replaced very quickly throughout the country, hours only in some cases, after the leaders had been interned. Thus, while at the national level the Solidarity leadership had effectively been muzzled, at the regional level the union retained an organized structure which was to prove itself still capable of mustering support and be quite active in the following months (though it took a couple of years for a real national underground structure to finally emerge).

What was significant in the mechanics of martial law was that the role of the regular army in dealing with the social unrest was in fact very limited. Unlike 1970, when conscript troops had been used to quell down the unrest in Gdańsk, and had been ordered to fire on the demonstrators, in 1981, the Army was detailed principally for patrol and cordon duties. Obviously, great care was taken by the Polish Generals to avoid a repeat of the 1970 tragic events which had so much discredited the Polish military. Most of the 'dirty work' was undertaken by the paramilitary services and the special police units. Weydenthal sees in this respect, the "picture of an intricate political ploy", by which, the military announced martial law but hardly participated in its repressive activities and the Security Services were actively involved but only because they were obeying orders to do so.[26] The truth was that they saw themselves as facing only two alternatives: either Solidarity was destroyed or they would lose their lives. In fact, such fears (the result of propaganda internal to the Party) were wholly unfounded. Despite their access to industrial dynamite and demolition expertise, the ten million strong

Solidarity movement never once resorted to terrorist tactics. Its ethos had always condemned the use of violence, something the authorities may have regarded as a sign of weakness. But it was precisely this non-violent characteristic which gave Solidarity its strength and source of moral superiority, making it a formidable opponent for the Polish ruling establishment.

c) Thirdly, the restoration of the political *status quo ante* would be near impossible without some concrete economic achievements. The process of *odnowa* or renovation called for in the summer of 1981 placed economic performances and successes as a high priority. Further, the military régime, in its quest to legitimize itself in the eyes of the population, was most concerned to bring about some degree of improvement for the Polish society. The need for economic reforms was therefore obvious but first, the country had to return to a state of affairs where these plans might be feasible. A militarization of the economy, by reinforcing control by the centre and introducing more discipline, would further this aim. Under martial law, some 300 to 350 enterprises and public services were militarized.[26] From December 13, 1981, in all militarized enterprises the work contract of all employees was immediately suspended and they automatically were declared to be on active service like soldiers.[27] Another way of exacting greater discipline from the labour force was the restrictions imposed on labour mobility and the increase in administrative control. An article in *Rzeczpospolita* spelled this out clearly

> The state of war put an end to the activity of the extremist force of "Solidarity" which had the aim of paralysing the Polish economy and render impossible the realization of any programme to resolve the crisis. With the imposition of a state of war much was brought about in the economic sphere: the chance was created to put a brake on the collapse of the economy and begin the difficult process of the reforms.[28]

In order to co-ordinate the implementation of these objectives, Jaruzelski announced that until the termination of the state of war, the country would be administered by the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), headed by himself and consisting of twenty other military men (see Appendix). Described officially as a "military-political institution independent of the state but at the same time strengthening the state administrative structure, inspiring at all levels through its various activities", it also "watched over the observance of martial law regulations, initiating and ensuring the effective implementation of acts serving the socio-political stability and the normalization of the country's life".[29] This would be, during the coming months, the highest authority in the land. This military council became responsible for the successful implementation of Jaruzelski's policies aiming at a return to 'socialist normality' and, "the broker and guarantee of Soviet interests in Poland".[30] Incidentally it should be noted that WRON was already in full control when the Council of State was formally requested to approve the decrees which formed the basis for the state of war. Its legitimacy was then questionable as it ran counter to the PRL's constitution which does not envisage the existence of such a body. Moreover, WRON and its commissars (*komisarze wojskowi*) were not subject to any control by either the Sejm or the People's Councils. In many ways, the military take-over should be interpreted as a political defeat for the Party, and as a clear sign that the PZPR had ceased to be a political force to be reckoned with. Some 15 000 professional officers were placed throughout governmental and economic administration.[31] Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the Party is not an agency separate from the army or the police, all senior members of which must belong to it (85% of armed forces officers are Party members).[32] It

should also be noted that in fact all senior ranks of the Polish military are required to undergo training in Soviet Military Academies, and that their nominations are subject to Moscow's approval. While the state of war did create a situation where 'the leading role of the Party' was put in a state of hibernation, its influence in the corridors of power remained a determinant factor in the policy-making process. Equally, one should be cautious in ascribing too much importance to the military factor. Although ostensibly the country was being run by the armed forces, the system's infrastructure comprising among others, the People's Militia (MO) and the Secret Services (SB), was still functional, as much as ever if not more. Above all, the state of war instituted an iron rule over the country, turning it into a fully-fledged police-state. Described as a temporary institution, WRON's activities were in no way meant "to undermine the competence of and [replacing] any bodies of civilian authority in performing their work".[33] In theory it was supposed to be only a policy-inspiring body as well as a policy-co-ordinating centre. However it proved to be neither. The implementation of policy was co-ordinated by KOK and the Regional Defence Committees (WKOs). Apart from issuing the occasional statement, in the form of exhortations rather than authoritative announcements, WRON's role appeared to be devoid of defining political or economic strategies for the government. This vagueness of purpose further highlighted two major areas of uncertainty, namely the relationship between the military and the Party, especially at the decision-making level, and also the relationship between the authorities and the population. One had to wait until December 30, 1981, to observe the first signs of Party activity in the form of a series of meetings taking place throughout the country and intent on demonstrating that Party organizational

functions had not suffered unduly because of the emergency. It also reflected a first attempt to reorganize and consolidate Party ranks. On December 15, 1981, the leaderships of four voivods (Elbląg, Katowice, Koszalin and Radom) were replaced by military men, along with the nationwide dismissal of many senior industrial managers, all accused of having failed to perform their duty in line with the requirements set by martial law.[34] These were the first steps taken by the authorities to militarize the state apparatus in order to try and invigorate through accrued discipline and military methods, the ailing state of the nation's economy.

As far as social unrest was concerned, the days following the imposition of martial law demonstrated amply that the situation was not evolving as smoothly as the military authorities might have hoped. The wave of arrests and the continuous reports of incidents opposing workers and the police forces indicated the régime's inability to quell completely all forms of opposition and foreshadowed the difficulties ahead. This was the unavoidable result of a dilemma facing Jaruzelski: to control the restless society, the régime's favoured option was to exclude, through repression, all those elements it saw as opposing its policies; at the same time, this method could only be valid in the short-term for soon or later, a certain amount of support would have to be mobilized for desirable national or social goals. What happened in 1989 with the Round Table debates between the authorities and Solidarity representatives, among others, showed what everyone already knew namely, that the PZPR was unable on its own to achieve any tangible successes. Only a *real* dialogue had a chance of improving the situation. But in 1982, one was still a long way from even imagining that the two sides who confronted each other in the

wake of the proclamation of martial law, would one day be seating at the same table and discuss their country's future. As George Sanford put it, "The dilemma is that control is best attained by exclusion but that the building up of legitimacy is best achieved by inclusion".[35] This was to become a major problem for the authorities and partly explains the duration of martial law rule. It lasted almost two years and though it was suspended in December 1982, it was only formally lifted in July 1983.

3.2 *The Party.*

What had happened in the PRL in 1980-81 was that the Party apparatus had ceased to operate as a political body. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned it was still loyal to the CPSU, but it simply had become unable to dictate the policy of the country anymore. Jaruzelski may have been a military man but at least he was loyal to the Soviet Union *and* had the means to enforce the latter's will. It represented a deviation of the orthodoxy, but it also had its own advantages. One of the priorities of the Jaruzelski régime after the imposition of a state of war was to rescue the PZPR from its organizational disarray and political demoralization. The leadership emphasized the need to return the party to 'Leninist' organizational practices. The stage was set by an instruction prepared by the Central Committee's Secretariat sent to provincial party secretaries a few days before December 13. Defining "the activities of the Party in conditions endangering the security of the state", it drastically reduced the role of effective party bodies and imposed strict control over rank and file members.[36] The practical effects of the instruction, implemented in full under martial law, were far-reaching. Numerous party bodies in factories, offices and universities were

dissolved. Within two months almost 100 000 party members had been expelled from the ranks; several provincial first secretaries were replaced; 349 secretaries of provincial and town committees were removed, along with 307 secretaries of factory committees and 2 091 first secretaries of basic party organizations. If one adds to these figures the some 2 000 members of various town and provincial committees and scores of party activists, most of whom had been elected in 1981, then the scale of these purges was massive. The purpose of the campaign was to effect a thorough change of personnel in various party bodies in order to make them compatible with the leadership's concept of a unified, disciplined and efficient Party. On January 8, 1982, the Party daily called for a "purification of the ranks" and the return to "the pure ideals" of the early years.[37] Jerzy Urbanski, the head of the Central Party Control Commission, in an article setting the conditions for the consolidation of the PZPR, wrote that,

> The fundamental principle guiding the consolidation of the Party must be that there can be no return to the situation prevailing in the country before the 13th of December of last year. ... The reality of the consolidation of the Party must be fulfilled on the grounds of scrupulously observing the leninist norm for the Party life - in particular the principle of democratic centralism.[38]

The state of war provided an ideal environment in which to implement the renovation of the PZPR and a speedy return to the ideals of *democratic centralism*, the pyramidal structure briefly damaged by the development of the *struktury poziome* or horizontal structures which followed the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress in July 1981. On April 23, 1982 took place the first National Ideological Conference of the PZPR. It initiated the process of rebuilding a revised theoretical base for the Party's 'leading role' and for its combative ideological character. At the time, Jaruzelski was faced with the problem of

ensuring that unity would remain within the Party. His resolution to clamp down on divisions within the Party and eliminate factionism in its ranks[39] was directed at the hardliners, who were whole-heartedly supporting the imposition of a state of war as the means to further their own goals. The most widely publicized example of this surfaced towards the end of 1982 with the disclosure of a letter which had been circulated among Central Committee members. Written by former Politburo member and CC secretary, Tadeusz Grabski, it criticized the Jaruzelski leadership for failing to revive the Party and destroying the 'counterrevolution'. "The Party is dying, losing its leading role in society and its managing role in the state", declared the letter which then went on advocating a four-point programme of action: the use of the strongest possible force to destroy Solidarity; a purge throughout the Party to eliminate the present vague mixture of Marxism-Leninism, Social Democracy and Christian philosophy; the elimination of the Solidarity-inspired aspect of economic reform ie., the privatization of industry, and finally to oppose attempts to transform the Church into an active political force in the PRL.[40] The challenge was weathered by Jaruzelski and the 'rejuvenation' of the Party, or the tightening of central control over all aspects of Party life, went ahead unimpeded. Along with changes in the Party, the leadership imposed wide-ranging transformations in the work of other institutions and in their relations with the population. This was carried out by changes in the PRL legislation which provided central administration with greater powers of control and action. This was accompanied by a campaign of 'verification', particularly among the ranks of the administration, aiming at weeding out all those not politically loyal to the régime and replacing them with personnel compliant with orders from above. The purpose of these changes was to

"create a strong and effective administration that would be capable of efficiently performing in the service of the socialist state".[41]

In 1989, speaking at the 10th KC Plenum, a reminiscent Jaruzelski said that "the state of war [had been] the closing of a certain era and, at the same time, the opening of a new one".[42] It was clear that despite the clamp-down and the offset of an internal 'normalization' of Polish life, too much had changed for a return to the pre-martial law situation. Efforts by the authorities to re-invigorate Party life proceeded at a slow pace, in spite of all attempts to re-build the base for its power domination. The slogan, *Partia ta sama, ale nie taka sama* ("the Party remains one and the same, yet it has changed"), which surfaced in later years, best illustrated the fact that a return to the political *status quo ante*, though desired by Jaruzelski, was not an entirely feasible task. Indeed, a study of provincial First Secretaries in post in 1984, revealed that the post 1981 changes had not meant a return to the same situation that had pertained under Gierek. The character of the former apparatus was not restored, with the influence of life-long party officials in it now greatly diminished.[43] The Party, whether it liked it or not, had to adapt itself to the evolving situation, incidentally not only in the PRL but also abroad, and especially later on, in the Soviet Union.

3.3 *The Polish Church and the State of War.*

With the imposition of a state of war the Polish Catholic Church once again reverted to its traditional position as the country's second (some would argue foremost) most important institution both in the sense of its physical presence and of its moral leadership. It is often stated that a true understanding of the Polish nation cannot be attained without consideration of the importance the Church holds in

virtually all aspects of the Polish society. Indeed, the first few months of martial law clearly reflected this and as subsequent events showed, the Church's role and activities were predominant inputs into the life of the country.

After December 13, 1981, the Polish Catholic Church was faced with possibly the most challenging task of its history. The very nature of the unfolding events put it to the test. At the heart of the matter lay a dilemma: how should the Church react to the new situation bearing in mind that, which ever way it decided to respond, it incurred the risk on the one hand, of alienating a majority of its followers and on the other, jeopardizing whatever leverage it might still have on the régime? For the sake of safeguarding some of its own institutional interests it might decide to temper its overall response and delay its moment of action, with the possible result that it would then lose the support of a great number of believers and also non-believers attracted to the Church. However, any decisive and forceful attitude, rejecting outright, for instance, any possibility of dialogue with the authorities would equally put it in a situation from which the holding of many gains won over the last few months might be seriously endangered. In this sense then, the overall credibility of the Church was under the spotlight.[44]

From the beginning, the Church hierarchy seemed to adopt a restrained attitude to the events. This was partly explained by the fact that, as the situation in the country became easier to assess (admittedly there was a great deal of confusion and uncertainty in the first week of the state of war), the Church found itself having to balance its position between defending the rights of society and ensuring that peace prevailed. To side overtly with the population

against the régime would inevitably have signified that it too would have become the target of official repression. However, at the same time, the pursuit of peace at all costs would have severely damaged its moral authority among Poles. One should also remember that the Church's own 'social doctrine' had its part to play in influencing the Polish episcopate's acts and words.[45] It is such considerations which determined the Church's stand throughout the state of war. It was also why it spent almost the entire period urging a dialogue between the authorities and the various groups in society.

The Church's main aim in the early period of the state of war was the avoidance of bloodshed at all costs. Here the plea was addressed to both the military and police authorities and the social groups opposed to them. In his sermon, broadcast repeatedly on the Polish radio network in the days that followed the proclamation of a state of war, the Polish Primate stressed this point:

> The Church wants to defend each human life; and therefore in this state of martial law, it will call for peace whenever possible; it will call for an end to violence and for the prevention of fratricidal struggle. There is nothing of greater value than human life.[46]

Yet the sermon failed to give listeners a forthright response to the country's internal developments. By calling the imposition of a state of war, "the choice of a lesser rather than greater evil", Glemp was seen to be accepting something inevitable and of course, in many ways he was. But this did not strike a cord among the frustrated Solidarity members. As the state of war continued, the term 'Glempic' appeared: 'to say nothing at length in soothing terms', an unflattering reference to the seemingly uncommitted attitude of the Polish Church's leader.[47] Yet such a view point may have been rather unfair: on December 16, the Polish episcopate issued a statement to be read in

all Polish churches on the 20th. In undisguised terms, the Polish bishops criticized the régime's current policies and called for the Church and society to concentrate on the following two questions: a) the freeing of all internees and b) the revival of independent trade unions and above of Solidarity's statutory activity.[48] It is interesting to note that the PRL's embassy officials throughout Europe were busy distributing to the media copies of Glemp's sermon a day before it was due to be read in Polish churches. This was an obvious attempt to show foreign observers that there was an identity of purpose between the régime and the Polish church's objectives, thereby giving some legitimacy to the imposition of a state of war in the PRL.[49] However the statement itself was not read in Polish parishes, presumably as a result of pressure from the authorities. A toned down pastoral letter from the Polish primate replaced it instead. On December 28, Archbishop Glemp sent an open letter to General Jaruzelski condemning the practice of exacting oaths of loyalty to the régime from all state employees accompanied by a threat of dismissal for those refusing to leave Solidarity.[50] At one point, the Archbishop directly blamed the state apparatus for the current situation: "The responsibility of the crisis is incumbent to the impassive bureaucratic apparatus which has functioned to this day".[51]

Despite the fact that throughout the state of war, at a time when public gatherings were banned, the Churches remained open, the martial law restrictions did affect the activities of the Polish clergy. Several priests had been interned (but were quickly freed after intervention from the episcopate), the publication of Catholic journals and newspapers was suspended, as well as the activities of the Lublin Catholic University and the weekly radio broadcasts of the

Mass. Yet the authorities on the whole refrained from explicit attacks on the Church, presumably because they recognised the contribution which it could give to the process of 'renewal' by helping to 'pacify' the country. Besides this would not be the first time that the communist authorities had sought to manipulate the Church's influence on the population.

With reports of continuing unrest throughout the country and the imprisonment of thousands of Solidarity activists, the Church's activities centered around providing humanitarian aid to the internees and their families. On January 21, 1982, the Polish episcopate formally established the Primate's Committee for Help to Internees and was allowed to visit many internment camps.[62] On January 9, a meeting occurred between Archbishop Glemp and General Jaruzelski, the first such meeting since the imposition of a state of war. Nothing filtered from the encounter except that the two men exchanged views on the current situation and expressed intentions related to the normalization of life in Poland. Equally secretive was the communique issued at the end of the Church-state commission which met on January 18. Both sides stated that they "had recognized the need to find political solutions to current problems".[63] In the circumstances, it was inevitable that the Church would attempt to mediate between the authorities and the suspended unions but its efforts to renew the dialogue fell short of everyone's expectations. Increasingly, it was becoming obvious that the Jaruzelski régime had no intention in returning to the pre-December 13 situation. In fact the Church hierarchy had been faced with a *fait accompli* (although it never explicitly recognized this) and its goals were now restricted to negotiating with whoever was in power for as long as this could serve

its own role as the guiding force of the nation's destiny. The 183rd plenary conference of the Polish episcopate which took place on February 25, was in many respects an authoritative statement of the Church's position. Having returned four days earlier from a visit to the Vatican where he had met the Pope as head of an important Church delegation (February 4-11), Archbishop Glemp informed the bishops of John Paul II's anxieties concerning the situation in the PRL. Obviously endorsed by the Pope, the final statement stressed that "the activities of the Church are non-political" and reiterated a call for a dialogue between the authorities and society. They pointed out that the suspended union Solidarity had a role to play and could not be absent from the implementation of a social accord. They asked for the release of detainees, an amnesty for those convicted, freedom of religious life, cultural pluralism and the reactivation of youth organizations. At the same time, they called "for a sense of realism and prudence" in assessing the situation:

> Social accord makes demand not only on the authorities, but also on the whole of the society. ... A sense of realism and prudence requires that we do not accept the principle of "all or nothing". Just the opposite - we ought to strive systematically, persistently and gradually towards the implementation of our aims. ... It ... requires us to define wisely our individual and social demands, taking a long-term view of our national future.[54]

In other words the Church was appealing for restraint and was echoing the late Cardinal Wyszyński's social and political teachings which had always stressed the paramount importance of Poland's sovereign existence. Only when the country's sovereignty was guaranteed could the Church make an effective contribution to the nation's religious, intellectual and cultural life. For the Church must operate in different time scales to that of the contemporary social groups. Its aspirations must remain above the political plane and should not be

involved in the struggle between social groups. This type of reasoning had tended to be forgotten in the heydays of Solidarity when the population's self-confidence had risen to new heights. As soon as repression became once again the dominant factor in the PRL's life, a return to a more pragmatic approach was required, even if in the minds of some of the clergy and laymen, the Catholic Church was appearing to be too 'soft' in its dealings with the ruling establishment. In April, the Polish episcopate issued a 10-point report entitled "Theses of the Primate's Social Council in the Matter of Social Accord".[55] It fuelled controversy and was widely criticized within the Church's own ranks. While the report condemned the imposition of a state of war as an act that dashed the hope for genuine social, political and economic reforms, it also went on putting some of the blame for the crisis on the suspended Solidarity union. The Council urged the union to consider critically its own share in the responsibility for the current situation and urged it to be apolitical. The report reflected the Archbishop's thinking that dialogue, dialogue and more dialogue was needed. It also gave an opportunity for the authorities to respond and demonstrate some of their supposed good intentions. Finally it showed that the Church hierarchy still believed that some degree of conciliation could be attained between the various social groups. Yet, at a new meeting between Jaruzelski and the Polish Primate on April 25, it became clear that all the hopes for a revived Solidarity had been dashed. The official media was increasing its barrage of attacks upon the suspended independent unions and all signs pointed to a reinforcement of the authorities' will to enforce 'socialist normality' upon the country. Violent clashes occurred in various cities on May Day and May 3, effectively putting an end to any chance of dialogue between the régime and the population. The Church's role

as a mediator lost then most of its *raison d'être*.

One issue which occupied most of Church-state relations at the time was the planned visit by John Paul II in the PRL. The second papal visit had been planned for the summer of 1982. On June 11, the Politburo met to discuss the prospects of the Pope's visit, which the Church was confident would take place on August 26. Yet no decision was taken. On the contrary, it was evident that the authorities were making the visit dependent upon two main determinants: in the first place, the situation inside the country had to be peaceful and unrest stifled. Secondly, the Church had to co-operate with the authorities in bringing about the right conditions for a Papal visit. For Jaruzelski, a successful visit by the Pope would have greatly helped him in legitimating the régime's aims and would have given him an opportunity to convince the outside world that the situation in the PRL was now back to 'normal'. However, such a visit would have had to be carefully controlled by the authorities. The memories of the Pope's first visit to the PRL in June 1979 and its impact on society were still fresh in everyone's mind. The régime, in the uncertain current situation, wanted to avoid any opportunity of allowing the morale of the population to be boosted again. At the root of the matter lay the fact that it was probably too early for the authorities to permit such a visit since their hold over society was still unsteady as the May and August demonstrations throughout the country amply demonstrated. In the event, an unexpected visit by the PRL's Foreign Minister, Józef Czyrek, to the Vatican on July 19 (he was eventually received by the Pope on the 20th) confirmed the authorities' desire to postpone the visit. This decision was probably welcomed by most of the PRL's allies and in particular the Soviet Union whose media had harshly

criticized the Polish Church in its columns, especially in the summer of 1982:

> New trends in the behaviour of church representatives disturb many people here. People ask themselves: Haven't certain church dioceses succumbed to the temptation to take the place of Solidarity, which suffered defeat six months ago and compromised itself, and to take its place in influencing public opinion in order to strengthen their own positions? Haven't they given up acting as merely spiritual guardians and taken to acting as apolitical organization that opposes the socialist régime? Reflections on this subject are all the more timely since there is much talk in Poland at present about whether the visit of Pope John Paul II, which is planned for late August, will take place or not.[56]

The cancellation of the visit was formally announced by Primate Glemp on July 22, 1982. It wasn't until November that a new date was fixed. After a meeting between Jaruzelski and Glemp on November 8, a joint Church-state communiqué mentioned as a possible date for the Pope's visit, June 16, 1983. While it seemed that at last some progress had been made to facilitate the Papal visit, the Church's apparent co-operative mood with the authorities was coming under increasing scrutiny and was sparkling arguments among believers. At a meeting of Primate Glemp with the priests of the Warsaw archdioceses on December 7, the head of the Polish Church came under heavy criticism for being too conciliatory with the authorities. Individual priests argued that the people were feeling that the Church was making politics with the authorities, that not enough references were made of the means of repression used against the population, that the episcopate spoke a language different from that of the Vatican.[57]

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Polish primate continued to pursue a cautious policy in its dealings with the state apparatus. In February 1983, he was nominated Cardinal, thereby dissipating rumours that the Pope had been dissatisfied with the Archbishop. On the 19th,

a pastoral letter named the date of the Pope's arrival in the PRL as of June 16, an announcement incidentally made without a formal invitation having been sent by the government. It was only after a new meeting between Jaruzelski and Glemp, in March, that the head of state, Henryk Jabłoński, finally issued an official invitation to the Pope to visit the country between June 16 and 23.

From the time when the state of war was suspended to the Pope's second visit in June 1983, Church-state relations deteriorated significantly. At the heart of the matter lay the Church's position in society perceived by the Party as being too influential. As the PZPR regained its confidence in the long months of 'normalization', it increasingly tried to pressurize the Polish episcopate in complying with the authorities' 'national renewal' policies.

3.4 *The Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Policy.*

A central argument often used in official Polish analyses is that the stabler the domestic environment the greater the possibility and the incentive for the PRL to have a more active foreign policy.[58] Only if the domestic situation is relatively calm and gives no great cause for concern to the leadership, can it afford to make initiatives on the international scene, especially towards the West. Similarly, the stabler the international environment, the more opportunities are made available to develop closer contacts with non-communist countries.

For what it is worth, this argument has a ring of truth to it. Certainly, Poland's geo-political position has meant that its scope of action in the foreign field has always come under certain constraints which has limited its ability and wish for a more assertive role on the international scene. Aside from the obvious limitations imposed on the PRL due to its membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and

its conformity to the political line of the regional sub-system in which it has to evolve, the range of options available to the Polish leadership is also heavily dependent upon the overall domestic situation within the country. As long as the Polish nation exhibits the two fundamental concepts essential for the preservation of the Soviet model in Europe namely, cohesion and viability in the context of the Socialist Bloc[59], and appears to be successful in balancing the two, then it may find some limited measure of autonomy. But in order to reach this position, the Polish leadership has to convince the Kremlin leaders that it is capable of pursuing such a policy without calling into question the principles governing the bloc alliance. Stability at home is one way of doing this. If the Party is seen as firmly in control, the Kremlin's watchdogs might even relax their attention and allow the pursuit of Polish national objectives which may not be *directly* identical with their own (the early Gierek years and the massive influx of Western investments and ideas may be cited as an example here). Further, Polish national interests may also be identical to those of the Soviet Union's, in which case, Polish foreign policy may actually seek the support of its ally (the 'Recovered Western Territories' question for instance, where the PRL's efforts to have the Oder-Neisse line officially recognized by the Bonn government found a helpful ally in the Kremlin).

While the PRL-Soviet context is of primary importance in assessing the nature and scope of the PRL's foreign policy-making, another factor is also highly relevant. The régime's diplomatic and economic relations with non-communist countries (here the attention is predominantly focused on the Western democracies) depends largely on the various contemporary Western leader's *perceptions* of the PRL.

Naturally, the overall international context partly determines the nature of relations between Socialist Poland and the West. In fact, the leading Western countries have a tendency of dealing with this country against the broader background of East-West relations. This surfaced only too clearly during the martial law period although this attitude has never significantly changed ever since the end of the Second World War.[60] It has meant that the successive Polish communist leaderships, in their dealings with Western states, have repeatedly sought to project a favourable image of the PRL abroad in order to obtain from them what they needed for their own internal purposes. Indeed, a large aspect of this public relation objective was intent on altering the traditional Western perceptions of socialist Poland as a Soviet puppet state. The 'independent satellite' description once given to Gomułka's Poland[61] was in this sense a success for the Polish establishment. More recently, the Jaruzelski's régime has shown clearly the priority this objective holds for its policy-making, although in this case, the process has been long and arduous (only in 1984/1985 did the first signs of the PRL's break from international isolation appear). In fact, the slowness of this process and the various factors which affected it provide ample evidence of the nature in which the leadership sought to extricate itself from the position of an international pariah to that of a more respected state.

What is most interesting here is the relationship between the PRL's Western-oriented and Eastern-oriented policy-making. Obviously any analyses of the Polish régime's objectives cannot be fully discussed without consideration of Soviet interests. It would then appear that the PRL has little choice but uphold a consistently eastward orientation. However, the geographical proximity to Western Europe has

meant that it has never been able, nor has ever wanted, to sever its traditional links with non-communist Europe. It is almost a truism to say that Poland is culturally closer to Paris than it is to Moscow. Political and geographical reality has meant that in many respects, the PRL sits astride East and West through psychological closeness to Western Europe and physical attachment to the Soviet bloc. A direct consequence of this has been the careful balancing of the PRL's objectives between East and West. The continuous efforts of the authorities in the attainment of this goal have largely been determined by the contemporary international situation *and* the domestic environment. Since the imposition of martial law, the PRL's policy-making has taken a more distinctive eastward orientation, due partly to the virtual isolation it experienced as Western countries imposed sanctions in protest of the militarization of the Polish society.

Western attitudes towards the PRL in the first half of the 1980s had originated in the perceived abandonment of the hopes created by the Solidarity era and reflected a concern that they should not be allowed to disappear. Three main demands were communicated to the Jaruzelski leadership in order that normal relations be resumed: the end of martial law, the release of all political prisoners and the resumption of a dialogue between the authorities and both the Church and the workers' union. As long as these conditions were not fulfilled, the PRL's contacts with the West would be curtailed. While the sanctions themselves were applied in a variety of ways and intensity, reflecting in large the indecision of Western nations as to the most appropriate conduct towards the PRL, their overall effect has been to isolate socialist Poland from the non-communist world and

restrict considerably its leadership's scope and range of activities on the international scene. However such a result was not without its dilemma for the West. As Timothy Garton Ash wrote,

> If [the West] refused to afford further help to Poland, then it would force the Polish people deeper into economic as well as political misery, thus probably shortening the interval before the next explosion of working class protest. If, however, it aided the régime, then it would facilitate the process of "normalization".[62]

As the martial law and post-martial law periods showed only too clearly, the régime's attempts to re-integrate the international community proved unsuccessful as long as they failed to alter Western perceptions concerning the internal situation of the country. It was only when Jaruzelski felt confident enough with the internal process of 'normalisation', that a definite foreign policy line was taken to improve the PRL's image on the international stage. Indeed, this became one of the PRL's most important goals in the 1980s. In fact appearances would seem to confirm the closeness, indeed the inseparability, between domestic and foreign policy-making during that period. Faced with the task of giving some credibility to its position both at home and abroad, the régime initiated a series of would-be socio-political reforms. These, it hoped, would convince both, on the domestic side, the Polish people and abroad, their former Western partners, that the PRL leadership once again was a credible interlocutor. The way that the USA have responded to the domestic policies of the PRL in the aftermath of the imposition of martial law seemed to confirm the link between PRL domestic and foreign policy successes in the second half of the 1980s. Only when the American administration became convinced that the domestic situation in the country was improving (the release of the last political prisoners in September 1986) did it gradually renew diplomatic and economic

contacts with the authorities. In many ways then, the PRL's domestic policy-making, while directly aimed at specific internal problems, was also indirectly aiming to change the attitudes outside the country's borders, incidentally both in the West *and* in the East.

3.5 *The Foreign Dimension of Martial Law.*

The imposition of a state of war in December 1981 represented a dramatic development in the PRL's socio-political life and was in this sense the climax of perhaps one of the most if not the most, significant event in post World War II Eastern Central European history. The climate of *Détente* which had characterized the 1970s and had fostered economic relations between East and West had resulted for the PRL in a brief period of apparent prosperity. However, very soon, Gierek's foreign economic policy began backfiring. Massive Western investments in forms of credit loans became an increasing burden on the national economy which had been unable to use this financial assistance in a rational way and which was now facing an increasingly larger debt to repay. When Edward Gierek became Party First Secretary on December 19, 1970, he embarked upon an ambitious economic programme. As we saw, the two keys elements which formed the basis of Gierek's strategy were centred upon two goals: a) to satisfy the consumption aspirations of the Polish people and b) to modernize the Polish industry and build a 'Second Poland'. This policy led the leadership in abandoning many planning constraints with, as a result, an investment policy which soon outran its own objectives: in the 1971-1976 5-year plan, investment spending exceeding planned investments by 12.6% in 1972, 30.6% in 1973, 45.8% in 1974 and 85.2% in 1975.[69] Although this had the immediate result of increasing the standards of living by some 40%. and providing a greater variety and

quantity of goods on the market, it soon became apparent that there were serious flaws in Warsaw's economic policies. Throughout the 1970s, Poland became over-dependent on Western imports and the legacy inherited in the 1950s to favour the heavy industry sector of the economy ensured that the traditional ministries (ie. heavy industry, transport, etc.) would receive a lion's share of Western imported capital. Bad management, the absence of a market, a high degree of waste and the importation of Western technology as a substitute for real economic reforms opened the door to a looming economic disaster. By 1978, there was a 2.2% decline in real wages and by 1979, for the fist time in the post-war years the official statistics noted a decline in the Polish national income. Borrowing on increasingly unfavourable terms, Poland's foreign debt with the West took formidable proportions and by 1980, it stood at some $25 billion.

PRL's Hard Currency debt, 1971-1980.

	Total ($bn)	Long	Medium	Short
		(as % of each type)		
1971	0.99	64.6	34.3	1.1
1972	1.25	64.8	34.4	0.8
1973	2.63	62.4	35.0	2.6
1974	5.22	55.9	20.5	16.6
1975	8.39	56.3	25.7	17.8
1976	12.15	54.5	29.2	16.3
1977	14.33	49.8	37.0	13.3
1978	18.63	44.1	41.9	14.2
1979	23.06	41.2	46.6	12.1
1980	25.09	39.8	51.8	8.3

In December 1976 a new economic policy was agreed upon to restore some order into the economy and shift from a policy of expansion to that of a sharp deflation. Investments and imports were cut down dramatically, wages growth was restrained and a major export drive was launched:

Impact of economic manoeuvres on Investments and exports, 1971-79.

(as the annual average % of growth rates)

	1971-75	1976	1977-79
Investment volume	17.8	1.0	-0.9
Import volume	27.3	11.4	-5.8 (with the West only)
Money wages	9.8	9.4	7.6
Export volume	8.5	12.3	3.0 (with the West only)
Cost of living	2.4	4.7	6.8

By 1981, the situation was getting out of hand. The volume of total exports to the West fell by 22.1% while imports declined by more than 30%. At the end of August 1981, the total hard currency debt had passed the $bn 28 mark with medium and long-term debts up to nearly $ 23½ billion. Although the reduction of the working week from 6 to 5 days as a result of Solidarity demands had a profound adverse effect on Polish industrial output, especially coal output, most of the blame should be directed at the long-standing deterioration in the supply system which was never properly handled by the relevant ministries. In addition the very nature of coal exploitation (the premature exhaustion of easily accessible coal reserves often inferior in quality to other fields) contributed to the continuing crisis of the coal industry. The world economic recession of the mid-1970s further fuelled a continuously deteriorating situation for the country. And it was almost with a sense of *déjà vu* that Polish observers witnessed Gierek's fall. It was triggered off by what had traditionally always been seen as a cause of popular dissatisfaction and usually culminating with the fall of the policy-makers, namely the rise in meat prices and other essential commodities. From the time of the first disturbances, occasioned by this decision and Gierek's departure from the political scene, unique developments had taken place in Socialist Poland. For the first time in a communist country,

independent trade unions had been legalised. The famous Baltic Agreements of August 1980 were to become a milestone in the country's history.

Naturally the Polish situation was developing into a massive headache for the Kremlin policy-makers whose appreciation of the dramatic changes taking place at their borders, and the challenges which they were creating, must have been that of complete disbelief and shock. For both strategic and ideological reasons, developments in the PRL represented a clear threat to the cohesion and stability of the European Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union's main political-ideological objectives in the PRL (as elsewhere in Eastern Central Europe) have always been to safeguard the existing communist political system. However, in the case of the Polish régime, the Kremlin's approach has often seemed limited at containing Polish heretics within manageable limits, while at the same time imposing the prescribed orthodoxy.[64] Moscow's choices towards its Polish ally at the height of the crisis would soon become restricted between two alternatives: the disagreeable and the intolerable. To be fair, the rise of Solidarity took everyone by surprise. The speed with which the movement was born and then developed was phenomenal and it is most probable that Poles too were overtaken by their own designs and failed to realize what was happening until it had happened.

In the West the signing of the Gdańsk Agreements and the whole evolution of events was followed attentively and for months the PRL became the focus of attention of the International community. Yet, there was a general attitude of caution towards the Polish events. It was more a case of wait and see, a case of waiting for the Poles to do something else and seeing what the Soviet Union's reaction might be.

In fact, throughout the period under consideration, the West fulfilled to a large extent the role of a passive spectator. An exception here was the US, which reacted very strongly against the proclamation of a state of war. Almost without consulting the rest of the Western camp (the West European governments bitterly complained that President Reagan had barely consulted them, prior to announcing the American sanctions), the US administration decided to press on with 'immediate sanctions' against the PRL. On December 23, 1981, 16 days after the generals had taken over in Poland, President Reagan publicly announced his administration's decision and threatened a similar move against the Soviet Union should the crisis persist. A day earlier, a statement had been issued by the EEC denouncing "the grave violation of the human and civil rights of the Polish people". On the whole, however, the American stand on 'the Polish question' and the general passiveness of the other Western nations were unable to prevent the crushing of the Solidarity movement nor the implementation of an effective retaliatory policy against both the PRL and the Soviet Union once this action had taken place. It is true that in crises touching East Central Europe, the West (and particularly the US) has never seriously attempted to question the legitimacy of Soviet security interests in the region. Further it has also refused to provide military aid to local resistance. In fact it has often sent signals indicating that it would not intervene militarily.[65] As one commentator, describing the attitude of some Western states towards the Polish developments, put it: "The Americans believe in sticks, the Germans in carrots and the French in words".[66] American apparent inability to do anything was surprising in so much as it seems that the Reagan administration was well aware of the details of the plan for the military crackdown, having a spy at Polish Army Headquarters.

Yet it chose not to warn Solidarity leaders, giving as an excuse 'fears for the spy's own security'.[67] Apart from the ulterior motives behind the American's silence, it is of course difficult to say whether this information would have helped in any way to solve anything and whether it would have helped the Solidarity leadership. Whatever the motives, they were certainly clear for the Polish authorities: "Washington hoped that the bid to impose martial law would set off internal strife in Poland which would ignite the situation in Europe".[68] In the end, the Reagan's administration acted the way it did for there probably was little else it could really achieve. As someone said, "cold realpolitik should not be combined with excessive moralism; otherwise it comes too close to moral cynicism".[69]

US sanctions had important effects on Polish-American relations: the export of agricultural products to the country was banned, civil aviation traffic to the US was disallowed, fishing rights for the Polish fishing fleet were withdrawn, and more importantly, the credits and all commercial ties between the two countries were suspended. Additional sanctions were introduced later and amounted to an effective blocking of the debt rescheduling negotiations with the Paris Club countries, the PRL's entry to the IMF and the World Bank. Finally the US government imposed the suspension of all scientific and technical co-operation.

One may identify six main objectives which the US administration sought to achieve by imposing sanctions on the PRL: 1) as an expression of Western sympathy and support for the Polish people; 2) putting into deeds the tough US anti-communist rhetoric which had preceded the imposition of martial law; 3) as a way of defusing the

mounting domestic pressures which were urging the Reagan administration to act in protest of the repression in the PRL; 4) to try and convince the Polish authorities that the US would not conduct normal relations with a government actively involved in repression; 5) to prevent the permanence of martial law in the country and dispel the belief that a return to totalitarism was the only answer to the country's economic problems; 6) to discourage the Soviet Union from supporting a hard-line communist régime which would negate much of the emancipation the Polish nation had gained over the years.[70] Three main conditions would remove the sanctions: an end to martial law, the freeing of all political prisoners and the resumption of a dialogue between the Polish government, the Church and Solidarity.

Although President Reagan appeared resolute to 'punish' the Polish junta, the weeks which followed the imposition of martial law revealed serious uncertainties in the US policy towards the Polish crisis. Three reasons affected the American response:

a) Washington seemed to have difficulties in analysing the crisis (it was reported that the US ambassador in Warsaw, Frank Meehan, thought the situation in Poland to be so unexceptional that he had left the Polish capital on home leave just before martial law was imposed;[71]

b) there were hesitations on the nature of sanctions to be implemented;

c) major uncertainties existed as to the effect the crisis might have on the NATO alliance. The American administration had not bargained for the split which developed among the Western allies as a result.

These doubts were also the reflection of an on-going debate in the corridors of the White House, between those advocating restraint and caution and those in favour of hard hitting measures against the Jaruzelski regime. In the end it would appear that the latter gained the upper hand with Alexander Haig proposing to "optimize the pressure". In his memoirs, the US Secretary of State wrote that "plans for dealing with an internal suppression were however very much less satisfactory" than those which concerned the possibility of a Soviet invasion:

> We had known for many months what we could do in case of direct Soviet intervention; but there was no certain plan of action in the more ambiguous case of internal crackdown.[72]

Eventually Reagan took the step to send a letter both to Jaruzelski and Leonid Brezhnev asking the Polish General to free all prisoners and the re-establishment of civil liberties, and warning his Soviet counterpart that unless repression stopped in the PRL, the US would have no choice but to extend economic and political sanctions against the Soviet Union as well. With the Polish authorities giving no signs that the state of war would soon be lifted, the US also decided to impose economic sanctions on the USSR, attributing to it a major share of the blame for the imposition of martial law by having exerted extraordinary pressure on the Polish Party leadership. Aeroflot flights to the US were suspended, the export licensing system for high technology items was tightened, the Soviet Purchasing Commission in New York was closed, negotiations on a long-term grain agreement were postponed while negotiations concerning a new maritime agreement were suspended; finally certain bi-lateral co-operation agreements - namely, those on energy, space, science and technology - were allowed to lapse. This did not bring unanimity among the ranks of the United States' allies. Unlike some previous major international crises, for

instance, the Cuban crisis in 1962 or the repeated confrontation over Berlin, which all tended to have a unifying effect on the Western alliance, the Polish crisis had a completely opposite effect. This was amply illustrated in the gradual deterioration of relations between the US and its allies which followed the unilateral American declaration of December 23, 1981. Divergences reached a peak in June 1982, when the US administration, recognizing the ineffectiveness of its restrictions on American exports to impede the construction of the natural gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, extended export restrictions to European firms producing pipeline equipment with American licences and to foreign subsidiaries of American companies. This move inflamed Western European governments and even triggered counter-measures from France, Italy and Great Britain. The Western European countries were further unconvinced by the American arguments which tried to differentiate between the exportation of grain (at the time, the US was encouraging the Soviet Union to increase its purchase of American grain) and the importation of natural gas. For the European Community, the Reagan administration "was calling upon others to make sacrifices that it was not prepared to make itself".[73]

The Soviet reaction was unequivocal. For the Kremlin, the American attitude towards the Polish events was showing all the characteristics of blatant interference into the domestic affairs of a communist ally-state and as such was totally unacceptable. In a *Pravda* article reprinted in one of the only two national Polish newspapers still allowed to be published at the beginning of martial law[74], the Soviet writer, Bolshakov wrote that,

> The White House and the Department of State were immediately in favour for the "return of the necessary conditions" for the continuation of "the Polish experiment", in other words, the unrestrained continuation of the counterrevolution. It

> is not a secret that the events in Poland are not just of a political nature for the US, but are also part of a strategic interest. ... Ideological pressure on Poland was achieved through the promotion of a "controlled crisis management", as well as through material aid to opposition groups, under the supervision of the US and other NATO countries' special services. ... The White House and the Department of State, breaking every principle of international law, and doing its best to dictate to the Polish government how to solve its internal problems, is trying to put pressure on Poland. And this is called "non-interference"! No, it was and still is a clear and active policy of interference. Its goal is obvious: the destruction of socialism in Poland and the tearing of this country from the socialist community.[75]

The Polish authorities' reaction to the international community's outcry was at first rather cautious. While denouncing the sanctions, Polish official statements seem to have reflected the concern that any further deterioration in the nature of relations between the PRL and non-communist countries would have very detrimental effects for the country in the long run. In what seemed to be an accommodating gesture, Warsaw lifted censorship regulations on foreign correspondents, restored some telephone links and gave telex lines back to a number of Western embassies.[76] In the first few weeks after the American decision to impose sanctions on Poland, one finds many official Polish declarations which appear to support this. While the overall nature and tone of these articles clearly reflected the authorities' anti-American mood, the hints that Polish-US relations should not be unduly affected by the Polish domestic situation were unmistakable. In a meeting with foreign journalists, the Brigade General, Tadeusz Szacilo, answering questions on what effects the US sanctions were having on Poland, said that,

> American economic sanctions against Poland, which were announced by President Reagan, are a double-edged weapon. On the one hand they admittedly worsen our economic difficulties, but on the other, *they compel us to seek other solutions.* In this perspective, these restrictions are another way of destroying the Polish economy. ... Reagan announced the implementation of sanctions against us, *but it is not known at the moment if they will be implemented.* It

> seems to me that Reagan's performance here will not remain as one of the classic example of contemporary diplomacy. The President of the USA uses human rights principles in a selective manner; we have seen this in the case for instance of, Salvador, Turkey or Ireland. His noises have only one direction for "export". Polish-American relations were formed on the base of mutual sympathy between our nations and *I hope that despite everything, they will improve in the future.*[77] (My italics)

As the passages in italics would seem to indicate, there still was, at this stage, hopes that the American sanctions would not be either implemented or at least would not affect key sectors of the Polish economy. The Jaruzelski régime appeared very conscious about the damaging potentialities which such sanctions might have on the already disastrous state of the national economy, an economy desperately needing new Western loans and credits. During the 1970s, the Polish economy had been oriented towards the use of international markets in order to develop domestic growth. Even if the results were not entirely satisfactory, foreign trade became a factor in itself which made it difficult, if not impossible, to keep to oneself or limit exchange solely with the socialist countries.[78] Because of this, the prospect that Polish foreign economic orientation might have to be re-directed to the East (the reference to "other solutions"), was perhaps not very attractive to the Polish leadership. Even if this was the only available option, any such aid would prove almost certainly insufficient and probably ephemeral. In any case there seemed to have been a clear appreciation that any aid from either the Soviet Union or the other Soviet Bloc allies would be far from sufficient to solve the Polish crisis. As Olechowski, the Deputy Foreign Minister pointed out, "It is improbable that the socialist states can, in the light of their present balance of payment situation, come to our help in a sufficient way to support the production level and the standard of living of the

population".[79] The current state of the Soviet economy supported this view. The imposition of a state of war came at a time when the Soviet Union's hard currency reserves had been declining sharply and while the initial 'fraternal aid' helped to alleviate some of the hardships of the winter months, this was only a short-term assistance programme. Further, a deterioration of Poland's status on the international scene would render more difficult the task of legitimating the régime both abroad and at home. As the Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Czyrek argued,

> The chief task of Polish foreign policy at the moment is to ensure the existence of the most favourable external conditions, both political and economic, in our efforts to overcome the Crisis in Poland by our own means. Of special importance here is ... the inviolable Polish-Soviet alliance and Poland's all-round co-operation with the USSR. It is important to reconstruct and to consolidate our place and our role as a durable link in the political and defensive alliance with the Warsaw Treaty states and develop our active partnership in the economic co-operation between socialist states, both at the bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels, under the auspices of COMECON. ... For our foreign policy at the present, we must bear in mind and avail ourselves of the conditions both internally and externally. Taking into our hands the terribly complicated effort of stabilizing and normalizing the domestic situation will not weaken our action in our relations abroad. We will act, keeping in mind, the continuation and unfolding of our traditional policy for dialogue, the easing of international tensions and the co-operation with all peoples, particularly in Europe, with whom we acted and are acting for the preservation of peace in Europe.[80]

On December 30, the PRL's Deputy Prime Minister, Mieczysław Rakowski, made a surprise two-day visit to Bonn where he had talks with the West German leaders. Nothing concrete came out of this visit if only that the Vice-Premier emphasized that there could be no return to the period before August 1980 just as there could be no return to the period of anarchy before December 13, 1981.[81] Yet, the subsequent West German attitude towards the PRL may have had something to do with this brief encounter. On the whole, the West German management of the

Polish crisis was essentially dedicated to downplaying it. Even if the German *Bundestag* was the first Western parliament to condemn the imposition of a state of war in the PRL and while Rakowski was told that the West German government expected the speedy lifting of martial law, the release of all prisoners and the resumption of the régime's dialogue with the Church and Solidarity, Bonn also spelled out that it would continue to adhere to the principle that the PRL must solve its problems by itself and without interference from abroad. The Schmidt Government had never been enthusiastic about Solidarity and in the aftermath of the imposition of martial law, it was careful not to ruffle Soviet sensitivities by initially denying any Soviet responsibility for the Jaruzelski coup. In a move to stave off new domestic unrest that might trigger a Soviet intervention after all, Bonn helped to launch a massive food campaign for Poland, instructing the West German post office not to charge any postage for food parcels sent to the Polish state. West Germany equally dashed American hopes on sanctions when Chancellor Schmidt, speaking in Florida where he was on holiday, said that "we would find it very difficult to apply sanctions ourselves against Poland". He even added that he thought that "sanctions, economically speaking, are not really of great effect".[82] Overall this opinion was also shared by the banking world. As roughly 50% of the PRL's hard currency debt was made up of private bank loans, the eventuality of having to write off these very loans must have caused great anxiety to the banks concerned. For this reason, it is not unreasonable to presume that the military take-over must have been a relief for many of them as it was seemingly putting an end to a situation which the banking world must have perceived as hardly conducive to a speedy repayment of the loans. As the head of Citibank's international division explained, "Who knows which

political system works? The only thing we care about is: can they pay their bills"?[83]

On January 4, 1982, the European Community's Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss the Polish situation and consider a collective response to the events there as well as air out their degree of support for Reagan's call for sanctions against the Soviet Union. The meeting aimed primarily on reconciling their own differences over how to react to convince the Polish military government that it will inevitably face European reprisals if it did not relax its crackdown on Solidarity. In the final communiqué a five point programme was presented:

a) a solemn warning was issued to the Warsaw Treaty Organization against any intervention in Poland;

b) a call was made for "close and positive consultations" with the US and other Western governments to avoid "any step which would compromise" President Reagan's sanctions against the USSR;

c) a pledge to secure condemnation of the Polish crackdowns as a grave violation of the Helsinki Final Act at the forthcoming Conference On Security and Co-operation In Europe, to be held in Madrid on February 9;

d) a pledge to secure at the UN "denunciations of human rights violations and accompanying acts of violence":

e) to implement moves to suspend credits, economic assistance and cut price food sales to Poland. In addition, the European Community will consider reducing the volume of its imports from the Soviet Union.[84]

An attempt to dispatch Mr. Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign

Minister, as an emissary both to Warsaw and Moscow, was opposed and finally blocked by France and Greece. In all, the Western response was rather low-key and showed many signs of disunity among the members of the Western Alliance. Contrary to the Reagan administration, the West Europeans did not believe that economic sanctions could produce tangible results. More significantly, the prospect of the PRL defaulting on its foreign loans and thereby upsetting the international banking system, would have meant that the Europeans stood to lose a lot more than the Americans in this matter. Another aspect of this reticence to act was based upon the fear that Socialist Poland would be drawn even further into the grip of its eastward neighbour. Only the NATO meeting of January 11, 1982 seemed to have unified the Western Alliance stand on the Polish crisis with the issuing of a strongly worded communiqué in which, for the first time, the NATO countries agreed to suspend negotiations with the Polish government on the rescheduling of the official debt owed to Western governments in 1982. The communiqué urged the PRL's authorities to end the state of war, release those arrested and restore immediately a dialogue with the Church and Solidarity. At the same time, it strongly criticized the role of the Soviet Union in the Polish crisis and hinted that the future of economic and commercial relations between the USSR and the NATO members countries would have to be re-examined.[85] Even so, individual countries' responses varied. On February 5, 1982, Britain became the first European nation to join the US sanctions. On the 22nd, Belgium followed suit and announced that it would suspend Polish debt-rescheduling talks, suspend scientific and technical accords, and carefully review Polish applications for trade visas. Japan, a day later, imposed limited sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union. Canada too, on February 24, 1982, imposed a

number of economic sanctions against Poland, which included suspension of new commercial credits for goods other than food and the delay of Polish debt rescheduling negotiations. In France, the Reagan administration's abrupt call for economic sanctions without prior consultation with the NATO allies had triggered profound criticisms of the American line and further contributed to the French doubts as to the effectiveness of the sanctions. While the French assured the Americans that they would not undermine their sanctions, at the end of January 1982, Paris signed a major contract with Moscow for a share in the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline. In Bonn, the *Bundestag* rejected a resolution calling for economic sanctions and although the West German government later decided to withhold direct economic aid to the PRL and suspend negotiations with the Soviet Union on further scientific, technological and shipping agreements, the overall reaction was that of caution. An outright Soviet Pact intervention might have made things clearer in the minds of Western politicians. Yet the question still remains whether the NATO countries would have been able to react in any other way. The West's potential for influencing the course of events in the PRL, or anywhere else in the Socialist Bloc, has always been constrained by the fact East Central Europe represents a fundamental security interest for the Soviet Union. As such, economic or political leverage attempts by the West are always sure of encountering fierce and determined Soviet resistance and thus be in a majority of cases ineffective. It is therefore doubtful that the Western nations could have acted differently from their response to the 1956 and 1968 crises in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. What more could they have done for Poland in 1981?

The Western response to the imposition of martial law triggered a

sharp *riposte* from the PRL's authorities. In an article entitled "Our open policy", it was written that,

> Not only us, but also an objective observer, can read this pressure as an attempt to destabilize Socialist Poland and prepare the ground for creating "a Polish crisis" of an international dimension. This is contrary to the lessons of the past, of Europe's need and necessity to preserve a climate of moderation in East-West relations. ... Poland has not changed and will not change its place on the world's political map, nor will it alter its stand on international problems. We still want to pursue an open foreign policy as established by Polish traditions. We do not want to lock ourselves inside four walls, to isolate ourselves from the international community. ... Settled and friendly relations in Europe are necessary for all states.[66]

The reference to the Madrid Conference particularly incensed the authorities who described such attempts as gross interference in Polish domestic affairs. "The Polish delegation goes to Madrid with the intention, neither to discuss the internal affairs of other countries, nor the domestic affairs of Poland", said a commentary in *Trybuna Ludu* (January 9). The head of the PRL delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister, Józef Wiejacz warned that his country would withdraw from the conference should any attempt be made to discuss the country's internal situation. It was around this time that a first allusion was being made by the authorities of a linkage between the events in the PRL and European peace and security: "the introduction of a state of war has not changed Poland's foreign policy. It threatens nobody. On the contrary, the risk has been averted of dismantling the Polish state, which *could have been of serious consequences for the stability in Europe*" (My italics).[67] Up till now the régime's justification for the imposition of a state of war had suggested that it had forestalled the eventuality of a Soviet Pact intervention, even if this was never implicitly stated. It would appear that the emphasis was now changing to stress that the possible effect of any such developments would have affected directly the

situation in Europe. This had the advantage, from a propagandist point of view, of shifting the onus onto the West to recognize the European context in which the Polish developments were unravelling and shifting the attention away from it being merely a situation concerning one country. In the months that ensued, a great deal of effort on the part of the PRL's authorities went into propagating this argument forward. Yet, it seemed to have had little effect on Western policies.

By this time Jaruzelski was facing three major problems. The main one was economic: how to put an end to the economic collapse and improve the overall situation, however slightly. The second problem was political: how to replace the military authorities with a more conventional form of rule where the Party would be seen as having regained its 'leading role'. The third and last one was to find a way of convincing the disillusioned Poles to co-operate with the régime in both tasks. Threatened by the restrictions imposed on the PRL by the West, the national economy was made to suffer accrued difficulties and any schemes to improve the situation heavily compromised. However it must be stressed that by this time, the PRL's economy needed more than just a new influx of foreign credits. While the absence of such economic aid from the West did create general problems for the central planners, the roots of the crisis lay elsewhere. Even if Western credits had been forthcoming, a solution to the catastrophic situation was still a long way ahead. As Jerzy Urban, the government's spokesman said in 1982, answering questions from foreign journalists on the effects of the Western sanctions on Polish society, *władza się zawsze wyżywi* (we - the ruling establishment - shall always eat well"), admirably summarizing, however cynically, the authorities' position on the restrictions imposed by the West.[88]

A recurrent theme began appearing in Polish commentaries at this time. Countering American justifications that the sanctions would be directed at the régime, it was repeated *ad nauseam* that the Polish people would be the first to experience the hardships caused by the sanctions. This reflected mainly the leadership's realization that unless something could be done to improve the lot of ordinary Poles, it would become very difficult to proceed with a successful 'normalization' of the country. And the longer this would be the case, the harder it would become for Jaruzelski to impose his rule over the Polish society. As the reported continuation of incidents throughout the country showed, the military were still struggling in their task of 'normalizing' the situation. Another crucial factor was the Soviet Union. The longer the crisis in Poland, the less support would Jaruzelski be able to expect from his eastward neighbour. For the Kremlin, despite all the positive aspects the imposition of martial law had reaped for the Soviet bloc, it had also affected its relations with the United States and revived the spectre of the Cold War (the more so with the continuing war in Afghanistan). More importantly, it had raised fundamental questions about the nature of communist power and the future of the Soviet Union's largest ally in the Warsaw Pact. After all, this was the first time a country within the Soviet sphere of influence had a military government at its head. Ideologically too, the PRL was far from presenting a cohesive picture: the state of the Polish Communist Party was causing great concern to the Kremlin leaders. The prospect of the PRL becoming an economic burden as Western aid was halted or diverted cannot have been seen by the Kremlin leaders as a very satisfactory outcome and certainly not on a long-term basis. The announcement of a Soviet long-term credit of 2.700 million roubles to cover the PRL's trade deficit with the Soviet

Union in the past year was made on January 6, but this was a long way from solving the Polish economic crisis.

The Polish-Soviet joint communiqué at the end of Foreign Minister Czyrek's visit to Moscow on January 10 1982, clearly expressed the identity of views of the régimes on the subject of Western sanctions:

> The Foreign Ministers strongly denounced the latest steps taken by the US administration against the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union. Both sides view those activities as an attempt to hamper the normalization of the situation in Poland and its emergence from the crisis and to subvert the socialist foundations of People's Poland, and also as an attempt to turn Poland into a seat of tension in Europe. ... The Soviet Union and Poland strongly reject the statement of the Brussels' meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries of January 11, 1982, as an attempt at grossly interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, the Polish People's Republic.[89]

Again, at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which took place in Madrid on February 9, the head of the PRL delegation, Józef Wieczak, made a passionate intervention in which he described the Western reactions to the imposition of martial law as the result of a "psychological-political war" against Poland. While he warned his audience that any attempt to use the current situation in the PRL as a pretext for global strategic goals was doomed to failure, he also made a parallel between continuing sanctions and the duration of martial law. Expressing the desire for its speedy removal, he complained that the authors of the "brutal campaign" against Poland (he singled out in particular the United States), were doing everything to impede this process and that any form of dialogue was made impossible because of that policy. What is perhaps most interesting here, is the reappearance of a theme which, throughout the crisis, was constantly used by the authorities in order to try and defuse the adverse international reaction to the Polish developments; again and again, the PRL's domestic situation was presented against the background of

European security and identified as a crucial factor in the preservation of stability on the continent. By drawing a link between European stability and the PRL's internal situation, a strong connection was being made between the domestic and external factors directly influencing the nature of the PRL's policy-making. As Vice-Foreign Minister Wieczak pointed out,

> We will do everything in our power to ensure that the Polish crisis is not used against the easing of tensions and European stability. Poland will not become a pretext to return to the Cold War.[90]

This close identification between Polish national interests and European stability was heavily stressed by Warsaw. Two main considerations were thus shaping the Polish authorities' stand on this question:

a) The worse the international situation, the more likely the pressure from the Soviet Union to speed up the 'normalization process' in socialist Poland. Already facing the prospect of having to turn eastward for assistance in the wake of Western economic sanctions, Jaruzelski had to try to persuade the Kremlin leaders that he was in control of the situation and that the PRL should not become an untimely burden for the Soviet Union, either economically or politically. The longer the crisis, the more likely that Moscow would soon voice its doubts as to the value of the Jaruzelski leadership. While the imposition of a state of war must have been seen by the Soviet Union as a successful operation, it was still too early to say that 'socialist normality' had returned to the PRL. In that sense, the police/military régime still had to prove itself as instrumental in bringing back stability in one of the main links binding the socialist bloc together. The quicker this could be done, the greater the margin of manœuvre for the generals. And this highlighted another aspect of

Polish 'normalization' policies namely, that the imposition of a state of war did provide Jaruzelski with some measure of leverage vis-à-vis Moscow; he had proved his ability to stop the 'counterrevolution' and now needed all the available support from Moscow to carry out the next phase of consolidation to ensure Polish stability within the Soviet bloc. The Party was in disarray and it was in his interest to persuade the Kremlin leaders that no-one else could succeed in carrying out this task.

b) At home, the situation was still uncertain. The primary tasks of the régime, after the suppression of 'open opposition', was to re-assert the PZPR as the leading political force in the country. Obviously, martial law was helpful in this respect: the partial militarization of the state and party apparatus enabled the authorities to press on with purges within the Party[91] and reinforce central command over the economy. A clear allusion to the beneficial aspects of martial law as providing the right conditions for a complete reorganization of the party was given by Politburo member, W. Mokrzyszczak in an interview to *Reczszpospolita*[92]. Yet, it was not surprising that such measures as the practice of signing a pledge of loyalty to the régime and the whole 'verification process' hardly made the authorities more popular in the eyes of the population. What was needed was the quick implementation of a series of socio-economical measures destined to persuade the nation that the 'road to anarchy' had ended and that the régime was now determined to put the nation back onto 'a new right track'. There was to be no return to the errors of the past.... One of the priorities was the imperative to reactivate an almost moribund economy and especially find a solution to the external debt problem. This would involve active participation

on the international scene and required above all an adequate external climate (hence the recurring calls for a stable international environment). Economic aid from the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist bloc allies, however, would not be enough to pull the Polish ally out of its current situation. While it is true that the Soviet Union was in a position to cover most of the PRL's indispensable requirements in industrial raw materials, the curtailment of sophisticated industrial inputs and spare parts from the West would seriously affect Polish ability to produce competitive and profitable exports, the prerequisites for servicing the country's foreign debt and the financing of its current and future requirements. Without a doubt this is to remain a major problem for the PRL as it nears the end of the century. The daunting prospect of being unable to update its industrial infrastructure and stem the inevitable disintegration of the existing machinary will have catastrophic results on the national economy and on the PRL's position in a world where, increasingly, new technologies and forms of production are determining the viability and stature of nations. Notwithstanding the limited aid the COMECON countries might give the PRL, the Polish industrial sector still required essential spare parts to maintain machinary purchased in the West during the 1970s and additional parts and equipment to complete the large numbers of semi-finished industrial development projects launched at the time. To this day stands in the middle of Warsaw, in front of the Central railway Station, a huge unoccupied and slowly deteriorating skyscraper, a monument, among others, to the false expectations engendered during and by the Gierek administration.

Western support was therefore vital for the PRL. This is why, despite all its propagandistic rhetoric, the Jaruzelski régime was

still seeking assistance from the West. And only in conditions conducive to relations of a friendlier nature could this be achieved. Hence the concern for a more suitable international climate. Further, any success in having the new Polish régime accepted on the international scene was also perceived as a way for the authorities of gaining greater acceptance for their policies inside Poland. It was thus faced with a dilemma: while there existed real *political incentives* to seek a stabilization of the Polish economy through greater reliance on the COMECON countries, at the same time, there were also powerful *economic constraints* on this option.[93]

The correlation between the domestic and the foreign dimensions was made explicit in Jaruzelski's speech at the VIIth KC Plenum, the first one since the imposition of the state of war. It is worth quoting here extensive extracts as they clearly illustrate the points made earlier on. After opening his address with a sharp attack on Reagan's "anti-Polish" campaign, he went on to say that,

> Poland is being treated as an instrument, as one of pressure levers operated against the Soviet Union and the socialist community. ... Poland is no small country. Its demographic and industrial potential, geographic position and military importance are valued very highly in Europe and the world. But at the same time our country has become, for a short period of time, a weakened link in the socialist system. ... The process of dismantling the socialist community link by link, the rolling back of European history by a whole epoch was to have begun with Poland. We have thwarted that intention. *The state of war in our country has become in effect an anti-war state* [stanem antywojennym]*; it has removed and at least considerably reduced for the present moment the threat of confrontation.* ... Perhaps history one day will state that just as World War II began over Poland, World War III did not begin in Poland. ... We took the decision to introduce the state of martial law solemnly, on our own responsibility, motivated by the interests of the nation and the socialist state. Nobody dictated that decision to us. ... We have always stated clearly and unambigously that counterrevolution will not pass. We have kept our word.
>
> Counterrevolution has not passed. Hopes of turning back events in Poland are a dangerous illusion and a dangerous blunder. One cannot turn back the course of history. The spring will belong neither to us nor to you [a reference to

> the Solidarity slogan which was popular at the time: "The winter is yours, the spring will be ours! There will be quite simply a Poland which is socialist. ... We must stand firmly on our feet and be a worthy participant in the international economic life, *which includes being a worthy partner for Western countries*. We are proud of our European heritage, of Poland's contribution over many centuries to the culture and civilization of our continent and of struggle for freedom and progress to other nations. We do not fence ourselves off from Europe and the world. *We want to maintain ties*. ... Martial law is not an objective in itself. We regard it as a stage in the regaining of an equilibrium, in the overcoming of the toughest threshold of the crisis.[94] (My Italics)

Seven years later, Jaruzelski would declare that the imposition of a state of war had "saved Solidarity".[95] Without it, the General argued, the movement would have completely ceased to exist. In the months that followed the December 13 proclamation, he was of course unaware that in a few years' time, his representatives would be sitting at the same table as those who had been interned, persecuted and tried throughout the martial law period and after. At the time, his immediate objectives were to restore a semblance of stability, re-build the Party, eliminate the 'opposition' and persuade the outside world to let socialist Poland regain its place on the international arena. The years that followed showed him how hard these tasks would be.

Chapter 3 Notes.

1. *Pan Tadeusz*, Book 12.
2. Roger Boyces Warsaw Diaries, *The Times*, 13/1/1982.
3. Dieter Bingen, 'The role of the Soviet Union in the Polish crisis' in *The Soviet Union in 1982-83*, London, Holmes & Meier, 1985, p. 237.
4. Despite the initial confusion and apprehensions, the sight of Polish army units brought relief to many Poles.
5. General Kiszczak's speech in *Trybuna Ludu*, 17/9/1982.
6. Almost too well-planned: on the lists drawn out of those to be arrested figured names of people who were not in the country at the time!
7. Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry, 'The military as a political actor in Poland', in Kolkowicz and Korbonski, *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 159-180.
8. For a recent analysis of Party-military relations, see Andrzej

Korbonski, 'Poland, the changed relationship between the Polish United Workers Party and the Polish People's Army', in Simon Jeffrey and Gilberg Trond eds., *Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Boulder & London, Westview Press, 1986, pp. 257-275.

9. "The State Council may proclaim martial law on part or on the whole of the territory of the Polish People's Republic, if this is necessitated by considerations of the defence or security of the state...". Art. 33 § 2 *Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej*, KiW, Warszawa, 1983.
10. *Ojczyzna nasza znalazła się nad przepaścią*, *Trybuna Ludu*, 14/12/1981. It is worth recalling here what Gomułka had said shortly after the proclamation of the PRL: "The pre-war government brought the country to the edge of the abyss and we, the Party, made the next step".
11. *Newsweek*, January 4, 1982.
12. *Mała Encyclopedia Wojskowa*, MON, Warszawa, 1976.
13. The article in *Rzeczpospolita*, 5 March 1982, by Maria Regent-Lechowicz, "Stan Wojenny a prawo międzynarodowe", in which the author presents an official justification for the imposition of a state of war , showing its legality within the framework of the PRL constitution and in accordance with the regulations set out by the UN charter.
14. Michael Chęchinski, *Terror and Politics in Communist Poland*, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, October 1983.
15. Ibid, pp. 76-78.
16. For an illuminating account of the way in which the régime used the Law for its own political purposes, see Andrzej Swidlicki, *Political Trials in Poland, 1981-1986*, Croom and Helm, London 1988.
17. Adam Michnik, 'We are all hostages', *Der Spiegel*, 8 March 1982. Also in *Telos*, Winter 82/83, p. 174.
18. It is interesting to note the different opening used by Edward Gierek when he made his speech on Polish Television as the new First secretary: "*In the name of the Party*, I am appealing to you in the name of the Party; on December 13th, Jaruzelski began with "Citizens of the Polish People's Republic, I address you as a soldier, as the chief of the Polish government. I address you on the most important affair."
19. Casimir Garnysz's article in *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1984, pp. 51-59.
20. The full text was printed in *Trybuna Ludu*, 14/12/1981.
21. In the Confederation of Targowica in 1792, Polish magnates, influenced and inspired by Catherine II's Russia, decided to unite and fight constitutional reforms, calling on Russian troops for help, which led to the second Polish partition.
22. This was described to me by a well-informed source in December 1987.
23. David S. Mason, *The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982*, *Slavic Review*, (1) 1984.
24. Jan B. de Weydenthal,' Martial Law and the Reliability of the Polish Military',in *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability*, Daniel N. Nelson ed., Boulder, Westview Press, 1984.
25. Ibid.
26. *Trybuna Ludu*, 14/12/1982.
27. Swidlicki, *The Political Trials in Poland 1981-1986*, London, Croom and Helm, 1988, p. 39.

28. *Rzeczpospolita*, 11/2/1982, p. 4 (M. Kamiński, "Trudny proces - Stan Wojenny i reforma gospodarcza").
29. Interview of gen. Kiszczak in *Polityka*, Nr. 24, 14/6/1986.
30. Jadwiga Staniszkis, 'Martial law *in Poland*', *Telos*, Winter 1982-1983, p. 89.
31. Tadeusz Podgórski, 'Polish People's Republic Generals', *Polish Affairs*, No. 113-114, Spring/Summer 1984, p. 23.
32. Ross Johnson, 'The Polish Military', in *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean. Alexander Alexiev, Crane Russak, New York, 1982, p. 39; For an excellent discussion on the links tying the PRL's armed forces and the Party see, *Poland's Politicized Army*, George Malcher, Praeger, New York, 1984, and 'The Military as a Political Actor in Poland', Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry in *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats*, Roman Kołkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982. For an interesting article on the development of the PRL's armed forces, see Korbonski, 'The Polish army', in J.R. Adelman, *Communist Armies in Politics*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Special Studies, 1982, pp. 103-127.
33. *Trybuna Ludu*, 14/12/1982, p. 2.
34. *Poland under Martial Law. A Chronology of Events, 13 December 1981 - 30 December 1982. Radio Free Europe*, Background Report, Chronology 5 (Poland), 1 July 1983.
35. George Sanford, *Military Rule in Poland. the Rebuilding of Communist Power 1981-1982*, London, Croom and Helm, 1986, p. 33.
36. *Polityka*, March 6, 1982, p. 1, article by J. Cegła.
37. *Trybuna Ludu*, 8/01/1982.
38. *Trybuna Ludu*, 16 /2/1982.
39. *Nowe Drogi*, 3/394, 1982, pp. 28-29.
40. Roger Boyes, *The Times*, 29/10/1982.
41. *Rzeczpospolita*, 15/02/1982.
42. *Trybuna Ludu*, 19/1/1989.
43. Paul Lewis, 'The Polish party apparatus: change in provincial First secretaries 1975-1984', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXVIII No. 3, July 1986, pp. 369-386.
44. For a short but excellent account of the role of the Church during this period see, Jonathan Luxmoore, 'The Polish Church under Martial Law', in *Religion in Communist Lands*, vol. 15 No. 2, Summer 1987.
45. The Social Doctrine of the Church holds that all established power comes from God and that power is stable and durable. There is therefore an obligation to obey the representatives of this power. However this view is only valid if Christians are free to excerce their religion unhindered. The obligation to obey 'Power' must be wawed if the 'Power' brakes any tenets of Christian morality.
46. *Od Trzynastego do Trzynastego*, Piotr Spiski, Polonia, London, 1983, p. 14.
47. *Next to God...Poland, op cit.*, p. 187.
48. *Le Monde*, 18/12/1981.
49. *Next to God...Poland, op cit.*, p. 163.
50. The oath read: "I hereby declare that I have today acquainted myself with the statement of the Chief of the Ministerial Council's Office dated 17 December 1981 and I fully confirm my knowledge of the fact that I bear the duty to behave according to the principles of the people's rule of law. Guided by public interest and the principles of building socialism I undertake at the same time to defend by all my actions the authority of the

people's authorities, strictly carrying out the instructions of my superiors at work, always having regard to the socialist development of the Polish People's Republic and keeping faith with the People's State. Taking account of the fact that many organs of NSZZ Solidarność leadership have in recent months openly stood up against the constitutional organs of power and administration, working with a counterrevolutionary aim for the overthrow of the socialist system, I declare that I resign from this union". A copy of the oath was communicated to me while I was in Poland.

51. *Le Monde*, 23/1/1982.
52. For a revealing account of the conditions of life for those interned, see, Jan Muir, *A Prisoner of Martial Law*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, London, 1984;, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, *Internowanie*, Aneks. London 1982 and Waldemar Kuczyński, *Obóz*, Aneks, London 1983.
53. *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 5/82/700.
54. *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 10/82/705.
55. April 5, 1982; for the full text see, *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 17/82/712.
56. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 23, 1982 in *Current Digest of Soviet Press* (thereafter referred to as *CDSP*), Vol. XXXIV, No 25 pp. 19-20.
57. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No 37, December 18, 1981.
58. M. Dobroczyński and J. Stefanowicz, *Stosunki Wschód-Zachód*, PWN, Warszawa, 1980; Edward J. Paługa, *Dyplomacja Polski Ludowej 1944-1984*, Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, warszawa, 1986; Longin Pastusiak, *Stany Zjednoczone-Europa Zachodnia, Polska*, GLOB, Szczecin, 1987.
59. J.F Brown, *Relations between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies: A Survey*, Rand Papers, 1975.
60. Lincoln Gordon, *Eroding Empire. Western Relations with Eastern Europe*, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1987.
61. H. Stehle, *The Independent Satellite*, New York, Praeger, 1965.
62. *The Polish Revolution*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1983, p. 331.
63. Unless otherwise stated, the figures cited have been taken from George Blazyca's *Poland to the 1990s*, *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, no. 1061, August 1986.
64. Korbonski, 'Soviet policy towards Poland', in SM Terry, 1984, pp. 61-91.
65. Jiri Valenta, 'The explosive Soviet periphery', *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1983 (51), pp. 84-100.
66. Joffe, 'French policy toward Eastern Europe', in Lincoln Gordon, *Eroding Empire...*, *op cit.*, p. 216.
67. David Martin, 'A Polish agent in place', *Newsweek*, 20 December 1982.
68. Jerzy Urban's Press Conference, *Rzeczpospolita*, 8/6/1986.
69. A. Walicki, 'The main components of the situation in Poland: 1980-83', *Politics*, 19(1), May 1984, p. 7.
70. M.S. Daoudi and M.S. Dajani, 'Poland: The Politactics of Sanctions', in *The Polish Review*, Vol. XXX No 2, 1985, pp. 149-166.
71. *The Financial Times*, 7/1/1982, p. 2.
72. Alexander Haig, *Caveat. Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy*, Macmillan, New York, 1984, p. 247.
73. Paul Marantz, Poland and East-West Relations, in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 25, no. 3. September 1983. p. 415. In his article, Maranzt argues that the Polish crisis had a greater impact upon the Western Alliance than the Western Alliance had on the Polish

crisis and examines the reasons why this was so.

74. *Trybuna Ludu* and *Żołnierz Wolności*. 16 regional newspapers were also published without interruption. On January 14, 1982, a new title appeared: *Rzeczpospolita*. 3 days later, *Życie Warszawy* , *Tu i Teraz* and *Przegląd Tygodniowy* re-appeared on newspaper stands followed on February 20, by *Polityka*. As it turned out, official newspapers appeared back on the stalls fairly quickly.
75. *Trybuna Ludu*, 28/12/1981.
76. *The Times*, 11/1/1982.
77. *Trybuna Ludu*, 30/12/1981.
78. Georges Mink and Anita Tiraspolsky, 'La Pologne prisonnière de la dependance Est-Ouest', *Le Courrier des Pays de L'Est*, No 260, March 1982.
79. *Polityka*, 20 March 1982, pp. 17-18; see also his other article, 'Is re-orientation a way-out of the situation?', *Polityka*, 24 April 1982.
80. *Trybuna Ludu*, 31/12/1981.
81. *Trybuna Ludu*, 2/1/1982.
82. *The Guardian*, 4/1/1982.
83. Quoted by Timothy Garton Ash in *The Polish Revolution*, *op cit.*, p. 329.
84. *Le Monde*, 6/1/1982.
85. *Department of State Bulletin*, February 1982, No 2059.
86. *Trybuna Ludu*, 6/1/1982.
87. *Trybuna Ludu*, 9/02/1982.
88. This was of course more a blunder of speech than anything else, yet this mishap was characteristic in what it implied.
89. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/1/1982.
90. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13-14/2/1982.
91. In particular an article in *Trybuna Ludu*, January 8, 1982 urging "a purification of the ranks"; also, Jerzy Urbanski's call in *Trybuna Ludu*, January 11, 1982 for a major purge of the party and the trade unions - he was the chairman of the PZPR Central Party Control Commission.
92. *Rzeczpospolita*, 9/1/1982: 'Ideological and political consolidation of the Party'.
93. Cam Hudson, *RFE/RL, Background Report* No 63, 16 March, 1983.
94. *Trybuna Ludu*, 25/2/1982.
95. Press Conference by General Jaruzelski after the 10th KC Plenum in January 1989, *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/1/1989.

Rex regnat, sed non goubernat.
Jan Zamoyski (1542-1605)

CHAPTER 4

CONSOLIDATION OF POWER.

Written some four centuries earlier, the remark that in Poland, "the king reigns but does not govern", has an analogous meaning for the PRL in 1982. Though are obvious historical differences, the fact remains that by taking the decision to impose a state of war, General Jaruzelski was now reigning over a militarized society; but his ability to govern the chaotic situation still prevailing in the country was being seriously impaired by the absence of a coherent policy designed to put the country back on its feet. And of course, Jaruzelski may have been the country's ruler, but no one doubted that even if Polish tanks were ensuring that order was prevailing, Moscow's directives kept on arriving in the Polish capital, keeping the new Polish leadership under constant observation. The General's main concern appeared limited to strengthening his own position and slowly re-introduce some, but not all, elements of the *status quo ante*. In a paradoxical way (if one listened to the arguments put forward by the authorities to justify it), the very existence of the state of war was detrimental to any plans for achieving this objective. Thus the question was raised, almost immediately as the state of war was implemented, when would it be 'safe' again to lift it. At the same time, the duration of martial law was providing the Generals with an ideal *okazja zrobienia porządku* - an ideal opportunity to put the Polish house in order. Also, there was a pressing need to re-assure the PRL's allies that the trust impaired upon Jaruzelski and his team

had been well-founded.

4.1 *The 'Fraternal' Context.*

It is significant to note how long it took for the state of war to be formally endorsed by the PRL's parliament. More than a month after the December 13 declaration, the Sejm finally 'approved' the decision on 25 January 1982. This belated 'ratification' was by itself in fact nothing more than a propaganda exercise, the purpose of which was, to say the least, unclear for the majority of Poles. What was clear however, was that force and not law was the real source behind the imposition of martial law.' In any case it changed nothing. With 'domestic normalization' under way, it was time for the Jaruzelski régime to turn its attention to its socialist allies and return to less ambiguous relations with them after the tumultuous events of the past few months. The PRL's public relations machine had to explain the concrete, present and future implications of the military take-over and reassure the socialist community that the situation was now at last under control.

Overall there had been unanimous consensus among the PRL's five WTO allies that the imposition of a state of war had been necessary and later that it had been a successful bid to restore 'socialist normality'. With various degrees of enthusiasm for Jaruzelski's decision (Romania was noticeably less effusive than the rest of the bloc), all the active bloc members of the region emphasized the necessity of martial law and insisted that the General's actions had quickly created the required conditions for a restoration of order and peace in the PRL. Even the most extreme actions on part of the repressive Polish authorities were praised and described as encouraging signs that the Polish situation was returning to normal.

The larger the number of arrests of various 'counter-revolutionaries, the more numerous the commentaries (especially Czech and East German) insisting that the situation was 'easing'.[2] None of the PRL's Warsaw Pact allies displayed any of the uncertainties which had characterized the Western reaction. With increasing Western European resistance to American pressures for sanctions against the PRL and the Soviet Union, the WTO member states made the most of the apparent lack of unity in the Western camp. They attacked bitterly the sanctions as an unwarranted effort to interfere in the internal matters of the PRL, supporting their views by the argument that the decision to implement the state of war had been a sovereign one, made by the Polish leadership. The Soviet Union had responded to the declaration of a state of war in the PRL surprisingly quickly. Radio Moscow announced the formation of WRON and the imposition of martial law at 0900, Moscow Time, only one hour after General Jaruzelski had broadcast his proclamation. An hour later, Radio Moscow carried the first lengthy excerpts from Jaruzelski's speech, giving details of the measures taken and repeated them four times later in the morning. A full text of the speech was broadcast later in the day. In the evening a first reference to the actual situation in the PRL and the effects of the new measures on the country claimed that with the introduction of martial law in Warsaw, Gdańsk and the majority of other regions of the country, a calm atmosphere had been on the whole maintained.[3] The certain fact that the Kremlin knew about the decision to impose a state of war in the PRL did not mean that the Soviet leaders were entirely confident in the success of the operation. Caught in an earlier dilemma of reconciling their wish for stability and conformity and having to chose between a military intervention and a reliance on the Polish communists' own efforts to stabilize the internal

situation, they had appeared indecisive over the possibility of finding a political solution to the crisis (ie. the least costly alternative). The first Soviet authoritative commentary on the declaration of a state of war was a TASS statement on Radio Moscow on Monday December 14, 1981.[4] It was a carefully worded expression of the official Soviet position on what had taken place in the PRL. It denoted a certain reserve, dictated probably by uncertainty about how successful the Polish authorities' action would prove to be in the long-run. In the weeks that followed, three main themes appeared in Soviet commentaries. First of all, it was stated that the situation in the PRL was returning to normal as a direct result of imposition of the state of war and the Polish authorities' success in foiling the counterrevolution. Secondly, the US was severely criticized for interfering in the PRL's internal affairs and American assertions that Moscow had been behind the measures taken in the PRL turned to ridicule. Thirdly, the US was portrayed as receiving little support from its allies in its attempts to impose sanctions on the PRL. On the whole, the picture presented was that of a socialist Poland regaining a semblance of normality in the face of the desperate efforts by the American nation to reactivate the counterrevolution:

> Driven into a fury by the failure of its plans to overthrow ... the socialist structure in Poland and restore capitalism in that country, the US administration is making convulsive attempts to hinder the normalization of the situation in Poland and prevent the Polish people from extracting itself from the crisis caused by the conspiracy of the counterrevolution.[5]

As the successful implementation of the state of war in the PRL became more obvious, the Kremlin then shifted its attention to two main areas. The first one concerned the implementation of measures to counter the effects of the Polish events on the international arena and their repercussions on the Soviet Union. With the announcement

that the US would also be applying sanctions against the USSR, Moscow began accusing the Reagan administration of being in violation of the Helsinki Agreements, thereby trying to heighten world tension and destroy the fabric of East-West détente. The second area concerned the internal developments in the PRL. The big concern now was to ensure that the PZPR regained its leading position. In the light of the Western sanctions, also appeared the first signs that Moscow was determined to use the occasion to reinforce the unity of the socialist bloc. A lengthy article appeared in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* describing the causes behind the Polish economic crisis.[6] It is worth here summarizing it as it represented a veiled warning to the countries of Eastern Europe that they should concentrate on developing their trade ties with the Soviet Union rather than with the West. It also foreshadowed the PRL's eastern re-orientation which was to take place shortly. In the article, the economic commentator, B. Rachkov, identified six main causes for the crisis in the PRL: a) the foundations of the crisis were laid in the early 1970s by the ill-considered actions of the previous Polish leadership who overestimated the country's export capabilities and underestimated the difficulties of trading with capitalist countries in order to resolve domestic economic problems; b) the mid-1970s economic crisis in the West raised the price of goods being imported by the PRL and affected the level of Polish exports; c) the leaders of Solidarity undermined the efforts by the Polish authorities to improve the foreign trade situation by strikes which severely damaged Polish exports; d) deliberate discriminatory measures in the West further made the situation worse in those sectors of the Polish industry dependent on supplies from the West; e) imperialist circles exploited the technological and financial Polish dependence on the West and strengthened the local

counterrevolution; f) from the summer of 1981, the leaders of Solidarity embarked on a direct blockade of exports of certain goods in order to leave the Polish economy wide open to the expansion of capitalist corporations. At the same time, a slanderous campaign against the PRL's ties with the socialist countries was conducted and the counterrevolution tried to convince everyone that the cure for the country's economic problems could be found only in the West. Overall the article made it clear that a serious re-thinking of the socialist bloc's relations with the West would have to be discussed in the near future. Meanwhile, the Soviet leaders waited for the report from General Jaruzelski on the evolution of the situation in the PRL.

Three days after the Sejm's ratification of the state of war, on March 1, 1982, a Polish Party-state delegation, headed by Jaruzelski, arrived in Moscow. The fact that it took place some three months after the December proclamation showed that Jaruzelski had not felt confident enough before to meet his Soviet counterparts. This was the first of a series of official visits paid by the Polish leadership to re-establish 'fraternal' relations with the socialist community's countries in the aftermath of the imposition of a state of war. As Raymond Aron once wrote, "*En politique, on peut choisir ses ennemis, on ne peut pas choisir ses alliés*". Naturally the Soviet Union was the first stop, just as it had been, over 11 years ago when Gierek had journeyed to the Soviet capital after his assumption of power. Despite the 'friendly atmosphere' in which the Polish delegation was received, the meeting revealed in part the continuing doubts of the Soviet leadership towards the process of the 'Polish normalization'. In his speech, the Soviet CPSU First Secretary emphasized the urgent need to restore the leading role of the Polish Communist Party and noted that

"things [were] not easy for Poland [today]". "The waves of anarchy, chaos and terror will not roll away at once", he added.[7] The Soviet side was identical almost to a man to the one which had followed the Polish crisis throughout its developments, a sort of informal task force on the Polish events. With the exception of Chernenko, this was the identical team of seven Soviet leaders which represented the CPSU at the Moscow summit of Warsaw Pact leaders during which the PRL was discussed in December 1980, and which met with the Kania-led PZPR delegation in Moscow on March 4, 1981. Facing this highly experienced 'crisis cabinet' the PRL delegation seemed weak in all respects, the more so since of all those comprising it, only Jaruzelski seemed to have had any kind of influence in the Kremlin. The Polish Foreign Minister, Józef Czyrek, who had been in Moscow in mid-January, did not seem at the time to be held in high respect by the Kremlin, a fact confirmed later with his replacement in July by Stefan Olszowski, a reputed 'hard-liner'.[8] In fact General Jaruzelski represented perhaps the only form of real authority to which the Kremlin leaders could address themselves to, a fact highlighting the current state of the PZPR who was yet to re-assess its 'predominant role'. In the joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the two sides confirmed their 'unanimity of views and their identical understanding of the current and forthcoming tasks'. Three fundamental points were stressed:

a) Poland would continue to be a socialist state whose economic and political system remained based upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism;

b) friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union was, is and will be the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy;

c) Poland remained a durable link in the socialist community as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.[9]

In the PRL the Party media hailed the meeting as "one of the most important international event of recent times"[10], a statement echoed in the Soviet press[11] and an indication of how significant the encounter had been for the Polish leadership. A large part of the discussion had inevitably dealt on the current domestic situation in Poland and through this first joint Polish-Soviet assessment of the 'normalization' process, both sides recognized the necessity to maintain a state of war as long as internal stability had not been achieved. Further, although this was not mentioned, the rigours imposed by the police/military authorities provided a suitable environment for the rejuvenation of the PZPR, a *sine qua non* before the return to a type of civilian rule. While there were obvious domestic reasons for maintaining the state of war, foreign policy considerations also played an important part for its duration. A certain degree of uncertainty surrounded Soviet policy at the time and this was grounded primarily in the anticipated death of Leonid Brezhnev. The failing health of the Soviet leader and the uncertainties concerning his successor were paralysing the scope of decision-making by the PRL ruling élite. In a climate of apparent instability in the Kremlin, the Warsaw leaders, though their policies generally kept in line with the requirements expected by a member of the Warsaw Pact, were certainly less tied by Soviet directives than in the past. In any case, as far as the domestic situation was concerned, both Warsaw and Moscow had the same goal: stability. Lifting the state of war before any succession question had been resolved would

have been too premature a move for the Polish leadership to consider, especially as they could not be assured that a relaxation of their control over society would not trigger an immediate response from the population, even if a non-violent one. A second chance to 'put the house in order', the Polish-way, might not then be so easily allowed by the Kremlin, the more so if Brezhnev's replacement proved to be less conciliatory towards the PRL's leadership. It is interesting to note here the identity of purpose of both the Solidarity union and the authorities, who both sought, partly for different reasons, to avoid an armed intervention by the Warsaw Pact armed forces.

Yet "Soviet military, political and economic power, though a necessary condition of the continuation of the Eastern European systems in their present form, is not a sufficient condition".[12] The régimes themselves are confronted by problems which they have to cope with on their own. With the continuation of the state of war the PRL leadership was faced with a series of dilemmas. On the *domestic* side, it impeded the process of 'national reconciliation' since it was difficult to gain the necessary popular support for the badly-needed economic reforms put forward by the Polish authorities. At the same time any socio-economic successes were perceived by the authorities as likely to be successful only if the internal situation became and remained 'stable', a condition seemingly unattainable without the use of repressive means. On the *external* side, while the continuation of martial law was part and parcel of the authorities' campaign to convince their socialist allies that 'socialist normality' was returning in the PRL, it also antagonised further any possibilities to resume normal economic and diplomatic relations with the West. Although a solution to the socio-political crisis had to be found,

this also required, by association, a solution to the economic crisis as well. Thus Western economic support was important as one determinant which would assist the Polish authorities, besieged by a myriad of economic problems, in regaining domestic and international recognition. The longer the state of war lasted, the more difficult would be the process of 'normalization' both at home and abroad. This dilemma once again highlighted a crucial tenet of Polish policy-making namely, that of the balancing of Eastern and Western oriented objectives. In this context it should be noted that the Polish Catholic Church was also opposed to any Western economic sanctions. The logic behind this position was the realization that they simply did not help to solve the Polish crisis. On the contrary, the sanctions, by complicating matters and forcing the PRL's authorities further into the arms of Moscow, presented a threat to the well-being of Poles without however, harming the régime itself. Therefore the very aim of such sanctions, as perceived by the West and aiming at putting the PRL's authorities under pressure, could not be fulfilled.

That the PRL leadership was eager to present itself in a favourable light in the eyes of Moscow was further demonstrated during the 37th anniversary celebrations of the Polish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which took place in Warsaw on April 20. This occasion received extensive media coverage although few, if any at all, took notice of this event. The day before, a Soviet delegation from the CPSU's department for organizational party work had started a visit of the PRL, presumably to assist in the task of re-shaping the PZPR's organizational structure. On April 14, the WTO Chief-of-Staff, Viktor Kulikov, met once again with Jaruzelski while that same week, Soviet East-German and Polish forces were held

the 'Friendship-82' military manoeuvres in North-West Poland.

On April 23, the 8th KC Plenum passed a resolution expressing the Party's hope that co-operation with, and the international aid of, the USSR and the other socialist bloc countries would be instrumental in bringing the PRL out of the current crisis. Undoubtedly, during this period Warsaw's foreign policy orientations were primarily directed towards the East and the extensive bout of travelling in Eastern-Central Europe by the PRL's representatives throughout the first half of 1982, clearly reflected this. On March 29, Jaruzelski visited the GDR, on April 5, he was in Prague, on the 21st, in Hungary, on May 20, in Bulgaria and on the 4th June, in Romania.[13] However, and despite the economic reasons which justified a Polish eastward realignment, the primary function of Jaruzelski's *Ostpolitik* must be seen as highlighting the pursuit of a *political* objective by the Polish authorities. The main aim here was to reassure the socialist bloc countries that the situation in the PRL was now under control and presented no more danger for the stability of the socialist alliance. At the same time, the Polish régime was at pains to show that further 'normalization' still required massive aid from the socialist community in order to ensure its success (whether it really believed that it would be forthcoming is a matter for speculation). While politically, for the Socialist bloc, the situation in the country was returning back to normal, despite the fact that many uncertainties still remained, the catastrophic economic situation of the country still gave great cause of concern to the PRL's allies (incidentally, although the whole bloc was experiencing severe economic problems, only in the PRL was the situation being called an economic crisis). It meant above all that the longer the duration of the economic crisis,

the heavier the burden of helping socialist Poland would be, a prospect hardly appealing to the COMECON countries, themselves facing major economic problems of their own. Thus, the PRL's foreign *economic* objectives, while inevitably eastward-oriented, were in many ways hampered by the fact that greater economic integration under the aegis of COMECON could not fulfil all their requirements. This was partly because of a lack of determination on the part of the PRL's allies and partly, most importantly, because of the unavailability of the long-term required assistance necessary to pull the PRL out of the crisis. In a confidential assessment of the situation in the country, on November 16, senior party activists made this clear when they concluded that:

> Many industries are paralysed because of the lack of imported materials, machinery and spare parts. We cannot rely on the fraternal nations to help us out of our present exchange difficulties with the West: the Soviet Union has already done what it could and the Hungarians, Czechs, Germans and in particular the Romanians, are suffering similar difficulties.[14]

Only the capitalist countries were potentially able to help although it was then doubtful whether they had such plans in the immediate future.

Characteristic of the beginning of the martial law period, and especially throughout December, was the degree of official self-justification regarding the imposition of the state of war. This of course was not new but it took on a new form by the end of 1982. In many respects there seemed to have been a concern from the authorities' point of view, to explain and praise not only the basis for the decision to militarize society, but also to stress the positive effects of such a measure. Such an explanation would be given a subtler content as the months and years passed. This concern was

naturally determined by the geo-political circumstances in which the PRL had to evolve and therefore it came as no surprise that the Jaruzelski régime made every effort to convince its eastern neighbour that the internal situation was now almost back to normal, a fact it saw supported by the recent low-key demonstrations of November 1982 (although there were important demonstrations throughout the country at the time).

The rise of Solidarity had provoked feelings of considerable alarm among the Soviet leaders. One of their most immediate apprehension concerned the way in which the Soviet population - and in particular the border regions with the PRL - would react to the Polish example. In the end, those fears proved unfounded as the Polish crisis did not affect relations between the leadership and the Soviet public at large. However, at the same time, the Polish events did affect, to various degrees, Soviet perceptions on the nature and form of orthodox Marxist-leninist principles. That Solidarity represented the Polish working class fighting for rights which the authorities, the Party, failed to respond to, while at the same time still ruling on the principle that they represented the working class, showed that something had to change. Although one still had to wait a few years before the beginning of real changes taking place in the Soviet Union, it was clear that in many ways, the Polish events helped to shape the "contours of the Soviet reform debate".[15] Jaruzelski's address to the Polish Nation was entirely re-printed in both *Pravda* and *Izvestia*'[16]. At this stage, the PRL's foreign policy orientation was virtually restricted to the Soviet bloc only, since Western reactions to the recent developments in the country precluded any immediate improvements in relations. One should also remember that it was now

nearly a month since Andropov, the new CPSU General Secretary was at the helm of the Soviet Union, following the death of his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev on November 10. Although the transition appeared to have been smooth, it was inevitable that the first few weeks of Andropov's reign would deal primarily with concerns internal to the Soviet Union. This gave the PRL's authorities an opportunity to use some initiative and present the new Soviet leader with *faits accomplis*. In particular, the announcement of Wałęsa's release (a day after Brezhnev's death and a day before the CPSU Central Committee elected Yuri Andropov), as well as his subsequent arrival in Gdańsk the same day that the PRL's delegation was attending the late General Secretary's funeral (November 14), all appeared too well planned to have been a mere coincidence. Soviet priorities at the time were elsewhere and this gave Jaruzelski the chance to be slightly bolder in his decision-making. This of course did not mean that the Kremlin was oblivious of the situation in the PRL. In the period 13 December 1981 to December 1982, over 50 meetings took place between Soviet and Polish delegations, half of which were on economic questions. At the end of November, on the 29th, Jan Główczyk, deputy Politburo member, travelled to Moscow where he met Central Committee member, M. Zimianin, to discuss ideological co-operation between the two countries. On December 20, a PRL party-state delegation led by Jaruzelski, went to Moscow to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union. During his meeting with Andropov, the General informed the Soviet leader on the activity of the PZPR and the government in dealing with the economic and political 'stabilization' of the PRL and thanked the USSR for its fraternal aid. In November 1982, Jaruzelski, in an interview for the *Guardian*, had described the Soviet Union as "Poland's bulwark both on account of ideological and political reasons

as well as for reasons of state". He also pointed out that

> The essential tenets of Socialist ideology were and remain constant. What however is subjected to continuous changes, improvements and corrections is their practical implementation. This is how we in Poland perceive the reforms now under way.[17]

With hindsight, this sounded very much like a pioneering declaration of *perestroïka*, the Polish way, and some three years before the advent of Gorbachev (in his book Gorbachev wrote: "It is in the sphere of Socialism and not outside it, that we look for answers. ... Those who hope that we will leave the socialist road will be deeply disappointed. Every element of the programme of perestroïka ... is based entirely upon the idea that we need more socialism, more democracy".[18]). The state of war in the PRL had given the régime an opportunity to start afresh, meaning returning to a situation resembling the *status quo ante*. Yet, the régime was conscious that there could be no return to the situation which had contributed to the rise of the Solidarity movement and hence it was faced with two main options: either return to the Stalinist model and hold the country with an iron fist, or develop an 'enlightened model of Socialism' where it would appear to be responsive to the demands of the people. The second option soon became policy and in the ensuing months, the régime used every opportunity to try and convince the Polish people that the 'time of rebirth' (*czas odrodzenia*) or 'renewal' (*odnowa*) had come. This then explains partly the insistence with which the leadership repeatedly referred back to the necessity for the declaration of the state of war in December 1981. In fact, to this day, some 7 years after the event, there are still regular references to the causes and reasons for the December 13 decision, especially in Jaruzelski's speeches, a fact which a psycho-analyst might well interpret as an extreme form of a guilt complex. To convince the

public that the authorities were set on a new path, there had to be a justification for the conditions which enabled them to rule. After all, the same rulers had imposed a state of war upon the country and now they were trying to govern.

A couple of days before Jaruzelski's expected announcement that the state of war would soon be lifted (in the event it was only suspended), General Józef Baryła identified three main characteristics embodied in the implementation of the state of war:

> The clear essence of the state of war in Poland is expressed in the fact that it was an act of defence of the socialist state, defence of the achievements of the revolution against a counterrevolutionary threat, and was made in the interest of the working class and working people. This is its first important characteristic. The second particular characteristic of the state of war in Poland is the fact that it was conducted in the whole majesty of the law, in accordance with the PRL's constitution, on the strength of the decision of the constitutional organs of the state. ... It was a legal act vital for the defence of the state. ... Finally the third particular characteristic of our state of war, is that the decision to implement it was undertaken in the most broadly conceived interest of the nation and the Polish reason of state - with the principles in mind that our own problems will be solved by our own hands. It is hard to overate this fact.

Concluding he added,

> The state of war is perhaps sometimes hard to bear, but for the country - it is salutary, it closes the gates to the forces of dismantlement, and opens it to others: common wisdom, worthwhile work for people, a disciplined society, respected law and people's pride.[19]

It may have been salutary for the ruling establishment, but this was certainly not what the majority of Poles thought as far as their own fate was concerned. Their hopes, raised during the Solidarity era had now been replaced by a sense of resignation and the acceptance that there was little that could be done in the present situation in order to return to those '500 days' of near democracy. The country was being pacified, yet all the same, it was still a long way from being

'normalized'.

4.2 *Domestic 'porządek'.*

Some five months after the imposition of a state of war, it was clear that the 'War' had not sapped the morale and determination of the Solidarity supporters. Indeed one can say that the apotheosis of their activities took place in the summer of 1982. With the militarization of Polish society and the suspension of labour unions, Solidarity was forced underground. The leaders who had evaded the authorities on the night of December 12-13, strove to rebuild the union and preserve its continuity. The Solidarity underground emerged in an *ad hoc* fashion and its means and scope of action were inevitably restricted by the circumstances. The tactics which were now used were based primarily upon the assumption that the authorities would be damaged and discredited by various forms of boycotts, work stoppages and other similar actions, leading them eventually to accept the necessity to renew a dialogue with the 'true' representatives of society. The first trial of strength took place on May Day. Alongside the official parades, and throughout the country, peaceful crowds of people gathered to voice their support for Solidarity, ostensibly dispelling any doubts that opposition to the militarization of society had been crushed. Two days later, the first violent confrontation since the December coup took place. 10 000 people gathered in Warsaw's Castle square demanding the release of Lech Wałesa and unfurling banners bearing the *Solidarność* logo. The peaceful meeting turned into a riot only after the ZOMOs began charging the crowd. The scene was repeated throughout the PRL and gave a clear indication of the degree of unpopularity for the authorities and underlined the still massive support for the suspended trade union. It was also indicative of the

ability and willingness on the part of the régime to use force in order to intimidate the population. The next day, night curfews were re-introduced in several provinces and towns which had been affected by popular unrest. All the signs were pointing to the authorities' intransigence in seeking any kind of compromise with the Polish population. While Jaruzelski seemed to have made some effort towards proving his good will to the West, by adopting some positive measures after April 28, the population's determination, little disposed towards 'a national reconciliation', forced him to use the only available means at his disposal, namely force. May 3, 1982, was marked by several demonstrations in all major cities and the re-imposition of the night curfew in several provinces affected by popular unrest. On this occasion General Czesław Kiszczak, the Interior Minister (MSW), commented that "public order was restored and this will be the case whenever anyone attempts to organize in Poland street disturbances or any other hostile excesses".[20] Throughout the summer, numerous demonstrations continued to occur, followed by increasing repression against the leaders of the opposition and their followers. On August 31, nationwide demonstrations took place to commemorate the second anniversary of the Gdańsk Agreements, the most extensive since the imposition of a state of war. The next day, WRON met and issued a communiqué forcing the WKOs to take appropriate and decisive steps to ensure peace and security.[21] On September 16, 1982, Kiszczak once again, called for greater and more effective measures to improve order and security in the country.[22] The Sejm was also put to good use: since December 1981, the Sejm passed over 50 major bills, more than the number passed in normal times during an entire four-year parliamentary term.[23] The main purpose of this flood of new legislation was to prepare the grounds for the aftermath of the state

of war. It was on October 25, 1982, that a first attempt was made by the authorities to transfer extraordinary martial law legislation into the permanent PRL legislation. The October 25 Law on Procedure with Regard to Work Shirkers exposed the aims of the régime in an unequalled way and made its declarations for greater democratization in the era of *odnowa* sound hollow. What in effect it was signalling, was the persistent and determined policy guiding the authorities namely, to reinforce the legal means of repression not only to control society more effectively but also to prepare the grounds for an eventual lifting of the state of war.

On October 8, the Sejm declared a new trade union legislation, effectively terminating the legal existence of all labour organizations. During the period August 1980 - December 1981, alongside the independent and self-managing Solidarity union, there had also existed also some 81 'autonomous' unions - the remaining official trade unions - and 24 branch unions. In replacement, plans were drawn to create new workers unions whose obedience to the Party and the state authorities would be legally secured (see below). They were to become active on January 1, 1983. As became clear later on, the trade unions issue was to become "a key ingredient in Jaruzelski's attempts to demonstrate his régime's continuity with the violently foreshortened Solidarity era".[24] The planned Papal visit for the Summer was cancelled and a virulent campaign against ex-members of KOR was initiated on September 2.[25] The authorities made it also clear that they categorically rejected any possibility of negotiations with the Solidarity leadership under which the trade union could resume its activities openly.

The summer of 1982 had indeed been a 'hot summer' for the PRL and

had demonstrated the still volatile atmosphere prevailing throughout the country. At the same time the extent of internal disturbances changed little to the overall situation. The social disturbances and the existence of the Solidarity underground failed to alter the course of events. However it did succeed in complicating the authorities' task by raising the political cost of their repressive policies. In turn this was demonstrating, both home and abroad, that the PRL's leaders lacked the legitimacy they were so keen to achieve through the process of 'normalization'. The Solidarity era had revealed, as never before, the extent of the ideological bankruptcy of the Polish Communist Party. The imposition of a state of war did nothing to reverse this fact, on the contrary. As the months under military rule unfolded, it was clear to everyone that society had been 'de-ideologized', and that more than rhetoric would be needed by the ruling establishment to muster any kind of support. This truth in turn emphasized the fact that any solution to current problems would imply a reinforcing of the authoritarian and bureaucratic apparatus, leaving ideological considerations to the 'dustbins of history'. In Leszek Kołakowski's words, this was "a new curiosity - a Communism without ideology".[26] In such conditions, plans for 'normalization' would not only be harder to fulfil but also, it would remain an open question whether the authorities would be actually able to return the country to real 'socialist normality'.

Yet, despite the continuing unrest, the military rulers were never really threatened. This is something which Jaruzelski must have stressed to Brezhnev when he met the Soviet leader at the annual Crimean meeting of the heads of the socialist bloc countries on August 16, 1982.[27] Naturally the two leaders expressed "their complete unity

of views". At the same time, Jaruzelski's short trip (he left on the 17th) indicated the degree of concern to the Polish leader that the situation was only precariously stabilized. A day before the second anniversary of the Gdańsk Agreements, General Jaruzelski, speaking at an officers' promotion ceremony in Poznań, said that only "strength and stability were capable of bringing about a reform":

> When there is weakness, and restless conflicts, it will fail. Today whoever acts against the interest of the state, is pulling Poland backwards, is breaking the process of change [*przemian*]. ... In order to get out of the crisis, we still need above, all calm and tranquillity. Its defence is the duty of the state of war.[28]

He pleaded that there be, on August 31, no "blood-stained (*splamione krwią*) excesses and illegal demonstrations", warning that even if the state of war was not to the liking of some, it was unfortunately a necessity which no-one would be allowed to upset.[29] In vain, for the next day erupted widespread public unrest throughout the country. 34 Voivods and 68 cities were affected. The authorities response was unequivocal: numerous arrests were carried out, and the WKOs were ordered to take appropriate and decisive steps to ensure peace and security. Over 5000 individuals were questioned and nearly 200 interned.[30] On September 12, a WRON meeting called onto the Sejm to speed the bill on procedures against adults who avoid work or schooling and increase penalties in the law on speculation and in parts of the criminal code concerning bribery.[31] (this incidentally was running counter to WRON's self-stated role in society, namely as a mere policy-inspiring body). It was also around this time that hundreds of internees, who had been held without charges in penitentiaries and internment camps and others who were simply under constant surveillance, were conscripted into the army and sent to "special military centres". By January 1983, some 8 000 male

conscripts were to be found in 22 such camps.[32] Shortly afterwards the State Tribunal was inaugurated, followed the next day by the institutionalization of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON). Founded on July 20, 1982 and adopted into the PRL's Constitution a year later, PRON became an important element in the policy of 'socialist renewal' patronized by the state following the elimination of Solidarity and other organizations not controlled by the PZPR. In effect the new organization was just as little an authentic representation of society as a whole as had been the National Unity Front (FJN) which had existed since the end of the Second World War (nearly all other East European countries had had a similar organization). The PRON initiative "was an attempt by the political leadership to extend the basis for its own existence of rule in society and to prop up the moral justification for the proclamation of martial law".[33] As such, from the very beginning of its existence it incurred the danger of discrediting itself in the same way as the FJN. The Sejm session of September 16, 1982, had heard an unequivocal speech on order and security given by General Czesław Kiszczak. Denouncing the recent disturbances he warned "Poland's enemies", at home and abroad that:

> No provocation, no enemy activity will push us away from the road on which we entered in order to save our socialist state, strengthen its independence and sovereignty, to implement the process of revival [*odnowa*], reform and democratization, so that Poland can be reborn again (*aby odrodzić Polskę*).[34]

The General's speech also referred, though briefly, to the use made by 'adventurists' of churches and other religious places for their anti-state activities, a reference containing an indirect attack on the Church as a whole for its role in the current disturbances. And he added the, by now, almost inevitable reference to 'foreign circles',

identifying the "real centre for the strategic control of all opposition in Poland as somewhere far from [the country's] borders".

As if to confirm the growing confidence of the Party leadership, the Sejm session of October 8-9, passed a new trade union legislation, thereby putting an end to the legal life of the suspended autonomous unions. The new Trade Union Act disbanded Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, the Polish Teacher's Union and two other union organizations. In their place, a framework was advanced for the establishment of a new labour movement, the expected new transmission-belt between the rulers and the ruled, which later came to be known as the All-Polish Confederation of Trade Unions (OPZZ).[35] The trade union issue very well illustrated the wider dilemmas and paradoxes of the post-martial law period.[36] The formation of the OPZZ was ardently attacked by a strong and vocal minority, including the most active Solidarity supporters, who refused to support the new structures and criticized those who did, calling them collaborators or opportunists. On the other hand, many Poles, though sceptical, about the new official unions (after all its leader, Alfred Miodowicz, was a Politburo member...), believed that they could provide the only real opportunity to defend the interests of the workers. Finally a broad middle group refused to identify itself with either position, preferring to wait and see or simply distance themselves from public affairs altogether. Because of this roughly equal tri-partite division of Polish society on this issue, both the régime and the 'opposition' were unable to muster enough support to carry out their programmes, assuming of course that either side actually had a real programme of its own. In his closing speech at the October 9 session of the Sejm, General Jaruzelski made no mention of a possible date at which the

state of war would be lifted, hinting in a small sentence only that it might be soon.[37] Meanwhile, the West looked on.

4.3 *Nothing New on the Western Front.*

The Polish official attitude towards the West after it had initiated economic sanctions against the PRL was unsurprisingly bitter. Inevitably, for political reasons, the régime condemned the Western stand and blamed the economic sanctions as an attempt to hinder the 'normalization' process. Of course there were also economic reasons behind Warsaw's attacks on "Western interference" in its internal affairs. Without capitalist aid, nothing much would come out of the 'Polish renewal' exhorted by Jaruzelski and his aides. Again the foreign-domestic link appeared in all its importance. The Western governments were imposing sanctions on the PRL as a direct result of the internal policies pursued by Warsaw. Jaruzelski's concern touched above all internal matters, but tackling them inevitably involved a close look at foreign policy considerations. On the one hand, he had to convince his socialist allies that his policies were well-founded and conducive to a return to the *status quo ante*, and on the other, he had to persuade the West that the quicker it accepted the situation in the PRL, the better it would be for all sides, including the Polish population. Further, he was also aware that in order to succeed in his internal policies, outside help would be vital. Without it, the whole process might not only take longer but also have good chances of being simply another interlude before the next explosion of society's discontent.

Apart from the innumerable articles published in the official press strongly attacking the Western sanctions, the authorities also organized conferences aimed at proving the 'foreign interferences' in

the PRL's internal affairs. In particular, on January 28, a meeting was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where specific charges of espionage were levelled against several Americans, including personnel from the US Embassy in Warsaw.[38] Yet, between the sharp attacks on Western states, accusing them of unwarranted interference in the PRL's domestic affairs, the Polish authorities always left the door open for the resumption of normal diplomatic and economic relations with the West, particularly in the economic field. This reflected a sober realization that the PRL needed the West, more than it needed the East. In fact it would appear that the Western sanctions took the Jaruzelski leadership unprepared. It certainly could have guessed that the imposition of martial law would be hardly greeted with joy by the West, yet it seemed to have underestimated the possible level of the restrictions which were implemented. The régime repeatedly expressed this concern in all major speeches and in numerous articles in the press during this period. A good example of this can be seen in Józef Czyrek's speech at the Sejm on March 25, 1982.[39] In many ways, this foreign policy *exposé* was revealing because it set the PRL's policy making for the next decade. The subsequent changes of Foreign Affairs Ministers in the following years (three in all) changed little to the formulation of the PRL's external objectives. This does not mean of course that it was possible to identify radical new tenets of the PRL's foreign policy other than those which traditionally have directed it. Rather it explained and confirmed the duality in the practice of the régime's policy-making namely, the constant relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. It also pointed out another crucial aspect of this policy-making in that it emphasized the intrinsic relation between political and economic objectives, a factor particularly important in all Soviet-type political systems and

especially for the PRL in the 1980s (even if this link is not always accepted by the ruling establishment - see below). Czyrek's opening line stated that,

> Poland's principal requirement is peace, internal peace. General comprehension of this truth forms an absolute imperative in the national education of contemporary generations of Poles and an indispensable condition of proper understanding of Poland's *raison d'état.*[40]

In other words, the stabler the internal situation, the safer the nation is, because of its geo-political situation in Europe. Hence the importance of a suitable domestic climate as a prerequisite for the conduct of foreign policy objectives. This line of argument revealed a two-pronged objective in that it sought to justify the repressive handling of the internal situation[41] and at the same time, to criticize the Western stand on the PRL. This point was stressed even more when the PRL's Foreign Minister went on to say,

> *Foreign policy is the function of the internal policy of the country, its national and class interest.* Today this is more obvious than ever. to extricate the country from a difficult socio-economic crisis, and remove its cause and overcome its effects - this is, at the same time, a fight to reconstruct and strengthen the international position and role of Poland. ... (My italics)[42]

The first part of the speech naturally emphasized the Polish-Soviet alliance ("the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy") and praised the recent Jaruzelski-Brezhnev meeting in March which confirmed the,

> ... historical, strategic dimension of the Polish-Soviet alliance embodied in the statement that existence of a strong, independent, socialist Poland lies in the interest of the Soviet Union, just as the might and and international authority of the USSR lies in the interest of People's Poland.[43]

Having stated the customary and praiseworthy reference to the Soviet Union, the Polish Foreign Minister began tackling the current situation with regard to the West. He called it a "dangerous tendency" to link the international political situation with the

sphere of economic relations, thereby reflecting the régime's dual approach to foreign policy: there should be political relations on the one hand and economic on the other, with as little interference on one other. This of course echoed the Lenin interpretation of peaceful co-existence as the principle guiding relations between the capitalist and socialist systems. For the PRL, in the wake of a military take-over, and facing an abysmal economic situation, it was natural to stress the dichotomy between the political and economic fields. Since economic recovery was a priority for the Jaruzelski team, only this aspect of Polish-Western relations should remain topical even if, both at home and abroad, 'political recovery' remained a key issue. To this end Czyrek proposed the establishment of 'economic confidence-building' measures:

> A new aspect is thereby given to the problem of the security of economic relations. We believe it desirable to frame and adopt appropriate economic confidence-building measures. In advancing this idea we are not guided by narrow self-interest. We appeal to the governments of the CSCE states to shield economic co-operation from the adverse effects of the deterioration in political relations, to refrain from introducing new barriers to its development and to work towards the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and certainty in economic relations.

On December 20, 1983, the PRL tabled at the UN General Assembly a resolution to this effect entitled, "The Building of Confidence in International Economic Resolution'.[44] Czyrek further added,

> We do not wish to augment our foreign debt. We do not wish to live at the expense of others, We only wish to secure through international co-operation the possibility of utilizing the full resources of our economy and to restore our capacity for partnerlike, stable co-operation with other countries. The Western countries are making the lifting of restrictions contingent on the fulfilment by Poland of certain political conditions. This is inadmissible in the light of international law and the provisions of the CSCE Final Act. It is also out of the question! ... We are confident that a sense of realism will prevail. Poland has all the makings of being an attractive partner in international co-operation. It stands to reason that this potential can only be realized by a strong law-abiding and stable state. A state that is weak and torn by

> contradictions cannot be a reliable partner either in dialogue of economic collaboration. We hope that our foreign partners understand this. We are ready to go on developing bilateral relations with the capitalist states and in particular with the European states with which Poland is linked by long-standing traditions of good co-operation.[45]

What is interesting in Czyrek's speech is the absence of any crude or violent attack on Western countries. While he criticizes any attempts to interfere in internal Polish matters, his audience, in which presumably he also included Western observers, heard an overall non-belligerent account of the PRL's relations with the West, the stress being made on past trading traditions. The impression was that the Foreign Minister was careful not to convey a too negative image in his appreciation of the current political-economic stand taken by the West. This contrasted heavily with the current Soviet analysis of the situation. Nevertheless, as later events would confirm, this policy would soon be altered in response to the continuing hostility expressed by most Western states, and in particular by the Reagan administration. A protest, issued by the PRL's authorities in response to the American President's statement on June 13, 1982, vehemently attacked the United States' blatant interference into the PRL's internal affairs, repeating what was to become the *leit-motiv* of the régime's slogans directed at the Western countries involved in any sanctions against the PRL.[46] However, the Polish régime did seem to react and try to defuse the situation, always of course keeping in line with the PRL's obligations as a member of the socialist community.

In lifting some of the martial law restrictions on April 28, 1982, Jaruzelski was primarily intent on influencing Western public opinion against the staunch US government line on economic sanctions. Equally, in view of the forthcoming unofficial, but traditional May 3

celebrations[47], the authorities were also attempting to prevent large scale anti-régime demonstrations by making a show of good will. The WRON meeting on April 28 lifted the overnight curfew throughout the country, allowed certain organizations to hold public meetings and extended travel possibilities (as we saw, these measures lasted only a short time). At the same time, it announced the release of 800 internees (among them many common law criminals), and the conditional freeing of another 200.[48] Yet these timid moves had little effect on the US administration which kept a staunch critical stand throughout. On May 13, 1982, in retaliation for the expulsion of two American embassy officers, Washington expelled two Polish embassy officials and proceeded to impose a ban travel under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie scheme by participants in a US-Polish programme of scientific co-operation.

The one direct effect of the new trade union bill passed on October 9, 1982, was to deteriorate further US-PRL relations, with the American government removing the country's Most Favoured Nation status (MFN). This contributed even more to the PRL's poor international standing and was bitterly attacked by the régime. Yet it did not stop the authorities in crushing a strike on October 12, in Gdańsk, in protest of the dissolution of the Solidarity union, and the militarization the shipyards. Evidently the internal situation still necessitated the use of force and Jaruzelski was in no mood to compromise, even if this entailed incurring more economic retribution on the part of the West. It should be noted here that by this time, the Western sanctions, in all fairness, had outlived their original goals. The régime had not been coerced in liberalizing its hold over society; martial law was still in force and there was no evidence that

it would be lifted overnight. In such a situation then, it was doubtful whether further sanctions against the PRL would have had any effects on the Polish ruling establishment. As it was more a gesture in response to domestic developments, and a natural reaction to the frustration of seeing the PRL's régime's apparent indifference to calls to re-establish the independent unions, the removal of the PRL's MFN status by the USA was, all the same, ineffective in altering the authorities' stand. It simply added a new type of economic sanction against the Jaruzelski régime and while economically, this may have had some effect, politically it proved a waste of time. It raised however, in the long-term, a new problem for the Reagan administration, namely when to decide to lift the sanctions. "In other words, what kind of political liberalism in Poland would be accepted by the West as a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions, despite the weak economic mechanisms and financial mess by which the country is still characterised?".[49] Indeed, Western sanctions would be used at a later stage, by the Polish authorities, to justify their own inability to reform the system and point an accusing finger at the West, especially the US, as the main cause for continuing Polish domestic economic problems.

This does not mean that the régime accepted this new sanction without a barrage of remonstrances towards the Reagan administration. On the contrary, it started a persistent but ineffective campaign on the international arena to try and have the decision condemned and presumably reversed. Apart from the loss of economic advantages that such a status did give the PRL, the political consequences were also relevant. The more the PRL lost its credibility now, the harder it would be in the future to renew a dialogue with the West. Since the

latter was essential for the economic future of the country, any delay in the 'normalization' of international relations would create vast problems, or at least delay the implementation of any possible internal solution. It therefore explained the PRL'S authorities' concern with stabilizing the situation within the country and convince both the West and the East that the internal conditions were becoming 'normal' once again. At the same time, this objective had to be pursued relentlessly, not only for external consumption, but also for internal purposes. The process of *odnowa* meant above all the reassertion of the Party in society, the elimination of any opposition and the rebuilding of a stable domestic environment. These were the top priorities and although they, by themselves, superseded at the time any other considerations such as the reactivation of a Polish *Westpolitik*, they were also perceived as the long-term means for the rebuilding of a more assertive foreign policy.

In the first interview granted by General Jaruzelski to a Western reporter since the imposition of a state of war, the PRL's leader metaphorically described the régime's current economic tasks as the "replacing [of] the engine driving the ship of Poland's economy" an operation which "is taking place amidst reefs and shallows". Satisfied that the state of emergency had "saved the the country from a dangerous internal confrontation, had contained anarchy and restored law and order", noting that the "period of [the] party's weakness [was] clearly passing", the General condemned the Western attitudes and actions against the PRL but made it clear that the PRL was "*vitally* interested in maintaining and developing economic relations with non-socialist countries". He even gave a warning: "The countries that give evidence of their understanding of the Polish difficulties

and efforts will be well engraved on our memory. We shall give them preference to relations with them in the future".[50] While it was not very clear what this sort of comment sought to achieve, especially in the PRL's current international situation, it denoted another change of tactic. After associating European security to the PRL's *raison d'état*, the régime was now trying to show how damaging sanctions were, not only to the PRL but also to its former non-socialist diplomatic and economic partners. One has to say that this failed to be convincing. The aim remained unchanged however: to detract the international community from meddling in the PRL's internal problems and focus its attention on external economic matters.

Speaking at the Sejm on October 26, the PRL's Procurator General, Francizsek Rusek, expressed the régime's determination to enforce its power and authority over the Polish society. Stressing the fact that "a return to law-abidingness, law and order were two of the principles required by the *raison d'état*", he forcefully declared that there could be no return to the pre-December 13 situation:

> Law-abidingness is one of the fundamental principles of the Polish People's Republic's political system as a socialist state. It is one of the primordial elements in accordance with and in every respect to, the development of the state. ... In order to implement this principle in practice, it is needed, to a very considerable degree, to shape the socio-political atmosphere within the country, the state of discipline in the society, the respect for the law and relations towards the state authorities' organs. Alongside this, it is also vital to undertake all action which will secure the application of law-abiding and state principles. Also, these principles must be constantly levered at various acts of anti-socialist forces in the country and from foreign centres of diversion.[51]

On October 27, 1982, the 10th KC Plenum of the PZPR took place. It heard a very gloomy economic report by Manfred Gorywoda. Commenting on the problems facing the PRL's economy in the forthcoming three years, he stated that "today it is not a question of whether we can surmount

the crisis but how quickly we can accomplish this task".[52] General Jaruzelski's speech at the Plenum identified some of the causes lying behind the difficulties ahead and produced a strongly worded commentary of the situation:

> Socialist Poland is finding itself in the fire of a particularly sharp attack from the imperialist camp. ... Poland is not the state of Texas. Poland cannot be shut in like Indians in reserves, it will always be open to the world.[53]

The thrust of his speech emphasized that the length of the state of war would depend entirely upon the internal situation and its evolution. External diversion and an anti-socialist underground were setting back the hopes for a 'national reconciliation' and impeding the recovery of the economy, he added. All such anti-socialist activities were bringing about only unrest, making it harder to come to a national understanding and slowing down the process of *odnowa*. Despite the slacking enthusiasm of the population in continuing its waves of protest and the organizational difficulties facing Solidarity's Underground Interim Co-ordinating Commission (TKK, formed on April 22, 1982), an eight hour nationwide strike had been planned for November 10, 1982.[54] The same day when Jaruzelski and Glemp had finally agreed on fixing a date for the Pope's visit (November 8), it was also announced that Lech Wałęsa would shortly be freed. His liberation on the 11th[55] had been accompanied by rumours spread by the régime, attempting to create the false impression that Solidarity's Chairman had decided to give up the struggle and had even struck a bargain with the authorities.[56] This attempt to drive a wedge between the charismatic leader and his aides who had fought out the 'War' in the underground, misfired. However, and perhaps because of these rumours, the November strike had a low turn-out and failed to be the massive mobilization exercise some had thought it would be. This

must have brought satisfaction to the régime whose professed objective of eliminating support for Solidarity seemed to be having some success. In this context, it is interesting to note the authorities's policy of using symbolic motives to press their case both at home and abroad. Throughout 1982, official exhortations repeatedly emphasized Polish independence, sovereignty, the unity of the nation and the country's social and cultural identity. Patriotism was equally encouraged and much was said about the historic continuity of the present armed forces with the traditions and achievements of their predecessors. The authorities used 'soft' propaganda techniques consisting of attempts to persuade the population that the interests of the Jaruzelski régime were identical with Polish national interests and *raison d'état*. This explains the repetitive use of emotion-laden national symbols as the means to have the status quo accepted by the nation.[57] For the first time in 33 years, the guard of honour at the tomb of the unknown soldier wore the *Rogatywka*, the traditional four-cornered hat, dear to all Polish patriots.[58] The theme of Polish nationalism was repeatedly used by the authorities. Poland under Jaruzelski saw the (officially-sponsored) return to some of the idea of the *endecja*, a right-wing radical ideology whose inspirator, Roman Dmowski, had initiated in 1893 with the National League. It was no mere coincidence that the authorities in the 1980s attempted to revive the ideas of a movement which under Dmowski, and in contrast with his great rival Piłsudski, had always looked eastwards and had held a pragmatic russian-orientated vision of Poland's future.... These themes were repeatedly used and in some respect have coloured (this was their aims) the perceptions of observers both inside and outside the country. What is more, this use of old fundamental values cherished by a number of Poles, especially among the older

generations, was being echoed in Church's statements, giving the régime an added support from a most unlikely source. This in fact contributed to popular feelings that the Church was being too compromising with the authorities. A good example of this 'psychological tactic' was the frontpage warnings which regularity appeared in the official media at times when social unrest was about to break out: Jaruzelski's call for calm on August 31 for instance and this un-signed commentary in *Rzeczpospolita* asking to whom the planned strike (November 10) was important ("... to those who want that Poland should never come out of the crisis. They call for strikes because they want the situation to become worse").[59] Despite the extreme reservation with which the official media is looked upon by Poles, such calls inevitably carried with them some measure of truth and as such may have contributed to forging the impression among outsiders that the PRL's leadership did have, in a patriotic way, the interests of the country in mind .

After the accepted unsuccessfulness of the November 10 demonstrations, 'oppositional activity' gradually diminished, at least in comparison with the previous 10 months. This assessment was echoed in a meeting of senior Party activists and military commanders in Warsaw to confidentially discuss the situation in the country. Noting the poor turn-out for the planned demonstrations, they congratulated themselves for the authorities' success in controlling regional opposition centres. They also discussed the positive effect of Jaruzelski's meeting with Archbishop Glemp, and Wałęsa's release which brought about the desired effect of placating the nation and receiving a favourable Western reaction: "Wałęsa's release will be used to compromise him in the eyes of public opinion as an element in

the destruction of the mythology and symbolism of Solidarity. The appropriate services of General Kiszczak are already working on it". Also mentioned were the currently used techniques to win popular support, ie. a large-scale campaign of winning over popular Catholic personalities to the PRON, a "series of smiles" organized by the authorities (Rakowski's meeting with the actors), a certain degree of criticism allowed on economic and social subjects in a number of selected publications ("Outright oppositional articles by Kisiel [Stefan Kisielewski] will appear in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, All such moves are under strict control and their intention is to create an impression of growing tolerance and normalization in public life").[60] Thus, it is fairly accurate to speak of the last weeks of 1982 as a mopping-up period for the police and military authorities. The extreme brutality in the dissolution of the actors' association, the dismissal of several editors-in-chief, and the anti-Wałęsa campaign which took place at the time, clearly showed that the régime was determined to impose its will upon society and accept nothing short of a capitulation. On November 23, the TGOs were returned to some 42 parishes and in 3 towns where they remained until December 1.[61]

By the beginning of December, signs appeared that the state of war would soon be lifted. On the 8th, the Warsaw KOK concluded that all the aims of the state of war had been fulfilled and that the situation had improved in every sector during the past year.[62] In his address to the miners at Jastrzębie on December 3, Jaruzelski praised the miners' performances and their contribution to the PRL's economy. He told them that "now it is possible to work without the terror tactics of strikes" and that "it [was] now safe on the streets of Polish cities". He added, although it must have been hard for his listeners to share let alone understand his optimism that,

> A year above we said that it was bad and that perhaps it might become worse. Today we cannot say yet that all is fine. But it is already better.[63]

So much "better", that less than two weeks later, the General, in an address to the nation on the eve of the first anniversary of the introduction of the state of war, announced its suspension by the end of 1982. Though he stressed that the road to "complete normalization" must be trodden on step by step, he looked back upon the past year and declaimed that while it had been a test, "we have passed [it]". However, "a decisive and more effective struggle with social evil is awaiting us. New legal instruments will make it possible to combat in a more severe manner crimes that threaten the lives, health, property of citizens".[64]

For the régime, the important was "to win or not loose".[65] Defeat was simply not an envisageable option for Jaruzelski. The state of war was hardly a victory, but at the same time it wasn't a complete set-back for the ruling establishment. At least, from the authorities' point of view, the 'anarchy' of the 1980s had been put to an end. Of course, the Polish Communist Party was in an urgent need of an uplift, but its eventual restoration as the 'leading force' in the PRL was compromised from the start. Too many myths had been destroyed in recent years for the Polish rulers to use out-dated ideological arguments to convince the *blasé* and tired Polish population that the 'errors of the past had not been caused by Socialism, but by an insufficient amount of it'. For the time being, force remained the only argument that could be used effectively by the authorities.

Chapter 4 Notes.

1. Swidlicki, *op cit.* note 16 Chapter 3, pp. 22-25, on the illegality of the imposition of martial law according to Polish law.
2. Stephen R. Bowers, 'An assessment of the Polish crisis: the Eastern European view', *Journal of social Political and Economic Studies*, Fall 1982, Vol. 7, Part 3, pp. 257-268.
3. Laurence Sherwin, *RFE/RL*, Research Bulletin, 499/81, 14/12/1981.
4. Bruce Porter, *RFE/RL*, Research Bulletin, 501/81.
5. *TASS*, 24/12/1981. Cited by Laurence Sherwin, *RFE/RL*, 1/82, (Soviet Union), 28/12/1981.
6. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 52, 1981, p. 19. Cited by Allan Kroncher, *RFE/RL*, 10/82, 7/1/1982.
7. *Pravda*, 2/3/1982, in *CDSP*, Vol. 34, no. 9.
8. Although it should be stressed that Czyrek did not lose his place in the Politburo and went on later to be a regular visitor to the Soviet Union. His replacement may have been simply a way of making room for new faces in the aftermath of the declaration of state of war.
9. *Trybuna Ludu*, 3/3/1982. c) was a direct reference to article 6, §2 of the 1976 PRL Constitution.
10. *Trybuna Ludu*, 4/3/1982.
11. For instance, 'The Unshakeable Alliance of Two Fraternal People' where the meeting was described as a 'milestone in international affairs', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 5/5/1982.
12. Archie Brown, 'Eastern Europe 1968, 1978, 1988', *Daedelus*, Winter 1979, pp. 151-174.
13. For a list of all important visits made by PRL officials between December 1981 and December 1987, see Appendix.
14. *Survey*, Summer 1982, Vol. 26, No. 3 (116), p. 109; A special double issue on *Poland under Jaruzelski*. The quote is taken from *Serwis Informacyjny Małopolska*, Kraków, No 42., 20/11/1982.
15. Elizabeth Teague, *Solidarity and the Soviet Worker*, Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 316.
16. December 14, 1982.
17. *The Guardian*, 15/11/1982.
18. Mikhaïl Gorbachev, *Perestroïka*, Paris, Flammarion, 1987, p. 46.
19. *Rzeczpospolita*, 11-12/12/1982, p. 6.
20. *Rzeczpospolita*, 5/5/1982.
21. *Trybuna Ludu*, 2/9/1982.
22. *Trybuna Ludu*, 17/9/1982.
23. See Appendix for a list of the laws passed between January and December 1982..
24. George Kolankiewicz, 'Polish trade unions normalized', *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1987, pp. 57-68.
25. In particular the article in *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/9/1982 p. 2, entitled, "Przeciw Państwu, przeciw Polsce (Against the state, against Poland).
26. *Kultura* (Paris), 'Pałka i teoria', No 3/438, 1984, p. 7.
27. It is interesting to note that a picture of the leaders meeting showed for the first and only time in 1982, a Jaruzelski in civilian clothes, *Trybuna Ludu*, 17/8/1982.
28. *Trybuna Ludu*, 30/8/1982.
29. On August 31, *Trybuna Ludu* carried a front page plea for calm and peace in the country; "We have only one Poland, one genuine country, whose fate depends above all on ourselves", *Trybuna Ludu*, 31/8/1982.
30. General Czesław Kiszczak's report to the Sejm on September 16, in

Trybuna Ludu, 17/9/1982.
31. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/9/1982.
32. Maria Łoś, 'Law and Order in Contemporary Poland', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 25, no. 3, September 1983, p. 407.
33. Dieter Bingen, 'The new Polish collective movement PRON and the reform of the electoral system', *Bericht des BIOst*, No. 38, 1984.
34. *Trybuna Ludu*, 17/09/1982, p. 2.
35. It was only formally set up in November 24, 1984!
36. Davis S. Mason, 'Stalemate and apathy in Poland', *Current History*, Vol. 84, No. 505, November 1985. For a fuller discussion on the OPZZ, see the same author's article, 'Poland's new trade unions', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, July 1987, pp. 489-508.
37. "...The state of war also creates a psychological barrier. However one must look at tomorrow", *Trybuna Ludu*, 11/10/1982, p. 3.
38. *Trybuna Ludu*, 29/1/1982.
39. *Trybuna Ludu*, 26/3/1982.
40. Czyrek's speech appeared in *Trybuna Ludu*, 26/3/1982.
41. Less than a week earlier, the Journalist Union, the SDP, had just been banned.
42. *Trybuna Ludu*, 26/3/1982.
43. Ibid.
44. *UN Yearbook, 1983*, Resolution No. 38/196.
45. *Trybuna Ludu*, 26/3/1982.
46. For the PRL's response to Reagan's statement see, *Rzeczpospolita*, 19-20/6/1982.
47. May 3 is traditionally celebrated as the anniversary of the 1791 Constitution and is also a religious feast day - the coronation of the Virgin mary as Queen of the Polish crown.
48. *Trybuna Ludu*, 29/4/1982.
49. On this particular point see, Adam Gwiazda, 'Poland's trade with the West: past trends and future prospects', *Co-Existence*, 21, 1985, pp. 79-90.
50. Interview granted to the Japanese daily "Nihon Keizai Shimbun" on July 28, 1982 in *Zbiór Dokumentów*, PISM, Nr. 7-9 (445-447), Warszawa 1982, pp. 307-310.
51. *Rzeczpospolita*, 27/10/1982.
52. *Rzeczpospolita*, 28/10/1982.
53. *X Plenum KC PZPR, 27-28 października 1982r.*, KiW, Warszawa, 1982.
54. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, Nr 31, 1982.
55. This was the official announcement but Wałęsa only arrived in Gdańsk on the 14th.
56. In particular, the authorities used Wałęsa's letter to General Jaruzelski, dated November 8, 1982.
57. Garnysz, 'Polish stalemate', *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1984, pp. 51-59, where he distinguishes between 'hard' and 'soft' propaganda methods used by the Polish authorities to gain popular support.
58. *Rzeczpospolita*, 18/1/1982. The very same day the Wujec mine tragedy was announced.
59. *Rzeczpospolita*, 8/11/1982.
60. *Survey*, Summer 1982, Vol. 26, No 3 (116), p. 108.
61. *Trybuna Ludu*, 23/11/82 and *Rzeczpospolita*, 2/12/1982.
62. *Rzeczpospolita*, 8/12/1982.
63. *Trybuna Ludu*, 4-5/12/1982.
64. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/12/1982.
65. "Gagner ou ne pas perdre", Raymond Aron, *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations*, Calmann-Lévy, 1984, p. 45.

Dla Polaków można czasem coś dobrego zrobić, ale z Polakami nigdy.

Aleksander Wielopolski (1803-1877)

(For Poles, one can sometimes do something, with Poles never.)

CHAPTER 5

A STATE OF WAR SUSPENDED.

Four years after the December 13, 1981 proclamation, Władisław Loranc (who became Minister for Religious Affairs in 1988), summed up in an article some of the successes which had resulted from the imposition of a state of war. Among others he particularly praised the 'moral victory' won by the Party:

> The imposition of martial law in December 1981 gave the lie to three political propositions which had been widespread within the Solidarity movement and constituted the political programme of its leaders. ... These three fundamental dogmas - the political and moral disintegration of the Party and the state administration, the enormous influence of Solidarity's professional staff, and society's readiness to jeopardize the national interest - were destroyed with the imposition of martial law, both by the way it was imposed and by the way society reacted to it.[1]

Ignoring the third 'dogma' as blatantly inaccurate and unfounded, it was clear that after a year of military rule, the first two propositions were clearly well off the mark. Although the suspension of the state of war showed that Jaruzelski's 'normalization' was scoring some success the fact that, in December 1982, it was suspended and not lifted, testified to the uncertainties still troubling the leadership. If Jaruzelski had thought that he was doing the Polish nation a favour by imposing his iron rule over the country, he was soon made aware that this decision had been made against the will of the population. Marquis Wielopolski's observation (whose deep concern

for his country was generally admitted while Jaruzelski's isn't), once again seemed to hold some truth. The Polish General knew that the coming years would require much dexterity and stubbornness on his part to gain the co-operation of a disillusioned and stunned majority.

5.1 *The External Environment: Eastern and Western Inputs.*

The state of war was formally suspended on December 31, 1982. The decree, while giving the Council of State the right to suspend some elements of martial law, actually incorporated many sections of it into legal statutes. The result was that almost all of the restrictions imposed one year earlier became now codified into the PRL's legal statutes. Perhaps even more important, all legal bills and rules enacted during the state of war remained in force. At the same time many internees, who had been released in the accompanying amnesty, found that they were still subject to a range of new repressive measures, among others, their dismissal from the jobs they had held before the imposition of the state of war.[2] Add to this the fact that all major industries remained militarized and it was clear that the situation at the beginning of 1983 was bleak. Despite the authorities' claims that they had succeeded in 'normalizing' the country, the nature of this achievement presented all the signs that a lot more needed to be done to put the 'Polish house' in order.

The decision to suspend the rigours of the state of war after more than 12 months changed little to the overall situation in the PRL. While the authorities were at pains to convince the outside world that 'normality' had finally returned to the country, the domestic situation was still far from presenting all the signs of 'socialist normalization'. Throughout 1983 the political leadership, stubbornly but somewhat unsuccessfully, attempted to muster public acceptance for

its policies. It tried to return to a set of relations between the authorities and the public where the role and function of the former would become viable again and where society's position would be once again characterized by compliance and submissiveness. However, this goal was not an easy one. The Party was still weak and the institutions it tried to foster, in particular the new unions, were hardly convincing or appealing to the majority of Poles. Over the past five months, the PZPR was the subject of an in-depth re-assessment of its mobilizing capabilities and a campaign to 'reform' it internally. Using the environment created by the state of war, the Party ranks were being reviewed in a sweeping campaign to boost its morale and effectiveness, not to mention its numbers. However the task was proceeding at a slow pace. The exodus of Party members since 1980 (800 000 lost members according to an official assessment[3]) had considerably weakened the PZPR's organizational capabilities. Indeed the whole process of 'normalization' was hampered by the acute lack of confidence and popularity of the population for the Jaruzelski régime. The authorities were well aware of this fact and they endeavoured to alter this situation by reinforcing the state's institutional power and prerogatives. It did not bridge the gap between the ruling establishment and society at large but it did strengthen the means with which the régime could enforce its will upon an exhausted and increasingly disillusioned population. That the state of war had only been suspended and not lifted as had been hoped, demonstrated amply the fact that the 'conditions were not yet right' for the leadership to be confident enough to do away with some of the instruments of control and repression offered by the imposition of a state of war. Yet by now, the tone and content of most major political speeches were expressing a new confidence which had not been so obvious in previous

months. The main emphasis was made on the successful thwarting and elimination of 'anarcho-syndicalist adventurism'. In his report to the Sejm in March, General Kiszczak said that,

> Today, 15 months since the crucial decision of 13 December 1981, we can say, with full authority, that the process of the disintegration of the state has been arrested, that the anarchy paralysing the national economy has been overcome, that the way is now open to a painstaking and long-suffering solution to the crisis.[4]

However the authorities were faced with the following dilemma: in order to defend the system, they had to resort to continued security precautions but this was having inevitably an adverse effect upon the economy. While in some cases the militarization of some key industries, coal for instance, had had some positive effects, this nonetheless was a short-term solution to a long-term problem. In order to stabilize and improve the situation, economic improvements were necessary. But they could only have some chances of success if there was a relaxation of security controls. Trying to extricate themselves from this vicious circle would be a major concern of the authorities in the forthcoming months. It should also be noted that the costs of the imposition of martial law had themselves been an added burden to an already poor state of the economy. Whatever profits remained from the Gierek era were used up in the operation and further contributed to deplete the meagre reserves possessed by the Polish authorities. It should also be noted that there were indirect costs resulting from the imposition of a state of war. In particular, one is reminded of the 1982 floods which affected the banks of the river Vistula. The damages were increased ten-fold for the inhabitants of Plock because of the communication blackout still existing there, which effectively prevented early warnings to the area as well as calls for rapid intervention.

The decision to suspend the state of war was an ambiguous one. By removing some of the restrictions imposed on the Polish society, the régime was hoping to have the support of part of the population and the recognition by the international community that the situation was evolving in a positive way. It hoped thereby to exact, both abroad and at home, some measure of goodwill in order to improve the process of external and internal 'normalization'. Yet, at the same time, the trials of Solidarity members and the institutionalization of repressive means into the legislation had the effect of nullifying this apparent relaxation of control on the part of the authorities. In many ways, Warsaw's policy-making was characterized by the fact that it satisfied no-one. While this may have been the only possible policy from the régime's point of view, it was hard not to assess it negatively. Even Soviet commentators seemed unhappy about developments in the PRL. In reply to a Western journalist's doubts, a Soviet counterpart remarked that, "at home (ie. in the USSR), on the level of impulsions and emotions, Jaruzelski's policy is making a lot of people unhappy, but on the political level, we have no other choice than support him fully".[5] Obviously the Kremlin still looked on with some uncertainty and a lot more would have to be done by Warsaw to convince the Soviet leaders that 'there was no other way'. In May 1983, *Kommunist*, printed a translation of an article in *Nowe Drogi*, which had appeared in the PRL a couple of months earlier. It highlighted the extent to which 'normalization' was still incomplete:

> Although the introduction of martial law and the decisive steps taken by WRON, the state authorities and the security agencies, eliminated the threat of civil war, broke the back of the opposition and severely constrained its activities, the rightist forces still represent a threat today, and it would be hazardous to entertain a casual optimism or faith in rapid success. Not all the preconditions that permitted the rightists forces to become active in the mid-70s and especially in 1980-81 have been removed.[6]

Obviously, the threat to socialism in the PRL was still present in the minds of both of the Soviet and the Polish leaderships, and as the following comments in the same article seem to indicate, not everyone was supporting Jaruzelski's policies:

> Only a deliberately guided, controlled and wisely programmed process can bring about a return to normality. ... Since martial law was introduced in december 1981, preconditions have been created for speeding up the process of restoring the position of socialism, including its position in the public mind. Yet it sometimes seem that these processes are moving too slowly.[7]

In the first months of 1983, the Polish authorities waged a harsh campaign against Western journalists posted in the PRL. On January 12, 1983, the American news agency UPI's correspondent, Ruth Gruber, was expelled and the activities of the agency suspended (February 3). Five days earlier, the BBC's correspondent, Kevin Ruane was told he could not renew his visa. The same fate was shared by the Austrian correspondent who was not allowed back in the country. The authorities presumably did not want the West to report the continuing repressive measures against Solidarity members and were determined to restrict any journalistic account which could have shown that the situation in the country was still a cause of concern for the régime. In fact this attitude did not restrict itself to journalists only. On March 3, the International Labour Organization voted by a large majority to ask the PRL's government to allow an ILO representative to be present at the trials of Solidarity members and draw a report on the internal situation in the country. On May 12, ILO also ordered an investigation into charges that workers' rights were being violated and set up an investigation commission to assess the violation of trade union law in the PRL. This was strongly attacked by the Polish authorities who decided to suspend co-operation with the organization as a retaliation for what they saw as "interference in the country's internal

matters".[8]

This concern to convey to the outside world the impression that the situation in the PRL was now normal was clearly becoming a primary objective of the leadership's Western foreign policy orientation. In the circumstances there was little else it could do in this area, yet this policy - if successful - had potential domestic repercussions. Any formal Western recognition of the present régime would be a badly-needed contribution to the process of legitimization facing the authorities, in their attempts to bridge the gap between rulers and ruled. As such, the 'normalization' of relations with Western countries was crucial to Warsaw. By obtaining international legitimization, the régime would find it easier to legitimize itself in the eyes of the Polish people. However, in a catch-22 fashion, international acceptance of the Jaruzelski's régime would not be forthcoming as long as it was obvious that society still rejected the ruling establishment. On February 11, 1983, the Central Committee International Commission met to discuss problems affecting the PRL's diplomacy. Wiejacz, the Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister, said that it was important to strengthen the external security of the state and ensure that it returned to its former international position. He also called for the support of Polish economic interests abroad, the presentation of a better image of the country and the development of co-operation with Polonia, the Polish *Diaspora* living in the West.[9] Of course this did not prevent the authorities from engaging in actions seemingly detrimental to such an objective, but then this was inevitable in the light of the geo-political position of the country. Once again the main argument used by the régime to justify the imposition of martial law and the need to return to a state of normal

relations with Western states was the identification of the PRL's national security with that of the whole of the European continent. In a speech to the Sejm, Stefan Olszowski, the new Foreign Minister, made this clear:

> A sense of responsibility has guided the actions of the Polish authorities in tackling our internal problems. The sovereign decisions taken in the supreme interest of the Polish state and nation have always also borne in mind the needs of stabilization of the international situation and the maintainance of security in Europe. ... Just as the removal of basic elements of a structure can bring about the collapse of the whole building, so an undermining of the foundations supporting the edifice of peace in Europe would have incalculable consequences. Guarding our own house and eliminating the hazards to it, we can also bear in mind the great significance of this for the safety of the whole of Europe.[10]

It is interesting to compare for a moment the main difference between this speech and that of Olszowski's predecessor, Józef Czyrek, almost a year ago, when he had addressed the Sejm on the same theme of foreign policy (See p. 153 above). In March 1982, the main emphasis had been made concerning the internal situation: "Poland's main requirement is peace, internal peace". 'Internal normalization' was the highest of priorities at the time. A year later, this was no longer the case, although of course it still remained a main objective of the authorities. 'Internal peace' had been achieved and the PRL's domestic problems could no longer be used as an excuse to implement restrictive measures against the PRL. International relations had to take this into account:

> Today we repeat: the policy of sanctions, pressure and interference in our internal affairs is a dead end and doomed to complete failure. In any case, the suspension of the state of war and the important decisions which followed have removed the pretext for this policy that were advanced as the preconditions for correct relations. Its continued pursuit can only mean one thing: a wish to obstruct the normalization of our internal situation and hopes of exploiting the so-called "Polish question" for the exacerbation of international tensions.[11]

Although concern was being expressed at the unchanged Western attitudes towards the PRL, the Polish authorities also set themselves specific foreign policy tasks for the coming year. At the politburo meeting of January 25, three main tasks were called for: the strengthening of ties with socialist countries, the pursuit of an active European policy on disarmament and peace and the building up of active economic and political relations with developing countries.[12] While the first two sets of policies had always represented, to various degrees, the PRL's traditional foreign policy orientations, the last task, itself also not new, stood out, however, from the others in the present context. It was clear that in the wake of the Western sanctions, and in the light of the country's need of raw materials, the PRL would attempt to obtain what it needed somewhere else. In April, Stefan Olszowski travelled to the African continent and visited Nigeria, Benin and Angola. The PRL's main interest in its approach to less developed and developing countries has always been economic, as a way to improve its balance of payments (even if this has reaped meagre results as commodities exchange has been the rule rather than the exception). But it has equally tended to be pragmatic in that it has sought relations with such countries that would provide tangible, near-term benefits for itself.[13] The call for a strengthening of relations with developing countries was perhaps unsurprising in the light of the current deterioration of relations with developed Western countries. However the net material benefits expected, if any, were destined to be an insignificant contribution to the solving of the PRL's economic crisis. It was more likely to be an attempt to reinvigorate a flaccid foreign policy and demonstrate that the PRL could not be isolated on the international arena.

All the same, the authorities were not successful in preventing the outside world from adopting a pessimistic attitude towards the situation in the country. As far as the 'opposition' was concerned, 1983 marked the return to a more active involvement in the country's political life. Though shaken, underground 'opposition' began to take on a more determined stand, partly as a result of its re-organization as a more unified body. Bronisław Misztal explained this new phase in oppositional activity as the normal conclusion of yet another cycle in Polish collective behaviour, his so-called 'Apathy-Participation-Apathy' model. In the *preliminary stage* (June 1976-1980), Polish society had behaved as a dissatisfied mass, discovering suffering and oppression. In the *precipitation stage (August 1980-November 1980)*, society began acting as a crowd. This was followed by the *popular stage (December 1980-March 1981)*, where an excited crowd/society formally organized itself as a movement. In the *disorientation stage (March 1981-August 1981)*, a clear polarization of policies appeared, aggravating conflicts between the movement and the political system. From September 1981 to December 1981, the *destabilization stage* gave rise to more excitement, fatigue and growing apathy. The state of war, the *truncation stage (December 1981-May 1983)*, introduced despair, broken hopes and apathy. Finally, the *reconstruction stage (May 1983-1986)*, saw the rebirth of beliefs and prudent participation.[14]

On January 22, 1983, TKK issued a statement calling for a programme of resistance including non-co-operation with the régime, economic struggle, a fight for an independent social consciousness and the preparation for a general strike.[15] Solidarity's Co-ordinating Office abroad, chaired by Jerzy Milewski, presented on March 17, a 600 page document concerning the state of human rights in the PRL to the heads

of delegations to the Madrid CSCE, pointing out the violations of international law entailed by the imposition of a state of war in the PRL. According to the report, "the introduction of a state of war in Poland violated the following rules of international law: a) Art. 4 §1 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political rights because no exceptional public danger threatened the existence of the nation, while only such circumstances can justify the imposition of the state of war as an emergency; b) Art. 1 §b of the ILO Convention No. 105 which states that forced labour may not be used for economic purposes; c) ILO conventions Nos. 87 & 98 which guarantee freedom of trade union activities; d) Art. 9 §1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights which was violated by the introduction of indefinite internment on the basis of administrative decision.[16] The verdict was obvious. Meanwhile in the PRL, all was far from being peaceful. On February 13, 1983, Police used tear gas and batons to break up a peaceful demonstration in Warsaw commemorating the 14th month since the imposition of a state of war. A month later similar demonstrations occurred again in Gdańsk, Warsaw, Wrocław and Kalisz. The Government spokesman, Jerzy Urban said, during a press conference on February 8, that the complete lifting of the state of war was still not possible as conflicts had not yet died out. He also pointed out that external circumstances did not create the right conditions either. In an interview with the London *Times*, he argued that it was high time for the West to call off sanctions against the PRL. "Western sanctions against Poland have so little to do with what is going on here", he said. "The dialogue with the Church had never been interrupted", he continued, and "how could there be an agreement with Solidarity since it no longer existed?"[17]

Speaking at the PRON's 1st Congress on May 7, General Jaruzelski, in an attempt to define his view of 'national conciliation' spelled out that it was not important "who is to reach agreement with whom, but on what matter and for what purpose":

> Fundamental for national conciliation must be and will always remain: First: the ensurance of Poland's external security, the integrity of her frontiers and of her territory. Second: the insurance of calm, internal harmony and the settlement of social controversies without conflict. Third: the insurance of real conditions for the improvement of the material and cultural life of the nation, for the advancement of Polish civilization. These matters are inseparable. they are unattainable in a state of internal division, without international guarantees ensured by the alliance with the Soviet Union and membership of the defensive coalition of Warsaw Treaty states, without the leading role of the Party and a strong, democratic, socialist state.[18]

Again we can notice the intertwined relationship between domestic and foreign policy-goals made in the General's speech. Internal conciliation, a domestic goal, became determined by the continued pursuit of a close relationship with the socialist bloc, a foreign policy *sine qua non*. The successful attainment of domestic objectives, namely internal 'peace' in turn represented a crucial determinant for the pursuit of potentially beneficial foreign policy goals, here, the resumption of normal relations with the West, themselves crucial for the improvement of the country's situation.

In this respect the forthcoming Papal visit took on an important significance for the Polish authorities' bid to be accepted on the international arena. Though the state of war had been suspended, the Pope would be visiting his homeland still formally under martial law. The fact that the authorities did not go as far as lifting completely martial law before the Pope's visit reflected two main concerns. In the first place, they obviously thought that it would be too early a move, as long as the 'internal normalization' of the country was not

fully implemented. On the other hand, it also reflected their desire not to appear to be bowing to external pressure as far as internal policy-making was concerned. By having the Pope visit the PRL still under military rule, Warsaw was seeking to show that all discriminatory measures undertaken by the West had failed to alter the régime's independence in the handling of its domestic affairs. At the same time, it gave Jaruzelski a sense of accrued credibility vis-à-vis non-communist countries: if the Pope could now visit the PRL, after his planned visit in 1982 had been cancelled, then it meant that the situation there was improving. However, as we will see, this wishful thinking on the part of the Polish authorities failed to materialize.

A week after the PRON Congress, Politburo member, Józef Czyrek, addressing Central Committee propagandists - known as *Lektorzy* -, said that the Party and Government's stand on the Papal visit remained unchanged and that it was seen as important for the further normalization of life in the PRL.[19] Yet the authorities appeared somewhat uncertain of the potential effects the visit might have. Characteristic of the weeks preceding John Paul II's pilgrimage, was the obvious state-sponsored campaign to over-dramatize the 'risks' entailed by it. The MSW deputy Minister, Straszewski appeared on television, explaining the reasons behind the stringent security arrangements for the visit, as a prevention against the possibility of an assassination attempt by foreign centres.[20] On May 26, General Kiszczak accused 'opponents abroad' of trying to shatter the unity of the WTO, explaining that "hostile forces were aiming at disturbing Church-state relations, helping the political underground and inspiring anti-socialist forces to set up terrorist groups".[21] These were just a couple of innumerable alarmist propaganda statements aimed

at creating a climate of paranoia among the population and capitalize on the entire nation's hopes that the visit would take place as planned. It should be noted that this was becoming a critical period for the authorities. Nothing illustrated this better than the signs of leadership uncertainty which emerged from the 12th KC Plenum which took place on May 31. Czyrek's report attacked opportunists and revisionists and warned against factional and demagogic attempts to prevent the consolidation of the Polish Communist party.[22]

> The Party needs to concentrate its forces, and not disperse them. In accordance with the position of the 9th Congress, we will oppose and decisively combat views and opportunist-revisionist behaviour and dogmatic sectarianism as well as fractionist and demagogic phenomena.[23]

The plenum occurred after a delay (it had been scheduled for the beginning of the month) and Jaruzelski's speech was only released on Friday, June 3, an unusual three days after the meeting, fuelling speculation that some disagreement had occurred. It was also learned that all major ideological decisions would be postponed until after the Papal visit had occurred. Significantly, it was at this plenum that Professor Hieronim Kubiak gave his report concerning the causes and circumstances of recurring crisis in Communist Poland. The 157-page study had been conducted by a special Party Commission appointed at the Extraordinary 9th Congress on September 2, 1981, to inquire in these matters. The main conclusion of the report which is relevant here was that while a deteriorating international climate in the mid-70s had undoubtedly contributed in exacerbating tensions within the country, it was wrong to ascribe the sources of social conflicts in the PRL to the international situation alone. Equally wrong was to blame them exclusively on the activities of the political opposition which, while normally aggravating crisis situations, is unable to provoke them. Instead, "it was the incorrect policy of the Party

leadership and of the government, not external circumstances, which led to the transformation of a difficult situation into a grave crisis".[24] The 12th KC Plenum was assigned the task of publishing the report in a special issue of *Nowe Drogi*, the PZPR main theoretical journal. However this was never done: it seems that even a watered-down version of the report could not be publicized. A couple of months earlier the same journal had published an article entitled, "External circumstances for the overcoming of the crisis in Poland".[25] In it, the author identified several reasons why the PRL was being used by the West as an element in the deterioration of East-West relations: a) to encourage the socio-political-economic crisis and alter the PRL's domestic and foreign policies; b) by affecting one socialist country, the crisis might also undermine the rest of the bloc; c) the PRL's traditional place in Europe; d) the fact that the 1980s had witnessed a confrontation between the capitalist and socialist camps; e) the fact that the Polish crisis became a good excuse for the US to confront the Soviet Union and affect the correlation of forces in Europe and the world between East and West. Continuing, the author remarked that the PRL had found itself in the middle of the ideological confrontation between the East and the West and that therefore its foreign policy must aim at removing the effects of the country's international isolation. The 'normalization' of the PRL's relations with capitalist countries would therefore depend in particular, on the progress of the internal stabilization of the socio-political situation. Thus, the link between the PRL's foreign and domestic policy-making remained as strong as ever. The fact that now the ruling establishment was beginning to accept this reality, augured some changes in the leadership's perceptions of how to conduct

its foreign relations with the capitalist countries.

5.2 *The Second Papal Visit.*

A visit by the Pope to Poland is itself a major event. That he should be a Pole himself increases ten-fold the significance of such a visit. In the summer of 1983, the fact that it should be his second visit to his native country brought back memories of his first pilgrimage, four years previously. All these factors combined with the reality of still existing martial law rigours, was to make the second Papal visit to the PRL a momentous event in the life of the Polish nation. Gone were the days when Pope Gregory XIV had formally condemned the 1830 uprising, siding with Tsar Nicolas II and Metternich in asking the Poles to submit to Russia's authority, arguing that the Tsar would then show all his goodness (the infamous *Brevis Cum primum*).[26] The contrast with the 1980s could not have been greater. Now the Pope was on Poland's side and epitomized the highest moral authority for the major part of the population. Unsurprisingly then, his summer 1983 pastoral visit became the psychological highlight of the year.

Since the beginning of the year, Church-state relations had been tensed and unproductive with the régime taking little heed of the repeated Church statements for a national dialogue, including the banned Solidarity union. In a statement issued on January 30, 1983, the Polish episcopate asked the government to declare an amnesty for those still interned and commit itself to other initiatives aiming at re-establishing full social justice to facilitate the return of forgiveness and national unity. The 190th episcopate Conference reiterated its call for social justice leading to a national accord and said that workers should have the right to organize themselves in

trade unions which defend their true interests. The statement also deplored the foreign press attacks on the Pope, a disguised reference to recent articles in the Soviet press.[27] Notwithstanding obvious differences between the authorities and the Church, there was little doubt that this second Papal visit was seen as very significant for the ruling establishment, the Church and the public at large. They all recognized the value of the Pope's visit, although for different reasons. For the population, it would be a breath of fresh hope in the creeping atmosphere of marasm and moral disenchantment. For the Church, it would be an occasion to confirm once more its predominant role in the Polish society and erase, in the joys aroused by the visit, some of the criticisms which it had received in recent times. Since the state of war had been imposed, the Church had been split with some of its leaders supporting the primate's wish to keep talking with the authorities while others, including some energetic parish priests, urged the Church to adopt a firmer attitude in defence of workers' rights. For the régime it would provide a well-needed boost to an otherwise damaged prestige and reputation at home as well as abroad. Although the visit was not happily looked upon by the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist bloc (for example, eight days before the Papal visit, the Czech authorities placed a temporary ban on all transit through its territory to the PRL until the end of the month, except for urgent family reasons and for business[28]), it nonetheless would offer the Polish régime a useful contribution to the process of 'normalization'. At the same time it might pave the way for greater chances of settling some of the PRL's current debt problems.[29] For Warsaw, there was also the hope that by allowing the Pope to visit his homeland a second time, it would enable the authorities to muster some support from the Church hierarchy in restoring stability and

calm. In the words of the head of the Office for Religious Denominations, Adam Łopatka,

> The experience of the last few years has taught us that co-operation between the state and the Church may be fruitful in removing damaging emotions and tension within the society, the appeasement of social conflicts and their negative effects, and the elimination of extensive areas of social indifference. This kind of co-operation may favour a way out of the economic, social and moral crisis in which Poland finds itself.[30]

The Polish Catholic Church stressed the pastoral purpose of the visit and hoped that it would be a motivating factor for the authorities to lift the state of war: "The expected pilgrimage of the Holy Father today becomes a pilgrimage of national hope. In the spirit of this hope, one ought to expect the lifting of the state of war, the restoration of civil liberties in full, the release of prisoners sentenced in connection with the introduction on the state of war, the consignment to oblivion of deeds defined by the law in connection with martial law as violations of the legal order, and the restoration to their places of work of persons dismissed as a result of their convictions"[31] The régime, while itself also concerned to stress the pastoral character of the visit, adopted a more circumscribed attitude and refrained from linking the visit with any process of liberalization. In an interview with the Hungarian Party daily, *Népszabdság*, when asked what he thought of the Church's attitude to the PRL's present political problems, General Jaruzelski replied:

> At the most dramatic moments the Catholic Church lived up to its reputation as a responsible patriotic force. It has an important social position because of the great numbers of believers. While observing the constitutional separation of the Church from the state, the people's power treats the Catholic Church with great seriousness meeting it half way in its requirements for carrying out the pastoral mission. Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland will be an important event. We hope that the joint responsibility of the government and the episcopate to create fitting conditions for the visit and also the course and primarily the results of the visits will be an important touchstone of our mutual relations. ... The present state of relations between the

> state and the Church is overall good, although I admit that there is still room for improvement. It is in the common interest and primarily in the people's interest, not to permit tension and conflicts. We believe that the leadership of the Church in Poland is pursuing the same goal, but it is difficult to pass over in silence the fact that part of the clergy is engaged in activity which has nothing in common with religion. And so one can say that the problem is largely one of collusion and contradiction between some representatives of the hierarchy and the vehement and politicizing part of the clergy, on the one hand, and the irreversible reality of the 20th century, on the other.[32]

The reality of Poland in 1983 was that under a political system advocating Marxism-Leninism as the state religion, the bulk of the population was seeing in the Polish Catholic Church its only hope, a situation the ruling establishment was only too aware of. For society at large, the prospect of another papal visit was becoming a crucial issue. Although it would be too much to presume that it expected a renewal of the 1979 atmosphere and its subsequent developments, a majority of Poles anticipated that it would re-invigorate the spirit at the origin of the Solidarity movement. But this time the situation was markedly different from 1979 and few harboured illusions that John Paul II's visit would trigger off a repeat of the 1980 events. As Bujak, the Solidarity leader still at large, put it, "it may be that, as a result of Papal visits every sixth dictator in the world announces democratic elections, but I don't think that our dictator will do so".[33] Unwilling to be coaxed into allowing the Pope to visit his homeland without setting out clear conditions for the visit, the authorities repeatedly stressed that the domestic situation should be such as to allow the Papal pilgrimage. A year earlier these had been lacking and had resulted in the cancellation of the visit. Now, with the situation almost under control, the prospects were better. From Warsaw's point of view, the visit was significant as it would represent the first official visit of a head of state (in this case

the Vatican's) since the proclamation of a state of war. It would also reinforce the arguments that the situation in the country was now back to normal, a factor which might influence a change in Western perceptions towards the PRL. And at home it would cast the régime in a more favourable light if it allowed the visit to take place. In *Polityka*, Adam Łopatka, summed up the state's view and hopes:

> What will the state gain? In the first place a certain desire of a large part of its citizens, to greet John Paul II in Poland, will be fulfilled. Secondly in the contemporary world there are political forces which try to undermine the treaties of Yalta and Postdam. As you know, the programme of the Papal visit includes a visit to Wrocław and St Anne's Mount, places which Poland has regained as a result of these treaties. A visit and the acceptance of hospitality from the Church and Polish Catholics in just these towns means that the Pope upholds the treaty of Postdam. Finally, as a result of John Paul II's visit there will be a certain widening of the breach in the blockade which is being applied by the US and certain NATO countries. the visit of the head of the Vatican state and the Church will make it much more difficult to continue this unfriendly policy.[34]

However, despite the gains which the authorities hoped to reap from the visit, they also were well aware of the potential pitfalls. Firstly, there was the question of the Soviet Union. The May hard-line article reprinted in *Kommunist* from *Nowe Drogi* (see above), was a tough warning to General Jaruzelski, and it indicated that Moscow was still concerned with the situation in the PRL. Another article in *Izvestia* pointed out that "the stabilization process has a good many opponents. These are battered, but as yet not decisively defeated as forces that only a year ago prepared a counterrevolutionary coup".[35] There were fears that after the effects the first Papal visit had had on the socio-political life of the PRL, a new visit might trigger renewed unrest. A second perceived danger hinged upon the fact that, while it was clear that the régime was intent on using the Papal visit to bolster its credibility, any events which might disturb the

occasion, either before or during, would have to be dealt with summarily, using if necessary force and violence. Should the situation deteriorate prior to the visit and require its cancellation, this would have become a major embarrassment for the Jaruzelski régime. Disturbances during the visit, under extensive foreign media coverage, would also be a setback for the PRL leadership. At it was, underground Solidarity leaders said, in a statement dated March 23, 1983, that they would not organize any demonstrations during the Pope's visit.[36] This did not stop them from issuing a call to demonstrate on May 1, prior to the papal visit. By doing so, it put the authorities in an awkward position. Should the authorities decide to act ruthlessly against the planned action they would reveal their repressive nature. If they let it happen, they would in a way recognize the existence of a movement which they had argued existed no longer. An article in *Rzeczpospolita* accused the underground call for confrontation (sic) on May day as "tantamount to proof that the opposition is bent on destructing internal peace". It went on saying that "obviously its leaders are well aware that, considering the mood of the majority of society and the firmness of the authorities as well, they will not emerge winners; but it is not victory they have in mind. This time their aim is only for world opinion to demand from the Vatican to reconsider the purposefulness of the Pope's visit".[37] In the event, the May Day demonstrations showed that the underground had recovered a little from its November 1982 setback. But the régime did not stand idle. Troubles broke out between the security forces and Solidarity supporters, tear-gas and water cannons were used and numerous arrests followed. On May 3, the Police broke into the Polish Primate's Aid Committee headquarters and maltreated several voluntary workers. In itself this event really showed how committed the authorities were in

their professed aim of improving Church-state relations. The height of the repression was symbolized by the death of a high-school student, Grzegosz Przemyk after a night in Police custody on May 14 (his funeral was attended by over 15 000 mourners).

John Paul II's visit to his native country lived up to its expectations. Throughout the pilgrimage, The Pope was careful to emphasize the conciliatory nature of his visit. While there was little in his homilies from which the authorities could rightfully benefit as far as their credibility and own perceived legitimacy were concerned, the Pope's meetings with Party and state officials, representatives of the PRON organization and the pro-régime catholic organizations were emphasized by the media as a sign of convergence of opinions and priorities between the Church and the state. Undoubtedly, the visit bolstered the régime's standing, at least in the opinion of its leaders. An eight page assessment of the Papal visit was made by the propaganda department of the Central Committee to be distributed internally. Reproduced in parts by an underground newspaper, it commented that the visit had been a "political necessity":

> To refuse it would have involved immense political losses ... We assume that the visit will break down the Western diplomatic blockade. There will be fierce battles for the interpretation of the visit, both at home and abroad. A struggle for people's attitudes and consciences will begin. Our propaganda should be allusive and intelligent. ... Summing up, it could be said that the visit was, for us, a success in the state-political field, and a setback in the moral field. We have learned a lot about the views and feelings of society. We have gained new experience on ways of dealing with the Church. The visit will change little in the short-term, but it may have its long-term effects, if we fail to neutralize its negative effects.[30]

The state tried to capitalize on the fact that it had been a jointly organized visit between the Church and the authorities and that it signified the collusion of the two institutions in the search for a

'national conciliation'. If one of the régime's aims had been to make some progress in the process of the normalization of relations between the PRL and the Vatican, it proved unsuccessful. Nonetheless the Politburo did accept a report by the joint Church-state commission, expressing mutual satisfaction with the course of the visit on July 1. It should be noted that despite the presence of some 14 Soviet journalists accredited to cover the Papal visit only three brief reports appeared in the Soviet press, denoting the low interest the Soviet propaganda was ostensively showing for the visit.[39] Soviet Television deliberately distorted its commentary of the Papal visit by making it appear as if John Paul II was only meeting a few old women when in fact millions were present wherever he went. The Soviet viewers were thus given the impression that the visit was of little interest. After the Pope had left the PRL, the news broke out of the existence of plans whereby the Polish Church would seek to obtain foreign aid for the benefit of individual farmers, in the form of a fund to be administered by the Church authorities. On September 14, 1982, Cardinal Glemp had already outlined these in some details in a letter to General Jaruzelski. Of course, problems for the setting of this Agricultural Aid Fund immediately arose. The régime was aware that should such a fund be created and successfully managed by the Church, it would lead to an increase in the Church's prestige - both in the PRL and abroad - and thereby contribute to undermine the authorities' virtual monopoly on foreign trade and hard-currency dealings. It might also raise eyebrows in Moscow as well as among the PZPR's hardliners. It also feared that the Fund would turn even more Poles towards the Church and tie some of the beneficiaries institutionally with the Church. It was evident that the Polish authorities, engaged in the process of re-establishing themselves as

an all-pervasive body, would ensure that such projects as the Fund would be controlled by them as tightly as possible. Equally, it was also clear that the Church would do everything to acquire as much freedom of manoeuvre in terms of control and management of the Fund. Thus, despite the authorities' assurances that Church-state relations were improving, it remained the case that between the two, contacts were still fraught with suspicion and a lack of sincere will to co-operate.

With the end of the Pope's visit, the stage was now set for the lifting of the state of war. On July 8, 1983, PRON's Executive Committee called for a lifting of the remaining restrictions, a call duly 'approved' by the Politburo. Yet available evidence seems to show that the actual decision was not finalized until July 19, when WRON met, almost certainly to give the go-ahead for the formal lifting of the state of war on the occasion of the July 22 State celebrations. Uncertainty concerning the decision was illustrated by the report of the Japanese News Agency which quoted an un-named Party source as saying that martial law would not be lifted on National Day as it would have a negative effect on coal production as soon as the mining industry was de-militarized.[40] The July 5 unprecedented meeting of the Politburo, the Sejm Presidium and the State Council to discuss the "actual socio-political situation in the country and the tasks resulting from it", was almost certainly a coded reference to a discussion on the finalization of the preparations concerning the ending of the state of war. It is most probable that in the current climate, the authorities were quite keen on using such an occasion to prove their good intentions. On July 6, on the occasion of Jaruzelski's birthday, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awarded the

Order of Lenin to the Polish First Secretary. Accompanying the award was a letter where the General was referred to as "an outstanding party and government leader of People's Poland, an eminent figure in the international communist and workers' movement and a staunch supporter of the inviolable friendship of the Polish People's Republic with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth".[41] The tone and phraseology used would seem to have indicated that the Soviet Union despite all the misgivings it may have had originally, was now becoming a lot more supportive of Jaruzelski's policies. Plans to lift the state of war must have been submitted to the Kremlin leaders for their approval, on the occasion of a Moscow conference of Communist leaders which took place on June 28, 1983.

With the imminent lifting of the state of war, the Sejm went into a flurry of legislative activity. As a result of three sessions on July 14, July 20-21 and July 28, a wide range of new legislative measures and constitutional amendments were implemented. They extended the penal code, strengthened censorship regulations, restricted further the right to demonstrate and carry out protest activities and bolstered the administrative powers of the state concerning national security. Among other things, it was now an offence to belong to a banned organization. In particular one should note the following: Art. 3. §2/3 replaced the Front of National Unity with PRON; art. 4 which until now contained a general statement of the aims of the PRL was now expanded to include a second paragraph that stressed "the class nature of the state"; art. 15 §3, was expanded by the introduction of the sentence that the state "guarantees the permanence of private farms"; art. 33, two new paragraphs empowering the Sejm or the State Council to declare a state of war in cases of internal *zagrożenie*,

(emergency). The amendments also distinguished between the two kinds of threats to the nation, internal and external, and provided for the introduction of a state of emergency in the case of the former.[42] When, in its July 22 communique, the PRL's parliament formally announced the end of the state of war after some seventeen months of existence, it also declared an amnesty for many internees. All women under the age of 21 and those serving terms of less than three years would be freed within the next month, and men with sentences of over three years would have their term cut by half. For those still remaining in hiding, safe conduct was offered in exchange for surrendering themselves to the authorities by October 31, 1983, confessing to their deeds and pledging to "discontinue their criminal activities aimed against the state's interests".[43] However the amnesty did not affect the so-called "eleven" KOR and Solidarity leaders still emprisoned[44], as well as tens of other Solidarity activists. Commenting on the July decision, Zbigniew Bujak wrote that "by lifting martial law and by acknowledging the situation as 'normalized', while the underground exists, the authorities signalled their reconciliation to the fact of our existence. We have thus become a permanent element of the political reality in Poland".[45]

Both the Papal visit and the formal lifting of the state of war were significant events for the PRL. But did they really alter anything? The Church saw its prestige grow even further by successfully and efficiently organizing John Paul's visit. Since December 1981, one had observed its overall spectacular political promotion. The nation as a whole perceived it as the sole authority and the only social structure able to act in the open. From the point of view of the authorities, the Church represented not only a powerful

opponent but also a potential ally for its policies of 'national conciliation'. For the people, the brutal end of a dream, as incarnated by Solidarity, had now created a curious situation: society, while persisting in its attitude of refusal towards the authorities' line and fidelity to the ideals of the now banned union, was unable to translate this attitude into a language of specific actions. The great majority rejected the idea of a massive underground movement and the continuation of 'all or nothing strikes'. Lifting the curtain of martial law revealed a pacified stage but still there was no sign of a return to what might be described as a normal situation. A cartoon which appeared in an underground publication in mid-1983, showed a set of huge, sturdy wooden doors, guarded by a heavily-armed and mean-looking soldier. The caption read: The process of democratization will take place behind closed doors". It aptly conveyed the state of the PRL as the state of war was finally lifted and also forecasted a pessimistic outlook for the months ahead.

Chapter 5 Notes.

1. *Ideologia i Polityka*, Nr. 12, December 1985, p. 21.
2. This would be one important item on the agenda of the 1989 Round table talks.
3. *X Zjazd Polskiej Zjednocznonej Partii Robotniczej. Stenogram z obrad plenarnych*, KiW, Warszawa, 1987, p. 31.
4. *Trybuna Ludu*, 23/3/1983.
5. Bernard Margueritte, *Le Figaro*, 30/1/1983.
6. The article in question was first published in February 1982 in *Nowe Drogi* and was written by Jerzy Kraszewski, the deputy editor in chief of *Trybuna Ludu*. See *Kommunist*, 7/1983 pp. 85-88 and *Nowe Drogi*, February 2/1983 (400).
7. Ibid.
8. *Trybuna Ludu*, 25-26/6/1983.
9. *Trybuna Ludu*, 12-13/2/1983.
10. *Trybuna Ludu*, 1/2/1983.
11. *Trybuna Ludu*, 1/2/1983.
12. Trybuna Ludu, 26/1/1983.
13. On the PRL's relations with the Third World, see 'Poland and the Third World: the primacy of economic relations', Howard Frost, in *Eastern Europe and the Third World*, Michael Radu, ed., Praeger, New York, 1981, and 'Poland's presence in Black Africa', R.

Stefanowski, *RFE Background Report* 50 (Poland), March 1979.

14. 'Apathy-Participation-Apathy; the vicious circle of collective behaviour in contemporary Poland', in B. Misztal ed., *Poland after Solidarity: Social movement versus the State*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick/Oxford, 1985, pp. 3-18.
15. *Uncensored Poland News Bulletin*, 3/83, 11/2/1983. (Thereafter referred to as *UPBN*
16. *UPNB*, 6/83, 25/3/1983.
17. 'Give Poland a chance', *The Times*, 2/3/1983. Urban later criticized the newspaper for distorting his comments and heading it with a new title, *UPNB*, 5/83, 10 March 1983.
18. *Przemówienia*, KiW, Warszawa. 1983 p. 94.
19. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/5/1983.
20. *Trybuna Ludu*, 24/5/1983.
21. *Trybuna Ludu*, 27/5/1983.
22. *XII Plenum KC PZPR*, 31 May 1983, KiW, Warszaw, 1983, pp. 10-37.
23. Ibid, pp. 31-32.
24. *Survey*, Vol. 26 no 3 (116), Summer 1982, pp. 87-107.
25. *Nowe Drogi*, M. Olender, No. 407, April 1983.
26. Norman Davies, *God's Playground*, Oxford, Clarendon, Vol. II, 1981, pp. 213-218.
27. February 23-24, 1983; *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, Nr. 11/83/758.
28. *UPNB*, 12/83, 17/6/1983.
29. Negociations on the rescheduling of the PRL's debts to Western banks took place in Warsaw on March 21.
30. *Nowe Drogi*, Nr. 407, April 1983, p. 24.
31. 192th Episcopate Conference, May 3-4, 1983; *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, Nr. 21/83/768.
32. Wojciek Jaruzelski, *Przemówienia, 1983.*, KiW, Warszawa, 1984, pp. 19-20.
33. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* no 53, 26/5/1983.
34. *Polityka*, Nr 23, 4/6/1983.
35. *Izvestia*, 6/5/1983 in *CDSP*, vol. XXXV no 18 p. 20.
36. *UPBN*, 7/83, 8 April 1983. This was a repeat of the statement which had been issued in June 1982.
37. *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/4/1983.
38 *Z Dnia na Dzień*, no 26, 21/7/83. Most probably, the meeting had taken place on 7 July when there was a Central committee departmental meeting to assess the repercussions of the Pope's visit. It was, incidentally, chaired by Stefan Olszowski.
39. *AFP* dispatch in *Le Monde*, 25/6/1983; see also *Pravda*, June 17, and 25, and *TASS* June 18.
40. *UPNB*, 14/83, 15/7/1983; also, on July 12, the Government spokesman said that no date had been fixed and that it will be a matter for WRON to decide. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/7/1983.
41. *Pravda* , 6/7/1983 in *CDSP* Vol. 35, no 27.
42. *Dziennik Ustaw Polskiej Rzezpospolitej Ludowej*, Nr. 39 Ustawy 175-178, 22/7/1983.
43. *Trybuna Ludu*, 23-24/7/1983.
44. Jacek Kuron, Jan Litynski, Adam Michnik, Henry Wujec, Andrzej Gwiazda, Seweryn Jaworski, Marian Jurczyk, Karol Modzelewski, Gregorz Pałka, Andrzej Rozpłochowski, Jan Rulewski.
45. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 69, 24/11/1983.

Je leur pardonne de ne pas avoir la même opinion que moi; je ne leur pardonne pas la leur.

Charles-Maurice Talleyrand.[1]

(I forgive people for not having the same opinion as me; I do not forgive them for theirs.)

CHAPTER 6

'NORMALIZATION'

The decision to impose a state of war reflected the ruling establishment's determination to put its own house in order. If the primary goal was to restore socialist 'normality' and gradually return to the political *status quo ante*, it was obvious that too many things had changed since August 1980 to allow for a real return to the pre-martial law established order. It would be an error to see in the imposition of a state of war more "than an illusionary impression of the past's having been recaptured by the present".[2] As Brzezinski aptly observed, that "past [may] turn out to be rather different, maybe not quite as profoundly different as the challenges had desired but certainly unlike what might have been expected if the challenge had never arisen".[3] Therefore 'normalization' would imply more than a mere cosmetic change of leadership, still basing its policies on an outdated set of Stalinist principles. If, on the one hand, we accept that the term 'normalization' refers on the whole to "the process whereby an authoritarian state re-asserts itself with the aim of suppressing the aspiration of society which had emerged during a period of weakened party control"[4], then Jaruzelski's bid to normalize the internal situation in the PRL had been on the whole successful. Yet, it was obvious that 18 months of martial law had failed to solve

all problems. If, on the other hand, "normalization in state socialist country occurs when people believe that the will to change things is lacking"[5], then the Jaruzelski régime was still a long way from achieving this aim. Domestically, tension still dominated relations between the authorities and the people. Despite an understandable weariness from the society at large, the will from the 'opposition' to re-organise itself remained ever-present. Although at the time it was still too early to predict the late 1980s radical changes in relations between the ruling establishment and the population, it was clear, even then, that unless some degree of compromise was found, the country's future augured very bleak indeed. As Lech Wałęsa put it,

> To illustrate the situation, I compare Poland to a chess-board. We play chess and our opponents - draughts. Both sides are convinced that they are winning. In fact nobody can until we decide on one game. No matter how different our views might be, we have to follow the same direction. It is the direction towards whatever is in the interest of our homeland.[6]

More than ever before, the Polish authorities faced the gruesome task of attempting to bridge the enormous gap between the rulers and the ruled. In this respect, 'normalization' was doomed to fail. Confidence in the authorities' ability to improve the overall situation was as low as it could be. Although Jaruzelski was aware that he had to build the basis for a 'national conciliation' if some progress in domestic reforms were to surface, he was at the same time unwilling to share this task with an 'opposition' he had only recently stifled.

Although the term 'normalization' primarily referred to the domestic environment, it also had external ramifications. With the imposition of martial law, the PRL had to face a near-complete rupture of normal relations with non-communist countries. Just as domestically, there was a desire to return to the political *status quo*

ante, externally there was a pressing need to resume normal diplomatic and economic relations with the capitalist countries. In many ways the two concerns were intertwined: 'normalization at home' would facilitate 'external normalization'. At the same time, normal (i.e, pre-December 1981) external relations would greatly enhance the chances of reaching a compromise on the domestic scene. This is why, in the case of the PRL, the term 'normalization' should be seen as applying to both the domestic and the external environment. At the beginning of 1984, the PRL remained isolated internationally, something which further confirmed and emphasized at home the lack of legitimacy of the régime. For Warsaw, ***domestic*** and ***external normalization*** was therefore essential. The problem was how to achieve it and what form it would take.

6.1 *Western Sanctions: The Continuing Battle.*

With the formal lifting of the state of war in July 1983, the régime was signalling, both at home and abroad, that it felt confident enough now to steer the country back onto the path of 'socialist normality' without the use of the repressive instruments provided by martial law. If it was meant to be a gesture of good will, it failed to be convincing. By attempting to suppress society's aspirations for greater socio-political autonomy and seeking the successful re-integration of the élite around the predetermined ideology imported from the Soviet Union, the Jaruzelski régime was showing little apparent desire to liberalize the Polish society. Since the imposition of a state of war, the authorities had used every opportunity to introduce new legislative acts destined to reinforce their power over Polish society. When the return to civilian rule was formally announced, these additions to the Polish Law statutes remained in

force and formed the legal basis for the post-martial law repressive measures. In other words, cosmetically, it had become useful for the régime to formally remove the symbol of repression encapsulated in the existence of a state of war; at the same time, having successfully legalized the means to enforce its control over the nation, the régime pursued its 'normalizing' objectives unhindered. It is doubtful however, that this strategy fooled anyone either at home or abroad. John Paul II's visit a month earlier had failed to give the régime the aura of credibility it had sought and the lifting of the state of war had all the characteristics of a non-event. It is interesting to note that the authorities had seen the visit as a test to gauge the population's behaviour.[7] Seemingly satisfied by it, the next step was to lift martial law. In itself, this changed very little. The majority of the population was still distrustful of the Jaruzelski régime while most Western countries preferred to make conditional their restrained satisfaction upon subsequent developments in the PRL. In August 1983, two US Congress delegations returned from their visit to Warsaw and concluded that it was still too premature to lift the American economic sanctions. More effort should be made by the Polish authorities to relax their restrictions on human rights before normal relations could be restored between the two countries.[8] It was only a year later that the first signs of a thaw in PRL-West relations took place. Meanwhile, the Polish authorities remained isolated on the international scene and faced an un-co-operative and highly distrustful population.

In its relations with the West, the Polish authorities used every opportunity to attack the policy of sanctions imposed against the PRL. 'Normalization' had to take place both domestically and on the

international arena. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, Jabloński sharply accused the USA of continuing its 'anti-Polish activities'. While America remained the régime's *bête noire*, Jabloński criticized the entire Western bloc for failing to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the PRL. He forcefully attempted to convince his audience that "normalization and stability" were now pervading the country. The main gist of his speech, apart from bitterly attacking 'imperialist forces', was to call for a dialogue, both political and economic. But he stressed that the PRL's internal situation was not to be "internationalized". His idea of Poland was of "an independent socialist state within secure borders and free from European armed conflicts". This was the 'essence of the Polish *raison d'état*', he added.

> A secure and strong Poland, stable and internally unified, is in the interest of peace and co-operation for the whole of Europe and the World. Its reason of state is part of the European reason of state.[9]

This reflected the continuity in the duality of purposes expressed in nearly all official statements concerning the West. While strongly attacking all external attempts to influence the domestic situation in the country, the Polish régime also attempted to divorce the internal issue from the external one. It repeatedly stressed that the conduct of foreign relations could not be conditional on domestic developments, and that an improvement in contacts with Western countries should not be dictated by Western perceptions of the régime's domestic policies. International relations should emphasize the 'objective character' shaping co-operation between states. However, this type of declamation could only disguise the authorities' own realization that the two issues of improved external relations and internal 'liberalization' were in fact linked. All major speeches

which immediately followed the lifting of martial law were primarily directed at a foreign audience and had one particular thing in common: they constantly reiterated that the PRL's domestic situation was now normal and therefore the internal situation could not be used as an argument for delaying the resumption of contacts between the the PRL and its former diplomatic and economic partners. Nevertheless, and whether it liked it or not, the Jaruzelski régime had to accept that its actions on the domestic level had significant effects on the external one. The reason why this was so significant for the PRL can be partly explained by the dependence on the West which it had grown accustomed to during the Gierek years. The most virulent exposés against 'Western interference' could not hide the fact that Western economic help remained vital for the implementation of far-reaching reforms. Practically, the whole policy of 'renewal' was based upon this reality. Any domestic successes, vital in themselves for the régime, depended enormously upon external factors, and in particular upon the resumption of normal economic and diplomatic relations with the West. In a memorandum addressed to the US administration, the Polish government repeated that the state of war had been imposed out of dire necessity but had now been lifted since it was no longer needed. Yet, the note continued, the Reagan administration showed no signs of ending its discriminating actions against the PRL. This meant therefore that "the US [was] doing all it can to jeopardize and impede all efforts of the Polish nation to come out of the crisis".[10] But if the Reagan administration seemed intransigent, the Polish authorities too showed clear signs that they were not prepared to accept blindly the terms offered to them by the West. On November 16, 1983, talks in Paris between the PRL and sixteen Western governments on the rescheduling of the Polish debt were disbanded early in view of

unacceptable demands by the Polish representatives. It should be said that even if the domestic situation in the PRL had been stable, it would still have remained doubtful whether the Polish government could have been able to service even the interest on the debt principal. One is therefore drawn to the tentative conclusion that despite all the calls for a 'normalization' of relations between the PRL and Western countries, General Jaruzelski did not welcome it wholeheartedly. Indeed, continuing domestic problems could be used to delay the resumption of normal contacts with the West, thereby pushing back further the date when the debt accounts would have to be settled. Of course, as a long-term strategy this had its drawbacks. But as a short-term one, it had the advantage of putting aside the need to service the debt, as well as appeasing Soviet concern that over-dependence on Western capitals would not once again be the key to the PRL's socialist development.

By 1983, the theme which dominated official statements was that all economic and diplomatic sanctions against the PRL were affecting the whole nation and not just the ruling élite. Furthermore, the authorities maintained, there could be no possible solution to the disastrous economic situation as long as those restrictions remained. Naturally this theme provided the authorities with a perfect excuse for failing to implement radical economic reforms. By focusing the root of all problems on the West, they could hide their own failings and identify a scapegoat for the PRL's internal problems. Already in Lenin's Russia, this line had been regularly used to justify domestic difficulties and has been repeatedly employed by all communist régimes ever since. This argument remained constant, even when it became obvious that Western sanctions could not be blamed anymore for the

continuing Polish economic crisis. Indeed, as a project study undertaken for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies seemed to show, the consequences of the Polish crisis were actually felt more by the West than by CMEA countries. The PRL stopped servicing her hard currency debt and asked for rescheduling, reduced her imports from the West to less than half of the imports in 1976, and faced with severe supply constraints, reduced exports to the West more severely than to CMEA countries (for example, because of the decline in coal output the PRL's total coal exports were 26 mn. tons less: 18 mn less for the West and 8 mn less for the East).[11] Thus, however paradoxical it may have seemed, the Western sanctions were in fact partly helping the Polish government by delaying the repayment of the PRL's enormous debt. In general, sanctions can not only help leaders to present themselves as effective defenders of the country and its people against external enemies, but can also provide them with a useful explanation for any economic difficulties or setbacks which arise, whether or not there is a real connection between the two: "it is often difficult to distinguish between or to identify sources of economic difficulty but always convenient to blame them on outside agencies".[12] In the case of the PRL, this line of argument would be increasingly used by the authorities as economic reforms faltered and as Western sanctions remained. In this sense, it provided Jaruzelski with a propaganda weapon both against the West and the Polish 'opposition'. Of course, this type of explanation could only give Warsaw a short-term reprieve in handling the difficult internal situation and would soon outlive its utility if serious reforms were to be sincerely implemented. But it gave the Polish authorities a breathing space during which they could hope to gain substantial

advantages for the future.

By the end of the year, Wałęsa himself, called for an end to Western sanctions because "what Poland needs now is not losses of millions of dollars but aid of thousands of millions". He also pointed out that the Polish government had been persistently using them as an excuse for the imposition of repeated and drastic decreases in the standards of living of Polish workers and the Polish society.[13] It was dawning upon the West that the economic sanctions against the PRL had outlived their usefulness and it was generally accepted that the aim had been primarily political. On November 2, the United States decided to take limited steps to ease some of its restrictions on the PRL: it joined other Western nations in negotiating a rescheduling of part of the Polish debt and allowed Polish officials to enter into discussion with private American companies concerning potential fishing agreements. But it kept its veto on the PRL's admission to the IMF and refused to reconsider its MFN status. This was enough for the Polish authorities to continue its sharp attacks against the Reagan administration, especially in the light of the end of EEC economic sanctions against the Soviet Union on December 23, 1983. An article in the Polish underground press summed up the situation:

> The American sanctions provide an excellent propaganda excuse while their economic effects are fairly limited. The trade with the West is hampered not so much by the removal of reduced import tariffs as by the fact that we are unable to offer much to the demanding Western markets. It is true that LOT planes cannot land in the US and that Polish fishermen have no access to US fisheries. But because of large distances the major part of the hauls were anyway sold straight away to foreign buyers and never reached our market. The gist of the sanctions was the refusal to grant further credits, including the purchase of raw materials and intermediate products needed by our industry. In short, however paradoxically, the end of financial contacts imposed by the USA was quite convenient to the Polish government: it meant that talks on the rescheduling of Polish debts would be postponed. By the same token there was no need to repay

> the subsequent instalments. Did the West know that? It did, but the sanctions were the only way to demonstrate its disapproval of the Polish authorities and the events after 13 December 1981.[14]

Nothing illustrated better the PRL government's exasperation at the continued American sanctions then its reaction to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Wałęsa. On October 11, the Norwegian Ambassador in Warsaw was told officially that the award was an interference in Poland's internal affairs and would have serious consequences for relations between the two countries. This was the first official protest against a Nobel Peace Prize winner since Hitler objected in 1936 to the award made to Carl von Ossietzky, a German pacifist. The Government's spokesman described this as "another monkey trick by Ronald Reagan, made in Oslo this time. ... It confirmed the thesis of the Polish government about foreign inspiration for the divisions and conflicts in present day Poland".[15]

6.2 *Nineteen Eighty Four.*

Some 24 months after the imposition of a state of war, the Polish domestic situation was still uncertain and little had changed on the international front. In 1984, however, domestic and foreign affairs would prove significant for the PRL: a) domestically, two events in particular stood out: the People's Council elections in June and the murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko in October; b) externally, the PRL scored several successes in the foreign policy field, especially with regard to the West. In the East, Soviet policy was feeling the effects of successive leadership changes, Brezhnev's successor Andropov dying and being replaced by Konstantin Chernenko. In itself this was having an indirect effect on policy-making in the PRL. In spite of the PRL's continual 'friendship' with the USSR, but most

certainly because of uncertainties in the Kremlin at the time, Polish policy-making found a greater margin of independent activity, both domestically and externally. 1984 marked the timid resumption of normal relations between socialist Poland and its former Western diplomatic and economic partners. In October 1984, the first NATO state visit since the imposition of martial law took place and although it was still too early to speak of a total 'normalization' in the foreign field, it was clear that slowly the PRL was emerging from its self-inflicted isolation.

Domestically, the state of the PZPR remained the main preoccupation for the Jaruzelski régime. Its return to active life depended essentially upon the success of 'normalization' in three main areas: 1) to purchase the compliance of those workers with the strongest industrial force - above all the coal miners; 2) to create groups and new unions which could lay claim to be speaking for the 'working class'; 3) to ban intellectual associations that could form a platform of opposition. However helpful the imposition of martial law had been for laying the basis for such a strategy, the internal situation was still uncertain; it still remained unclear that the authorities would succeed in these tasks. Though living in clandestinity, the Polish 'opposition' continued its work of opposing the régime's policies through the dissemination of a large underground press.'[6] Though beset by obvious organizational problems, it remained an active force whose influence could not be dismissed. Following the Polish historical tradition, underground Solidarity was the Twentieth Century version of the 'struggles for national liberation'. Despite repeated efforts by the authorities, its impact on society was indisputable and was constantly reminding the

Jaruzelski régime that a 'national accord' would be unrealistic in excluding Wałęsa and his supporters. On January 26, 1984, the Sejm set up an extraordinary commission to work out a bill extending the current parliamentary term of office. In effect this meant a deferment of general elections. It was also, therefore, an indication that the authorities were conscious of their inability to stage-manage parliamentary elections to their own satisfaction. On February 13, the Sejm formally extended its term of office until the end of the year with its final session taking place on July 31, 1985, after 65 months of unbroken tenure. This had been the longest parliamentary session in the PRL. With the election of new deputies approaching, the next move on the political board was to hold People's Councils elections (*Rada Narodowa*). People's councils are "the local organs of power and the fundamental organs of community self-government of the town and country working people in communes, towns, districts of larger cities and voivodships" (PRL Constitution, Art. 43 §1.) The successful stage-managing of these elections would give a boost to the authorities' aims of restoring the PZPR to the fore of Polish political life.

In preparation for the People's Councils elections, the PZPR ideological machine was set in motion. On March 16, a 3-day National Conference of PZPR Delegates took place. Usually Party congresses are held every five years but sometimes an interim Party conference is held to 'discuss' pressing current problems and boost Party members' flagging enthusiasm. It evaluated the implementation of the 9th Extraordinary Congress and prepared the election of participants to the next Congress. It also assessed the state of the Party's membership and organizational unity. Since October 1983, 30% of

factory, municipal and voivodeship committees had been changed. 30% of POP first secretaries had been replaced and a total of 7900 members expelled.[17] The Conference adopted a resolution entitled *O co walczymy, dokąd zmierzamy* (what are we fighting for, where are we heading), laying the basic principles behind the policy of *odnowa* which so far had remained confined to slogans.[18] 39 years earlier in 1943, the first manifesto of the Polish Worker's Party (PPR) had used practically the same title (*O co walczymy*) to head a programme stressing the twin goals of national independence and social revolution. In 1984, the fight was taking place inside the Party and the introspection it was subjecting itself to, revealed only too clearly how hollow were its claims to be the leading force in the PRL (if you do not know where you are going, it is hard to to lead...). In his closing speech General Jaruzelski made it clear that the Party had to play a leading role in post martial law Poland:

> We took the responsibility that never again could there be a return either to the pre-August deformation [*deformacji*], nor to the pre-December anarchy, and the threat to socialism. On this basis we approved the renewal of socialism, the line of understanding, battle and socialist reform. The guarantee for the realization of this policy can only be the Party - the same, but not quite the same. Such a Party we are becoming. From this road we cannot digress.[19]

He presented eight targets to the Party: to overcome the economic crisis; to fully rebuild the ties between the Party and the 'working class'; to strengthen the socialist state; to continue the introduction of socialist reforms; to consolidate the policy of national accord; to mount an ideological offensive in the younger generation; to achieve tangible progress in science, education and culture and finally, to consolidate the PRL's place within the socialist community.[20] In spite of the ritual propagandist tone of the conference, it was clear from the delegates' own speeches that

the PZPR was engaging in a thorough re-appraisal of itself as a party and on the solidity of its base. Though the conference confirmed that the Party line had not changed since the 9th PZPR Congress, it was obvious that it had been held for the purpose of closing ranks. The National Conference of PZPR delegates provided a platform for a first public assessment since the lifting of the state of war of the new orientation faced by the Party in its battle to regain its credibility. Of course, anti-socialist forces and especially the intellectuals in the 'opposition' were criticized, but also the uncertainties of the leadership, local parochialism and excessive bureaucracy within the Party. Emphasized throughout was the poor frame of mind of administrative cadres and the growing weakness of the youth and the workers in playing an active role in the affairs of the Party. Little was said about how the *odnowa* would be conducted, but the general mood was indicative enough of the continuing marasm affecting the PZPR. The resolution adopted at the end of the 16th KC plenum[21], on June 3, called for the enhancement of the political role of the working class and its influence on the activity of the state. By underlining the necessary socialist character of trade unions and their recognition of the leading role of the PZPR, the Central Committee was clearly stating that it had no intention of considering the participation of Solidarity in the process of renewal.[22] Under such conditions it was hard to imagine that 'normalization' would proceed smoothly.

The fears and concerns expressed at the Conference of PZPR delegates were amply justified from the Party's point of view by the results of the local elections which took place on June 17, 1984. Although preparations for the successful outcome of the elections

were made[23], including a co-ordinated secret services offensive which started on March 5 and ran well into May - presumably to intimidate the electorate and prevent any *coup d'éclat* by the underground opposition -, a low turn-out on the day dispelled Jaruzelski's claims that the Polish 'renewal' was answering the aspirations of the Polish society. Despite the fact that more candidates' names appeared then there were seats to be filled, this semblance of democratic choice was nullified by the fact that even if all candidates were not PZPR members, they had been first 'approved' by the Party. All the Party candidates put forward were listed first on the ballots, and the sole practical use of the voting booth was to voice one's disagreement with the order on the list. Officially, the authorities claimed that the elections were boycotted by some 20% of eligible voters (40% according to the opposition). By claiming a near 75% turn-out (when one compares with the March 1980 elections when there was then a 98.87% turn-out), the authorities were acknowledging that at least some 6 million people had failed to vote, even more if one uses the 'opposition's' own figures. Alone this low turn-out was a revelation when one has been accustomed to the usual 95% or more participation in all Eastern Central European countries' election results. The first three days of May had seen demonstrations erupting in all industrial centres where Solidarity was influential. In Gdańsk, Lech Wałęsa managed to enter the official First of May parade and salute the tribune with a V-sign. Some 684 arrests were reported throughout the country. In such an uncertain climate, it was no wonder that the authorities failed to attain the support they had wanted. Rulers-ruled relations had further been exasperated at the beginning of the year with the start of the so-called 'war of the crosses'. The conflict erupted when the head of the agricultural school at Mietne (Siedlce), under government

instruction, ordered crosses to be removed from seven lecture halls, sparking protests by students and their supporters. The authorities' decision to ban crucifixes from the classrooms provoked a strong reaction from the Polish episcopate who demanded the return of crosses in all public places and the respect for Catholic rights. The whole affair was a matter of principle on both sides. The Church refused any compromise on this issue while the authorities appeared determined to tighten its political control over the activities of the Roman Catholic clergy. The fact that the régime had taken this decision indicated that it felt strong enough now to engage a head-on conflict with the Church. With the 'opposition' seemingly under control, the process of 'normalization' was now turning its attention to the next 'opponent'. Although Jaruzelski needed the support of the Church, the latter's uncompromising stand on certain issues continued to represent a direct challenge to the Party and therefore, failing its outright elimination, it had to be constrained. The overall result of such a policy alienated further the régime from the society. Moreover, it fuelled a negative publicity for a government who was hoping to appear 'reform-minded' in its policies. When Jaruzelski said that "we are pursuing a line of struggle and accord. Struggle with those who damage socialist Poland. Accord with all who, despite traumas, bitterness and vacillation, want to work honestly for their country. It is to them that we stretch out our hand. we will not be lacking in patience", it was difficult not to find a hollow ring to his declaration.[24] The picture from the outside continued to remain bleak and in such circumstances it was difficult to imagine a rapid improvement in relations with the West. 'Internal normalization' was delaying its external counterpart. By the end of the year, a new event was to have significant repercussions for both. Indeed, in many ways, it became a

turning point in the history of the PRL.

6.3 *The Death of a Priest.*

"Too great is the sacrifice of blood, of tears, of humiliation, offered at the feet of Christ, that it should return from Him as a gift of real liberty, justice and love, that it should bring about the resurrection of the Motherland".[25] In his 'Masses for the Homeland', Father Popiełuszko constantly reminded his listeners to the need for human and national dignity, for alienable human rights, for the courage to conquer fear and hatred with love.[26] Often his sermons would deal with the notion of sacrifice and it was clear that this was a prospect he had reconciled himself with. His death at the hands of three officials of the PRL's security forces, on October 19, 1984, tragically confirmed his premonitions.[27] This was not the first time that a priest had been murdered in the PRL.[28] Yet in this particular case, the search for the culprits and their subsequent trial in Toruń were conducted in a blaze of publicity, in itself a rare, if not unique, occurrence in a Soviet-type system (such trials have of course existed before, but they never never received the kind of publicity and openness this one did). The most immediate reason for the actual trial taking place at all was the escape of Father Popiełuszko's driver. Had he too vanished, it is very likely that the crime would have gone un-reported and the priest's disappearance added merely to the list of 'mysterious and unexplained' cases. In the event, the authorities displayed a remarkable openess considering that the whole case was implicating the secret services. At the same time, it was obvious from the very start that, while the exact circumstances behind the murder remained unexplained, the government did everything it could to exploit the situation to its own advantage.

The authorities embarked very rapidly upon a campaign to convince the Polish population that it was an isolated incident, not an example of 'socialist legality' or normal security forces practices. They did almost everything to show that Father Popiełuszko's murder had been a deliberate attempt to discredit the authorities. This attitude had its roots in both domestic and international considerations. At home, it was clear that the priest's murder could fuel renewed unrest and jeopardize the meagre results of 'normalisation'. Father Popiełuszko's funeral was the occasion of probably the greatest public gathering (some half a million people) since December 1981, with the exception of the Pope's visit. It was therefore essential that the Jaruzelski régime distance itself as much as possible from any association with those involved. Hence the repeated statements, even before a single arrest had been made, that the abduction was aimed primarily at the government and its policies. At a press conference, the Government's spokesman said that,

> Regardless of who committed this act, it was intended to strike a blow at the positive processes taking place in Poland. For example, it was meant to cast a shadow over the normalisation of relations with some Western countries. It is an act directed against the process of renewal and is presumably aimed at Church-state relations.[29]

The PRON leadership issued a statement which voiced the opinion that the abduction had been intended to give the impression that "instead of entering into the dialogue they have proposed, the authorities were aiming to liquidate their political opposition".[30] Internationally it was essential for Warsaw to convey the impression that this 'act of provocation' had been aimed at Jaruzelski himself. Judging from the Western reports at the time, this was partly successful. It should be pointed out that the notion that the whole affair had been a provocation aimed at the government was originally launched by the

government itself, anxious to portray the incident as an isolated event and at odds with the normal standards of legality observed by the security apparatus. To obtain reliable information on this is almost impossible, but one should also mention the real possibility that the murder and the trial that followed, may have been the reflection of a probable fight between the Party and the SB. In communist states there have always been two powers, the Party and the institutions in charge of repression, information-gathering, and all the activities related to the task of controlling society. Conflicts between the two may at times occur, and more often than not, the Party emerges the victor. In the PRL, the repressive apparatus may have caused Jaruzelski some trouble in the carrying out of the General's 'normalizing' directives (it is thought, for instance, that the Popiełuszko 'affair' had been, among other things, the result of the personal tension existing between Mirosław Milewski, the head of the Central Committee department in charge of law and order matters, and General Kiszczak, the Interior Minister). By staging the Popiełuszko's affair, the SB could effectively be compromised and thus give Jaruzelski the advantage it needed to dominate it. In the event, the 'conspiracy theory' soon became a real possibility. When, on November 11, Milewski was effectively suspended from his influential position, while Jaruzelski took personal control over the Interior Ministry[31], the road seemed open for a thorough purge of the MSW. This then seemed to support the thesis that Father Popiełuszko's murder may have been planned without the General's knowledge (Milewski 'resigned' from all his public functions on May 14). Instead, since such an operation could not conceivably have been enacted without high-level orders, it was showing that even among the ruling establishment the General was encountering difficulties in pursuing his policy of 'national accord'

- something the official propaganda was at pains to show. That Milewski was also reputedly one of the most senior hard line Marxists in the Politburo helped to boost the 'liberal' or 'moderate' image of the First secretary. At the time there was a real possibility that sanctions would soon be lifted, thereby finally 'normalizing' relations with the West. As such, the case of the murdered priest threatened to impede progress in this context. As an anonymous contributor wrote,

> The crime was aimed against its victim and also against the clergy, against Solidarity and against all social opposition - not against the generals. Nevertheless, what it meant to Jaruzelski was the destruction of all effects, poor as they may be, of all his efforts towards "normalization". The image of law-abiding and competent government which was so laboriously created, especially for the sake of international credibility, was shaken.[32]

Shaken but not irremediably damaged. Judging from the number of Western high-level visits in the aftermath of Father Popiełuszko's abduction and the subsequent discovery of his body, PRL-West relations remained largely unaffected by the event. Three days after the abduction, the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou was in the PRL on an official visit. A week later still, the Finnish Foreign Minister followed. Finally on November 3, Malcolm Rifkind, the Minister of State at the British Foreign Office was in Warsaw (see below). Jaruzelski's decision to hold the trial of three members of the security forces was still a perfect way of showing the world and the Polish population that the blame for Father Popiełuszko's murder should not be placed at his door. By showing that it had only been an isolated event and not part of a systematic pattern of violence, a trial could have a very beneficial public relations impact. In an unusual way, the 17th KC plenary session endorsed a resolution condemning the Popiełuszko's murder[33] and the next day General

Kiszczak who was personally in charge of the investigation, announced the arrest of the kidnappers.

When the trial of Piotrowski, Chmielewski and Pękala began in Toruń on December 27, 1984 it became clear very soon that the authorities had also decided to use it as a forum for criticizing those priests who, like Popiełuszko, were considered too political. Some eight days later, the victim himself became accused of his own murder. This was a prelude to a series of concerted attack on the Church in general and on other 'extremist priests' in particular. In his closing speech, the Public Prosecutor, Leszek Pietrasiński, noted that,

> While our state has always purged and continues scrupulously to purge the ranks of its employees, eliminating all those who infringe the law in whatever aspect it may be, the Church authorities do not act in the same way. ... Citizen and priest [Father Popiełuszko] was involved in extremist acts contrary to our laws and the rules governing his work. He was the victim of the accused who, like him, thought they could hold up to ridicule the law and who, like Father Popiełuszko, considered that their office protected the law.[34]

It is not an exaggeration to say that the 'honey-moon' between the Polish authorities and the episcopate came to an end with the Toruń trial. The beginning of 1985 heralded a state offensive against the Church. On January 26, *Rzeczpospolita* published an interview with Adam Łopatka, the Minister of Religious Affairs, where he condemned the Church's tolerance towards the "fighting clergy" which prones "anti-state activities in Poland". He added that,

> I make no secret of the fact that some of the clergymen are political zealots and show no respect for the principles defined by our constitution and the state's interests. we disapprove of this and are concerned by it. ... We shall make every effort to eliminate such phenomena for the sake of the state and, above all, for the sake of our people.[35]

In February, the Party daily addressed a severe warning to the Church by saying that the authorities' patience had its limits and that so-

called extremist priests would be sanctioned if they did not put an end to their political activities against socialism.[36] The attacks persisted and even intensified after the verdict in the Toruń trial had been given (February 7). On February 2, the Polish episcopate issued a statement against the "tendentious reporting by the mass media on the Toruń trial.[37] But the authorities' onslaught continued unabated. Guidelines were issued to all the voivodships departments for religious affairs by director Aleksander Wołowicz, one of Łopatka's aides, stipulating that, a) the departments should emphasize the contrast between the policies of Pope John Paul II and that of Primate Glemp; b) those priests who enjoy official favour should be set against those whom the authorities dislike; c) the building of churches ought to be blocked or at least delayed, even when permission had originally been given; d) the turn-over and circulation of the Catholic press should be decreased and new publications not permitted.[38] That a real offensive was being waged against the Polish church was further illustrated by an article in *Trybuna Ludu*, where, for the first time, the Pope himself was being accused of supporting Solidarity.[39] John Paul II was also later accused of following a policy aimed at opposing the PRL to the socialist bloc in order to make it a "state-buttress of Christianity against communism from the East".[40]

The 'Popiełuszko affair' had created an unfortunate situation for the Jaruzelski clan. If one accepts that the decision to assassinate a member of the clergy had been taken without the General's knowledge (though a provocation to compromise the SB cannot be excluded), then it is easy to see why. Just when Warsaw was making progress in the conduct of its foreign affairs, with the visits of the Greek Premier,

the Foreign Ministers of Finland and Austria, the murder was focussing world opinion on the negative side of the PRL's internal life. All Polish efforts to convey to the outside world the picture of a 'back to normal' country could well be seriously damaged if the Polish leadership was in any way identified with the event. In this sense then, it could prepare the ground for the General's replacement by ostensibly showing his inability to rule. That General Kiszczak, made a personal appearance on Polish Television to announce the arrests of father Popiełuszko's murderers, was a revealing testimony to the gravity of the situation as far as the ruling establishment was concerned. Later in the year, a remarkable event happened in the annals of Polish law: the PRL Secret Services were formally condemned to pay damages and interests to two Solidarity activists who had been maltreated during internment.[4] This was a symbolic event for it seemed to mark a new stage in the relations between the population and the ruling establishment. But, it did not become a real precedent. Rather, it was the exception to the rule, which proved that the régime was still a long way from tolerating society's involvement and control of its repressive organs.

Ever since the suspension of martial law, the chief difficulty for the West had been to decide how direct a link there should be between the easing of Western's remaining sanctions against the Jaruzelski's government, and that government's handling of its explosive people. The murder of a priest, should it be proven that it was conducted with the support of the authorities, could further delay the resumption of normal external relations. It was then crucial that Jaruzelski should show that he had little to do with the whole affair. It must be said that in this he was helped by Western governments. They too, in a

sense, had little to gain from a situation where internal tensions would once again be set alight. Despite condemnation by the international community (the European Parliament passed a resolution to this effect on November 15, 1984), restraint was shown in assessing the impact of the event. Tacit acceptance that this would not unduly damage the *rapprochement* between the PRL and the West could only give Jaruzelski the satisfaction that he had successfully weathered a potential crisis. However, it remained unclear why precisely when a thaw in PRL-Western relations was in the making, the authorities should choose this moment to wage a bitter campaign against the Polish Catholic Church. It may have been a result of the power struggle within the Party hierarchy and Jaruzelski's determination to settle the thorny issue of the Church's influence. By accepting to renew normal relations with the PRL, the West was in effect *de facto* sanctioning the 'legitimacy' of the Jaruzelski régime and therefore giving it the possibility to settle internal matters without too much external interference.

6.4 *External Normalization?*

Internationally, little had changed for the PRL since the imposition of martial law. To succeed in normalizing its external relations with the West, the Polish régime was determined to break out of the isolation in which the country had found itself after December 1981. In this, the use of new slogans was very revealing. At the beginning of the year, the official media tried to make convincing the idea that increased production and better standards of living were peaceful instruments on the road to 'national conciliation'. Similarly, the basis for normal relations with foreign governments had to be based upon peaceful principles of mutual co-operation.[42] Peace,

at home and abroad, the slogans claimed, was the only solution to a situation that was too similar to the Cold War era and all of its implications. A headline in May read: "A joint aim unites us: Prosperity - in Poland; Peace - in the World".[43] At the time, the main issue in East-West relations concerned the stationing of American Pershing missiles in Western Europe. Against this background, one may assume that the PRL's interest in pursuing an active 'peace policy' in its foreign policy had two major aims. Firstly it was obviously following the lead of the Soviet Union and supporting its declared intention to stop the missiles from being permanently stationed in Europe. Secondly, the pursuit of a disarmament policy in Europe, was one conducive to a climate of renewed *détente*. And here the PRL could hope to profit from this enormously. Even Cardinal Glemp seemed to be supporting this policy when he said, in a homily, that "the perspective of a new year may wake in us a feeling of oppression, as we hear the news that certain European countries of old christian culture are harbouring death-carrying rockets". The outstanding economic problems still facing the country were unchanged: wages were increasing faster than production; too many investment projects had been started with the result that they were putting too much stress on factories having to supply the materials (especially housing); a low product-quality ratio; a chronic shortage of imported materials and components; an un-controllable foreign debt. In such conditions, any improvement in relations with the Western creditors could have far-reaching effects on the national economy. Yet, the removal of sanctions and an improvement of economic relations with the West might not have much effect in the long-term. Of course new credits from the West would certainly add vigour to the production process, but the end of sanctions would also accelerate a rescheduling agreement with the

Western creditor governments. In effect this would mean that Warsaw would have to pay a much larger amount of hard currencies to the West in order to service its huge debt. New credits could thus be channelled into repaying debts rather than giving fresh life to the country. But even if the short-term prospects resulting from an improvement of PRL-Western relations could bring about some economic successes, the political implications of such a *rapprochement* represented then, a greater attraction for the Polish authorities. In a situation where visible economic improvements could only be envisaged in the long-term, the quickest way for the régime to regain some kind of prestige and thereby credibility, was to make some progress in the political field. And here one can explain the main motivation, and at the same time goal, of the Jaruzelski team. In his speech to the diplomatic corps at the Wilanów Castle, Premier Jabloński stated that,

> We would like to stress in particular the fact that we behaved in this manner (i.e. by imposing a state of war) not only from our own interest, but also for the whole of Europe, in the interest of peace, valued by all nations of the world. ... A year ago, in January 1983, when the state of war was already suspended, I could say with satisfaction that Poland was once more a country where order reigned, in the process of consolidating internal peace, and at the same time a reliable partner in international relations. ... An important element in the economic development of each country is co-operation and trade exchange with foreign countries. This always has been of great significance and particularly at times when a country is struggling with great efforts in the midst of a crisis. ... Poland was and remains an open country without barriers and restraints, prepared for co-operation with everyone; but co-operation with partners possessing equal rights and to their mutual advantage.[44]

By 1984, it was becoming apparent to the Polish authorities that an easing of Western economic sanctions against Poland would require a reassessment of Polish foreign policy. December 1982 saw the first signs of a thaw in East-West relations with the lifting of EEC

sanctions against the Soviet Union. By January 1984, the US had started easing its stand against the PRL, with President Reagan's decision to allow Polish chartered flights to land on US soil and lift the ban on Polish use of US territorial waters. It seemed that everyone, the West, the Polish régime and the 'opposition' were for once agreeing that the continuation of restrictive measures against the country had by now outlived their usefulness. Wałęsa's plea to President Reagan that economic sanctions should be abandoned (December 5, 1983) clearly illustrated this. But if sanctions were soon to be completely lifted, the problem remained as to the form in which future relations between the PRL and the West would develop. For the West, the main problem was to find a satisfactory way of dealing with the Polish external debt. More than two years after the imposition of martial law, it was clear to Western governments and bankers that the Jaruzelski régime was now stable enough to be considered as a durable partner, whether they liked or not. For the PRL, the foreseeable improvement of relations with the West had to be tackled in such a way as to ensure political and economical benefits. A relatively calm domestic situation was conducive to the pursuit of external goals. At the same time, the knowledge that the Western stand on economic sanctions was weakening, gave Warsaw an opportunity to adopt a more confident attitude in its relations with the West. Despite the dramatic state of the Polish economy, it was obvious that the internal situation was more or less under control. It was then only a matter of time until the West would have to reconsider its own position vis-à-vis the PRL. This would thus explain the vigorous and seemingly self-assured Polish attitude in the foreign affairs field at the beginning of 1984. However, this apparent will to regain credibility on the international arena was marred by the deterioration of US-USSR

relations. Since the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet forces in 1979, relations between the two super-powers were at their lowest point since the beginning of the *détente* years. It was not surprising then, that the Soviet Union took the decision to boycott the Olympic games due to start in the summer of 1984 in Los Angeles. Inevitably, the Kremlin 'asked' its allies to join in. On May 17, the PRL formally withdrew from the Games following a two-hour discussion of the Polish Olympic Games Committee. Earlier, a delegation of Polish Party officials made a special journey to Moscow in order to soften the Soviet demand for Warsaw Pact unanimity on the issue of the Olympic boycott.[45] Just as in 1982 when the Football World Cup diverted the attention of many Poles from their everyday problems, the prospect of the country's participation at the Olympic Games could have diverted some of the nation's energy into following the performances of the Polish athletes. In this light, it was understandable that the authorities were hoping to change the Soviet stand on the boycott. This illustrated once again the traditional dilemma faced by Polish leaders between furthering their own interests and at the same time having to comply to the Kremlin's own current priorities. It also served to explain the régime's attitude towards the West, especially towards the USA. Indeed, Soviet-American differences could provide Warsaw with an opportunity of playing a role in East-West relations. But for the moment, this possibility appeared remote.

In his speech to the Sejm, Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski, emphasized that "unfriendly behaviour towards Poland in the form of sanctions and other restrictions or aggressive anti-Polish propaganda [was] incompatible with the cultivation of normal relations between sovereign states". But he left the door open when he added that,

> It is the government's intention to maintain partner-like, mutually beneficial relations with the developed capitalist

> countries. The state of our relations with this group of countries varies according to the approach adopted by each of them towards Poland and their observance of the generally accepted rules of international law, particularly their compliance with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.[46]

It is significant to note the use by the Polish régime of the sanctions factor as one of the determinants behind the continuing crisis. After the poor policy of the 1970s and the '1980 anarchy', the Western sanctions, and in particular the American ones, were used to justify the failure to improve the Polish internal situation.[47] Of course, by 1984, it was obvious that whatever effects the Western sanctions originally had, they simply could no longer be used by the Polish leaders as a credible explanation for their inability to solve the crisis. While publicly still using this justification for both domestic and external purposes[48], the authorities were already looking ahead and preparing the ground for the resumption of normal relations with the capitalist countries. In this respect the visit by the UN Secretary General, Pérez de Cuellar to the PRL on February 18, 1984 was significant. It gave the Polish authorities the first occasion since 1982 to demonstrate their 'international credibility' in the eyes of the capitalist countries. According to a commentary in the official press[49], three political conclusions could be drawn from the visit. Firstly it "underlined the fact that the large contribution of socialist Poland in matters of peace and international co-operation [could] not cancel the effects of a slanderous Reagan-style campaign". The UN General Secretary's visit was not going to change Western positions and attitudes overnight. Secondly, it showed that "Poland's presence and activity [was] needed by Europe and the World, particularly in the contemporary climate of a growth of international tension and armaments". Although this may have been wishful thinking

by the commentator, it was true that the Polish question remained high on the East-West agenda and that a solution to the crisis was in the interest of all. Thirdly, the visit had a domestic content. Though it was not published, part of the talks between de Cuellar and Jaruzelski touched the issue concerning A. Wesołowska, a UN employee sentenced by the Polish authorities in March 1980 for spying. In exchange for UN mediation between the Polish state and the '11' interned KOR and Solidarity activists, Warsaw promised to release her. However the deal was rejected. What was striking here, was the authorities' willingness to allow a third party - ie. an international organization - to deal with an internal matter. Admittedly, it was doubtful from the beginning that the interned would accept a deal as long as their own requests were ignored (the holding of a trial). Nevertheless, UN mediation, if successful, could both settle a thorny domestic matter and boost the régime's image abroad. In the event, it served only to highlight the growing realization by the authorities that the issue of human rights in the PRL could give them an additional lever in negotiations with the West: as long as political prisoners, and especially those with international renown, remained imprisoned, a speedy return to external normalization was unlikely. However, their release at opportune times might bring about some results. It should be noted, however, that the tactical use of the issue of human rights had its own limitations. De Cuellar's speech appeared censored in the official press and the passage in question illustrated well enough that the authorities were not prepared to go too far. A four page commentary in *Rzeczpospolita* on the UN General Secretary's visit made no mention of the following:

> ...less life-threatening, but nonetheless tragic, is the fact that important human rights - civil and political,

> economic and social, religious and trade union - continue to be ignored.[60]

Again, when the ILO Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Poland published its 144-page report, confirming that the régime was violating labour union rights as laid down in the ILO Convention of which the PRL is a signatory, the Polish authorities reacted angrily and boycotted the 70th ILO Conference in June 1984. Later, on November 19, the PRL formally submitted its intention to resign from the organization in response to the ILO's acceptance of the report. Against a background of vain economic sanctions, the issue of political prisoners in the PRL was one of the last cards held by the West in delaying formal resumption of diplomatic and economic contacts. The Jaruzelski team was well aware of this and it proceeded to adopt measures intended to eliminate this problem. On July 13, under the terms of the amnesty, the '11' were freed. Nine days later the Sejm proclaimed a full amnesty. To give a semblance of democratic participation by the Polish society, the decision was preceded by a PRON resolution asking for a general amnesty on July 16, 1984. Over 31 000 petty criminals were released from prisons together with 630 people (out of 652) arrested or sentenced for "offences of a political nature".[61] The next day, EEC's Foreign Ministers issued a statement welcoming the amnesty, hoping that further measures would help to promote national reconciliation and a programme of reforms. On August 3, the Reagan administration removed restrictions on scientific and cultural contacts with the PRL and authorized the resumption of regular Polish airline flights to the US.[62] It also agreed not to block negotiations on the PRL's membership of the IMF but made this conditional upon the fact that political prisoners released are not re-arrested. It seems that the Pope's appeal to the the US President

"for an immediate unconditional lifting of Western sanctions and an end to the ban on Polish membership of the IMF" in May[53], may have had had an influence on American policy towards the PRL. The US decision was followed by Japan's confirmation that it too had lifted some sanctions against the PRL. A Polish-Austrian inter-governmental mixed commission for economic co-operation met in Vienna on August 24. This was the first meeting of its kind at such a high level attended by the Polish side with representatives of a Western government for several years. On the whole, the July 22, 1984 amnesty triggered, as far as the PRL was concerned, a positive reaction in the West (even if some sanctions still remained). Domestically, even the Polish church voiced its approval by commenting that "the latest amnesty for political prisoners is seen as a step in the right direction".[54] Moreover, it epitomized the continual linkage of domestic and foreign policy. Its effects were doubly satisfying: internally it sought to put into practice the régime's professed determination to facilitate a 'national accord' and thereby remove some of the opposition's claims against it; externally, it succeeded in improving the PRL's image by removing (temporarily) one of the most durable objections expressed by the West towards the Jaruzelski régime. In one decision, the goals of both 'domestic and external normalization' could be furthered.

One should be careful, however, not to ascribe here too much good will on the part of the authorities. It was obvious that certain limits could not and would not be transgressed. Although the authorities' stand on specific internal matters could, to some degree, be discussed in an international context, it was clear that this 'gesture' was very limited. In its foreign policy, the régime's priority lay in the resumption of normal diplomatic and economic

relations with the West in order to lessen the extent of the economic crisis. It clung to the idea that economic reforms could be implemented successfully without political changes, a position which was strongly and continually criticized both by the Polish 'opposition' and the West. With this in mind, it is understandable that General Jaruzelski would remain intransigent as far as domestic matters were concerned. Yet, he was giving himself room for manoeuvre by calling for renewed normal relations with the West. Although the period since the imposition of a state of war had seen a definite Eastern re-alignment of the PRL's foreign policy, the authorities never expressed the desire to break its relations with the West. This was indicative of the fact that socialist Poland, not only *needed* Western partnership, but also *sought* to play a role in East-West relations. Continued isolation could have no positive effects - on the contrary. Thus, while remaining firm in specific areas, it was undoubtedly in the PRL's interests to 'normalize' its foreign policy and convince the outside world (the Soviet Union included) that a return to pre-martial law relations and an intensification of co-operation between the PRL and capitalist countries could only be beneficial to all concerned. As was shown, the main preoccupation of the ruling establishment since December 1981 could be summarized in the following question: how to divorce economic matters from the political context? The fact that the two are intrinsically related to one other, made the task a difficult one. The Polish UN initiative for International Economic Confidence Building Measures (first enunciated on December 20, 1983) was a step in this direction. The main professed goal of this initiative was to protect economic relations from growing tensions in international political relations. It showed the PRL's

concern to avoid a repetition of the kind of economic sanctions it had been experienced for nearly three years now.

With the political amnesty of July 1984, the Polish authorities had hoped that the road was now open to complete the 'normalization' of relations between the PRL and the West. It did trigger a favourable change of attitude with Western governments but it failed to be entirely satisfactory to the Polish régime. In particular, the American position, by falling to remove all remaining sanctions, was the subject of sharp attacks by the Polish media. An article in *Trybuna Ludu* on September 20, cast a gloomy picture on Polish-American relations. It described them as "being worse than in the early 50s" and summed up US 'interference' along four parameters: political, economic, propagandistic and subversive. In December 1983, the Polish authorities had stressed that all US restrictions should be lifted, and that they were prepared to engage into a dialogue with the Reagan administration and fully normalize relations between the two countries.[55] With the formal US conditional intention to reconsider its objection to the PRL's IMF membership, the Polish government expressed its disappointment that this was still not enough to constitute a return to normal relations. On August 13, 1984, the US Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, John Davies (ambassadorial relations had still not be resumed after the last US Ambassador Francis Meehan had left Warsaw in January 1982), was handed a memorandum from the Polish government in which it was written that,

> Only the resignation from a policy of interference in internal matters and propagandist aggression, a return to normal conditions of trade and joint economic and financial co-operation in all areas and applying measures for the elimination of the damages caused by a policy of restrictions, can lead to a normalization of Polish-American relations. The Polish government does not see any other way.[56]

On the occasion of the celebrations commemorating 40 years of the PRL's foreign policy, the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee met in Wrocław and heard Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski summing up the external activities of the state since the Second World War. Alongside the traditional praises for the Soviet-PRL alliance, and the usual attacks against any revanchist claims to alter existing borders, Olszowski said that "the present anti-communist policy of confrontation, directed by the USA and aggressive NATO forces" must end in failure just as had failed "the imperialist policy of the Cold War in the 1950s". He added that,

> In conditions of international tension, American policy - and also other NATO states - towards Poland is the function of an imperialist policy of confrontation in the relations of allied socialist states. They endeavour to use Poland as an instrument of global contest with Socialism. Our difficult situation is being used in order to further aggravate the atmosphere in Europe and in the world.[57]

If the beginning of the year had showed little improvement in PRL-Western relations, the October month heralded the return to the 'external normalization' so much hoped by the Jaruzelski régime. After 33 months of an absence of contacts with Western governments, the PRL authorities greeted with satisfaction the resumption of high-level talks with Western representatives. 1984 was a land-mark in this respect (see Appendix), although one has to wait until 1987 to see a real progress in the PRL's foreign contacts with the non-communist world.

On October 16, 1984, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold Gratz, arrived in Warsaw for a three day-visit. A few days later, on the 22nd, the first official visit by a NATO country leader since 1982 took place. On this occasion the Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou, behaved in a discordant manner towards his Western allies

by praising General Jaruzelski and voicing perhaps an unwarranted optimism towards the internal situation in the PRL. It was known for some time that Greece, ever since its entry into the Common Market, had often been critical of EEC's policies - both internal to the European Community and on foreign policy issues -, and the Greek Prime Minister's enthusiastic comments during his visit only served to emphasize, as far as the Polish authorities were concerned, the growing disunity among members of the Western alliance towards the PRL. Indeed, this disunity which had emerged after US calls for an European boycott of joint participation in the building of the Soviet gas pipeline, may be identified as one of the causes which enabled the PRL régime to break out of its former isolation. In a situation where economic sanctions were beginning to become a problem not only for the PRL but also for Western governmental and financial institutions, a solution had to be found to solve the deadlock. It is therefore not surprising that individual Western countries, apart from aiming to salvage their economic investment in the PRL, also had in mind to make diplomatic use of the 'Polish question' against the wider background of East-West relations. On October 29, the Finnish Foreign Minister, P. Vaeyrynen, payed an official visit to the PRL. He soon was followed by the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Malcolm Rifkind, on November 3. The latter's visit was important, not so much for its contents, but mainly because of its form. The British guest angered repeatedly his Polish hosts by behaving in a manner which they considered as totally inappropriate. The government's spokesman accused him of "treating Poland as a colony".[88] In a gesture which set a precedent for all subsequent Western visits to the PRL, the British Minister met with members of the 'opposition' and payed his respects to Father Popiełuszko's grave, in the yard of St. Stanisław Kostka

church, a place considered by most Poles as a sanctuary both against state repression - 'the one really free place in the PRL'. and, in the religious sense [59] of opposition to the authorities. Both acts were directly challenging the credibility and legitimacy of the Polish authorities since they were ostensibly pointing out to the existence of other valid Polish interlocutors for the West apart from the régime. A couple months later, the government spokesman was to announce the authorities' decision to fix a code of conduct for all Western official delegations. By it, the Polish government firmly invited its foreign guests to abstain from meeting, even on a private basis, representatives of the 'opposition': "Poland has only one representation, not several, and this principle should be respected by our guests. If any of our Western partners feels the need to compensate its relations with the Polish authorities through unfriendly gestures towards them, it would be well advised to wait for this need to disappear". [60] If the Polish régime had hoped that domestic matters be disassociated from external ones in its relations with the West, it was proved wrong. The PRL's 'public representation' machine seemed somehow oblivious of the fact that by cancelling or postponing foreign visits, the régime was hardly publicizing a positive picture of itself in the West. The Western diplomats' insistence in paying their respects to Popiełuszko's grave was a clear sign to the authorities that the governments they represented attached great importance to the Solidarity-Church-state dialogue. Official attempts, therefore, to publicize progress in the 'national reconciliation' process were very ineffective in Warsaw's handling of foreign diplomats' visits. Despite this, in the ensuing months, the régime endeavoured to do everything to counter what it saw as ostensive signs of Western interference in Polish domestic affairs,

arguing that the 'normalization' of relations with Western countries had to be freed from such attempts:

> It cannot be expected that all future visits by Western diplomats will be absolutely free from attempts to interfere with the internal affairs of our country. However, the efforts to counteract such attempts are certain to foster a genuine normalization of relations with the West.[61]

Despite the appearance of the first signs that an improvement in PRL-West relations was in the making, the process of 'external normalization' was not unfolding smoothly. On November 21, the planned visit by the West German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, was postponed as a result of what the West German Government described as "unacceptable conditions" imposed by the Polish authorities. Warsaw had refused to grant a visa to a West German journalist, objected to the laying of a wreath at the grave of a German soldier killed in World War II, and had publicly admonished the Foreign Minister for visiting Popiełuszko's tomb.[62] The postponement of the visit followed a campaign against West German 'revanchism' which had filled the pages of the official Polish media throughout the Autumn of 1984.[63] Despite this setback, both sides seemed eager to resume normal relations. One had to wait until March 1985 for the West German Minister to finally visit the Polish capital, on his way to Sofia from Helsinki. The brevity of his visit did not hide the fact that both countries had key interests to discuss. For West Germany, good relations with the PRL were necessary in order to try and resolve the contentious question of the emigration of Poles with a German origin from the so-called 'Western territories'. For Warsaw, West Germany could be used as a bridge head for convincing the West to come forward with new hard currency credits. With a total foreign debt of some $bn 28, Bonn was the principal creditor country with $bn 4,5. Willingness on both sides to normalize their relations was given added significance with the

visit of the West German Finance Minister, Martin Bangemann on March 21, 1985. During the two-day official visit, a meeting of the Joint Economic Polish-West German Commission took place, the first one since 1979. Speaking at a press conference, Bangemann said that the FRG was prepared to offer the PRL new credits, provided Warsaw officially signed the agreement rescheduling its debts to Western governments. He also called on other creditors to follow with offers of new credits and promises to support the Polish application to rejoin IMF. Whereas there seemed to have been an improvement in PRL-FRG relations, the war of words continued between the two countries throughout 1985. That year had marked the 40th anniversary of the return of the 'Western and Northern territories to the PRL'. For Warsaw, any hints that for the West Germans the question of the PRL's western borders was still open, always triggered strong attacks against the Bonn government.

US-PRL relations saw an improvement at the end of 1984. On December 17, Washington announced that it was withdrawing its objection to the Polish membership to the IMF. The Reagan administration considered that the Polish government had carried out its commitment on a general amnesty. This signalled the end of a conflict which had opposed the two countries since December 1981 and the beginning of a thaw in their relations. In many ways it was a victory for Jaruzelski. After repeatedly accusing the US administration of interfering in Polish domestic affairs and waging an anti-Polish campaign, Warsaw had the satisfaction of seeing its major adversary compelled to make the first move. Real benefits from IMF membership would not be helpful to the PRL for at least a year and therefore the US decision had more the character of a psychological success for the Polish authorities than a material one. For a year now, the Polish official line had been that

the PRL was prepared to resume normal relations with capitalist countries "on the basis of partnership, reciprocal advantage and non-discrimination", but only when all current restrictions had been lifted. In adopting this stand the Polish authorities were effectively placing the onus of improving relations between the West and the PRL, on the capitalist countries. One of the latest expression of this position had been presented at the UN forum by the PRL Foreign Minister, Stefan Olszowski on August 28 when he had described to the General Assembly, the extent of anti-Polish "propagandist aggression". In a speech given on the occasion of Miner's Day (December 3), General Jaruzelski had said that,

> Poland is recovering her international position and wishes to improve relations with America (as well as other countries). ... Poland is too significant a country to be marginalized. Poland desires an improvement of relations with the US but not at any price; the US is famous for being the last to recognize historical realities. The French government is so enthralled by its new love of Washington that it has forgotten several hundred years of friendship with Poland. Poland is invariably for a normalization of relations with West Germany but these relations are complicated.[64]

A week earlier, in front of some 122 editors, columnists and journalists from 22 countries attending an East-West conference[65], he had repeated that "Poland was not, is not and will not be the outcast (*wyrzutek*) of the international society".[66]

A month after the 'express' visit by the West German Foreign Minister, it was Britain's turn to send a high-level representative and thereby fuel the process of the PRL's 'external normalization'. On April 11, 1985, Geoffrey Howe, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs arrived in Warsaw, on the last leg of an European tour. His visit had three main purposes. In the first place it was aimed at improving East-West relations in general and specifically to

achieve some progress on arms control. Secondly, it sought to stress the importance of human rights and respect for the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Finally, it was an occasion to discuss bi-lateral issues, including the freeing of credit loans and the accreditation of British journalists. The mere fact that these items were officially accepted by the Polish authorities reflected how anxious they were for the visit to take place. As a Polish commentator noted,

> The British Foreign Minister is not the first Western politician visiting Warsaw since Washington's attempt to isolate Poland from contacts with the West, but he is the first Cabinet member of a large Western power, the closest ally of the US, to come to Poland on an official visit. Considering this, it is impossible to speak about Poland's isolation.[67]

Throughout and shortly after the visit, the Polish official media was at pains to stress the significance of the resumption of Polish-British relations. Even if no specific agreements were signed, the visit "initiated the beginning of a vast programme for Britain's East European Policy", it "closed the initial stage of Poland's move away from its political and economic isolation",[68] it confirmed the fact that "relations with Poland continue to occupy an important place in the British version of 'Eastern policy'"[69] and it showed that "Poland cannot be ignored by anyone wishing to pursue an effective Eastern policy, and that [it] is emerging from the isolation imposed on it by the West".[70] During the visit, Geoffrey Howe met not only with Jaruzelski but also with Cardinal Glemp and Solidarity activists. He followed Malcolm Rifkind's example and paid a visit to Father Popiełuszko's grave.

'External normalization' seemed to gather some speed with this latest round of Western ministerial visits to the PRL. Slowly the dark curtain of international isolation was being raised. Still, it was too

early yet to talk about a full resumption of normal relations between the PRL and the West. The fact remained that Warsaw was giving away very little of anything and at the same time asking a lot of everything. Jaruzelski's Western approach still lacked many of the ingredients needed for it be fruitful. Consequently, he was drawn to look to the East.

6.5 *Re-orientation to the East.*

In an interview, some four months after the lifting of the state of war, the Foreign Trade Minister, Tadeusz Nestorowicz, drew attention to the fact that in the light of the US sanctions and vetos, his ministry had reached certain conclusions, supporting "the geographical re-orientation of the PRL's foreign trade".[71] Virtual isolation from the non-communist world called for a 're-orientation' of the PRL's foreign economic policy. Even if the PRL's isolation was not total in the sense that it was the subject of diplomatic and economic sanctions only from developed Western countries, the fact was that their lack of willingness to resume such contacts were in effect contributing to lowering the PRL's international status. This gave the PRL very little room for manoeuvre on the international scene. Inevitably, the East would have to become the primary objective for a bid to break out of international isolation. By trying to develop an *Ostpolitik*, the Polish régime was attempting to regain the status of an active country in foreign affairs and build the foundations for the resumption of normal relations with the West. In this, it sought the support of the Soviet Union. It should be however stressed that this 're-orientation' did not imply a fundamental change in the PRL's foreign and economic policies since it would have implied that the orientation was different before. Rather it was meant to intensify co-operation with

the PRL's socialist allies and reduce the country's over-dependence on Western financial sources. As the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman, Stanisław Długosz put it,

> It would be more accurate to speak of a qualitative and quantitative boost to processes of economic co-operation with CMEA countries, which mirrors the progress being made toward an integration of their national economies.[72]

Also important was the fact that, in itself, 'external normalization' was a process which was also directed at the Kremlin and not only at the West. By intensifying contacts with its socialist allies, Warsaw was also trying to show that it remained a faithful and reliable partner. 1983 had been a busy year for Polish-Soviet relations. On August 1, the head of the CPSU CC International Department, L. Zamyatin, had led a Party delegation to Warsaw where the discussions hadfocused on ideological co-operation, propaganda and information between the two communist parties.[73] Viktor Kulikov, the WTO commander in chief visited Warsaw on September 14. In October, Jerzy Majka, head of a PZPR CC Information Department delegation arrived in Moscow for talks on ideological questions. It appeared that with the PZPR 13th KC Plenum on 'The Ideological Activity of the Party' (the first one in twenty years solely devoted to ideology) due to take place on October 14, both Warsaw and Moscow had been determined to present a facade of ideological continuity and mutual support. Despite the 'success' of the first stage of 'normalization', the PRL still represented a certain degree of deviation from the accepted model. The military factor in Party-state organizations was still very active. This anomaly had to be rectified and broad lines defined to re-invigorate the presence and activity of the PZPR. In the event, the 13th Plenum provided no answers. The main thrust of all the speeches centred on the need for political and institutional continuity combined with an

equally strong defensive reaction against any and all attempts, real or imaginary, to undermine the viability of the existing system.[74] Some twenty days later, the head of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, was in Warsaw[75], a few days after the 14th PZPR KC Plenum had introduced new faces among the Party leadership. One cannot avoid suggesting the hypothesis that such a visit had had the objective of giving council to the most pro-Soviet elements of the Polish Communist Party, starting with the Police apparatus. On the whole, it was clear that the Kremlin continued to give its support to General Jaruzelski. Inevitably such support implied a re-assessment of the trade between the two countries. Since 1981, Polish foreign trade balance with CMEA countries, and especially the Soviet Union, had remained heavily in the red. It was thus understandable that efforts would be made to correct this situation. Martial law, Western sanctions and the need to ensure that the PRL was back on the path of socialist normality provided an ideal opportunity to solve this debt problem. On November 28, 1983, a Soviet Party and State delegation, led by Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Planning Committee, Nikolai Baibakov, visited the PRL. Agreements were signed touching Polish participation to the construction of a pipeline between Kobryn and Brześć.[76] A fortnight later it was the turn of a Supreme Soviet delegation, led by Vitali Ruben, the Chairman of Soviet Nationalities. the delegation stayed in the PRL for a whole week during which Ruben met Jaruzelski. Later still, on December 13, Jaruzelski met Yuri Marchuk, Soviet Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Soviet State Science and Technology Committee, heading a delegation of Soviet academics and industrial leaders. A discussion ensued on the expansion of co-operation in science and technology between the two countries. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the PRL's army, *Pravda* praised the latter's

role, by saying that "in the delicate and complex situation [it had] shown patriotism and a a profound internationalism, an attitude without compromise in the fight against counter-revolutionary and enemy ideology"; It also had presented "a high morality".[77] Interviewed by Soviet television on October 12, 1983, General Jaruzelski thanked the Soviet Union for its "solidarity and trust" and called the Polish-USSR alliance "the cornerstone of the class and national interests of the PRL". Emphasizing that "the strongholds of counter-revolution had been destroyed", he warned that their "parasite activities", at home and abroad, still hoped to use Poland's problems to weaken its place in the Socialist bloc.

> Poland is being punished because she is socialist and a friend of the Soviet Union, and particularly because she saved herself from the conflicts of a fratricidal war. She has avoided a civil war which could have destabilized the whole of Europe. Political boycott, economic restrictions and propaganda aggression are used against us but this too, we bear it. Nothing will come out of imperialist plans against Poland. We do not want to be, and will not be a pawn on the international scene.[78]

Perhaps best underlining the current nature of Polish-Soviet relations was Jaruzelski's official visit to the USSR on February 4, 1984. It was the second one since the imposition of a state of war and followed the nomination of the new CPSU First Secretary, Konstantin Chernenko. Soviet support for the General was underscored by the presentation of the Order of Lenin (for his birthday, a few months earlier). Just over two years after the General had imposed his iron fist on the PRL, the Soviet leaders could be satisfied with the progress of 'normalization'. They may still have had some reservation, but on the whole they had to be pleased: "The frenzied attempts of reactionary forces to reverse the course of history have failed"[79] The main result of the visit was the signing of a Long-Term Programme of Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation between the two countries up to the

year 2000. By calling for an intensification of co-operation and closer integration within the CMEA, the agreement's primary goal was aimed at reducing the two countries' over-dependence on the West. It specified 219 areas of co-operation. The scientific and technological programme was to cover 85 research problems involving the co-operation of 95 Polish and 180 Soviet institutes.[80] Yet, the agreement also symbolised Moscow's new strategy towards impoverished Poland. In order to assure deliveries of Soviet raw energy materials, the quantity of which are not usually predetermined, the PRL would have to invest both in Soviet mining and pipelines and direct its most modern industries, including micro-electronics, robotics, mining machinery and machine and ship-building capabilities, towards the specific needs of the Soviet economy. This declared intention of co-operation was however less productive than claimed. Indeed, a quick glance at the level of foreign trade between the two countries since the imposition of martial law indicates that the volume of trade between the PRL and the USSR has in fact decreased noticeably:

Comparative Table of Polish Imports-exports For 1981 and 1987 With Selected Countries.[81]

(in Percentage of total trade).

	Imports		*Exports*	
	1981	1987	1981	1987
Austria	*2,5*	*3,9*	*1,8*	*3,2*
France	4,8	2,5	2,7	2,4
Yugoslavia	*2,4*	*3,8*	*2,1*	*2,9*
FRG	*7,3*	*11,5*	*9,8*	*10,8*
Switzerland	*1,4*	*3,9*	*1,8*	*2,2*
Great Britain	3,3	3,7	3,7	4,4
Italy	2,0	2,9	2,9	2,9
USSR	**34,4**	**27,5**	**26,1**	**24.8**
China	*0,6*	*3,2*	*0,4*	*3,4*
India	0,6	1,4	0,4	0,6
Japan	1,1	1,2	0,7	0,8
Brazil	4,0	2,1	1,1	1,2
USA	6,1	1,3	3,1	2,8
Australia	0,7	1,2	0,1	0,1

With the italics denoting the greatest observed long-term changes in trade volume over the period, it can be seen that PRL-USSR foreign trade showed a marked decrease in volume, disproving the claims that Warsaw's Eastern re-orientation was reaping benefits for the country.

A month after the signing of the co-operation programme between the PRL and the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Soviet Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Riabov, was in Warsaw. Three days later, a high-level CMEA meeting took place in Moscow (June 12-14, 1984). It was attended by Jaruzelski who was met at the airport by Mikhaïl Gorbachev, perhaps the very first official contacts between the two men. If there were any doubts that Jaruzelski's policies had supporters in the Kremlin, then the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the PRL (July 22, 1984) dispelled them. A high-level Soviet Party-state delegation, led by Nikolaï Tikhonov, attended the celebrations. It was exclusively composed of Central Committee members (Ligachev, Sliunkov, Aristov, Golubiev, Savicki). Both Tikhonov and Ligachev gave speeches to Polish workers at Warsaw and Katowice factories, in which they both praised Polish-Soviet relations, emphasizing that "our security and strength lies in a long-lasting and united alliance" and that "40 years of Poland is also the story of our friendship".[82] General Jaruzelski was praised for his "realism" and although little else was said about him, the overall impression was that (it is tempting to say by now, inevitably) the Soviet Union was fully backing the Polish régime.

The PRL 'Eastern re-orientation' was to be expected in the light of the Western economic and diplomatic sanctions. However, despite the May 1984 Polish-Soviet agreements and the usual slogans of friendship and co-operation, relations between the two countries showed no real

signs of profound changes. If economically, some adjustments were made, primarily in order to settle a deficient Polish trade balance with the USSR, they represented a fraction of what was really needed to pull the PRL out of its continuing crisis. Politically, as long as the internal situation remained calm, the Kremlin leaders, beset by succession problems, could only have been satisfied that the Jaruzelski régime had managed to 'pacify' Polish society. Deviation of the Marxist-Leninist norm embodied in the institutional militarization of the Party and Government seemed to have had positive effects after all. In the absence of a more orthodox alternative, Jaruzelski would still have to be trusted.

'Normalization' has thus been process taking place both on the domestic and foreign level alternating between economic and political interests and between the socialist bloc and the West. Although, in the beginning, a Polish re-alignment to the East had been the only available option for an internationally isolated PRL, it became clear very quickly that Warsaw had also continued to attach great importance to the resumption of normal relations with the West. Despite a slow start, 'political normalization', both at home and abroad, appeared successful. However, 'economic normalization' was still a long way from being attained, constantly raising the possibility of wiping out the gains obtained in the political sphere.

Chapter 6 Notes.

1. Cited by André Castellot, *Talleyrand*, Librairie Académique Perrin, Press Pocket, 1980, p. 155.
2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc. Unity and Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971 (3rd edition), pp. 338.
3. Ibid.
4. G. Schöpflin, 'Normalization of Eastern Europe: the reimposition of the Soviet system', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*,

Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 1982, pp. 149-154.
5. David Ost, 'Poland revisited', *Poland Watch*, No. 7, March 1985, p. 77.
6. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 110, 13/12/1984.
7. Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Przemówienia 1983*, KiW, Warszawa, 1984, p. 184. (A yearly selection of Jaruzelski's speeches; thereafter referred to as *Przemówienia*).
8. *UPNB*, 16/83, 19/8/1983.
9. *Trybuna Ludu*, 1-2/10/1983.
10. *Trybuna Ludu*, 4/11/1983.
11. *Economic effects of the Polish crisis on other CMEA countries*, Gerhard Fink et al, WIIU Nr. 98, June 1983.
12. Margaret P. Doxey, *International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective*, Macmillan Press, London, 1987, p. 116.
13. *UPNB*, 23/83, 8 December 1983.
14. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 68, December 1983.
15. *Trybuna Ludu*, 12/10/1983.
16. Here is a list (though incomplete) of some of the most important underground newspapers published during the period December 13, 1981 and December 1984: *Wiadomości*, *Tygodnik Wojenny*, *Vacat*, *Wezwania*, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, *Verbum*, *KOS (Komitet Oporu Społecznej)*, *Reduta* (independent Army letter), *Wolna Trybuna*, *Wola*, *Tu Teraz*, *Słowo*.
17. *Rzeczpospolita*, 17-18-19-20/3/1984.
18. *Dokumenty Krajowej Konferencji Delegatów PZPR*, Warszawa, Marzec 1984 r.
19. *Przemówienia*, 1984, p. 112.
20. *Przemówienia*, 1984, pp. 111-127.
21. For the first time it took place outside Warsaw in the industrial town of Łódź. It was also the first fully public meeting of the KC. Not only were some 800 workers from all over the country invited - half of them not even Party members - but all the speeches were broadcast live on Warsaw radio.
22. *XVI Plenum KC PZPR*, Kiw, Warszawa 1984, pp. 105-110.
23. *KOS (Komitet Oporu Społecznej)* No. 54, 7 March 1984, an appendix to a confidential circular of the secretariat of the central committee of the Democratic party (SD) gives in minute detail the proposed distribution of seats in People's Council for all 49 voivodeships as well as the pattern of distribution in councils of lower level.
24. *Trybuna Ludu*, 1/1/1984.
25. "Zbyt wielka jest danina krwi, łez i poniewierki złożona o stóp Chrystusa, by nie powróciła od Boga jako dar prawdziwej wolności, sprawiedliwości i miłości. By nie doprowadziła do Zmartwychotanie Ojczyzny". Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, *Cena Miłości Ojczyzny*, 1984, a posthumous collection of sermons..
26. Jerzy Popiełuszko, *Kazania Patriotyczne*, Paris, Libella, 1986.
27. 'In a room guarded day and night by four secret policemen, Father Jerzy's body, lying on a metal bed, was covered with white paper. The paper was removed - and they looked with horror at the massacred body, unable to recognize their friend. the whole body was covered in bruises of a brownish grey colour. The face was deformed. The nose and areas around the eyes were black, the fingers were brown and red, the feet greyish. His hair was much thinner, as if some of it had been pulled out. Large areas of the skin on his legs seemed to have been torn away'. Grażyna Sikorska, *A Martyr for the Truth*, London, Fount Paperbacks, 1985, p. 100.
28. For reports of many other cases, see *UPNB*, No. 6, 1985.

29. *Trybuna Ludu*, 24/10/1984.
30. *Trybuna Ludu*, 30/10/1984.
31. *Trybuna Ludu*, 7/11/1984.
32. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 108, January 1985.
33. *XVII Plenum KC PZPR*, Warszawa, KiW, 1985, p. 143.
34. Michel Pierre, Mink Georges, *Mort d'un Prêtre. L'Affaire Popiełuszko*, Paris, Fayard, 1985, pp. 291-292. This book offers a detailed account of the trial proceedings and includes many uncensored extracts which were not published in the *Tygodnik Powszechny* serial.
35. *Rzeczpospolita*, 26/1/1985.
36. *Trybuna Ludu*, 27/2/1985.
37. *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 6/85/858.
38. I was shown a copy of the guidelines while in Poland.
39. *Trybuna Ludu*, 9/4/1985. The article was initialed J.R. which stand for Jan Rem, the government's spokesman pseudonym.
40. *Polityka*, 30/3/1985.
41. The Kraków court condenmned the regional SB to pay 5 000 Złotys and an equivalent sum to the Polish Red Cross. *AFP*, 30/12/1985.
42. *Trybuna Ludu*, 31/3/1984.
43. *Trybuna Ludu*, 1/5/1984.
44. *Trybuna Ludu*, 12/1/1984.
45. *UPNB*, 10/84, 24 May 1984.
46. *Trybuna Ludu*, 14/2/1984.
47. Urban's Press Conference, *Trybuna Ludu*, 2/4/1984.
48. 'In The Defence of Socialist Poland', Interview of General Władisław Pożoga, MSW Vice Minister, where he strongly denounces the 'distabilizing activities' of NATO countries towards the PRL. *Trybuna Ludu*, 19/4/1984.
49. *Rzeczpospolita*, 22/2/1984.
50. *Rzeczpospolita*, 22/5/1984. I learned about this while in Poland through a close friend of one the '11'.
51. Speech by Lech Domeracki, the Minister of Justice, *Rzeczpospolita*, 24/8/1984.
52. This was made conditional upon the PRL dropping its arbitration claim with the International Civil Aviation Organization. The PRL had maintained that the US should pay LOT for financial losses incurred.
53. *Financial Times*, 25/5/1984.
54. 202nd Polish Episcopate Conference Communiqué, 28/9/84, *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 40/84/239.
55. *Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki wobec Polski w Świetle faktów i Dokumentów (1984-1985)*, the so-called 'White Book' on US-PRL relations in the 1980s, Interpress, Warszawa 1986, Chapter 5.
56. *Trybuna Ludu*, 17/8/1984.
57. *Trybuna Ludu*, 12/7/1984.
58. Hella Pick, *The Times*, 8/11/1984.
59. *Nowe Sanktarium Polaków u grobu Ks. Jerzego Popiełuszko - Fakty - Wydarzenia - Perspektywy.*, Ks. Antonin Lewek, Warszawa, 1986.
60. *Rzeczpospolita*, Urban's Press Conference, 12/2/1985.
61. Łodzimierz Zralek, 'Normalization: what is it like?', *Trybuna Ludu*, 6-7/7/1985.
62. *Die Welt*, 22/11/1984.
63. In particular the article by Mieczysław Tomala in *Nowe Drogi*, 9/1984, pp. 168-182.
64. *Przemówienia* 1984, KiW, Warszawa, 1985, p. 339.
65. Jaruzelski's first news conference with selected representatives of the Western press since he became Prime Minister in February

1981.
66. *Przemówienia 1984*, KiW, Warszawa, 1985, p. 365.
67. A. Nartowski, *Gazeta Krakowska*, 1/4/1985.
68. *Słowo Powszechne*, 15/4/1985.
69. *Życie Warszawy*, 15/4/1985.
70. *Sztandar Młodych*, 15/4/1985.
71. *Trybuna Ludu*, 11/11/1983.
72. *Rzeczpospolita*, 15/7/1985.
73. *Trybuna Ludu*, 8/8/1983.
74. *XII Plenum KC PZPR*, KiW, Warsaw 1983.
75. *Trybuna Ludu*, 26-27/11/1983.
76. *Trybuna Ludu*, 30/11/1983.
77. Pravda, 14/10/1983.
78. *Przemówienia 1983*, KiW, Warszawa 1984.
79. *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1985, p. 100.
80. *Trybuna Ludu*, 7/5/1984. By the end of 1986, of the 44 agreements envisaged, 33 had been signed.
81. *Rocznik Statystyczny 1988*, pp. 357-358. These official statistics of course fail to be informative of the level of barter trade between the two countries, an area in which the PRL has traditionally been the looser.
82. *Trybuna Ludu*, 24/7/1984.

Drodzy radzieccy towarzysze i przyjaciele, nigdy dotąd nie byliśmy sobie tak bliscy...[1]
Wojciech Jaruzelski

(Dear Soviet comrades and friends, we have never been so close to each other...)

CHAPTER 7

THE PRL SINCE GORBACHEV.

On March 11, 1985, Mikhaïl Sergeï Gorbachev was elected First Secretary of the CPSU. At the age of 56, he was one of the youngest Party leaders to head the Soviet Union and his ascension to power, as later events confirmed, marked the end of an epoch dominated by the dinosaurs of Soviet politics. His immediate priorities were to strengthen his own position and remove the remains of the old Brezhnev generation still anchored in the state and Party apparatus. The new Soviet leadership, by professing to conduct radical domestic changes seemed to demonstrate a desire to break away from 'the remnants of the Stalinist epoch', both in the economic and political spheres. From the beginning he demonstrated a radical change of style from his predecessors and as he progressively strengthened his position, all the signs pointed to some far-reaching changes ahead, not only in the Soviet Union, but also by implication East Central Europe as well. From 1975 to 1985, the apparent overall stability of the Soviet Bloc, Moscow's involvement in other concerns and the enfeeblement of the Soviet leadership, all contributed to a lack of coherent and active Soviet Policy toward its East Central European allies. With the arrival of Gorbachev, this seeming passivity soon gave way to a greater involvement in the affairs of the Socialist Bloc by the Soviet

Union. The emergence of a new leadership in the Kremlin was greeted with some restraint, both in the East and in the West, the latter having learned its lesson since Andropov. It was clear that it would be better to 'wait and see' before assessing the real significance of the Gorbachev phenomenon. For the PRL, the new Soviet leader was still an unknown factor and had little effect on the country's internal and international situation. Geo-political priorities remained unchanged and as long as the internal situation remained stable, the Jaruzelski's régime had no reason to see in Gorbachev, either a threat or a positive development (though of course the former was always more likely). Yet, as later events showed, the Gorbachev era would have a sizable impact not only on the nature of East-West relations, but also on the domestic policy-making of the socialist bloc countries. As Vladimir Kusin remarked, Gorbachev had set the signposts for Eastern Central Europe "in a way that [combined] firmness with a good amount of understanding. He [seemed] to have recognized that there [were] limits that he himself [could not] overstep, as well as problems that his lesser allies had to cope with in their own way".[2] The implications of the Soviet *perestroïka* were inevitably touching upon the nature of the relations between the Soviet Union and its European allies. The policies of the new man in the Kremlin were thus bound to affect the decision-making processes within the socialist bloc. And the PRL was no exception.

7.1 *Polish-Soviet Relations.*

The Gorbachev phenomenon did not fail to attract the attention of the majority of Poles. Opinions about the new Soviet First Secretary varied and although the majority seemed at first sceptical about the merits of *perestroïka* and *glasnost*, everyone agreed that a new era was

in the making. In a poll conducted in 1987 by CBOS (the government 's opinion polling centre), 40,2% of respondents thought that Soviet reforms were considerable and that they was a good chance of producing considerable changes. 53,9 % thought that the Soviet reforms' influence on the international situation would be beneficial and 48,6% that East-West relations would benefit from them . Only 38,4 % thought they would have a beneficial effect in Poland while 20,3% failed to see any effect.[3] Officially, support for Gorbachev was unrestrained but it could not hide the fact that all developments east of the Vistula had a sense of *déjà vû*. The economic reforms, the reforms in the local CPSU elections, the liberation of political prisoners, all these signs of the so-called *perestroïka* had seen light in the PRL as early as the small 1956 revolution. The Polish leadership has made a lot of the 'convergence' between the Polish and Soviet reforms but at the same time it has avoided posing as the precursor to the Soviet changes. As Jaruzelski pointed out during the 10th PZPR Congress and later, Polish and Soviet communists were at different stages in building socialism, each developing under different conditions. However, needless to say that the PRL remained an unconditional ally of its big Eastern brother. As far as the Polish 'opposition' was concerned, many of its leaders continue to doubt Gorbachev's will to make some progress, especially in the field of human rights, without endangering the very foundations of his power. Others have argued that the Soviet leader need the support of the intelligentsia to enliven an inert Party and that therefore his reforms can only be limited. Finally there are those who simply do not believe that anything Gorbachev can do will bring about long lasting changes. The Church has tended to abstain from making any overt comments on the events in the Soviet Union, but may have been more involved than is thought, as for

instance, in the noticeable thaw between the Kremlin and the Vatican. The invitation to Cardinal Glemp to attend an International Forum for a World without Arms in Moscow, in January 1987, (he refused but sent two delegates) seemed to indicate that the Polish Church might have a role to play as some liberalization of religious freedoms in the Soviet Union become more certain.

Since the lifting of the state of emergency, two dominant themes had dominated the PRL's foreign policy statements. In the first place there was an almost never-ending glorification of the USSR and repeated expressions of gratitude for Soviet help. Secondly, there were stubborn and, at times, irrational attacks on the Reagan administration, implying that Washington alone was the source of tension in the world and the principal cause of political and economic troubles in the PRL. With the advent of the restrictive measures promulgated by the West, the Polish régime was no longer so inclined to balance its involvement with the East with independent ties with the West, especially the US. Although, for obvious reasons, relations with the West could not be fully ignored, the Polish disappointment which followed the slow and cautious Western responses to 'normalization', restricted Warsaw's policy-making choices. Very soon the Polish government concluded that it had nothing to lose by anti-American campaigns and the subsequent deterioration in relations between the two countries. Yet, and despite the so-called Polish re-orientation to the East, the Polish régime repeatedly indicated that it had no intention of severing all contacts with the West. This task was by no means an easy one. Since the imposition of the state of war the country had become more than ever identified with the Soviet Union and it had thereby lost much of its previous international prestige. A

mere resumption of normal diplomatic and economic contacts with the West was still not sufficient enough to restore the PRL's image on the international arena. This concern surfaced many times and was particularly clear in the context of Polish-Soviet relations. Although all pointed to a definite re-alignment to the East - part of Jaruzelski's policy of regaining its place within the socialist community - it appeared that Warsaw was concerned that its international position be not solely identified in terms of Soviet interests. Ardently supporting every new Gorbachev initiatives, especially in the disarmament field, the Polish authorities did, at the same time, all they could to boost their country's standing both in Europe and in the world. With the emergence of a second *détente* and helped by the success of Gorbachev's very effective seduction campaign in the West, this process was greatly facilitated. But it was not one without difficulties. Against a background of American intransigence, Warsaw sought to convince the lesser states of the Western camp of the futility of the various sanctions applied to the PRL. However, despite their differences and apparent lack of unity, Western governments showed little inclination to resume normal relations with the Polish régime. Partly because of this, an active Polish policy, following the Soviet lead, was initiated outside Europe, culminating with Jaruzelski's visit to China in September 1986. Even so, it seemed that this policy of normalizing external relations was not a hurried one. Above all, for Warsaw, domestic interests were predominant. This did not stop the Polish authorities from linking their foreign and domestic interests together, and use the resulting interrelationship as the foundation of their 'normalization' policies. The domestic-foreign dichotomy was never as clear as in the years following the

imposition of a state of war in December 1981.

While the British Foreign Minister, Geoffrey Howe was in the PRL, his Polish hosts also greeted, on an official visit, the Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshal Sergeï Sokolov (April 9-13, 1985). The visit which "took place in a friendly atmosphere, [and] touched upon the present international situation and the further development of Polish-Soviet co-operation", was also the prelude to the forthcoming meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, to be held in Warsaw. On its agenda was the signing of a protocol extending the validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, originally signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955. This first meeting of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the Polish capital since May 1980 represented an obvious praise for General Jaruzelski's policies. The presence of Gorbachev, for whom this was the first trip abroad in his capacity of CPSU First Secretary, was also the first visit to the PRL by a Soviet Party leader since Brezhnev's attendance of the Treaty's 25th anniversary in May 1980. Amid enormous and omnipresent security arrangements, contrasting with the discreet security presence in 1980[4], the various East Central European leaders arrived on April 24 in the Polish capital. A day later, the Soviet leader was greeted at the airport by General Jaruzelski. The renewal ceremony produced no surprise. On the other hand, more significant was the implicit announcement by the Polish authorities that only part of the Soviet delegation had left the Polish capital at the end of the meeting. During his extended stay, Gorbachev met with General Jaruzelski, the first such high-level discussion in the PRL between Soviet and Polish officials for nearly 5 years. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting stressed "the

Soviet Union's invariable solidarity with the PZPR, for surmounting completely the consequences of the crisis, for the stabilization and the strengthening of Socialism".[5] The fact that no mention was made of Jaruzelski's efforts and achievements indicated that in the eyes of Moscow, the road to full 'normalization' in the PRL was still incomplete. On May 14, 1985, the Soviet Union and the PRL signed a new protocol on border traffic between the two countries, intended to simplify the procedure for crossing the border by residents of border regions.[6] This was the first official relaxation of the border controls which had been imposed in the wake of the Polish events in the early 1980s. That the new Gorbachev leadership was anxious to ensure that the situation in the PRL was stable and ideologically secure, was further illustrated by the visit of the CPSU Central Control Committee Chairman, Mikhaïl Solomentsev. Although the visit was described "part of regular contacts between the PZPR and the CPSU"[7], it was obvious that the Kremlin wanted to ensure that the Polish Communist Party was taking all necessary steps to reinvigorate itself and develop constructive strategies for the future. Without a doubt, and more than ever in the current period of changes taking place in the USSR, stabilization in Poland remained for the Kremlin the key to the *status quo* in the Soviet European empire. But the imposition of martial law, and the fact that the Poles had been intimidated in doing the 'dirty work' for them, made the Soviet leaders have to accept the fact that they would have less control over the process of normalization in socialist Poland than had been the case in Hungary or Czechoslovakia. This of course did not mean that Jaruzelski would have a completely free hand, only a greater margin of manoeuvre that otherwise might have been the case. Not being totally in control has never been something the Kremlin leaders have accepted

lightly. It was for this reason that the Jaruzelski card, despite all the profits it had reaped, was still to some extent, an uncertain one in the long-term. Later, in June, the 40th session of the CMEA countries took place in the Polish capital. In a speech delivered at the closure of the meeting, Nikolai Tikhonov reaffirmed Soviet support for Jaruzelski's policies by saying that,

> [in] visiting Warsaw, we feel a deep satisfaction at the progress achieved by the working people of Poland - led by the Polish United Workers Party - in building a new society and overcoming the difficulties encountered by their country as a result of the hostile activities of anti-socialist and anti-Polish forces.[7]

The final communique underlined the economic priorities for the Bloc countries and gave a first insight in Gorbachev's policy towards his East Central European allies.[8] It set out the general trend toward military-economic integration put forward by the new Kremlin leadership. Five interlocking goals were spelled out: There had to be a closer co-ordination of the national 5-year plans so as to fit production programmes; special long-term co-operative agreements were concluded such as the extracting and transport of Soviet natural gas; there was an elaboration of a joint plan of action for scientific and technical work; there were calls for a continued high concentration of trade within the bloc with special emphasis on the delivery of quality goods and consumer durables from East Central Europe to the Soviet Union; finally guidelines were issued for the limitation of trade and economic links with the West.[9]

On May 28 the Italian Premier, Benito Craxi, met General Jaruzelski during a short stop over in the Polish capital on his way to Moscow. In a message he delivered to the Polish leader, he expressed his wish to see greater contacts between the two countries but he linked this possibility to greater tolerance from the Polish authorities towards

the 'opposition': "a lack of tolerance can cause great damages to the image of Poland and even provoke serious repercussions on the international level".[10] It was also learned that during this meeting, Jaruzelski informed his interlocutor that the Polish ambassador in Brussels would shortly present the EEC with an informative note from COMECON concerning relations between the two economic communities.[11] This was the first such report of this type written by COMECON. It seemed to confirm the opinion that the PRL was regaining greater status within the socialist bloc and that Moscow, by allowing it to submit this message, wanted to prove that it now firmly supported the Jaruzelski régime. This support developed notably before the October Sejm elections, with the Soviet Press taking a positive view of developments in the PRL and joining ranks with Polish communists in blaming all difficulties on Western interference in the country's internal affairs.[12]

Characteristic of PRL-USSR relations at the time was the flurry of economic contacts between the two countries. On September 6, 1985, a Polish delegation led by Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda, head of the Council of Ministers' Committee for Science and Technology paid a one day visit to Moscow. The purpose of the visit was to expand scientific and technical co-operation for a forthcoming long-term Polish-Soviet programme on scientific-technical progress. That same month, on the 28th, a PRL Agricultural and Food Ministry delegation led by Stanisław Zieba, was in Moscow to review the progress made in implementing a long term Polish-Soviet co-operation deal in agriculture and food industry.[13] On October 7 the Polish and Soviet Vice Premiers and Planning Commission Chairmen signed a protocol on the co-ordination of the socio-economic plan of both countries for 1986-1990. It was also

agreed to defer the repayment of some 5 mn. roubles owed by the PRL to the USSR. This was the first stage in the implementation of the long-term co-operation programme signed in 1984. As Premier Zbigniew Messner later assessed it,

> [The] co-operation and the durable bonds between the Polish economy and the Soviet economic potential guarantee the former a rapid and stable development and a considerable reduction of technological dependence on the capitalist countries. They testify to the advanced stage reached in the re-orientation of the Polish economy towards co-operation with Socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union. This is a strategic move for Poland.[14]

The new Polish Foreign Minister, Marian Orzechowski[15] paid his first visit abroad to the Soviet Union, where he met his Soviet counterpart. Soviet support was again stressed with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze pledging that "the Soviet Union will support and help Polish communists and all working people in their struggle to overcome the results of the crisis".[16] Warsaw's undoubted submission to Moscow, especially in foreign policy and economic areas, was rewarded with the PRL's quick return as the Soviet Union's first major ally. After attending the CPSU 27th Congress (25-27/2/1986), where he had been treated with special respect and attention by Mikhaïl Gorbachev, Jaruzelski stopped in Wilno, on his way back to the PRL, to meet Lithuanian Communist Party officials. This visit to Lithuania, the first by a PZPR leader, was remarkable in that it had a controversial and highly emotional connotation. The Lithuanian capital was a highly-charged symbol of Polish nationalistic expression. Until 1939, it had been a Polish city and was the birth place of many Poles who had distinguished themselves against Russian domination. It also evoked memories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which had had, for some four hundred years contained Turkish and Russian expansion to the West. It had also been Pilsudski's coveted objective after the

1920 Soviet *débacle* following the 'Miracle of the Vistula', and a crucial city in his plans for a Lithuanian-Ukraine-Poland federation. Its forceful separation from the Polish state at the end of World War II and its inclusion in the Soviet Republic of Lithuania is still regarded by many Poles as one of the major infamies of the Yalta Agreements. The fact that Jaruzelski was allowed to make such a visit testified to the high degree of confidence by the Soviet leaders for the General. By visiting Wilno, Jaruzelski hoped he might be favourably viewed by many Poles, even those most staunchly opposed to him. One of the undoubted aims of the visit was precisely to use the emotional significance of the city for the Polish nation, in order to create a picture of a patriotic leader deeply concerned about the fate of those Poles living in the Soviet Union. By doing so, it also sought to present Jaruzelski as a man capable of extracting concessions from the Soviet leadership, even in such sensitive issues related to the annexation of Polish territory by the USSR during the Second World War. The Polish authorities' manipulation of national symbols as means to divert the population's interest from pressing domestic problems was once again being used to the full. Yet, talking to Poles, it would appear that this tactic was only convincing for the very ones who were trying to implement it and that the majority of the population, well aware of this, hardly responded to it at all.

Less than a month after the CPSU 27th Congress, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, was in the PRL on an official visit. The speech he delivered on this occasion took the form of a public Soviet confirmation of support for Jaruzelski's policies, and its strongest expression to date:

> Today we are gratified to hear that the time of unrest is over, that the situation is stabilizing, that first successes have been achieved - all due to the wisdom, resolve and energy of your nation and of the party led by

Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski.[17]

This unequivocal appraisal of Warsaw's policies meant the 'return' of the PRL to its pre-1981 position within the socialist bloc. It confirmed its 'unshakeable alliance with the Soviet Union' and opened the stage for greater Polish initiatives on the foreign policy front. The most spectacular example of this was the official visit made by Jaruzelski to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in September 1986. Originally, he had intended to visit only Mongolia and North Korea but three weeks before his departure, the PRC was added to his itinerary. Contacts between the two countries had been revived in 1985 with the visit of Deputy Premier Obodowski, the first such high-ranking visit to the PRC since 1957 when the then Prime Minister, Cyrankiewicz had been in the Chinese capital. In May 1985, the PRC Deputy Premier, Li Peng, had signed in Warsaw a trade agreement between the two countries for 1986-1990. The appearance of PRC diplomats in Eastern Europe was something new and it reflected a timid Chinese effort to improve relations with Eastern Central Europe. In the case of the PRL, the opportunity to participate in this process and reap at the same time economic but also, more importantly, political gains on the international scene was promptly taken up. Jaruzelski was the first East European leader apart from Nicolae Ceaucescu (1985) to visit the PRC for nearly 30 years and he preceded a planned visit by Erich Honecker in October. Apart from the visit's economic results for the PRL[18], it had allowed the Polish authorities to play an intermediary role in the resumption of Soviet-PRC relations. In July 1986, Mikhaïl Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok had stressed Moscow's desire and willingness to improve relations between the two countries and had been the first step in the Soviet Union's new Far East 'peace

offensive'. "I would like to re-affirm: the Soviet Union is prepared - at any time and at any level - to discuss with China questions of ... measures for creating an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness", the First Secretary had stressed.[19] With the Kremlin leadership eager to make some headway in this direction, it was only a matter a time for its East Central European allies to follow suit. The fact that the PRL succeeded in being one of the first two members of the Soviet Bloc to make an official visit to Peking in recent years emphasized the trust which Jaruzelski enjoyed in Moscow. Presumably, the PRC leadership also had supported the choice of the PRL as the *de facto* representative of the Soviet bloc. It was significant that a few months after the Polish visit, the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, in the wake of internal turmoil shaking the PRC at the time, had advised that the country should follow the Polish example by using 'dictatorial' means to handle political opposition: "They adopted martial law and controlled the situation; that clearly shows that if we don't use dictatorial methods, it won't do. ... We must not only talk about dictatorial methods but also practise them".[20] The Chinese were probably the most constant admirers of General Jaruzelski's methods. In June 1987, when Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang visited the PRL on his first leg of an Eastern European tour, he praised in no uncertain terms the 'normalization' policies of the Polish régime:

> We are particularly delighted and impressed by the fact that during recent years the Party and the Polish government, together with people from different groups of Polish society, in a joint effort and relying on their own wisdom, bravery and power, took firm steps to reverse and then stabilize the situation, thus enabling the nation to return to the proper road of development.[21]

It was clear that the Polish leader's visit was seen as a first attempt to warm up relations between the PRC and its Soviet neighbour and its diplomatic significance should not be underrated. As far as

the PRL was concerned, it undoubtedly contributed greatly in re-affirming the country's stand as the Kremlin's closest ally. Indeed, from then on, it appeared that the PRL had been chosen, admittedly in a limited capacity, to play the role of a broker for some of Moscow's delicate international initiatives. With the posting of Stefan Kwiatkowski, the first Polish diplomat in Tel Aviv since 1967, relations between Israel and the PRL seemed to take on a new character. The PRL was now the first East Central European Country apart from Romania to have a permanent representative in the Israeli capital. On October 16, 1985, Israeli TV reported that an exchange of representatives with the PRL was expected to take place shortly.[22] The two-day Sejm meeting on foreign policy (31/1-1/2/1986) discussed relations with Israel. And on October 16, 1987 Kwiatkowski was in Tel Aviv. Although it was stressed that this was not a formal ambassadorial post, the mere fact that there was now a permanent Polish representative in Israel seemed to indicate the opening of a new channel of communication between the two countries, and consequently also with the Soviet Union. In itself this was no great event, but it did point to a certain degree of foreign policy initiative from Warsaw. What is more, it showed that the PRL had regained *in toto* its place as the number two of the socialist bloc.

Prior to the 10th PZPR Congress in July 1986, The Jaruzelski régime had followed the developments in the Soviet Union in what could be best described as a passive way. The Kremlin's support for the General's policies was equally somewhat reserved, even if all the signs pointed that Gorbachev appraisal of his Polish neighbour were on the whole positive. Until the 27th CPSU Congress, in February 1986, Polish issues remained to a large extent outside the Soviet Union's

sphere of concern, busy as it was with the magnitude of its own problems. With the confirmation of the predominant Gorbachev line, and the strengthening of the Soviet First Secretary's position, the USSR's European allies began to show greater signs of acceptance, and even in some case enthusiasm, for the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. Aware that Gorbachev now seemed a durable and stable phenomenon, Eastern Central European ruling establishments slowly started to adapt their behaviour on the 'new Soviet model'. With the closure of the Polish Congress, a symbolic apotheosis of Jaruzelski's 'normalizing' policies, the PRL wholeheartedly became one of Gorbachev's most ardent supporters. Mieczysław Rakowski expressed this clearly when he said that,

> Anything that happens in the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, concerns People's Poland. The PZPR and its ideological and political allies welcome with great satisfaction, and fully support, the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and the firm will to continue the policy of *perestroïka* and *glasnost*. We perceive a recognition of the values and weaknesses of socialism that runs close to our own in the reformist moves of the CPSU leadership.[23]

At the same time, there were repeated indications that the Polish leadership was keen on identifying domestic changes in the Soviet Union with the PRL's own internal developments. To quote Rakowski again,

> It can be said without exaggeration that every success of the Soviet Party in pursuit of its present policy is also our success and a confirmation of the correctness of the road upon which we embarked at the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress in July 1981. ... Our achievements in the democratization of the socio-political system are a tangible contribution to the consolidation of the policy line of which Mikhaïl Gorbachev is the leading figure.[24]

As one Soviet journalist commented, "present day Poland lives a rich and eventful life. The spirit of revival is felt in every sphere".[25] PRL-Soviet relations took on a new turn on April 21, 1987, with a Declaration on Polish-Soviet Co-operation in Ideology, Science and

Culture. General Jaruzelski, making his sixth official visit to the Soviet Union since the imposition of martial law, was greeted by Gorbachev as "a great friend of the Soviet Union and Poland's outstanding leader". After the Soviet leader's attendance of the 10th PZPR Congress, this new meeting between the two leaders finally consecrated Jaruzelski's position as the number two of the socialist bloc. While several long-term co-operation agreements in cultural, ideological and scientific research were signed, by far the most significant event of the visit, in view of its important historical connotation, was the undertaking by both sides to re-examine relations between the two countries and eliminate the so-called 'white blanks' in their joint history. The joint declaration read that,

> The PZPR and the CPSU give great importance to joint studies on the history of relations between our countries, parties and nations. There should be no "white blanks" in this history. The centuries-old ties between the nations of Poland and Russia require a thorough examination.[26]

Those controversial historical episodes - among others, the Katyn massacre and the fate of Poles deported to the Soviet Union in 1939, the secret clause of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact - have always been the source of the Poles' great animosity towards their Eastern neighbour. There was also the question of the total liquidation by Stalin of the Polish Communist Party (KPP) in 1938 and the execution of some 5 000 of its activists. The Polish authorities were never able, and more accurately never could, convince the Polish population that such events had been either perpetuated by Nazi Germany or had been in the higher interest of the nation. For over 40 years they attempted to ignore what all knew about, making a farce of the 'fraternal alliance' binding the PRL and the USSR and confirming in the minds of the population the image of a Polish puppet-state, subservient to the Kremlin's whims and interests. That the two leaders

publicly announced the need for this re-examination was in itself a surprise for everyone. Of course, traditional Polish pessimism wanted more than a mere declaration of intent. A first meeting of officially appointed Polish and Soviet historians opened in Moscow on May 18, 1987 and to this day (1989), talks are still going on, with little concrete results so far. The decision to examine the "white blanks" in Polish-Soviet relations re-kindled a burning issue.[27] Gorbachev himself raised it while in the PRL in 1988, during a meeting with representatives of the Polish intelligentsia.[28] At the beginning of 1989, the Polish media began publishing numerous articles on the Katyn massacre after the publication of British Foreign Office records concerning the results of the Polish Red Cross investigation in this matter. Most surprisingly, these records were first published in the PRON weekly, *Odrodzenie* ("Revival"), after a Polish researcher had patiently gathered them.[29] Re-opening such issues and all their implications seemed a bold move on the part of the Polish and Soviet authorities. For Warsaw, using the *glasnost* climate and raising the expectations of millions of Poles had a direct internal effect. It was yet another calculated step to further the process of 'national conciliation'. By 1987, because of very policies implied by 'normalization', Jaruzelski was left with very little to give to those who opposed him. The 'carrots' he could use to sweeten this process had been almost all handed out. The domestic situation being far from satisfactory, the Polish ruling establishment was eager to make its decisions more palatable by 'liberalizing' some of its views concerning previously taboo subjects. By doing this, not only were they keeping in line with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union - calling for greater openness - , but they were also hoping to divert the Polish public's attention away from pressing current problems to

more emotional issues, concerning the past. It is likely that General Jaruzelski used his meetings with Gorbachev to convince the latter that unless some controlled degree of liberalization in various spheres was permitted, Polish 'normalization' would fail, thus once again raising the spectre of another highly destabilizing period for the socialist bloc. With the new 'Gorbachevian' mood and the accompanying domestic problems it was creating, this was the last thing the Kremlin wanted. Therefore the apparent new character of relations between the PRL and the Soviet Union was answering Warsaw's desire to become recognized as an actor in its own right on the international scene and at the same time provide the means, through greater room of manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy, for getting greater internal support for its policies. As Orzechowski, the Polish Foreign Minister, summed it up,

> The circumstances behind the fact that *perestroïka* and our own "socialist renewal" have coincided, provide a first-rate occasion for us to enhance our opportunities in international politics. This accordance and this convergence hold important consequences for us.[30]

Although he repeated the so-often heard need for the Soviet Union to have a "strong Poland, a Poland which is stable and which speaks out in its own strong voice on the international forum", he also added that,

> The Soviet *perestroïka*, as well as our own "socialist renewal" have made it necessary for Polish-Soviet relations, for concepts such as friendship, alliance and co-operation, to be given a new meaning, for they have adjusted to modern times, and have been cleared of unnecessary ornamentation, their formality or ceremoniousness. Today, perhaps more than ever before, we clearly understand how much Poland and the USSR need each other.[31]

That the PRL was now firmly supporting Gorbachev remained unquestioned. At the same time, it seemed that opportunities were emerging for the Polish state to be more assertive in its domestic and

foreign policy-making. Though both the Soviet the Polish leaderships had problems of their own, they were also both aware that it was in the interests of all to see the outcome of their own reforms. "Our two countries are at different stages of building socialism and are building it under different conditions. However the Polish policy of "socialist renewal" and reform closely converges with the Soviet strategy of restructuring and acceleration", emphasized Jaruzelski.[32]

On February 28, 1987, Mikhaïl Gorbachev made a statement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, a step that opened the road for the signing by the two superpowers of the December 1987 INF treaty in Washington. Since the advent of 'Gorbachevism', Soviet foreign policy had launched an unprecedented 'peace offensive'. This was the result of Soviet domestic needs to direct efforts towards the implementation of deep economic reforms. Gorbachev overall aims were to cut military spending, create an efficient bureaucracy by streamlining it, improve the state of East-West relations and thus obtain money and credits (especially from Western Europe) needed for his 'restructuring policies'. An obvious route for the attainment of those objectives passed through a series of arms-control agreements, starting with the INF Treaty. In this respect, aid and support from its Eastern Central European allies was all the more useful. Not only could it serve the purpose of reinforcing the unity of the socialist bloc, but it also added other voices supporting the 'socialist peace policy', thereby increasing the weight of the argument. Three months after the February statement, Jaruzelski himself proposed a Polish plan to Decrease Armaments and Increase Confidence in Europe. Speaking at the 2nd Congress of the OPZZ (May 8), the General outlined a four-points scheme for reducing nuclear and conventional armaments in

Central Europe. The 'Jaruzelski Plan', as it came to be known, called for a gradual withdrawal of mutually agreed operational and tactical kinds of nuclear weapons as well as various types of conventional weapons, especially those that could be used in a surprise attack; an evolution in the nature of military doctrines that could be reciprocally assessed as being strictly defensive; and finally a continued search for and agreement to new security and confidence-building measures.[33] This Polish 'initiative' was received in the West as indifferently as the 1957 Rapacki Plan to establish a nuclear-free zone in Europe or the 1964 Gomułka Plan envisaging a freeze of nuclear armaments. Indeed, it looked more as an attempt by the Polish leader to have his name inscribed in the annals of disarmament initiatives and give his country a semblance of having an active peace policy. The May 29, 1987 meeting of the WTO Political Consultative Committee made no mention of the plan in its final resolution.[34]

7.2 *External-internal linkages.*

A bare week after the Warsaw Pact meeting in April 1985, important demonstrations took place throughout the PRL. Some 10 000 people took part in a peaceful march in Warsaw. In Gdańsk, serious troubles opposed an estimated 3 000 Solidarity supporters with the anti-riot forces.[35] Jacek Kuroń, the founder of KOR was arrested. While 'internal normalization' was still proving to be causing problems to the authorities, 'external normalization', despite the resumption of contacts with the West, was also the subject of disappointment by the Polish régime. After the May 1 demonstrations, two US diplomats were thrown out of the country for allegedly "having taken part in an illegal demonstration", the authorities describing their participation as "a flagrant violation of diplomatic status and international norms

and customs".[36] This prompted a protest by Washington and the subsequent expulsion of four Polish diplomats from the US. The Polish media also carried severe criticisms of Reagan's decision to lay a wreath in a cemetery where Waffen-SS soldiers had been buried, at Bitburg in West Germany. It looked as if every occasion was good to attack the US administration and thereby show its apparent lack of goodwill in resuming normal relations with the PRL. On May 6, Warsaw decided to suspend some of the air facilities granted to the US embassy. The planned visit by the Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, was cancelled after the Polish authorities had turned down his request to meet members of Solidarity and lay flowers at Father Popiełuszko's grave. Polish-French relations were further aggravated by the strong Polish protests against the showing of the film *Shoa* in French cinemas, accusing it to give an outrageous portrait of apparent Polish contribution to the Jewish holocaust. On May 17, the Government spokesman made public a letter by 28 Nobel Prize winners protesting against the forthcoming trial of Adam Michnik, Bogdan Liś and Własdiław Frasyniuk, who had been arrested on February 13 and accused of leading an illegal organization. The trial which ensued became the main subject of conversation throughout the spring. It revealed, as if it still needed to be confirmed, the authorities' unrelentless intention to muzzle the opposition. In this respect the Gdańsk trial heralded a new stage in the process of 'internal normalization'. Tensions between the authorities and the Church, which had risen in the wake of the Popiełuszko's murder, persisted. The unprecedented opening of the trial, on June 3 before the district court in Jędrzejów[37], of two young priests (Marek Łabuda and Andrzej Wulczynski), accused of supporting students in their attempts to oppose the decision to remove crucifixes from classrooms, clearly

illustrated that the traditional conflict over the Church and the state's respective influence on society had not rescinded. Despite all the calls for 'national conciliation', the régime was once again showing that it was determined to curtail any opposition, in whatever form, to its policies of 'normalization'. There were now some 200 political prisoners after only 20 had remained imprisoned in the wake of the previous Summer's amnesty. Less spectacular but perhaps more significant in the long-term, were the legislative measures which aimed at further strengthening central power. In his speech to the Sejm On The Present State of Security and Public Order (May 10), General Kiszczak accused "special services and subversive centres" of waging a war against the PRL and equated opponents to the régime to Western spy agents:

> Attempts are made to expand the scope of infiltration into Poland's socio-political life, as well as the economic and defence potential. Signals multiply about the growing number of Western special services' attempts to recruit spies among Polish citizens travelling to the West. Provocations, blackmail and other pressures are employed for this purpose. ... The intelligence and subversive centres in the West prepare instructions and scenarios addressed to [Poland's] internal enemy.[38]

The Sejm passed on this occasion a new law on Special Criminal Liability, making criminal law still more repressive.[39] The adoption of these new legal measures significantly enhanced the authorities' capacity for repression in a wide range of political and criminal cases. This new array of legislative acts showed that the policy of 'internal normalization' had still not attained its goals. The effective elimination of all 'oppositional' activity remained one of the most important priorities of the ruling establishment. This was further confirmed by Józef Czyrek's speech at the 19th KC Plenum (May 13-14) devoted to the Role and Tasks of the Intelligentsia in Socialist Poland,

> At the same time we tell with full firmness the ringleaders of destruction and anarchy, the counterrevolutionary adventurists hiding behind demagogic words the absence of any positive programme: there will be no agreement with the enemies of socialism. The struggle will continue to the very end, to the total defeat of anti-socialist forces and slogans.[40]

He also added that one of the practical tasks for the Polish intelligentsia was "to unmask the real objectives of the Reagan administration's anti-Polish policy as well as the rising revanchist tendencies in the FRG".[41]

The Gdańsk trial once again stressed the linkage between domestic and foreign policies. With the verdict being announced and the following harsh sentence passed upon Frasyniuk, Liś and Michnik (3½, 2½, and 3 years in prison respectively), most Western governments voiced public dismay at the Polish authorities' stand for being so intransigent. A concrete effect of the sentence was the refusal by the Italian Prime Minister to meet the Polish Foreign Minister, Olszowski, who arrived in Italy on an official visit on June 20. Yet the Polish authorities relentlessly endeavoured to implement the various phases of 'internal normalization' and on June 22, all funds and assets seized from Solidarity and other unions were officially transferred to the new official unions, the OPZZ.

The Spring-Summer 1985 period marked a significant period for Party activities. Repeated interventions and discussions took place during this period to emphasize the need to renew the Party's internal life which, since the 9th Extraordinary Congress, had given the leaders ample cause for concern. After the successive purges implemented during and after the imposition of martial law, there was now an urgent need to make the PZPR effective again in its organizational activities and in the effectiveness of its political role in Polish

society. On June 5, 1985, The Chairman of the KC Central Auditing Commission said that Party's life was still marred by insufficient individual activity by rank-and-file members. He added that "there is a necessity to improve the effectiveness of the whole Party and its particular organizations, because if this effectiveness is missing, this can check development and progress, and bring down the rate of achieving the socially accepted goals as well as those involving the Party's ranks' internal instructions and tasks".[42] A week later, the 20th KC plenum convened to discuss the obvious failure of the Party to infuse life into its inert membership. Also on the agenda was the notable decrease in Party membership, down some 30% since the last Congress in 1981, and now standing at 2,112,000 members (3,150,000 previously). As general Jaruzelski stressed at the end of the plenum,

> It is indispensable to step up the pulse of ideological life, to consolidate Marxist-Leninist identity and unity of the Party. Every kind of demagogy, irrespective of its origin, every manifestation of both self-complacency and scaremongering are harmful. they affect the Party's cohesion. we shall care for it continuously, we shall defend it consistently.[43]

It is interesting to note that during the plenum, General Jaruzelski referred explicitly to Gorbachev's 'new style'. In particular, he embraced two of the Soviet leader's main objectives namely, the fight against alcoholism and the denunciation of ineffective Party cadres. He said that "our Soviet comrades criticize openly and publicly by calling by name, both heads of some administrative and economic links, including the central level, as well as individual members of party authorities". "In our country", he added, "we are still too kind, too soft in this respect".[44] He also encouraged Polish communists to inspire themselves from the innovatory solutions in process in the Soviet Union. The Polish *odnowa* was finding its *raison d'être* in the

Soviet *perestroïka*.

On July 31 1985, the final session of the current Sejm took place. It had been the longest Sejm in the history of the PRL and during its 65 months of existence managed to pass 203 laws as well as some 90 acts defining programmes and directions of development in particular areas. On this occasion an amended version of the Trade Union Bill was passed, making the workplace trade unions representative of all workers instead of its members, thereby allowing only one trade union per enterprise. This was a further blow for all those hoping for trade union pluralism and was clearly demonstrating the authorities' determination to weaken and ultimately destroy the last remains of the Solidarity era. The July 25 Amendments to the 1982 Law on Higher Education were also a step in this direction. They increased the government's powers to dismiss, suspend and transfer university teachers as well as the power to suspend or expel students, and close down institutions. University teachers would have to take an oath of pledging loyalty to the principles of a 'socialist university'. That the régime was now feeling more confident was further confirmed with the announcement that parliamentary elections would be held on October 13, 1985, the first such elections since March 1980. The uncertainties which had forced Jaruzelski to delay the opening of a new Sejm had by now seemingly been resolved. The TKK immediately called for a boycott of the elections, saying that "to participate [in them] would mean abandoning the social and national aspirations [of the Poles] and participating in the crimes of the state of war leadership"[45], to which the government spokesman answered back by saying that "a boycott is nothing but a turning of one's back on the only kind of Polish state which really has a chance to exist, ..., a demonstration of

unwillingness to participate in state life in any form".[46] It was undeniable that the Jaruzelski régime viewed the elections as an important milestone, not only in the process of 'internal normalization', but also as far as foreign relations with the West were concerned. As the 21st KC plenum resolution stressed, "the success of the elections in Poland will be evidence of progressing socio-political stability; it will also consolidate our state and strengthen its international position".[47]

One of the main pre-occupations of the authorities in the Autumn, was to ensure that the parliamentary elections to be held on October 13, would be a success for their "normalization" policy. The 1985 elections aimed at proving that the internal situation of the country was now well under control and that General Jaruzelski's policies were finally paying off. It wanted to boast both internally and externally of a return to a 'normal' political life. As one commentator noted,

> In other countries of the world, political normality is understood as a situation where, although various groups may express their discontent in a more or less energetic manner, the people and groups in power rule the state with the support, or at least the consent of the majority of society. I think that the elections have shown that we have reached this state of affairs.[48]

All the pre-election campaign speeches stressed the importance of the elections as another clear sign of the 'national accord' emerging from the growing stability within the country. By staging the elections the régime was hoping to score points against two of its main opponents at the time namely, the Solidarity activists and the US. With a high turn-out, Jaruzelski could show both at home and abroad that his policy line had gained the support of the majority of the population and that therefore all internal and external activities which countered the authorities' efforts were detrimental to the well-being

of the nation. Although the very fact that the election date had been publicized demonstrated the authorities' confidence that they could ensure its success, the weeks preceding October 13, revealed that the régime was somewhat uncertain as to the final results. On September 12, Solidarity and other autonomous branch and Union representatives called a boycott of the elections while the Church refrained from advising believers on how they should vote. As far as the procedure of the elections was concerned, the Polish electoral system established for the June 17, 1984 local peoples' elections and for the October 13, 1985 Sejm elections had revealed that the opportunity for a real contest was seriously impaired. Carefully selected candidates, electors not able to have a candidate on the ballot if the authorities opposed him, officially preferred candidates given an almost unsurmountable advantage by being listed first on the ballot sheets, rather than have their names appear in alphabetic order, and the drawing out of a national list which included Jaruzelski and other top Party leaders, all of whom ran unopposed in order that national leaders would not be voted out of office[49]; it was thus not surprising that the 'opposition' called for the boycott. In an interview to the Party daily, the MSW Deputy Minister, General Władysław Pożoga, accused Solidarity underground and Western secret services of preparing a campaign of provocative actions aimed at upsetting the outcome of the elections.[50] Speaking on the tasks for ideological activists and all party members in the election campaign to the Sejm, Politburo member Józef Czyrek said that,

> the campaign preceding the election to the Sejm is of particular political significance. Another stage in normalizing Poland's socio-political situation is being completed, and the campaign constitutes one more important step towards national agreement. ... At the same time we know that this agreement does not exclude the possibility of a struggle, above all against those forces which try to sabotage the process of socialist renewal, forces which are

> increasingly remote and increasingly opposed to the supreme interests of the nation and state.[51]

While there was a clear domestic goal in assuring the smooth running of the elections, Warsaw was also eager to use this occasion to demonstrate what it saw as the ill-foundation of the continuing economic sanctions against the PRL. By staging successful elections, the Polish authorities would be able to back up their claims for credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of Western governments. The elections then provided Jaruzelski with a new tool by which to further the PRL's current foreign policy objectives. It aimed at proving that Western claims of repressed political freedoms in the country were false and unfounded. In this they were helped indirectly by Cardinal Glemp's call for a lifting of the sanctions during his visit to Washington, on September 20, 1985. In his press conference, the Polish Primate said that he had always considered them as unjust since they had ruptured economic and scientific co-operation and inflicted dangers on the Polish people.[52] In his election campaign speech, General Jaruzelski clearly stressed the connection between the elections and the PRL's standing on the international arena:

> Our joint electoral voice will be yet another confirmation of our nation's will and determination to defend peace, to strengthen security and the inviolability of borders, to boost Poland's international position in the are of political, economic, scientific and cultural relations. We will do this to demonstrate once more to those who keep to their policy of boycott, restrictions and interference in our affairs that theirs is an irrevocably lost cause. No foreign government shall believe that here, in the land of the Vistula and the Oder, anything can be done without us, besides us, or against us.[53]

Attending the 40th Anniversary session of the United Nations, on September 27, his first visit to the West since taking power, General Jaruzelski gave a lengthy interview to Michael Getler of the *Washington Post*. In it, he declared that a voter turn-out of 75 to 80

percent in the Sejm elections would indicate a return to a 'high level of normality and stability in his country and might lead to a new amnesty for political prisoners: "The better the results of the elections [the more it will show that] stability and normality have reached a high level and the better consideration [there] will be for announcing an amnesty".[54] At the same time he warned the Reagan administration that its support of Solidarity and its calls for a boycott of the elections would seriously jeopardize the chances for an amnesty: "Encouraging people to boycott as the Voice of America and the so-called Radio Free Europe do ... is aimed at limiting electoral participation and this will lower the index of stability [which may] not allow for the amnesty".

As it turned out the official results of the elections showed a 78,8% turn-out[55], a figure contested by Solidarity which recorded only a 66% turn-out of all eligible voters. Compared with the 1980 elections which had recorded a 98,87% figure, the 1985 election results were indeed poorer. Yet, the authorities seemed to have been satisfied with the outcome. The Politburo Report on the PZPR activity during the Sejm campaign noted that by "going to the polls, the vast majority of Poles expressed its determination to participate in socialist Poland's future". It also "showed that the social base for national conciliation [was] widening and that the overwhelming majority of Polish society [was] backing this patriotic idea".[56] Regardless of the truth of this statement, it was clear that the authorities assessed the outcome in a positive manner and saw in it an opportunity to carry on their policies unchanged. Speaking at the 22nd KC Plenum, General Jaruzelski expressed this confidence by claiming that "the elections results should give us the energy to solve the

problems that are still piling before us". "We are stronger now", he added, "we can therefore afford to be more determined and decisive in overcoming our weaknesses, in opposing everything that holds or pulls us back, and in preventing the dirt we sweep out of our house from returning through the back door".[57] Jaruzelski also stressed the "important external dimension" of the elections:

> The elections results have promoted the consolidation of Poland's international position and its international prestige. They gave satisfaction to our infallible and time-tested allies in neighbouring countries and to our friends in more distant lands.[58]

In effect, the elections' results produced a 'normalized' parliament.[59] The 460 deputies were all selected by PRON and not a single deputy who had dared vote against important governmental decisions during the last parliamentary session was re-elected. It also provided an opportunity to undertake extensive governmental changes. In a move that seemed to mark a timid return to 'civilian' rule, General Jaruzelski resigned from his post of Prime Minister, to be replaced by Zbigniew Messner, an economist expert and technocrat. Jaruzelski's new post as head of state (replacing the aging Henryk Jabłoński), an honorific position, would enable the General to meet all heads of state without any infringement to the diplomatic protocol and spend more time for the preparation of the 10th PZPR Congress, due to take place in June 1986. However, it changed little to his position within the PRL. In view of his First Secretaryship of the Party and his presidency of KOK, his authority over the affairs of the country remained indisputable. That he remained fully in control was further evidenced by the mini-high-ranking purges within the Party apparatus which took place at the time and which continued up to the 10th PZPR Congress. In March 1983, Mieczysław Moczar, the head of the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK), had been one of the first of Jaruzelski's

potential enemies to be removed. During the 22nd KC Plenum on November 11, 1985, Stefan Olszowski was replaced by Marian Orzechowski. Olszowski's demise was soon followed by the replacement of the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Kociołek, on January 4, 1986. After Milewski, both Olszowski and Kociołek were reputed to have belonged to the so-called hard-liners within the PZPR and often at odds against Jaruzelski's policies. Their 'retirement' was interpreted as an expression of the General's wish to smooth out Party differences in the wake of the forthcoming Congress.[60] The first sitting of the Sejm (6/11/1985) saw the replacement of five Vice-Premiers and 13 cabinet Ministers. The 'normalization' of the PRL's internal life was continuing unrelentingly.

On the external front, the US still remained the main target of Polish phillipics. It seemed to the Polish authorities, that nothing it did was pleasing the Reagan administration. Jan Rem (or the government's spokesman) summed up in his own way the essence of the US doctrine towards the PRL:

> It is the conviction that it is possible to rule Poland from Washington, that the US should mould Poland into a shape that corresponds to the American vision of what political and economic relations should look like. It is believed that Poland can still be used as a lever to crack open the whole socialist bloc from within. ... It is not only Washington's policy towards Poland which is characterized by being completely divorced from reality. The same is true of the political evolution of America's friends inside Poland.[61]

It is striking to note once again how the Polish authorities were identifying their internal and external enemies as motivated by the one and same objective. Indeed, this identification was part of a co-ordinated campaign to discredit both the 'opposition' in the PRL and the régime's greatest opponent abroad, the USA. As interpreted by the ruling establishment, domestic problems had their origins outside

Polish borders, while foreign interference in the PRL's internal affairs was being promoted and encouraged inside the country. Again the foreign-domestic link appears, this time used by the authorities as a major component of its propaganda machine.

7.3 *The Polish Economy since Martial Law.*

In a nutshell, the 1970s Polish policy of attracting Western investments had been based upon the naive assumption that all the credits and loans thus incurred would be re-payed as soon as the PRL would begin to flood the international market with its goods. What in fact happened was that the Polish economy, as a result of the investment boom, was developed and modernized in total isolation from the domestic capacity of the Polish economy to provide the necessary outputs for an export drive, essential if a viable economic balance was to be preserved. The legacy of this policy was now affecting the Jaruzelski régime's ability to extricate the country out of the economic crisis and was seriously impeding the 'normalization' process.

On December 13, 1981, a state of war had been proclaimed over the whole of the PRL. As we saw, it had all the appearances of being introduced predominantly for political reasons. However, the fact remained that economic issues, having played a crucial role in the 1980 explosion, could not be disregarded as peripheral to the decision to impose a state of war over the PRL. In fact, it cannot be doubted that in seeking to destroy Solidarity, General Jaruzelski, not only had hoped to eliminate political opposition to his policies, but also to create the right conditions for re-establishing normal socialist economic order. Indeed, both political and economic reasons dictated the decision to militarize the whole country.

On January 1, 1982, it was announced that a major economic reform would be implemented with the aims of restructuring the economic mechanisms, the principles underlying the Polish economy and the whole organizational set-up. Before the imposition of martial law, the reform had been planned officially to start in 1983. The key initial document, *Kierunki reformy gospodarczej*[62], had been completed in June 1981, was approved by the Party Congress in July 1981 and served as the basis for the new law on the state enterprises and self-management adopted in September 1981. The decision to begin the process of implementing the economic reform a year ahead of schedule was taken for two main reasons: In the first place, martial law enabled the authorities to drastically increase prices and set up of the right conditions to implement economic decentralization. On January 1, 1982 new wholesale prices were introduced, followed in February by another steep increase in retail pricing. Secondly, the political élite wanted to be seen as reformers and thereby gain wider acceptance among the Polish population. However, the proposed reforms were not sufficiently far-reaching. They completely ignored the central problem of the Polish hard-currency debt to the West and "the extent to which the Polish economy had become an open economy during the restructuring and modernization drive of the early 1970s".[63] Three major principles underlined the reforms: a) enterprises were to become independent, self-financed and self-managed, the so-called 3-S principle (*Samodzielność, Samofinansowanie, Samorządność*). Independence meant that the enterprise's choice of production was no longer to be constrained by a centrally imposed directive plan. b) greater price flexibility and increased financial discipline would be obtained through competition, anti-monopoly laws, freedom to import and conservative credit policy. Even bankruptcies would be allowed. c)

although central planning would still be maintained, it would be much less detailed. The new policy slogan would be: competition as much as feasible, direct intervention as little as possible.[64]

The immediate economic objective of the military government had been to restore some semblance of order to the economy. Yet, it soon became clear that the economic reform was producing very little concrete results apart from empty words. With the abandonment of the 1982 Plan, the Polish economy gained many attributes of a war economy with highly centralized planning as its main feature. Even by themselves, the measures introduced by WRON had little in common with the sweeping principles of the reform. The 3 year plan (1983-1985) had three main priorities: a stress on saving materials and energy, an export drive to the West, and the attainment of equilibrium on the domestic market. In order to fulfil these aims, operational programmes were introduced. They were essentially the embodiment of central planing as applied to an enclave of the economy. In 1982, their use was extensive with 14 operational programmes covering around 50% of all industrial production.[65] By 1983, they had been reduced to six:

a) Transport Equipment;
b) Industrial supplies for agriculture;
c) Medicine and sanitary products;
d) Clothing for young people;
e) Footwear;
f) Safety Gear.

That same year, the authorities introduced government contracts (*zamówiena rządowe*) which were a variation on the operational programmes, the main differences being that, where firms were drafted into the former, participation in the latter was voluntary. This move turned out to be popular with firms because the authorities guaranteed them supplies of scarce materials and foreign exchange. In return co-

operating enterprises promised to fulfil orders for goods as specified by the government. Every 'operational programme' was put under the command of a special commissioner. The responsibility of managers for their enterprises was reinforced. All forms of workers' participation was suspended. Key industries were 'militarized'. At the same time, the very conditions created by the state of war further determined that the PRL would hardly benefit from any so-called reforms. In an environment of administrative chaos, where inter-city travel, telephone services and other means of communication were restricted, the conditions necessary for rapid economic development were indeed very limited if not non-existent. Western economic sanctions only created new difficulties for the Polish authorities and this further impeded any chances that some real improvement would soon surface. The only success story concerned the coal mining industry. With its militarization, ie., miners were subject to military discipline and could be court-marshalled for refusing to follow orders, coal output over the first five months of 1982, was some 16% higher than in the same period in 1981. This had the direct effect of eliminating coal shortages and provide a more even supply of electrical power. However, it failed to improve the situation of the economy as a whole. In the steelworks, output fell by 24% in the first five months of 1982. Motor car production was 33.5% lower in the January-May period than in the first five months of 1981. The production of television sets fell by 34,2%, cotton fabric by 16,3% and footwear production by 15,8%.[66] In sum, the state of war had failed to make any profound positive impact the economy. Though production targets were achieved, those related to improved effectiveness were not. The 3 year plan was a quantitative success but a qualitative disappointment. The excess of actual over planned investment highlighted this, with an increase in investment in

1983 of 9.4% (the target for 1985 had been fixed at 5%), of 11.4% in 1984 and 6.4% in 1985 despite the call in the annual plan for a zero investment growth.[67]

Nonetheless, and however bad the state of the Polish economy still was in 1982, the rate of economic decline was somewhat reduced and a hard currency trade surplus even achieved:

Polish Foreign Trade in Millions of $ US.[68]

	1981	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*	*1986*
Imports	5668	4309	4451	4008	5077	5437
Exports	5772	5742	5890	6339	6137	6510
Balance	-96	+1433	+1439	+1531	+1060	+1073

It should be noted that from a deficit $ 750 m. in 1981, the PRL's trade with the West in 1982 went into a surplus of around $ 358 m., the first time this had happened since 1971. Obviously, the austerity measures imposed by the authorities were having some positive effects on the level of imports. Of course, this improvement was inevitable in the he sense that it was doubtful in any case whether there was any money available anyway to purchase goods on western foreign markets. The outstanding problem facing the PRL remained its huge and growing external debt. By 1982, the Polish gross hard currency debt (ie. including arrears) stood at some $ 25 billion.

PRL's Gross and Net Hard Currency Debt 1977-1986 (in $bn).[69]

	Gross (a)	*Net*	
1977	14.0	13.5	a) including
1978	17.8	17.0	arrears
1979	22.7	21.5	
1980	25.1	24.4	
1981	25.5	24.7	
1982	25.2	24.2	
1983	26.4	25.3	
1984	26.8	25.2	
1985	29.3	27.6	
1986	31.2	29.6	
(1987	33.5	31.5)	(beg. of year)

Since then it has continued to rise steadily, reaching in 1987, the enormous sum of some $bn 33 and making the PRL the most indebted country in the Socialist bloc. The imposition of a state of war in December 1981, had ended all discussions between the Western creditors and the PRL. However, in view of the interests involved, governments-banks union on the question soon broke down, with Western banks speedily engaging in negotiations for the re-scheduling of the Polish debt. They had simply concluded that if they wanted the PRL to service its debt, then all concerned would have, soon or later, to discuss the modalities for doing so. By April 1982, Western banks were already actively seeking ways of settling with the Polish government the 1981 maturities. Only 5% of the $ 2,3 bn principal due had to be paid, with the remaining 95 % being deferred after 1986. Since 1982, the Banks signed 6 major agreements with the PRL. In 1983, they agreed to defer further $ 1,1 bn. of the principal to 1988-92. In 1984, the principal of money due over 1984-1987 ($ 1,5 bn.) was postponed until 1988-1993. In 1986, an agreement was reached whereby 95% of $1,6 bn. due to be repaid in 1986-1987 was re-scheduled to 1990-1991.[70] Finally, on December 10, 1987, the PRL signed an agreement with the Club de Paris, deferring the payment of $ 8,8 m. due in 1986-1988 for a period of ten years, with a five year grace period.

Overall, the Polish debt problem required actions by the authorities in two main areas. First it would be necessary to have intensive economic policy efforts domestically in order to gradually speed up the country's economic growth, especially in export production, as well as the attainment of better effects in the first field of efficiency and profitability, quality and usability of products. Unless there was an increase in economic efficiency, there

seemed that little could be done to direct resources towards exports or to cut back on exports, short of course, of imposing intolerable hardships on the Polish society. Secondly, Warsaw was inevitably compelled to continue talks and negotiations with creditors, not only for the rescheduling of payments, but also to increase the participation of creditors in solving problems of the PRL's further economic development. This last objective became a major part of the PRL's foreign economic policy towards the West, and the most difficult in which to achieve any concrete results.

The recovery which seemed to have been achieved in 1983-84 was due to five overall factors. In the first place the preceding deep slump had furnished an opportunity for renewed growth as a strong fall in outputs 'suspended' some of the previous barriers for growth such as energy shortage and transportation under-capacity. Secondly, the working week was increased by some 20 % in comparison with 1981. Thirdly, the excellent weather conditions had permitted a remarkable increase in crop yield after many years of stagnation and thus assigned more funds for the purchase of production materials needed by the industry. Fourthly, the cuts in imports of capital goods enabled some additional purchase of raw materials and components. Lastly, the creditor countries' own conduct helped the Polish government to delay the repayment of the Polish debt.[7]

he first stage (*pierwszy etap*) of the economic reform was quantitatively successful, but production targets relating to improved effectiveness were disappointing. As the following table shows, the poor quality of economic control in 1983-1985 was illustrated by the excess of actual over planned investment.

The 3 year plan: Intentions and results.[72]

		% growth planned	*% growth*
National income			
	produced	10.1-11.7	15
	distributed	8.5-10.1	14
Consumption		9-10	13
Investment		5	27
Industrial production		14-16	16
	fuel & energy	8.9	9.1
	metallurgy	16.2	10.7
	engineering	22	23.4
	chemicals	20.4	17.5
	minerals	10.2	8.9
	wood & paper	20.5	19.5
	food industry	11.2	14.2

In 1987, with the slow progress made since 1982, the Messner government decided to launch the second stage (*drugi etap*) of the economic reform.[73] According to the project, this stage would consist in a) restoring equilibrium on the consumer market, procurement and capital markets; b) making the economic parameters more realistic; c) increasing the autonomy of enterprises and development of 'socialist enterprises'; d) strengthening of worker's self-management and local self-governments; e) free-flow of material and financial means between enterprises; f) consistent observance of the principle of self-financing, and g) further restructuring of the system of managing the economy, including institutional restructuring of the centre. Despite the clamours in which it was announced, the second stage of the economic reform did little to remove the traditional problems plaguing the Polish economy. Waste of labour, little innovation and the new low level of production continued to constrain the country's economic development. As labour supply increasingly fell, working time cuts and losses contributed further to the perennial lack of rationalization of labour policy in the industrial sector, causing among other things, high fluctuation in levels of work. Additional constraints such as the high and constantly rising foreign debt, the growing technological gap

between the PRL and developed countries, the rationing of goods and the thriving black market economy, severe ecological problems, all made efforts by the Polish authorities to put the Polish economy back on its feet, a daunting task. Without decreases in state subsidies and a substantial revision of the pricing system, hopes for an improvement in economic performance remained bleak. In the words of the well-known Polish economist, Waldemar Kuczyński,

> It is commonly admitted that the reform, after a powerful drive in 1982, is dying out. The modifications have brought about a degeneration and created a mixed system where the defects of centralism and those of market economy are co-existing - a kind of bastard state of affairs. If there is no new drive to create a real market, this attempt at reform will only be of interest to historians.[74]

7.4 *Foreign Affairs.*

On June 20, 1985, the Polish Foreign Minister arrived in Rome on an official visit. The contents of his speech at the Italian Foreign Ministry indicated that the PRL was still pursuing a policy of *rapprochement* with the West despite the setbacks suffered recently in the wake of the Gdańsk trial and the overall definitely cool response from the West to Polish efforts to resume normal relations. In his speech, Olszowski stressed the Polish government's vested interest in "assigning high priority to its relations with Italy". He went on to add that,

> Whatever differences may exist in political systems or in current international obligations, we want Poland and Italy to co-operate as closely as possible in the international arena for matters of supreme importance for all mankind. ... We want an intensification of bi-lateral trade and industrial co-operation as well as co-operation in science and technology. We think there are still considerable, yet unused, possibilities in this area.[75]

He emphasized the main line of current PRL'S foreign policy orientation namely, to develop relations with all countries regardless of their political system. This of course was not something new, but

it had now become a pressing need. During his stay in Rome, Olszowski also held talks with the Pope, ostensibly showing the régime's desire to make some progress in the normalization of relations between the Vatican and Warsaw.

In an interview, the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan Kinast, discussed the nature of the PRL's foreign policy and its slow recovery of its position within the international arena. Coming at a time when some progress in this field was being made, it was an interesting official point of view of the nature and development of the PRL's foreign policy in the mid-1980s. It is also significant in that he opened the interview by underlining the close link between the PRL's socio-political developments and external factors:

> The conditions in which Poland's socio-economic problems are resolved are not only shaped by internal factors, although their role is of course predominant. But such matters as the political and economic situation in Europe and worldwide, the state of East-West relations and Poland's contacts with other countries also carry significance.[76]

The internal-external link was further emphasized when Kinast defined one of the PRL's foreign policy tasks as "creating the best possible external conditions for overcoming difficulties, for attaining greater internal stability and for accelerating socio-economic development".

As far as foreign policy was concerned, General Jaruzelski's visit to the UN headquarters in New York (September 26) was the highlight of Polish diplomatic activity in 1985. This was his first visit to a Western country since in power. Coming less than a month before the Sejm elections, it bore all the signs of a new diplomatic effort towards normalizing the PRL's relations with the Western World. During the visit, the General had the opportunity of meeting several foreign ministers and to discuss with them the current Polish domestic

situation and its implications for accentuating the resumption of normal economic and political relations between the PRL and Western countries. He met with the UN General secretary, De Cuellar as well as with the Italian, West German and Austrian Foreign Ministers. Speaking in front of the General assembly, Jaruzelski urged the organization to prepare a special report on the anticipated effects of militarizing outer space, following in this the Soviet line. He also advanced two suggestions, one for creating a World Debt and Development Centre at a founding meeting in Cracow, and another for adopting the rule of the free flow of technology for the purpose of environmental protection. He praised the Polish government's success in stabilizing the Polish internal situation and called for 'realism' in the conduct of relations with the PRL:

> We have indeed gone through a difficult test, but political realism. a sense of responsibility for Poland's future, and a conviction that Poland's stability constitutes an important element for peace in Europe, prevailed in the end. ... the worst is behind us now.[77]

While the main gist of his speech and later interviews to the US press denoted that he was most interested in conveying the impression that it was now high time that the US should alter its position on socialist Poland and that normal diplomatic relations be at last resumed, he also demonstrated a concern for a rapid improvement in economic relations. He expressed deep concern for "the deepening development gaps, a new upsurge of protectionism and discrimination, the political character of present international economic relations". In an interview to *Time*, the Polish leader said that the PRL was prepared for a full normalization of US-PRL relations but that this goodwill had to be paralleled by American return to political realism and the halt of practices which are hurting the Polish nation. On the subject of Solidarity, the General unequivocally declared that "this

chapter had been closed"[78], a strong indication that he was satisfied with the effects of 'internal normalization' and that therefore progress could and should be made in normalizing relations between the West (the US in particular) and the PRL. At the time of his visit, an IMF team was in the PRL, attending one of a series of meetings winding up the preparatory stage of reviewing the PRL's bid for re-admission to the Fund. The presence of the Polish leader at the UN seemed to have started anew the PRL's attempts to finally settle the thorny question of 'external normalization'. At the time, Polish anti-american propaganda once again opened fire on the Reagan administration mentioning not only the continuation of Polish attacks on the US but also a growing impatience at the slow pace at which Washington was reacting to the internal changes in the PRL. Out of the three conditions set by the US administration for the lifting of sanctions, the lifting of martial law and the release of all political prisoners, the resumption of a dialogue between the régime and Solidarity, and between the régime and the Church, only the first half of the first condition had been really met. On the other points, it was difficult to imagine that the US would be entirely satisfied. Further, one had to admit that while the lifting of martial law and the release of some political prisoners could be satisfied by discreet or public specific acts by the Polish régime, the resumption of a dialogue between the various Polish *dramatis personae* required a process and therefore time - a single act could not bring about long-lasting changes. On this point it was clear that Washington and Warsaw had very different views on the meaning of 'normalization'. The slowness of this process, admitting that it was taking place at all, was thus hampering PRL-US relations. At the same time, the Reagan administration was also concerned in finding a way of lifting the

remaining sanctions without loosing face. Indeed, one of its main problems now was not whether or not to lift the sanctions, but when. In the spate of anti-american commentaries at the time, one article in particular should be mentioned here. Written by the government's spokesman, it summarized the main tenets of American policy towards the PRL over the last decade. Jan Rem argued that in the 1970s, US policy "was designed to bring about a situation in which the incumbent Polish government would become dependent on different ties with the West, especially on economic ones, and this would gradually curb its elbowroom. The Polish leaders at the time failed to foresee the adverse economic and political effects which might lead to Poland's excessive dependence on the West". In the 1980s, still according to Urban, the US administration shifted its attention to "those forces inside Poland who took up the struggle to bring about the fall of the socialist system in Poland".[79] While stressing that the PRL could do little to improve relations with the US as long as the latter did not wish it, he made the point that there were ways of preparing for the future 'normalization' of relations between the two countries:

> The progress in *internal political and economic stabilization in Poland* will help a future normalization of relations with the US and a development of relations with American allies, and vice-versa, all internal troubles and conflicts would be interpreted by ruling circles in America as an argument for continuing the policy of making life difficult for Polish society.[80]

The government's spokesman was well aware that internal stability had a crucial role to play in affecting the nature of the PRL's relations with Western countries. This concern had been amply illustrated in the manner and form of many governmental decisions since the lifting of the state of war. This is also why, for instance, the Polish authorities had been so eager to show successful parliamentary elections, hoping by this token to obtain some credit for their

efforts of normalizing the domestic life of the country. They were part and parcel of the régime's attempts to regain an international credibility which had been so seriously damaged since December 1981.

After the results of the parliamentary elections on October 13, 1985, a series of contacts with Western states was initiated. The tempo with which they were carried out seemed to demonstrate Warsaw's urgent desire to make some headway in this area. Whether the West's willingness to resume some sort of dialogue could be explained by a positive assessment of the elections, or simply because of a psychological lassitude with the doubtful utility of continuing a policy of restrictions, remains an open question. Most probably, the perceived necessity to deal with some pressing economic problems, in particular the Polish foreign debt question, gave the impetus for a quantitative rise in contacts between the West and the PRL. In the political field however, diplomatic apathy remained. On November 7, ended in London the 12th session of the Polish-British Joint Commission for Economic, Industrial and Technological Co-operation. The Polish side expressed its readiness for a further growth of turnover but pointed out to the need to facilitate the access of some Polish goods to the British market and for the full normalization of financial and credit relations.[81] A week later representatives of the two countries met again and held political consultations. On November 17, the first meeting of the kind in four years between Japan and the PRL took place. It discussed the further development of trade and industrial co-operation between the two countries. November 22 saw the signing of a long-term programme between Austria and the PRL, aiming at expanding economic, industrial, scientific and technological co-operation. Five days later, Dutch and Polish Foreign Ministries'

representatives held political consultations in The Hague. Despite the constant calls for a re-orientation of the Polish economy towards COMECON countries, it was obvious that Warsaw was looking wherever it could outside the socialist bloc for the possibility of expanding its economic contacts. On August 29, a Polish bankers' delegation headed by the Finance Minister, Stanisław Nieckarz, was in the PRC for a 6-day visit. Already in June, the resumption of parliamentary contacts between the two countries had taken place with the visit of a delegation from the Chinese National People's Congress. On October 5, the Morroccan Minister of Mining and Energy was in Warsaw where he met Jaruzelski. They discussed problems of economic co-operation. By Autumn 1985, some progress seemed to take place as far the PRL's external debt to Western countries was concerned. On October 24, 1985, Bonn agreed to a programme for the rescheduling of the PRL's debt, an agreement formally signed on December 13, and delaying the repayment until 1991-1995. On November 19, the Paris Club representing 17 Western countries, agreed to reschedule the Polish debt over a period of ten years.

The most surprising development as far as the PRL's foreign policy at the time was concerned, was the unexpected visit by General Jaruzelski to France on December 4, 1985, the first meeting between French and Polish heads of state since May 1980, when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had met Brezhnev in Warsaw. This was an unofficial visit, a short stay (*une escale technique*) between visiting Libya and Tunisia. It is probable that the Polish authorities had hoped to use the current favourable climate following the recent American-Soviet summit in Geneva in order to speed up the return of the PRL to the rank it wanted for itself in the international arena. It is worth noting that

just as Gorbachev had chosen Paris as his first official visit to a Western capital, Jaruzelski chose President Mitterand as his first Western interlocutor. It is still unclear why President Mitterand thought it might be of some use to French-Polish relations and this uncertainty was clearly reflected by the amount of critical appraisal by the French media and political world. In the event, the Polish side was evidently pleased that it had taken place at all for it provided another opportunity to make some progress in the 'external normalization' of the PRL.[82] The visit touched "bilateral relations in the context of the situation in Europe and the world"[83] and appeared to have produced an informal agreement to develop and tighten the relations between the two countries, thus founding the basis for the resumption of a French-Polish dialogue.[84] It was obvious that a meeting between the two leaders was by itself an event that could be seen as conducive to an improvement of relations between the two countries. But it remained unclear whether it actually served this aim. Certainly for Jaruzelski, it was an important first step in the process of improving his country's external relations with the West. Regardless of the concrete results of the talks, it offered the Polish leader a psychological platform of credibility from which to assail both the domestic and international communities and show all that 'normalization' was not an empty word. For Mitterand, the purpose of the meeting was somewhat vaguer. When he made his first visit to Eastern Central Europe, on December 8, 1988 he chose Czechoslovakia and not the PRL, thereby indicating that his relationship with the General was not as close as one could have surmised. As far as Warsaw was concerned, the international impact of the meeting was certainly beneficial. On December 7, 1985, The West German ex-Chancellor, Willy Brandt, payed his first visit to the PRL since the

signing of the Polish-West German Treaty of 1970. During his stay, he gave his approval for the return of the PRL on the international arena. His "Europe needs Poland" and "Peace in Europe needs a stable Poland" must have delighted his Polish hosts. He also expressed hostility for the remaining sanctions against the PRL by saying that "experience has shown that discriminatory method and economic isolation are practically never reasonable and on the whole are contrary to the hopes they are linked with".[85]

The Politburo report at the 23rd KC Plenum assessed positively the changing relations between the PRL and the West. Yet it was careful not be too overjoyed at the slow resumption of contacts with former diplomatic and economic partners:

> We appreciate the realistic approach of those Western states which have embarked on the path of normalization of relations with Poland. To those countries which have not yet abandoned the line of restrictions, we repeat: there can be no normalization on the basis of intervention in Poland's internal affairs.[86]

With the announcement during the plenum that the PZPR Congress would be held in June 1986, the authorities' resolve to fully normalize the internal life of the country gathered new strength. Having weathered the storm. it was now high time to formalize the *odnowa*. Capitalizing on the dissensions within the 'capitalist camp' concerning the usefulness of continued sanctions and aware that the climate in East-West relations was conducive to improving contacts with the West, Warsaw continued to use every opportunity to pursue the 'external normalization' of the PRL. Shortly after the Jaruzelski-Mitterand meeting, the first meeting of the French-Polish Commission on Economic Co-operation took place in Warsaw on 8 January, 1986. The visiting French Deputy Foreign Minister, Jean Baylet, offered new credits worth some FF 170 million. Although the meeting had been arranged prior to

the two countries' leaders' meeting and therefore may supposedly have had no connection with it, it is revealing that Baylet's visit was particularly discreet. There were officially practically no announcements that it had taken place, no reported meeting between the Deputy Minister and members of the opposition, and he made no statement concerning the situation in the PRL. What is surprising is that the Polish authorities seemed unwilling to use this visit for their own political purposes. This may have been the result of French insistence that this should be so. This did not mean that Warsaw was tempering its attempts to publicize its public relations campaign. On January 16, the Congress of Intellectuals For a Peaceful Future of the World opened in Warsaw. However, it was regarded as little more than a new attempt by the Polish authorities to secure a measure of international recognition and acceptance of their policy of international normalization and more than 400 invited personalities refused to take part. Diplomatically then, little progress had been achieved since 1982.

In the foreign economic sphere, it was still too early as well to speak of a radical improvement, though something was obviously changing. The Vienna talks between the PRL and a working group of Western commercial banks on January 28, showed that the problem of servicing the Polish debt was encountering notable difficulties. The banks voiced on this occasion complaints that while there was some apparent repayment of the capital debt, interests arrears were still not being repaid in full. Yet hunger for Western credits ensured that the PRL would remain as active as it could on the international arena. On March 10, 1986, a Polish delegation headed by Deputy Premier Zbigniew Szalajda, was in Bonn to discuss the development of co-

operation between the two countries. Here again it was announced that West Germany had granted the PRL export loan guarantees of up to DM 100 million ($ 45 mn), the first agreement of its kind since 1981. A month earlier, on February 11, the signs that a thaw was in the making between the PRL and the US surfaced with the meeting in Warsaw of Polish Foreign Trade Minister Andrzej Wójcik, and the American Chargé d'affaires to discuss the state of trade between the two countries. But nothing concrete came out these talks. In his speech to the Sejm, summing up the PRL's foreign activities in 1985, Foreign Minister Orzechowski unequivocally stated that " [the PRL's] political and economic relations with many capitalist countries [were] still precarious". He emphasized that the principal aim of the PRL's foreign policy was to "break out of isolation, to neutralize the repeated efforts to re-impose it and to obtain the lifting of restrictions". Blaming, as his predecessor had done, the West for the internal difficulties faced by his country, he added that "the overcoming of the difficulties will largely depend on the restoration of normal practices of financial co-operation and credits with the main creditor states in the West".[97] While obviously, economic matters continued to be at the top of the Polish foreign affairs agenda politically, foreign policy acquired a new meaning for the Polish authorities with respect to internal affairs: "foreign policy is both an impulse to and a broad platform for national conciliation", the Minister said. This statement emphasized the clear connection the régime was making between the two sides of its normalization policies. Praising the country's successful (sic) bid to "crumble the barrier erected to separate it from part of Europe and the World", 1985, according to Orzechowski, had confirmed another truth:

> It confirmed the importance of the alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union, Poland's dependence on the strength

> and cohesion of the socialist community of states and *the direct interrelationship between the country's domestic situation, its economic strength and the progress of national conciliation on the one hand, and its international position and role on the other.*[88] (My italics)

But if political closeness was viewed positively by the Polish leadership, geographical proximity to the Soviet Union on the other hand could have its drawbacks. Late April 1986, the worst nuclear power station accident ever recorded took place in Chernobyl, near Kiev. Apart from the ecological consequences it had for the PRL, it also contributed to lowering once again the level of economic interaction between the PRL and the West. On May 1, 1986, Sweden, Norway and West Germany imposed restrictions on the import of food from East Central Europe. Austria followed on the 4th and on the 10th, 11 out the 12 members of the European community imposed a ban on the imports of fresh food from Eastern Central Europe. Disputing the obvious health reasons behind this decision, the Polish government attacked it and claimed it to be of a continuation of Western's interference in Polish domestic affairs:

> What purpose is this decision meant to serve? The purpose is beyond doubt of a political nature. It is not just since yesterday that the policy of pretexts has been pursued towards Poland, and this is not the first case of putting stumbling blocs before the socialist countries and the economic co-operation between the East and the West.[89]

For obvious domestic reasons, the Polish authorities, unprepared as they were to face the eventuality of a nuclear disaster, were anxious to dispel mounting fears that the whole country had been contaminated by the nuclear cloud. Chernobyl not only showed the PRL's total lack of safety measures in the case of a nuclear accident, but it also cast a dark shadow on the government's own schemes to develop the country's reliance upon nuclear energy. By minimizing the extent of the fall-out over the PRL, Warsaw was undoubtedly hoping to avoid even greater

opposition to the Żarnowiec nuclear station project. Also from an economic point of view, any reduction in the amount of trade with the West was detrimental to the national trade balance especially when it touched the export of Polish food, one of the few positive development in the PRL's foreign trade. As GUS reported, the PRL had earned $642 million from food exports in 1981, $711 mn. in 1983, $829 mn. in 1984 and $938 mn. in 1985.[90] Despite the slow progress in the PRL's 'external normalization", a minor success was scored when, after some years of intensive negotiations, socialist Poland was formally re-admitted to the IMF on June 12, 1986. It was only a minor success because mere re-admission to the IMF was insufficient to solve the outstanding economic problems faced by the country. Rather, it had greater political significance in that it contributed in consolidating the PRL's place in the international arena by reinforcing its leaders' credibility. It also showed that despite the country's 'Eastern re-orientation', the need for Western credits and loans was still vital for the national economy. The economic benefits from re-admission to the IMF were dubious, at least in the short-term. A country which has pulled out, but wants to rejoin, must follow the same procedure as a country which has never belonged to the IMF. This rule had important consequences for the PRL. The size of a country's IMF quota (the so-called Special Drawing Rights) is significant because it predetermines the maximum amount of financial assistance the IMF may arrange for member country. The fact that the PRL was granted a quota ($ 680 million SDR), which was much smaller than the one it could have had if it had been an IMF member continuously, was in itself a serious setback. The PRL's IMF membership, though by itself an encouraging sign, was insufficient to solve all the current Polish economic

problems.[91]

The arrival of Gorbachev certainly had a significant impact on the PRL, and especially upon its leaders. The lengthy *exposés* of the CPSU First secretary, declaring that Socialism had reached a crisis, inevitably affected all the East European ruling establishments. In the PRL, it primarily contributed to the restraint showed by Jaruzelski and his return to the rhetorics of reforms. It also paved the way for the gradual improvement in the PRL's relations with the Western capitalist countries. In the light of what was happening in the Soviet Union, Polish policy-making was forced to turn away from policies of open repression - contrary to the Gorbachev line - and engage into some sort of dialogue with the society at large, the so-called 'national conciliation' line. Thus, Jaruzelski was left with only two options: be remembered as the man who introduced a state of war or as the man who gave the impulse to a new compromise between the state and the nation. Since the first option was something that he repeatedly seemed to want to forget, the second option inevitably drew him to seek a *rapprochement* with Solidarity, a force in the PRL without which little could realistically be done. This alone was bound to create some opposition within the PZPR for Jaruzelski's policies. The task, therefore was a difficult one for the General. In the end, he had to allow the resumption of a dialogue between the interests he represented and those which constantly threatened his perceived vision of stability of the social set-up in the PRL. His dilemma was crystal clear: how to develop the Polish brand of *perestroïka* and invite more liberalism in the political life of the country, without losing the reins of power.

Chapter 7 Notes.

1. From Jaruzelski's speech on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution. The next line reads, "The common aims and searches in the reform taking place in Poland and the Soviet Union have contributed to the fact that relations between our parties, states and nations have been evolving onto a new and especially high level". *Rzeczpospolita* 3/11/1987.
2. Vladimir Kusin, 'Gorbachev and Eastern Europe', *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1986, pp. 39-53.
3. *Polityka*, No. 35, 29 August 1987, p. 4.
4. *AFP* 23/4/1985.
5. *Rzeczpospolita*, 27/4/1985.
6. *Trybuna Ludu*, 15/5/1985.
7. *Trybuna Ludu*, 18/6/1985.
8. *Rzeczpospolita*, 28/6/1985.
9. *Trybuna Ludu*, 28/6/1985.
10. *AFP*, Dominique Garaud, 28/6/1985.
11. Urban's Press Conference, *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/6/1985.
12. *Pravda* 12/9/1985; 13/9/1985; 16/9/1985; *Izvestia* 13/9/1985.
13. *Rzeczpospolita* 28-29/9/1985.
14. *Nowe Drogi*, December 1985, 12 (439), pp. 18-27.
15. Olszowski had been removed from his function after the 22nd KC Plenum on November 11, 1985.
16. *Życie Warszawy*, 7-8/12/1985.
17. *Rzeczpospolita*, 18/3/1986.
18. In 1981 Imports from the PRC represented 0,6% of total Polish imports while exports a mere 0,4%. By 1987, Imports had risen to 3,2% and exports to 3,4%, making the PRC, the PRL's second largest trade partner with non-capitalist countries after the Soviet Union. *Rocznik Statystyczny 1988*, pp. 357-358.
19. Supplement to *Soviet News*, as translated from *TASS*, July 28, 1986.
20. *Financial Times*, 28/2/1987.
21. *Rzeczpospolita*, 5/6/1987.
22. *UPNB*, 21/85, 24/10/1985.
23. *Polityka*, 'Great openess', March 7, 1987.
24. Ibid.
25. *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1986, p. 127.
26. *Rzeczpospolita*, 22/4/1987.
27. *Białe plamy?*, Materiały ze spotkania w dniu 28 XI 1987 r., Konwersatorium Historii Kultury Kościół Świętej Trójcy w Warszawie, Warszawa 1988.
28. *Spotkanie Michała Gorbaczowa z Przedstawicielami Polskiej Inteligencji*, KiW, Warszawa, 1988, p. 89; "...Many people in Poland are convinced that Stalin and Beria were responsible for the [Katyn] massacre".
29. *Odrodzenie*, Nr. 7, (273), 18 February 1989, pp. 7-10.
30. *Polityka*, No. 30, 25 July 1987.
31. Ibid.
32. *Rzeczpospolita*, 22/4/1987.
33. *Życie Warszawy*, 9-10/5/1987.
34. *Rzeczpospolita*, 30-31/5/1987.
35. AFP Dominique Garraud, 1/5/1985.
36. *Rzeczpospolita*, 3/5/1985.
37. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, June 16, article by Tadeusz Szyma.
38. *Rzeczpospolita*, 11-12/5/1985.
39. *Dziennik Ustaw* No. 23, Item 100, 10/5/1985.
40. *XIX Plenum KC PZPR*, KiW, Warszawa, 1985, p. 81.

41. Ibid, p. 86.
42. *Trybuna Ludu*, 7/6/1985.
43. *Przemówienia 1985*, KiW, 1986, pp. 192.
44. Ibid, p. 198.
45. *AFP*, 18/7/1985.
46. *Trybuna Ludu*, Jan Rem, 'The Brave Ones', 19/7/1985.
47. *XXI Plenum KC PZPR*, KiW, Warszawa 1985, p. 45.
48. 'What is normal?', *Polityka*, No 48, 26/9/1985.
49. Werhner Hahn, 'Electoral choice in the Soviet bloc', *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1987, pp. 29-39.
50. *Trybuna Ludu*, 6/9/1985.
51. *Życie Partii*, 9/9/1985.
52. *Associated Press*, 22/9/1985.
53. *Życie Warszawy*, 10/9/1985.
54. *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 28/9/1985.
55. For a complete record of the elections results see *Życie Warszawy*, 16/10/1985.
56. *XXII Plenum KC PZPR*, KiW, Warszawa, 1986, pp. 8-22.
57. *Przemówienia*, 1985, p. 374.
58. Ibid, p. 389.
59. For a detailed panorama of the new Sejm's composition and data on each deputy, see *Sejm Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej, IX Kadencja*, PPW 'Rzeczpospolita', Warszawa, 1986
60. In the case of Olszowski, his own personal conduct may have been used against him. It was reported that after having left his wife for a Polish international civil servant he was now living in New York, *The Independent*, 21/5/1988.
61. *Rzeczpospolita*, 24/10/1985.
62. *Kierunki Reformy Gospodarczj-Projekt*, Warzsawa, July 1981.
63. Zbigniew M. Fallenbuch, 'The Polish economy under martial law', *Soviet Studies*, vol. XXXVI, no. 4, October 1984, p. 514.
64. *The Polish Reformed Economic System 1982/1983*, Gomułka and Rostowski, *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXVI No. 3, July 1984.
65. For a complete list see, 'La Pologne prisonnière de la dépendance Est-Ouest', in *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, No 260, March 1982.
66. *Zycie Gospodarcze*, No 4, 1983, pp. 1 &. 6. and no. 12, 1983 pp. 8-9.
67. *Poland to the 1990s...*, G. Blazyka, (*op. cit.* Ch. 3 note 63), pp. 40-41.
68. *Rocznyk Statystyczny 1988*, p. 356.
69. *Poland to the 1990s...*, *op cit.*, p. 76.
70. Ibid.
71. Ryszard Bugaj, 'Why is the crisis continuing', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Nr, 1, January 5, 1986.
72. *Zycie Gospodarcze*, No. 12, 1983; *Zycie Gospodarcze*, No 6 9 February 1983.
73. 'Program Realizacyjny Drugiego etapu Reformy Gospodarczej', *Rzeczpospolita* supplement, October 1987.
74. Waldemar Kuczyński, 'un regard critique sur l'économie polonaise depuis le 13 décember 1981', *Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, No. 308, Juillet 1986, p. 19.
75. *Rzeczpospolita*, 21/6/1985.
76. *Express Wieczorny*, 21-23/6/1985.
77. *Przemówienia 1985*, pp. 337-348.
78. *Time*, 28 October 1985, p. 24.
79. *Życie Warszawy*, 30/11-1/12/1985.
80. Ibid.
81. *Rzeczpospolita*, 8/11/1985.

82. *Trybuna Ludu*, 5/12/1985.
83. *Rzeczpospolita*, 5/12/1985.
84. Jaruzelski's own assessment in an interview to André Fontaine in *Le Monde*, 6/3/1986.
85. *Die Welt*, 10/12/1985.
86. *XXIII Plenum KC*, Kiw, Warszawa, 1986, p. 13.
87. *Rzeczpospolita*, 30/1/1986.
88. Ibid.
89. *Rzeczpospolita*, 10-11/5/1986.
90. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/5/1986.
91. In an excellent article, Jędrzej Krakowski discussed the opportunities arising from IMF membership and stressed the need for a complete restructuring of Polish imports-exports; *Tygodnik Powszechny*, no. 22, June 1, 1986.

Pracujmy produktywnie,
produkujmy reprodukcyjnie,
konsumujmy produkcyjnie,
a tym, czym byliśmy,
jeszcze będziemy.
Masymilian Jackowski 1870
(Should we work productively, produce reproductively, consume productively, what we were, we would become again.)

CHAPTER 8

SOCIALIST RENEWAL

To some extent, changes in communist countries resemble soccer. The manager, the coach, or the team may be removed or replaced by new faces, new principles of organization and strategic play may be tried out, but in the end, the game remains the same. Players come and go but the rules and aims stay unchanged. To use this analogy for the PRL, the board of directors, after a disastrous season, decided to change the organization of the club and change the team's coach. Very quickly, the Polish team somewhat improved its game and avoided being relegated to the bottom of the League table. Soon, it even began winning some matches, but on the whole its playing performance remained unsatisfactory. After another change of the club manager, a new style of play and 'revolutionary tactics' were introduced. Under the latter's enthusiasm, the 'polska team', through a series of close victories, regained its place in division one. Yet, World Cup qualification was still a long way ahead and a lot of effort still needed to be done to ensure Polish representation.

After the 'socialist normalization', 'socialist renewal' made its entry on the Polish stage. In line with changes in the Soviet Union, the PRL approached the end of the century with unprecedented internal

developments. Yet their long-term effects are still in the balance and though one can now (1989) aptly speak of a new era in socialist Poland, many incertitudes linger on. Breaking out of its international isolation has not meant that the PRL has found it easier to deal with its debt problem. Similarly, the new character of Polish political life comprises many superficial changes which denote little changes in the authorities' attitude towards society. The traditional socio-political set-up remains unaltered. The setting up of new state institutions (senate and president) and a 35% representation in the Sejm of a legalized opposition, do not yet represent the makings of a truly parliamentary democracy. Over the past seven years, after a period of internal pacification, the PRL has ceased to be the pariah of the international community. At the same time, the new *status quo* reached as 'normalization' ended, determined the shape of the new important internal changes taking place in the PRL. In 1985, Lech Wałęsa had accurately foreseen that "the legal period of Solidarity's existence, was a minor episode to be continued. Everything lies ahead of us. The great battle is still to come. It will be less spectacular, without fireworks, but a lot more interesting than what we have been trough".[1]

8.1 *The Same but Different...*

The first Party Congress since the 1980-81 crisis took place in Warsaw on June 29-July 9, 1986. Its main emphasis was on the prospects of 'socialist renewal' or the strategy for the socio-economic "path into the 21st century".[2] It was a very different Congress from the 9th Extraordinary Congress of 1981. At the beginning of 1980 the party had had over 3 million members and candidate-members; by 1986, more than 1 million had been expelled or had resigned. Between the congresses, the

Party had admitted some 160 000 new members and at the time of the 10th Congress the ranks of the PZPR totalled 2,125,762 members.[3] In the event, the congress produced little of any real interest for the nation. Its main resolution, "On Increasing Management Efficiency and Improving the Standard of living, on Enhancing Socialist Democracy, on Consolidating Poland's International Position"[4] was a bland statement trying to create the impression that the Party was particularly concerned with improving the nation's standards of living, especially the desperate housing shortage. The four main goals formulated at the Congress called for the achievement of a gradual improvement of living conditions of the working people and their families, for a strengthening and consolidation of the abilities of the national economy for an effective and balanced development, for the further development of socialist democracy as the foundation for the strengthening of the state and the rallying of all patriotic forces in the country around the supreme interests of the Polish nation. Finally it called for a strengthening of the PRL's international position and authority, especially through the consolidation and expansion of all-round ties with the socialist community and the active participation in the international movement for the defence of peace in Europe and in the world. The Congress' declaration " On Security and Co-operation in Europe"[5] was a mere reiteration of Moscow's current 'Peace policies' and offered no new propositions of any value. In his opening speech, General Jaruzelski made several major points. In the first place he praised the Party for having weathered the storm, "surviving a formidable ordeal, overcoming its defensiveness, its ideological confusion and its organizational weakness".[6] He called for renewed efforts for the development of the PRL, to make up for lost time ("We must stride forward more boldly. Acceleration is a necessity at this

point of history"[7]) He repeated once again that the PRL's "interest is inextricably bound up with detente and with international dialogue",[8] that the PRL would not be dictated to and that its voice should be heard more loudly. He also called for a meeting of all socialist countries to chart their struggle for peace.[9] On the whole the Congress allowed General Jaruzelski to reinforce his own position within the PZPR (the promotion of 3 generals to the Politburo[10]) and strengthen the hold of the Party over the country. In fact, the Congress revealed only too clearly the inherent paradox of the 'normalization policies' of the Polish régime. Since 1982, there had existed an obvious contradiction between the political *raison d'être* of normalization, ie. the establishment of state hegemony over society - and the principle of economic reform, namely the decentralization and market exchange. As one commentator stressed, "an obvious tension exists between an economic recovery programme based on decentralization and a political programme of 'normalization' aimed at the consolidation of power and hegemony over society".[11]

Perhaps the real highlight of the whole Congress was Gorbachev's address, the only Soviet Bloc leader to attend the gathering.[12] Even his presence seemed shrouded in unexplainable discretion, with hardly any mention of his arrival in and departure from the PRL, in great contrast with his earlier visit to the GDR.[13] His presence was, however, enough to confirm that in the eyes of the Kremlin, Jaruzelski had been and still was the 'man of the situation'. Despite earlier misgivings on the General's ability to quell the Polish turmoil, the praise with which Gorbachev described the 'normalizing work' achieved by his Polish counterpart was enough to underline Soviet satisfaction and confidence in the Polish leadership. In his address, the Soviet

leader appraised the Polish Communist Party in effusive terms, paying special tribute to General Jaruzelski's "energy, political perspicacity, foresight and skill in finding solutions to very complex problems, his unflinching defence of his nation's interests and of the cause of socialism".[14] He also added that "Soviet communists know that the cause of socialism in fraternal Poland is in reliable hands".[15] This was by far the greatest expression of support the Polish leader had had since the imposition of martial law by any Soviet official. It indicated that the Polish authorities' policies of 'normalization' were fully sanctioned by the Kremlin: "Your Congress shows again that the Polish United Workers' Party is the vanguard force capable of uniting Polish society and leading the country along the road of economic, social and cultural progress".[16] At the same time that he praised the Polish leadership, commending it on its ability to restore socialist normality through the imposition of martial law (and without Warsaw Pact forces intervention), Gorbachev also made it clear that the so-called Brezhnev 'limited sovereignty doctrine' was still in force, at least in theory:

> "I want to assure the Congress and all Polish people that we shall remain your friends in the future, in any weather. ... To threaten the socialist system, to try to undermine it from the outside and wrench a country away from the Socialist Community means to encroach not only on the will of the people, but also on on the entire post-war arrangement, and, in the last analysis, on peace.[17]

Gorbachev's speech also contained a Soviet assessment of the Polish crisis, acknowledging its lessons for the communist movement. It stressed that the Polish crisis "was not a protest of workers against socialism. It was, above all, a manifestation of disagreement with the distortions of socialism in practice, distortions which painfully affected the working class".[18] This disagreement, he went on to say, was used by "the adversaries of socialist Poland, inside and outside

the country":

> It is well known what was sought by those in the West who hypocritically describe themselves as friends of the Polish people. They are not in the least concerned about the destinies of the Polish nation. Their intention is to dismantle socialism, to liquidate socialist gains. Really, the worse it is in Poland, the better it is for them.[19]

With the closure of the 10th PZPR Congress (which could be aptly be described as Jaruzelski's own Congress), the 63 year old General was confirmed as the indisputable leader and his policy of 'renewal' given a new boost. In the months that followed a new impetus was given to the attempts to re-build the PZPR into an efficient and confident organization. The 2nd KC Plenum of July 24, 1986 presided over a major reshuffle in the Party leadership. In May 1987, the 4th PZPR KC Plenum On the Role of the Basic Party Organizations, called for renewed efforts to revitalize the basic party units (POPs) and harnessing the rank and file membership into more active involvement in the régime's economic and political normalization programme. It also installed a 20% cut in the Party apparatus and a transfer of 10% of full-time Party political activists from the voivodship committees to the POPs.[20] But this apparent re-organizational activity did little to increase the Party's standing with the Polish population. Its effects were primarily aimed at consolidating Jaruzelski's position and stem once for all the wave of demoralization which had so much characterized the Party's activities over the last few years. Confident in the internal stability of the country, the General decided once again to use the 'political amnesty card', both for internal and external purposes. In his opening speech to the Congress, the Polish First Secretary had implicitly raised the possibility of an amnesty for political prisoners. The July 17 1986 Sejm session announced a programme for the release of both political and criminal

prisoners in order to provide then "with a last chance of rejoining public life". It passed a bill intended on reprieving on humanitarian grounds persons convicted of offences against the state and public order if there were grounds for supposing that they would not repeat these offences for which they were originally arrested.[21] This partial and conditional amnesty seemed to have had the positive effect, in the foreign policy field, of triggering the first economic agreement between the Polish and American governments since 1982. On July 30, Washington and Warsaw agreed on the re-scheduling of government guaranteed debts owed to the US and initially due in 1982-84. The payment of some $m. 1700 would now be made over a period of 6 years beginning in 1990.[22] More spectacular still was the MSW's announcement of a surprise amnesty, this time unconditional, for all political prisoners on September 11, 1986, a measure directly affecting 225 persons including among others, Zbigniew Bujak, Władysław Frasyniuk, and Leszek Molczuski. In an interview the Interior Minister, General Kiszczak, explained that the decision was taken because of "the progressive stabilization of the internal situation in Poland and especially the diminishing social response to attempts to carry out clandestine activity as well as other initiatives directed against the state and public order".[23] This new amnesty was a surprise for everyone, especially for the 'opposition'. As Bronisław Geremek commented,

> The manner in which [the amnesty] was conducted shows that the authorities aimed at producing a kind of psychological shock. Presumably, apart from winning new credits from the West, the decision aimed at producing certain effects at home. As in the case of previous amnesties, one of the object was to weaken social resistance, to break the unity of the opposition movement and to convince "the silent majority" that normalization in the country has prevailed.[24]

Asked what he thought Western reactions to the amnesty would be like,

General Kiszczak answered that "the attitude of numerous Western countries towards our present decision would be a specific test of their political realism and of their good will, of their real disposition to develop political and economic relations with Poland based on equal terms".[25] This latest amnesty prompted Lech Wałęsa to write to President Reagan urging him "to take action that might help to improve the situation of the Polish people", expressing the hope "that if Polish society [was] given the chance to undertake positive actions in the field of the national economy, ..., Poland could count on foreign credits".[26] On October 15, the Solidarity leader and nine intellectuals from various social groups, issued a statement concerning the current situation in the PRL and called for an end to the remaining US sanctions. They underlined the fact that Western economic assistance was indispensable if the PRL was to overcome its economic problems.[27] There were already some signs that the American administration was considering a lifting of the remaining sanctions. After his return from a visit to the PRL, US Congressman, Stephen Solarz, voiced the opinion that the US should now drop its sanctions against the Polish state.[28] However this process was to last a while longer, the Reagan administration cautiously delaying its decision until it was satisfied that the latest amnesty was not followed by new arrests. This caution was naturally attacked by the Polish authorities. In his speech to the Zielona Góra PZPR Conference on Report-back and Election, Jaruzelski made the following remarks:

> Western propaganda presents our move as a result of external pressures. Is it that they have so few successes of their own that they want to take credit for what the Polish authorities do and for that which results from the maturity of our nation? All our sovereign decisions which stabilize the situation in the PRL, whether someone likes them or not, stem from an evaluation of the internal situation and are dictated by the realities of the country. ... Poland is not interested in special relations but in normal relations. And this normalization lies not only in our interest but equally

> in the interest of our Western creditors. A withdrawal of restrictions and a development of economic relations is, objectively, one of the conditions for repaying the debt.[29]

By the end of 1986, the Reagan administration seemed to have reconciled itself with the fact that a return to normal relations with the PRL was now needed. On the occasion of the Vienna CSCE Conference on November 5, 1986, the US and the PRL held their first meeting at governmental levels since December 1981, when Rozanne Ridgeway, the US Secretary of State for Europe and Canada, met the Polish Vice-Foreign Minister, Jan Kinast. Later the US Department of State announced that it was in the process of reviewing US policy towards the PRL in the light of the recent amnesty. The road for a resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries was thus being re-opened. Some ten days later, the Polish authorities announced that they had decided to delay by one year the PRL's planned withdrawal from the International Labour Organization. The decision to withdraw was to have taken place on November 17, two years after the PRL had voiced its disapproval of the ILO report on the violation of Trade Union rights in the country. The decision not to withdraw from the ILO was described as a "gesture of good will" from Warsaw in the hope that "this would be met in an appropriate manner" by the West.[30] Eventually, a year later, the PRL decided to remain member of ILO after "evidence that [the organization] had abandoned its previous policy of using the organization for anti-Polish campaigns and interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign state".[31] Yet Warsaw itself showed apparently little resolve to do everything it could to improve relations with the US. On December 9, Senator Edward Kennedy was refused permission to visit the PRL on a private basis, the authorities' decision being based on account of the "heavy

political programme" planned by the Senator. A couple of days earlier, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Simmons had left the PRL after a five day visit. Obviously, official meetings were preferred by the Polish authorities to private trips.

Speaking at the Revived Polish Trade Unions Congress on November 27, 1986, General Jaruzelski appeared in an optimistic mood.

> The attack on the socialist state continued on both the external and the internal front. They wanted to crush us by hunger and cold, by restrictions and boycott, they wanted to force us to our knees when pent-up emotions subsided, they reached for new methods. They spared no expense, no time on the air, no generous awards, no grotesque citations. We have survived. We have not bowed to pressure.[32]

'Normalization' was slowly but surely returning to the country and Solidarity, at least for the time being, seemed a thing of the past. Relations with the capitalist countries were showing some signs of improvement and the PRL's place in the socialist bloc had regained its former position. Yet, the situation was still far from being normal. Indeed, as time went by, it became more and more obvious that the authorities' claims that (socialist) normality was once again reigning in the PRL were vastly exaggerated.

8.2 *The New Status Quo.*

1987 marked the return of the PRL on the international stage. Between Jaruzelski's official visit to Italy in January and George Bush's trip to the PRL in September, the Polish authorities were hosts to a number of important Western officials. This resumption of high-level contacts between the PRL and Western states was in part triggered by the lifting of US sanctions against Warsaw. It set the scene for a radical increase of diplomatic and economic links between the PRL and its former Western partners and put an end to its international isolation. This process of 'external normalization' had

started in 1984 but had encountered many difficulties. This had been due mainly to the various aspects of 'internal normalization'. The Polish authorities had failed to convince the West that their policy of *odnowa* was having positive effects on Polish society. Underground Solidarity, in spite of society's growing political apathy, still represented a force which, together with the Church, kept on fighting against the implications of Jaruzelski's 'normalization' policies. The repeated demonstrations of public discontent, the various arrests and persecution against Solidarity members, the apparent unwillingness by the authorities to improve their relations with both the Church and the 'opposition', received a lot of publicity in the West. After the '500 days', when world attention was focussed on the Polish developments, the martial and post martial law period continued to be followed attentively, even if in a somewhat resigned way, in Western capitals. However, with the rise of Mikhaïl Gorbachev, interest in Eastern Central Europe affairs shifted noticeably to the Soviet Union. In the wake of the new Soviet First Secretary's declarations and deeds, world opinion began to by-pass continuing Polish problems and became almost fascinated with developments in the Soviet Union. This new period of a second *détente* had the indirect effect of allowing Jaruzelski to pursue his 'normalization' policies partially outside the glare of Western inquisitiveness. Recurring problems emerged from time to time and though they kept on evoking once again the early 80s period, a certain lassitude with Polish events crept in. Gradual acceptance that the new Polish régime had all the characteristics of being durable, and that further restrictive measures against the PRL seemed hopeless to change a situation where the ruling faction was becoming stronger all the time, promoted among Western governments the view that a policy of confrontation had ceased to be useful. The time

was now ripe for abandoning a 'passive' stand towards the PRL, (consisting in ignoring the Jaruzelski régime), and develop instead an 'active' policy in relations with Warsaw, that is, the renewing of normal diplomatic and economic contacts and the opening a dialogue with the authorities to try to solve the debt problem. At the same time, the changes taking place in neighbouring Soviet Union were opening possibilities for a greater measure of East-West contacts, in which the PRL, in view of its importance in the socialist bloc, may come to play a significant role. Against this background, it was becoming clear that soon or later, the poor state of relations between the West and the PRL would have to change. With the lifting of the remaining US sanctions, a new chapter in PRL-West relations opened.

In an interview, Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski, when asked about the PRL's foreign policy achievements in 1986, expressed his satisfaction at the progress made since the international blackout following the imposition of a state of war:

> We have achieved tangible results in our efforts to establish favourable co-operation with the West, to remove obstacles to trade and scientific and technical co-operation, and to regulate our financial and credit relations. These factors have made a large contribution to eroding the policy of restrictions and normalizing economic co-operation with most of our Western partners. ... Realism is getting the upper hand. It arises from an understanding of the durable nature of the socio-political transformations under way in Poland. ... It seems as if Western Europe has come to realize once again that Poland is too important a partner to be subject to attempts to limit its equal-righted participation in the life of our continent.[33]

Concluding the interview, Orzechowski stressed the importance of internal developments in the PRL for the continuation of Warsaw's 'external normalization':

> Our internal achievements are going to facilitate the elimination of whatever has been left from economic sanctions and will fully restore Poland to its previous international position, including its influence upon the

fate of the world.[34]

Jaruzelski's official visit to Italy on January 12, 1987, was the first tangible sign that the period of the PRL's international isolation had finally come to an end. This was the General's first official trip to a Western state since 'the War' and as such was heralded as a "historic visit" by all the Polish media. Its significance was boosted by the fact that the Pope himself received the Polish leader with whom he talked for over an hour. From the Polish authorities' point of view, this was a *de facto* acceptance by the Vatican that the policy of 'internal normalization' had succeeded. Throughout 1986, there had been growing rumours that the two sides were moving closer to an agreement for the resumption of full diplomatic relations. Shortly before the Polish visit, the Polish Minister for Religious affairs had hinted that "something may happen in the briefest of delays, if the Vatican expresses its interest to the existence of such relations".[35] Part of the discussion between the Pope and Jaruzelski undoubtedly touched upon this question. For Warsaw the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Vatican had become a main goal of its policy towards the Polish Catholic Church. Yet progress was slow since it depended upon the authorities' will to give the Church full legal status, a demand which for years had remained unanswered. If successful, it was obvious that this diplomatic coup would greatly change Church-state relations in the PRL. At the same time, the Polish episcopate too had reservations about the implications of such a rapprochement between the Vatican and Jaruzelski's régime. The visit also provided an opportunity of emphasizing the PRL's regained prestige on the international scene. From a foreign policy standpoint, it confirmed the resumption

of normal contacts between the PRL and the West and opened the road to finding solutions concerning the Polish debt problem. As Jaruzelski himself commented,

> In the current complicated international situation we regard this visit and the contacts we have established here as a major element of European and East-West relations. It was with this idea in mind that we expressed our desire to make our relations with Italy something like a model.[36]

Domestically, the encounter between the spiritual leader of the Polish nation, Pope John Paul II, and the head of socialist Poland, contributed to reinforce the General's stand with regards to 'national conciliation'. It was during his meeting with the Pope that General Jaruzelski formally invited the head of the Catholic Church to pay his third visit to his native country. The programme included a trip to Gdańsk, a city banned from the Pope's previous two visits, which by itself was an important and highly symbolic addition to the Pope's agenda for millions of Poles. Despite whatever reservations the population had towards Jaruzelski, this and the fact that the Pope had accepted to meet him, was bound to alter somehow its appreciation of the man and perhaps even make it forget for a while that he had instigated the imposition of a state of war upon the country.[37]

Upon his return to the PRL, Jaruzelski hosted Japan's Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone (January 15). Continuing a series of diplomatic 'firsts', this was the first ever visit by a Japanese head of government since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries 30 years earlier. This visit, apart from the diplomatic-political benefits for the Jaruzelski régime, had also an important economic connotation. The PRL was hoping to increase the volume of trade between the two countries as well as obtain further credits, so crucial for the PRL's economic reforms, at a time when the

external debt stood at some $ 33 billion, $ 1,3 billion of which fell to Japanese creditors. Some five months later, General Jaruzelski returned the visit by travelling to Tokyo on June 28, 1987. If he had intended on following the footsteps of Józef Piłsudski and seek Japanese help to raise a legion - in his case new credits and loans - he was as unsuccessful as his illustrious predecessor 82 years before.[38] And he was certainly not greeted the way Wałęsa had been when he too paid a visit to Japan on May 10, 1981. Yet the visit was obviously viewed as an important one by the Polish leadership. As Jaruzelski himself noted,

> We want the Japanese presence in Poland, along with all the technological and organizational consequences of that, to become a significant and permanent factor in Poland". ... I cannot speak for others, but I am sure that the economic effects of Polish-Japanese contacts will be watched closely in many countries, including socialist ones.[39]

If he had a vision of a Japanese-run economy for the PRL, his trip certainly dispelled this momentary mirage.

Of considerable significance for PRL-Western relations was the January 28, 1987, visit by US Deputy Secretary of State, John Whitehead to the Polish capital. With the September 1986 amnesty, one of the last visible obstacles to an American withdrawal of its sanctions had disappeared. Though cautious not to act too soon upon the news that Polish political prisoners had been freed, the Reagan administration had waited for the new year to make some concrete moves in this direction. A presidential statement on December 12, 1986, had expressed the hope "that the amnesty [would] be an important first step toward a meaningful dialogue between the Polish people and their government". In order to encourage this process, the US administration had "decided to enter into dialogue with the Polish government".[40] After the Vienna meeting between Orzechowski and Ridgeway in November

1986, and Simmons' visit in Warsaw in December, this latest *prise de contact* between the US and PRL augured the high-level resumption of relations between the two countries. Being only a fact finding mission - as well as meeting Polish officials, Whitehead also staged a diner with Wałesa and other leading members of the 'opposition' and held talks with Cardinal Glemp -, Whitehead's visit produced no concrete agreements. It was only decided that both countries would increase in the near future their economic and political contacts. The Polish authorities were aware of the implications of the visit and ensured that Whitehead would be free to meet anyone he liked. He was allowed to meet Wałęsa and leading members of the opposition, pay his respects to Father Poiełuszko's grave, without any official interference, when only not so long ago, the sole perspective of a meeting outside the planned agenda was enough for the authorities to cancel an official visit altogether (this had been the case with the Belgian, Irish, Spanish and Norwegian Foreign Ministers in 1985). More ways of repairing PRL-US relations would be discussed on the occasion of Politburo member Józef Czyrek's visit to the US in March 1987, as head of a Polish parliamentary delegation. Yet, the 'first steps' had been made even if the official Polish line remained somewhat reserved:

> Realism is surfacing in the US administration circles, as can be seen in the very fact of initiating dialogue. However we still await practical conclusion. Relations between Poland and the US are still abnormal.[41]

The Polish authorities did not have to wait long. On February 19, 1987, President Reagan announced the lifting of all remaining US sanctions against the PRL. After mentioning the fact that his administration had been in touch at the highest level with the Polish government, the Church and with Solidarity, Reagan said that the Polish authorities had taken steps which led him to believe that

"Poland should be given a renewed opportunity to address its trade obligations with the benefit of most favoured nation treatment". He also announced the lifting of the ban on the PRL's eligibility for official US credits and credit guarantees.[42] 'External normalization' had now entered a crucial stage. The most enduring and damaging obstacle to the PRL's return on the international scene had finally been removed.

But there was still a long way until the resumption of normal contacts with the West would produce concrete results. In this sense one can speak of the PRL's success in 'the diplomatic-political normalization' with the capitalist countries; however, in the economic sphere, 'external normalization' had not yet been achieved. Apart from the huge burden on the national economy created by the external debt ($ 33,5 billion at the beginning of 1987), the PRL was now confronted with the task of persuading Western governments and banks to invest once again in the country and provide for greater financial assistance. Without substantial Western aid, the whole package of economic reforms envisaged by the authorities had little chance of succeeding in improving the continuing dramatic situation. The GUS report on February 3, 1987, showed that the industrial production level was still some 5% down on the 1979 figure.[43] However, Western credits were now harder to obtain in view of a general reluctance by the West to repeat what had been in the end a loss-making venture in the 1970s. Although the Polish government was undoubtedly pleased to see the remaining US sanctions lifted and regarded this as an important achievement for the PRL's foreign policy, contributing to "a definite and generally visible consolidation of Poland's position in Europe and the World",[44] it was still unhappy about future prospects

in PRL-West economic relations. As Orzechowski noted in his address to the Sejm on the PRL's foreign policy,

> The normalization of political relations with the West is unfortunately not accompanied by an equal pace of normalization of economic, credit and financial relations. To us, a country's friendly readiness to pursue economic co-operation is the basic indicator of its attitude towards Poland and a sign of its will to genuinely normalize mutual relations.[45]

But of course, the successful 'normalization' of economic relations with the West did not entirely depend upon the latter's goodwill. Important structural changes in the PRL's foreign economic policy were also badly needed. This need was reflected in an open letter to Zbigniew Messner, the Polish Premier, which urged him to conduct deep and profound reforms in the running of the PRL's foreign trade. Stating that "Poland finds itself at the bottom of European statistics", the letter expressed the conviction that,

> Previous efforts to stimulate Poland's foreign trade and external contacts have been insufficient. This is particularly true with regards to the economic system operating in foreign trade and the practical operation of central administration. ... We are convinced that the philosophy, organization and manner in which foreign trade is conducted need revision, that outdated views must be eliminated, inefficient methods abandoned and bureaucratic barriers and interference swept away.[46]

With the lifting of US sanctions, the foreign policy front looked brighter. In the months that followed, the Polish authorities played hosts to a series of official visits by Western Foreign Ministers (see Appendix). Possibly the most significant one was that of Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French Foreign Minister, marking the resumption of Franco-Polish relations after 6 years of stagnation. The attitude of the Mitterand administration towards the Polish situation had been well encapsulated by the then French Foreign Minister, Cheysson, who had declared in the spring of 1981, "Good luck to the Polish people" and on December 13, 1981, "Of course we'll do nothing". Despite the

fact that France's position on the 'Polish question' was perhaps second to none except the Reagan administration, it remained true that apart from stopping credits to the PRL, its policy reflected great discretion and ultimately great passivity at the top. Nonetheless, contacts between Warsaw and Paris had, until then, been almost non-existent and Jaruzelski's inopportune visit had done little to break the ice. Raimond's visit finally put an end to this state of affairs. On July 31, 1987, in Vienna, a rescheduling agreement of the Polish debt was signed with 500 Western commercial banks. It concerned some $ 8 bn. and was a small, but undoubtedly useful, new arrangement for Warsaw.

George Bush's visit to the PRL in September 1987 marked a new stage in PRL-US relations. He was the most important American personality to be in the PRL since President Carter's 1977 visit. Two seemingly contradictory purposes emerged from the Vice-President's trip. In the first place, it served the purpose of consecrating the resumption of normal relations between the two countries after a long period of stagnation and at times deep tensions. At the same time Bush wanted to express the American interest and support to the activities of the Polish 'opposition'. Prior to the visit, in July, the US Congress had voted a $ 1 million fund for the banned Solidarity union in the form of a supplementary appropriation bill for the 1987 fiscal year. Though Solidarity refused the money for its own use and proposed instead its allocation to an exclusively medical destination, the Polish authorities had angrily denounced the gift as yet another American attempt to subsidize anti-Polish state activities.[47] From the start it was obvious that the Vice-President's visit was not to be equated with American support for the Jaruzelski régime. In his speech upon landing

in Warsaw, the Vice-President announced that the United States hoped to play a constructive role in the process of 'national conciliation' in the PRL. Without wishing to interfere in Polish internal affairs, he also expressed his determination to meet representatives of all tendencies in the Polish society.[46] In a toast, Bush said that he would like to see [the Poles] "freer, more independent and more prosperous". He also added that, "everyone recognizes that these last few years have been difficult ones in Poland. We in America have watched and suffered with you. But we are confident that you will not merely survive the present difficulties but will prevail. You will never be alone". One had to bear in mind of course, that on October 12, 1987 Bush announced his presidential candidature and that therefore a lot of the euphoria of his Polish trip was inevitably linked with this fact. Even if at times, Bush appeared to be conducting a pre-election campaign tour which was directed at the American electorate, his presence and speeches seemed to re-assure the majority of the Polish population that he would be a welcomed successor to President Reagan. His appearance at St. Stanisław Church and his use of Solidarity's victory sign was endlessly commented by many Poles. Indeed, one could even hear later Polish voices claiming Bush to "our president". His appearance on Polish television (September 28) when he informed the viewers of the non-official part of his visit was unsurprisingly applauded by the Polish nation. As far as PRL-US relations were concerned, Bush visit produced three concrete agreements and one conditional one. The US administration voiced its willingness to intervene in favour of the PRL with the members of the Club de Rome for the rescheduling of the country's debt. A co-operation agreement was also signed touching scientific and technical matters. Thirdly, normal ambassadorial relations were re-established.

On October 6, John R. Davies was formally accredited as the American Ambassador in Warsaw, while his Polish counterpart, Jan Kinast took up his functions in Washington on October 17. Lastly, Bush promised economic help for the PRL if progress was realized in the domain of freedom and pluralism in the PRL. In 1989, he seemed to fulfil this promise by urging the creation of a special economic aid package for the PRL, following the April agreements of the Polish Round Table

The Vice-President's was officially ending almost five years of tensed Polish-American relations. While in practice, it was too early to notice any substantial improvements in PRL-US economic relations, Bush's trip served the grander Polish scheme of finally extracting the country out of its international isolation and for this reason was seen by Warsaw as highly beneficial. As a symbol - something communist régimes are always eager to use -, it was a step which opened the road to greater possibilities of at last making some progress on the domestic front. It was significant that the Polish Foreign Minister, Orzechowski, had linked the fate of *détente* with Polish-US relations: "In the long-run, there can be no détente in East-West relations without the normalization of relations between the USA and Poland".[49] All the same, it was hard to explain Washington's changed attitude towards Warsaw outside the context of the new Soviet-American dialogue. The 'normalization' of relations between the PRL and the US was therefore nothing more than one of a series of gestures to improve East-West relations. On the whole, for the PRL, internally and externally, it short-tern effects meant very little.

8.3 *The Third Papal Visit.*

When, on June 8, 1987, John Paul II stepped off his plane at Okęcie airport, he was returning to a changed Poland. Four years had passed

since his last visit. The state of war had been lifted and the country 'pacified'. Yet it was still not 'normalized'. Unlike his previous pilgrimages, this time, the Polish nation did not expect any miracle from the Pope. It was enough that he came.[50] His first speech urged the Polish faithful to be hopeful, and not give way to despair and moral apathy:

> I invite you into the community, to this community that has been shaped by Jesus for generations. He does not cease to restore sense to the man who is tired, lost, suffering and loosing hold of life's meaning. The Eucharist is the Sacrament of this great sense. It also helps to regain faith in the right ideals, the will to live - to hope.[51]

The preparations for the Pontiff's third pilgrimage to Poland had contributed to a certain improvement in Church-state relations. Since the 'Popiełuszko Affair', the ruling Polish establishment had increasingly hardened its stand towards the activities of the Polish clergy. Severe warnings were repeatedly given to the Church urging it not to engage itself politically in favour of the opposition.[52] From 1985 onwards, the régime intensified its attacks against what it called 'clericalism'. As Adam Łopatka, described it, "clericalism has nothing in common with the concern for the religious needs of believers":

> It is a flagrant violation of the Church-state separation principle, ... , it abuses the freedom of religion for political activities, [and is] incompatible with socialist Poland's *raison d'état*. ... All clericalism is harmful. Particularly perilous are such symptoms of clericalism which are in tune with the designs and actions of enemies of socialist Poland's constitutional order, both those at home and abroad".[53]

With the 2nd National Party Conference (November 27-28, 1985) devoted to ideological and theoretical matters, the authorities had launched a new campaign of doctrinal attacks against the Church. Its main onslaught had touched the education sector. The Sejm law of July 1985 on Higher Education had been the first step in a national purge of

senior officials from universities and other intellectual institutions of higher education. The 24th KC PZPR Plenum discussed problems in education and passed a resolution to strengthen administrative and ideological control of the central and local governmental agencies.[54] At the 212th Episcopate Conference (12-13 March 1986), in Częstochowa, the Polish bishops discussed what they perceived as the latest governmental efforts to exert increased ideological and political pressure on the Church and to bring about the disintegration of the Catholic nation. They issued a statement highly critical of the government's internal policies. Among other things it noted that schools were again "unfortunately becoming, under the slogan of secularism, the ground for an intensification of atheist propaganda".[55] That the authorities were conducting a new anti-church campaign was obvious. A month later, Jan Rem used a whole page in *Trybuna Ludu* to accuse the "extremist priests" of harming relations between the government and the Church, blaming 'clericalism' as a burden on relations between the two.[56] However, this time, officials commentaries appeared more subtle in that they clearly aimed at splitting clerical ranks between 'extremists' and 'moderates', always careful to stress that only a fraction of the Polish clergy was engaging in anti-state activities. A crucial part of Jaruzelski's 'internal normalization' policies had been to improve Church-state relations in the name of 'national conciliation'. Warsaw was also anxious to show that Western accusations that such a dialogue was non-existent was groundless (the Church-state resumption of a dialogue had been one of the conditions set by the Reagan administration for the lifting of US sanctions). Yet all showed that the authorities' efforts to woo the Polish episcopate were largely unsuccessful. The 212th Episcopate Conference had drawn attention "to the fact that without

full respect of human rights and the rights of social and professional groups, the economic problems which the homeland faces cannot be solved".[57] The Glemp-Jaruzelski 'summits' (there had been eight between December 1981 and December 1987) produced little concrete results and it seemed that no progress would be made until the authorities showed a greater will to compromise. The absence of a positive dialogue was best illustrated with the episcopate's decision to renounce its three year-old project of aid to the private sector of the agriculture in view of the authorities' attitude. It issued a communiqué on September 3, 1986, stating that that a deadlock had been reached on the future of the foundation. The government had been unwilling to modify their insistence that the Foundation be subordinated to various ministries, a stand which, for the episcopate, would mean "a *Diktat* by the state administration, which would run counter to the assumptions of the foundation, particularly its autonomy".[58] Although on July 1987, the Polish government decided to lift tax and custom charges on agricultural equipment imported by the Church, the long-term application of the aid programme remained uncertain.[59] Despite the authorities' 'Christmas gift' in 1986, allowing the full retransmission of the Midnight Mass by the Pope on Polish television - the first time this was ever shown, Church-state relations remained on the whole stagnant.[60] For the Polish Church, the future of a successful dialogue with the authorities required "the setting up of such social and legal solutions which would not bring about any political discrimination and which would create lasting solutions to the problem of political prisoners".[61]

Unsuccessful in their relations with the Church at home, the Polish authorities turned their attention towards the Vatican. At the

beginning of 1987, there was considerable speculation that the Polish government was on the verge of establishing diplomatic relations with Vatican. Its old aim of undermining the influence of the Church through direct relations with the Vatican once again was surfacing. But little progress would be made as long as the Polish Catholic Church had not been given legal status. In 1983, the Church had proposed a bill ending the government's right to veto appointments of parish priests and the building of churches, and establishing the right to found Catholic schools and hospitals. Though the bill was accepted by governmental experts, it was rejected by the Party leadership. The subject was revived only in 1987 after the Pope's 'historic' meeting with Jaruzelski in Rome. In the months preceding the 3rd papal visit, successive meetings involving dignitaries from the Vatican, the Polish government and the Polish Church hierarchy took place, culminating with the week-long visit by Archbishop Silverstrini, the Vatican's special envoy, on April 21-28. Warsaw's interest in raising the topic of diplomatic relations was obvious, both for domestic and external reasons. This fact alone explains partly why it failed to be successful.

In May and June 1987, the Polish press published lengthy articles concerning the preparations for the papal visit. Fears were expressed not only for the safety of the Pontiff, but also for the peaceful outcome of the whole trip. Four days before the Pope's arrival, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs made a statement in which he announced that the ministry had received "reliable information that attempts to disrupt the Papal visit may occur":

> Extremists are planning to take advantage of the Pope's visit, not only for propaganda purposes, such as throwing leaflets, making statements and launching appeals, but also to disrupt public order by provoking riots in the streets. ... The actions aimed to disrupt the visit of John Paul II to Poland are actually designed to prove to the West that

> Poland is an unstable country. Those who are planning the disturbances of the Papal visit are striking principally at the most vital interests of the Polish nation.[62]

It was clear that despite its claims that the PRL was now a 'stable and normalized' country. the régime was still mindful of the effects of a new papal visit. Just as in 1983, there were important gains to be won by it, especially on the international scene, but at the same time, there always was the possibility that something may not go according to plan. An editorial in the Party's theoretical monthly described the third papal visit as "occurring at an unusually important time for Poland, Europe and the world". "Nothing should stand in the way", it continued, "in order that this event brings about advantageous benefits to the question of Polish understanding and co-operation in the field of the economic reform and surmounting difficulties on the road to the country's development".[63] The anxiousness on the part of the authorities to use this occasion to publicize the effects of 'normalization' was best illustrated by the government spokesman's comments in the aftermath of the visit. According to him, the visit had brought about "the outbreak of a 6-day anti-Polish propaganda in the West".[64] At a time when the PRL's external relations were finally recovering from a period of isolation, critical comments in the Western media were a cause of immense irritation on the part of the Polish authorities. The Pope's own speeches during his visit must also have at times caused exasperation to the Polish régime. A few hours only after his arrival, the Pope told General Jaruzelski that "a lack of respect for the rights of man constitutes a threat to peace":

> It is immensely important for a society's future that individuals do not lose their sense of usefulness in their work, that they are not disappointed with their efforts. ... This is of fundamental importance for the national economy. The economy, like all work, exists for man and not vice-

versa.[65]

On his second day, John Paul II called for academic freedoms in Poland in a speech at the Catholic University of Lublin and on the 10th, he reiterated the Church's support for farmers to have their own trade union. The next day he was in Szczecin and Gdańsk, where he praised the 1980 Agreements, implicitly stressing that he remained attached to the ideals of Solidarity. He also met Lech Wałęsa. This was his first visit to the Baltic coast as the Pope. His words could not have pleased the Party hierarchy, and despite the relative passivity on the part of the authorities, the important police deployment throughout the visit testified to a certain nervousness from the top. With the departure of the Pontiff, the ruling establishment heaved with relief that all had gone well, with minimum trouble. With the end of the visit, it was now time to return to 'the real problems', a concern which Jaruzelski himself somewhat ironically commented upon in his farewell speech to the Pope:

> Your Holiness will soon bid farewell to your motherland. and you will take its picture with you in your heart, but you cannot take away its problems. The nation remains here, between the Bug and the Oder rivers. It must itself cope with challenges. The future of Poland, its actual position in Europe and in the World, will be determined by its internal cohesion and economic might, its civilizational, scientific and cultural progress.[66]

Despite the Western 'anti-Polish propaganda', the visit was positively assessed by Warsaw. It had confirmed "the continual and irreversible character of internal stabilization" and the PRL's "normalization of its foreign relations".[67] Just as the second Papal visit, the authorities had sought to use the Pope's pastoral trip for domestic and foreign purposes. In both cases, it was an opportunity to publicize the results of the country's "normalization" in a favourable way. But this, in itself, had its drawbacks. Despite all the efforts

by the authorities to conduct a public relation campaign, it was clear that their smoke-screen was very light indeed. For the ruling establishment, the benefits *per se* reaped from the visit were almost null. As far as the Polish nation was concerned, the visit had provided it with a breath of fresh air by giving the Polish people the moral support it so much craved for. The editor of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Jerzy Turowicz, summed up this feeling:

> John Paul II walked across Poland, stirred all Polish hearts and returned to the Vatican. Our social, economic and political situation is apparently the same as before, but perhaps this is not so? Something has changed, and not only inside. Poland, after this pilgrimage is different.[68]

In the spiritual sense, yes, but materially little progress had been made. A social accord was still a long way away; the external debt was expected to be over $ 36,250 million by the end of the year with the PRL repaying nearly $ 2 bn. in capital interest yearly.[69] Church-state relations were still as stagnant as ever. Less than a week after the Pope had left the PRL, the 221st Polish Episcopate Conference issued a public statement announcing that the Church would expand its public activities in defence of human rights and the principle of public self-determination.[70] By presenting the main direction of the Church's activity in broad social rather than narrowly defined religious terms, this statement was of considerable political importance. Moreover, it struck directly at the Polish régime's social policies. With the Church taking a more determined stand, with the 'opposition' still active and influential, with the economic crisis showing no signs of easing up, Jaruzelski must have wondered if anything had really changed since 1983.

8.4 *Epilogue*

> Support for *perestroĭka* is now a new political and moral yardstick. It makes it possible to tell genuine advocates of peace and social progress from more or less declared

champions of reaction and confrontation.[71]

These words uttered in the Kremlin Congress hall by Jaruzelski to the participants of the Great Socialist October Revolution 70th Anniversary Celebrations, in November 1987, showed how much had changed since the fateful days of the General's decision to impose a state of war in the PRL. Unable to find a lasting solution to his country's deep problems and at loss in elaborating a rational and successful policy to extricate the PRL from its socio-political apathy, the Polish leader had turned to his Eastern neighbour for ideological help. The Polish *odnowa*, was Warsaw's answer to the Soviet *perestroïka* (in fact it preceded it several years before when the concept was first used by Stanisław Kania at the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress) but due to the particular situation in the PRL, it had so far failed to muster the masses. One has to remember that in the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary, any renewal means above all, the renewal of the Party and reform, any change which strengthens the Party apparatus. The 1980 events had laid the last nail in the coffin of the demystification of communist rule in the PRL, and if a 'national renewal' really was to appear, it would have to be without the Party and its fossilized structure. By fully supporting the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, the PRL was seeking to import the psychological factor of 'Gorbachevism' and draft it on the country. But Jaruzelski was no Gorbachev. And the PRL was not the Soviet Union. In a Polish article examining the changes taking place in the USSR, a commentator remarked that the "balance-sheet [was] gloomy":

> The only encouragement is the fact that the overwhelming anti-reformist camp ... is united primarily by the force of their opposition to changes. It has no programme (underlined in the text); to be more precise, it cannot admit that its only actual programme is the defence of the *status quo ante* in the name of their ruthless social egoism. This compels this camp to pretend that it cares for the revolutionary ideals of the past, for the purity of the idea, for the good

> memory of the predecessors, for the moral health of the contemporary people, etc. However, at the bottom of it all, one finds a more or less skilfully disguised greed of the man of property, threatened by the spectre of expropriation.[72]

In many ways this evaluation also fitted the PRL. Six years after the Polish experiment in 'Bonapartism', after unsuccessful stages of economic reforms, after the failure to rally the bulk of the population behind his policies, General Jaruzelski was showing all the traditional communist leaders' propensity to hold on to power and do little else.

At the same time, however, what was happening in the Soviet Union was increasingly putting pressure on the Polish ruling establishment to seek new ways of governing the country. The apparent Soviet willingness to upset many of the orthodox principles which had until then regulated Soviet socio-political life, provided the Polish leadership with a ready-made theoretical framework from which to try to resolve the country's internal deadlock. In the purest of Marxist-Leninist tradition, it offered a convenient basis to launch a new era, by explaining the past in terms of the present. Fundamental tenets of ideology came increasingly under fire and this gave the opportunity to justify certain changes. Gorbachev had launched a campaign to re-appraise Socialism and this process was finding a real justification in the PRL. Polish 'restructurization' coined new words, new phrases which changed little, but gave the semblance of a new era. Nothing illustrated this better than the Polish Foreign Minister's (Olechowski) use of the term "socialization of Polish foreign policy", which he explained as the "taking into account to a greater extent the opinions of various milieux and especially the coalition mode of exercising power...".[73] Seven years after the Gdańsk Agreements, the

Polish authorities began re-assessing the road covered since, concluding that the Solidarity events and the imposition of martial law were all part of one and same process:

> Today we know that the signing of the agreement did not end anything, but it began a process of basic changes - which are increasingly revolutionary - in social life. This process is taking place and we know that it is far from ended. The year 1981, together with martial law and the last four years marked successive stages of this process which consists of *the elimination of a paternalistic organization of society* and the achievement of subjectivity and independence by citizens and social groups.[74]

The same article contended that "Socialism in the form in which the state has overwhelming control has exhausted all its developmental possibilities".[75] Clearly something was changing, at least in form. In the PRL, the summer of 1987 saw the first signs that a cautious but resolved destalinization process was burgeoning in the PRL, following the Soviet example. In September 1987, an article entitled "Is this the end of a taboo?" discussed the new thinking (sic) about Stalinism, commenting that it was "marking a fundamental change and [made] more credible the desire for deep reform".[76] Little by little, the changes taking place in the Soviet Union were filtering through into the PRL. The only problem was that in this respect, the Polish society was far more advanced than the Soviet one, when it came to introducing new types of so-called liberalization. Poles simply expected more. This was thus creating problems for the Jaruzelski régime for, while pressured to show that it was not only supporting Gorbachev policies, but also that it was actually implementing some far-reaching changes in the PRL, it had to be prudent not to relinquish its last levers of control over an increasingly dissatisfied society. Jaruzelski's views at the time were best illustrated by the publication, in the Soviet journal *Kommunist*, of his comments on the "new horizons" ahead of Socialist Poland. They deserve to be quoted in full, as they

succinctly summed up the ideals pursued by the Polish leadership:

> Our Party has had dramatic experience of the effects of departing from the dialectic regularities of building socialism. The failure to perceive various dilemmas and contradictions, the conservative attitude, self-satisfaction and bureaucratism separating the Party and state leadership from 'real life', weakened the ties with the working class and the broad masses. We paid dearly for delaying the changes for which conditions had already been ripe and for stepping back from processes already embarked upon, for conservatism, for the petrification of the forms and corrosion of the mechanisms of development of the economy and democracy. ... Our Party has started the renewal within itself. While remaining the same Marxist-Leninist Party, it is gradually becoming a different one in terms of raising its ideological and moral requirements, conceived in a Leninist way. ... Efforts to consolidate the Party's position in the state and in public life involve a trend which can be conventionally referred to as socialist pluralism. It has nothing to do with the bourgeois concept of the so-called game of political forces; it also rejects antagonistic competition. It is based on consolidating the leading role of the Party and on expanding socialist democracy.[77]

Despite the vagueness of the term 'socialist democracy', it was clear that the Polish authorities had no intention on introducing reforms that might undermine their power. On the contrary. Yet, their tactics had to change and adapt themselves to the new mood in the socialist bloc. One way of "broadening socialist renewal" and "inject broader democracy in the political life of the nation", was to hold a referendum, the first one to take place in the PRL since 1948. In many ways, the sole decision to turn to the population for its opinion was an unprecedented move for a soviet-type system. But the novelty of this decision went no further. In the case of a majority affirmative vote, the government could then pretext the support of the population for its policies. On December 29, 1987, the Polish electorate was asked two questions: a) are you in favour of the full implementation of the programme for the radical revival of the economy - as proposed to the Sejm - in order to visibly improve the standard of living, even if this involves living through a difficult two or three years of rapid change; b) do you favour a democratization of political life, the strengthening of self-government, the broadening of civic rights, and a greater public participation in government ?[78]

In the case of a negative vote, little would change and it certainly would not cause the demission *in toto* of the ruling establishment. Indeed, by staging a referendum, the Polish régime was primarily intent on demonstrating its self-professed good-will of bringing the nation together. It must have been aware that abroad, such an example of 'public consultation' would have a major psychological effect on Western perceptions concerning the Polish *odnowa*. Such semblance of democratic means would nullify many of the criticisms to which the PRL was still being subjected to. In the end the outcome was predictable. A low turn-out (the official figures put it at 67,32 % of eligible voters) ensured that the 51 % affirmative vote required to make the reforms binding on the government was not attained. Non-confidence in Jaruzelski's policies was once again being demonstrated. This "new experience in socialist democracy"[79] had ended up in a failure. But if the battle for people's minds was a lost cause, the Jaruzelski régime stubbornly clung on to ideological principles to justify their place within Polish society. Speaking at the 6th KC Plenum on December 15, 1987, Jaruzelski stated that,

> The analysis contained in the report on the sources and the development of social conflicts in the history of Poland proves that it was a shortage and not an excess of socialism that was behind the turmoils and breakdowns; not a surplus of democracy, but a deficit of it, not too much but inadequate authority of the state.[80]

In this, the Polish First Secretary was merely paraphrasing his Soviet counterpart. Gorbachev's exhortations were being relayed in the PRL by an increasingly confident leadership. The new mood was contagious. Even if at home, the Polish 'socialist renewal' was still a rhetoric phrase to camouflage the continual stagnancy, the Polish ruling establishment increasingly relied on the changes taking place in the Soviet Union to further its own goals. Asked by a journalist what he

thought of *perestroïka* and what it meant for his country, Foreign Minister Orzechowski replied:

> Do you really think that we are in competition with *perestroïka*? Let's stop being so complex-ridden. It's only natural that the position and policies of the Soviet union have a decisive meaning for the future of Europe and the World. We cannot aspire to such a role. But we néed not and do not have any complexes on that score. We are making up fast for the lost years. It is a long time since Poland has seen such diplomatic activity. Never before have so many foreign diplomats and politicians visited Poland. ... The similar aims of Soviet *perestroïka and Polish 'renewal' give Poland a unique chance to say more in the arena of international politics. The similarities in the thrust and tone of perestroïka* and 'renewal' are of great importance to us.[81]

But just as reforms in the Soviet Union were encountering many problems, the Polish *odnowa* was in great danger of remaining dead letter. A mini-crisis erupted in the Summer of 1988 among a disillusioned and impatient workforce. The strikes which then took place were the result of grievances expressed by workers at the ineffectiveness of the government's policies. It was also showed that Solidarity was still alive and active, that the need to have the banned union re-legalized was firm and strong and that the policies of 'normalization' had in this respect failed. The immediate result of the summer disturbances was a thorough reshuffle in governmental ranks with the entire dismissal of the Messner cabinet in October. The ineffectiveness of the second stage of the economic reform and the constant lowering of standards of living had provoked the new generation of post-Solidarity workers into vividly expressing their dissatisfaction. Even if not comparable to the 1980s, this latest unrest called for radical new measures on the part of the authorities to avoid a new wave of unrest. This time, there could be no more hope that another 'Polish solution to a Polish problem' would be available. The new faces in the Mieczysław Rakowski government, and the apparent

greater pool of ability and competence represented by many of the new ministers, raised hopes that at last something could be done to extricate the PRL from its tragic situation. And soon enough, appeared the first signs that the ruling establishment, after nearly seven years of uncompromising attitude, was finally prepared to accede to some of the propositions enunciated all this time by the underground 'opposition':

> Halt the police trends in the development of the state, free political prisoners, re-establish a meaning to national understanding - these are initial realistic imperatives and Polish thoughts about the future. Only the realization off these demands can unblock the society's situation, bring about initiatives, enable the concrete carrying out of economic and state reforms.[62]

On November 30, 1988, Lech Wałęsa appeared on Polish television in a *tête-à-tête* with the leader of the official trade unions, Alfred Miodowicz. The Nobel Peace prize winner was slowly ending his exile as a 'private person' and though representing a social force which was still illegal, he made it clear to millions of viewers that without the participation of Solidarity, without a real dialogue being instaured between society and the ruling establishment, no progress would be made. Until then, the ruling establishment had stubbornly refused to consider the idea of trade union pluralism advocated by Solidarity. By portraying the union as bent on seeking confrontation and refusing any political solutions, the authorities were attempting to persuade would-be listeners that the era of Solidarity had come to an end. But the slogan *Nie ma wolności bez Solidarności* (there is no freedom without Solidarity) which came to be heard and repeated throughout the country, showed how wrong they were. By the end of the year, the PZPR was beginning to acknowledge the necessity for change. In a two part KC plenum, a new course of action was drafted. Apparently disagreement among the participants pervaded throughout,

with Jaruzelski even submitting his, and others, resignation to the KC. In the end, however, his line prevailed. In its final resolution, the 10th PZPR KC Plenum stated that "a continuation of socialism requires the thorough reform of the PZPR" and that the Party "recognizes the need to consider the plurality of interests and aspirations, and [the extension of] the coalition government to that part of the opposition which recognizes and acts within the limits of the constitutional order".[63] In an unprecedented statement, the Party presented its position on political and trade union pluralism, declaring that "the KC believes it is necessary to devise a new formula for the shaping of political pluralism. ... The KC confirms the PZPR's readiness to hold a dialogue and to search for new forms of agreement with every constructive political force, provided that the latter - no matter what its political orientation and ideological inspirations are - observes the constitutional order of the country and recognizes the good and fine future of the people and the state as the greatest value".[64] On February 6, 1989, took place the inaugural meeting of the Round Table talks between the ruling Party, the allies and organizations linked with it, and Solidarity and representatives of those groups and professions represented in Lech Wałęsa's Civic Committee. Ironically, the so-called 'constructive opposition', led by Wałęsa, sat at the table though it was still an illegal organization. Two months later, the April Agreements were signed, opening the way for the legalization of Solidarity, Rural Solidarity and the Independent Students' Union, as well as important constitutional changes in view of the forthcoming Sejm elections in June. An important new chapter in Poland's history seemed to have been written. In Bronisław Geremek's words,

> The very idea of the round table may be regarded as something imperfect, something which hides the shortcomings

of public life, an implant substituting for the lack of parliamentary practice. But even then it is an extraordinary proposal for other nations in this part of Europe. Besides, it may not be quite absurd to think that amid the contemporary crisis of institutionalized public life, this lame form of dialogue between the authorities and society, similarly to the 1980 Gdańsk Agreements, contains some universal message about the subjective rights of social groups, the nation and society. At any rate, something has started moving in Poland. This may be an opportunity.[85]

Chapter 8 Notes.

1. Interview with Dominique Garaud, *AFP*, 25/8/1985.
2. *Trybuna Ludu*, 5/7/1986.
3. 1 200 were accepted in the second half of 1981; 7 500 in 1982; 17 000 in 1983; 35 000 in 1984; 63 000 in 1985 and more than 30 000 in the first half of 1986. *Polityka*, No. 27, 5 July 1986, p. 5.
4. *X Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, Stenogram z Obrad Plenarnych*, KiW, Warszawa 1987, pp. 839-879; (Thereafter referred to as *X Zjadz*).
5. *X Zjadz*, pp. 880-882.
6. *X Zjadz*, p. 307.
7. *X Zjadz*, p. 310.
8. *X Zjadz*, p. 362.
9. *X Zjadz*, p. 364.
10. Generals Baryła, Siwicki, Kiszczak.
11. Jack Bielasak, in *Creditworthiness and Reform in Poland*, Marer Paul, Siwiński Włodzimierz eds., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988, pp. 103-114.
12. *Trybuna Ludu*, 30/6/1986, listing the heads of delegations from socialist countries, p. 11.
13. He arrived and left on July 1, and apart from a speech in a Warsaw factory, no other details were made public.
14. *X Zjadz*, p. 476.
15. *X Zjadz*, p. 483.
16. X Zjadz, p. 476.
17. *X Zjadz*, pp. 476-477.
18. X Zjadz, p. 477.
19. *X Zjadz*, p. 477.
20. *IV Plenum KC PZPR*, KiW, Warszawa, 1987.
21. *Rzeczpospolita*, 19-22/7/1986.
22. *Zycie Warszawy*, 31/7/1986.
23. *Trybuna Ludu*, 12/9/1986.
24. *Tygodnik Mazowsze Nr. 183, 8/9/1986.*
25. *Trybuna Ludu*, 12/9/1986.
26. *UPNB* 19/86, 14 October 1986.
27. The statement was reprinted in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Nr. 43, 26 October 1986.
28. *International Herald Tribune*, 26/9/1986.
29. *Przemówienia 1986*, KiW, Warszawa 1987, p. 274.
30. *Rzeczpospolita*, 15-16/11/1986.
31. *Rzeczpospolita*, 17/11/1987.
32. *Przemówienia 1986*, KiW, 1987, p. 331.
33. *Rzeczpospolita*, 5/1/1987.

34. Ibid.
35. *Zycie Wraszawy*, 8/1/1987.
36. *Rzeczpospolita*, 15/1/1986.
37. This of course may be hard to ascertain but from the repeated declarations by the Polish leader on the causes behing the December 1981 declaration, it seems clear that the responsibility for this decision was permanently haunting him and that he was anxious to stop being identified with "the one who had imposed martial law".
38. Piłsudki had visited japan in 1905 in order to form a Polish legion from Russian prisoners of war in Manchuria.
39. *Rzeczpospolita 4-5/7/1987.*
40. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Washington, D.C., (16445), Vol. 22, No. 50.
41. *Trybuna Ludu*, 13/2/1987.
42. *Presidential Documents*, (166), Vol. 23, No. 7.
43. *Rzeczpospolita*, 3/2/1987.
44. *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/3/1987.
45. *Rzeczpopsolita*, 19/3/1987.
46. *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, No. 22, 31 May 1987.
47. In particular the article by Włodzimierz Łoziński in *Trybuna Ludu*, 22/7/1987.
48. *AFP*, 26/9/1987.
49. *Życie Warszawy*, 18/2/1986.
50. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, No. 23, 7 June 1987, p. 5.
51. For the complete speeches of the third papal visit, see *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 25/87/980-29/97/984.
52. For instance, *Życie Warszawy*, 29/6/1985.
53. *Trybuna Ludu*, 29/5/1985.
54. *XXIV Plenum KC PZPR*, KiW, Warszawa 1986.
55. *BPEP* 12/86/898.
56. *Trybuna Ludu*, 5-6/4/1986, p. 5.
57. *BPEP*, 12/86/898.
58. *BPEP*, 36/86/740.
59. *RFE*, BR/128, 27 July 1987.
60. In 1988, also for the first time, Cardinal Glemp made a personnal appearance on Polish TV to express his New Year's wishes to viewers.
61. Polish episcopate communique at the end of the 214th Conference, *BPEP*, 27/86/731.
62. *Rzeczpospolita*, 5/6/1987.
63. *Nowe Drogi*, Nr. 456, May 1987, p. 11.
64. *Rzeczpospolita*, 17-18/6/1987.
65. *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 25/87/980.
66. *Rzczpospolita*, 15/6/1987.
67. Government's Report on the Pope's visit delivered by Władisław Loranc at the Sejm meeting on June 17, 1987, *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/6/1987.
68. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, No. 26, 28 June 1987.
69. *Rzeczpospolita*, 24/11/1987.
70. *BPEP*, Pismo Okólne, 26/87/981.
70. *Rzeczpospolita*, 5/11/1987.
72. Andrzej Drawicz, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Nr. 48, 29/11/1987.
73. *Życie Warszawy*, 23-26/12/1988.
74. *Polityka*, Nr. 35, 28/8/1987.
75. Ibid.
76. *Ład*, Nr. 16, 6/9/1987.
77. *Kommunist*, No. 11, November 1987; also reprinted in *Nowe Drogi*,

Nr. 458, July 1987, pp. 5-19.
78. *Rzeczpospolita*, 1/12/1987.
79. Andrej Barcikowski, *Ideologia i Polityka*, January 1988, pp. 27-33.
80. *Rzeczpospolita*, 17/12/1987.
81. An interview with Foreign Minister Orzechowski in *Polityka*, 26/7/1987.
82. *Raport Polska 5 lat po Sierpniu*, Międzyzakłada struktura "Solidarności", NSZZ Solidarność, 1985.
83. *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/1/1989.
84. *Trybuna Ludu*, 20/1/1989.
85. 'Warsaw's spring', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Nr. 17, 23/4/1989.

Pamiętajmy, że Polska wśród narodów jest dużą myszą, nie małym słoniem.

(Remember that Poland, among nations, is a large mouse and not a small elephant.)

Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886-1981)

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION.

'Polish normalization' lasted nearly five years. It started with the imposition of a state of war in December 1981 and ended around the 10th PZPR Congress in June 1986. Throughout this period, the Polish authorities had been determined to destroy the 'opposition', consolidate the system and build up public support. Using the conditions offered by the militarization of Polish society, the Jaruzelski's régime first proceeded to 'pacify' the country. During a period which lasted almost as long as the 'Solidarity era' (585 days), the Polish Army, aided by the repressive organs of the state, sought to restore some order and lay the foundations for the re-building of pre-1980 Socialist Poland. Apart from its domestic implications, martial law also had significant external consequences. The 'War' had been a 'triumph' for Soviet foreign policy. It had solved the Polish internal crisis, had had a sober effect on potential Eastern Central European unrest and had not jeopardized too much the Kremlin's European diplomacy. "It was a tragic, though undeniable, tribute to the art of statecraft as developed and practised by the Kremlin".[1] For the first time, a major crisis originating in one of the socialist bloc's countries, and whose potential effects were directly threatening the stability of the entire Soviet European sphere of

interest, was solved without the use of direct Soviet military intervention.

Despite its setbacks, Polish 'pacification' and then 'normalization' were also a success for Jaruzelski and his ruling team. The general remained in power, seemingly strong enough to resist all potential threats to his position. Even the Soviet Union was forced to admit, after a while, that the Polish General had saved the day and that he represented the only capable force able to improve the situation in the 'Polish province'. Indeed, as, the years passed, Jaruzelski steadily reinforced his position, shedding his uniform for a civilian suit and becoming the uncontested leader at the head of the PZPR. His confidence, and a measure of his power, was revealed in 1989 when, during the 10th KC plenum, he actually offered to resign as First Party Secretary.[2] Alongside the propulsion of a military man at the head of country, the instauration of a military/police state had also the immediate results of pacifying the country, providing its new leaders with the opportunity of consolidating their hold over society and restore socialist 'normality'. However, at least until 1985, this policy had very little concrete effects on improving state-society relations. Despite the official calls for a 'national reconciliation', the majority of Poles, either ignored the new leadership, or engaged in activities aimed at countering its policies. If a certain apathy at large had arisen in the months following the imposition of a state of war, very quickly, the movement which had been seriously weakened in December 1981, once again began gathering strength, making the authorities' task the more difficult. With the arrival of the new CPSU leader, Warsaw moved away from its overall passive attitude aimed at containing opposition to its policies and remaining in power, to a

more active policy whose main psychological guidance it drew from Moscow. The new East-West climate facilitated this and was scrupulously used by the Polish régime to further its own interests. Since it differed little from the new Soviet thinking, it was allowed to develop into something which not even the ruling establishment could have foreseen in 1981. In all appearances, Gorbachev made no attempts to constrain the PRL's policy-making. However paradoxically, this 'freedom of action' had its own constraints for the Polish authorities. Left to decide on their own the appropriate course of action to take, the Polish authorities were soon faced with the dilemma of how to implement badly-needed reforms without losing their hold over society, two aspects of the internal policy-making which by definition seemed mutually exclusive.

Yet, Polish 'normalization' did not end at home. It was also taking place on the international scene. After successfully, though slowly, regaining the favours of the Kremlin, the PRL persistent foreign concern touched its relations with non-communist countries. The state of war had isolated the PRL and in spite of efforts by Warsaw to regain its lost international status, little concrete was achieved in the first years of 'normalization'. Only when the domestic situation seemed stable and the ruling establishment confident enough that it had finally restored 'socialist normality' to the country, did the first signs of a thaw between the PRL and the West appear. Yet, persistent Western insistence that a return to normal relations was dependent on internal developments arising from Jaruzelski's policies, obliged the latter to pursue a line which after a while seemed to contradict the very aims of 'normalization'. The 'socialist renewal', intended primarily to rebuild a new Polish Communist Party, and

restore its leading role in Polish society, faltered and forced the régime to accept the gradual return of Solidarity as a major socio-political force in the country. After years during which the Polish authorities had strived to destroy the 'opposition', it dawned upon them that any solution to the stagnancy of the system passed through some compromise with those very forces they had sought to eliminate. In this they were also influenced by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union.

Thus, the internal changes in the PRL as it approached the end of the decade had been conditioned by external events to such an extent that it has been hard to separate the two sets of determinants over the last eight or so years. The present study showed how closely linked were the domestic and foreign policy-making of the PRL since 1981, and how repeatedly each set of internal and external factors deeply affected one another. The imposition of martial law was a response to both domestic and foreign determinants. Despite Jerzy Urban's claim that "the West with its own hands co-created the imperative of proclaiming martial law in Poland"[3], it was clear that Moscow's security interests in the stability of the PRL had been the main determinant behind the December proclamation. The 'normalization' policies in turn were markedly affected by internal and external events, while the 'socialist renewal' resulted from constraints emanating both abroad and at home. In 1981, a Polish analyst had written that "everything which takes place in Poland has its international implications, exerts an influence on external relations, on Poland's position in the socialist community, in Europe and in the world".[4] At the same time practically everything that takes place in the broader East-West context has its influence on PRL's internal

developments. The period of 'normalization' provided a striking example of this link. After a period of isolation, the Polish régime painfully extracted itself from international ostracism. But this was not achieved without significant domestic changes, which directly or indirectly were the result of external pressures, originating both in the East and the West. These pressures or constraints for the Polish leadership influenced the latter in seeking a framework of policy-making adequate both for domestic and foreign objectives. Had, for instance, Western insistence that a resumption of normal relations between Warsaw and Western capitals died out, it would have been very unlikely that Jaruzelski would have been compelled to go as far as he did in 1989. His 'normalization' policies were a mitigated success in that they preserved the political system, but failed to ensure its viability. Also, it it quite obvious that in the absence of Gorbachev, the General would have equally been hard pressed to undertake the kind of concessions to the aspirations of Polish society he did from 1988 onwards. All this, of course, does not warrant the comment that he was the inspirator of changes taking place in the PRL. On the contrary, he was subjected to them, and only did his utmost best to keep in line with them, by trying to be in control as far he could. International pressures and domestic tensions cumulated in forcing him to adapt himself and the Party to the evolving environment. Captain of an unruly crew and seconded by inefficient officers, he tried to steer the Polish ship though rough waters, holding on to a helm whose rudder was out of action. One is here reminded of the metaphor identifying the PRL to a 'ship of state ploughing hostile seas across the unchartered ocean of the future':

> On this line of thought, People's Poland must be seen as a war galley of the great fleet of Communism commanded above desks by a corps of overseers, propelled below by a press-ganged crew shackled to the bench; and rowed by to the tap

> of a martial drum. It sails due astern of the great Soviet flagship to which it is fastened by a heavy, spidery chain. Unfortunately, most of the Polish overseers are half-hearted in their job; the crew consists of former freemen, who still long for their liberty and who are sons of Themistocles, not Xerxes; and no one wants to listen to the drum. As a result, the Polish galley is slewing from side to side. The decks are already awash. Is she capsizes, she threatens to drag her neighbours with her to the bottom. So urgent action is needed. Either the overseers drive the convicts to row in unison, or the flagship will send a boarding party to help them. Better still, they could hand over the galley to the crew, and let them row as volunteers. Best of all, if the Soviet admiral would only agree to cut his losses, he could axe the chain, and set 'the Poland' free.[5]

By 1989, the chain though in an advanced stage of rusting, was still there.

The PRL's geo-political position in the centre of Europe, firmly anchored in the socialist bloc dominated by the Soviet Union, usually has meant that it has not been seen by many observers as a policy-generating state. Instead it has been viewed as a target of the policy of other states, and in particular, the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Second World War, the Polish People's Republic has remained in the so-called socialist community and as such, bearing in mind the perceived hegemonic nature of the Kremlin leaders, has attracted little attention from Western scholars. This can be partly explained by the general tendency of researchers to ignore the foreign policy of smaller and medium sized states and by the obvious fact that the PRL has been, both politically and military, in the Soviet shadow since 1945. For all practical purposes, the PRL's foreign and domestic policies were therefore, above all, a reflection of Soviet decision-making and a mere implementation of the Kremlin's wishes and needs. It has thus been assumed that its policy-making was insignificant and warranted no detailed examination. However, this kind of reasoning cannot be sustained in the light of the internal and external

determinants which have shaped Polish policy-making since 1945. These have had a significant impact on the PRL's successive leaderships' ability to develop, to various degrees, a Polish brand of policy-making independent of Moscow. This does not, of course, mean that one can ignore the huge constraints imposed on the country in virtue of its place in the Soviet bloc. In this respect it would be naturally incorrect to speak of a truly independent and sovereign Poland (the question whether any state in the present world can be truly sovereign is of course another matter beyond the scope of this study). Nevertheless this argument does not preclude the existence of a specific Polish policy-making and therefore its analysis. Naturally, the foreign policy of any given state is the subject of many constraints, its geography, its economy, its political structure, culture and tradition (the domestic environment). Foreign policy action is also taken with reference to other bodies similarly acting on the international stage and is likewise affected by their action (the international environment of the decision-makers). Elements within environments interact with each other and this interaction takes place between environments as well. Its nature may vary, with one country clearly dominating another, but even then, both are subject to influences originating from their respective domestic and foreign environments and as a result of their mutual relations. Thus, PRL-USSR relations are also a two-ways process, where, to various degrees and depending on the situation, both countries influence each other. In 1981, the events in the PRL, to a significant extent, created various constraints and pressures on the Soviet Union decision-making. Likewise, developments in the USSR, and especially from 1985 onwards, had important consequences for Polish policy-making. In both instances, definite domestic questions had their

impact on both the domestic and foreign processes within both countries. As far as the PRL was concerned, the whole period following the imposition of a state of war demonstrated clearly the complicated process of interaction between Polish domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, it provides the political analyst with a revealing insight in the policy processes of a Soviet-type country. Though it may be tempting to see in the PRL a unique country in this respect, it is obvious that of study of this relation between foreign and domestic processes could prove very instructive for other East central European countries.

Poland's unique position in Central Europe, with its lack of effective natural boundaries, has meant that it has never been able to develop a secure political existence independent of either German or Russian and then Soviet influences. As a result, the nature of its policy-making has always been heavily determined by Polish perceptions of its neighbours. By the 19th century, both German and Russian powers dwarfed Poland and it became the latter's policy to try and play one against the other. Poland has traditionally harboured fears of German-Russian coalitions which, as the numerous partitions it had to endure throughout its history amply demonstrated, were not idle apprehensions but directly linked to the very survival of the nation. By the end of the Second World War Poland, now the Polish People's Republic, found itself completely under the influence and 'protection' of the Soviet Union. Until at least the death of Joseph Stalin, it presented all the characteristics of a 'Soviet puppet state'. With the rise of Krushchev and under the leadership of Władusław Gomułka, it slowly developed its own brand of 'Polish socialism', gaining in the process the attribute of being an 'independent satellite' - a slightly exaggerated

description but one with some truth attached to it nonetheless. Throughout its existence the PRL's conduct of foreign affairs has been closely associated with that of the Soviet Union. On practically all major international issues, the PRL has aligned itself on Soviet foreign policy, whether it was Indochina, the Middle-East, Cuba or Afghanistan. At the same time, it has taken advantage of opportunities to pursue its own interests, especially in Europe. The fact that these often paralleled Soviet own goals in the area does not mean that the PRL had therefore no objectives of its own or lacked any initiative in the foreign policy field. The PRL has sponsored measures aimed at reducing East-West tensions in Central Europe by arms limitations, *détente* and economic co-operation. In 1958, it put forward the so-called 'Rapacki Plan', calling for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. More recently, in May 1987, the 'Jaruzelski Plan' sought to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Europe between the two blocs. Arm limitations initiatives have continued to be a prime foreign policy objective for the PRL, both on account of foreign and domestic considerations. While Polish alignment on Soviet foreign policy has always been obvious, a study of the PRL's foreign policy-making process should not however be confined only to an approach from a Soviet perspective. While it has a ring of truth to it, the argument that "Polish foreign policy is made in Moscow" is by far too restrictive of the PRL's abilities to make and execute its own foreign policy objectives. Rather, there seems to be more sense to ask oneself what are the limitations and restrictions on Polish efforts to realize their own perceived interests.

One the most fundamental limitations on Polish policy-making stems from the *Prymat Polityki Zewnętrznej* and its characteristic importance

for Polish domestic affairs. In the twentieth century, more than ever, the PRL's domestic and foreign affairs are closely linked and this has meant that without a close look at both processes, a complete coherent picture of the situation in this country is hard to reach. Nothing illustrated this better than the period between December 1981 and December 1987. The decision to impose a state of war over the country was ostensibly a political act in response to a perceived internal deterioration of the situation. Jaruzelski's *coup* was not an attempt to replace the communist system with a military junta, but on the contrary an act to preserve it. And it was not aimed against the broad framework of the Soviet system. It was confined to it. Yet, it also was the result of enormous external pressures on the Polish leadership. The 'Polish crisis' was not limited to Polish borders. Its ramifications went far beyond the Oder and the Bug and for this reason, its international significance formed an intrinsic element in explaining Jaruzelski's unprecedented *coup d'état*. Similarly, the developments ensuing from the militarization of Polish society, not only had enormous effects on the situation inside the country, but also on the conduct and state of Polish foreign policy. By sealing the country internally, the Polish leadership equally isolated itself from the international community. Despite the relatively low interest traditionally shown by Western/capitalist countries for events taking place behind the 'iron curtain', the imposition of a state of war in the PRL, spurred them to take decisive, though on the whole ineffective, measures in protest. Even it they were on the whole characterized by a lack of unity and an absence of real coherent policy-making, they were enough to turn the PRL into an international pariah. In the months and years which followed, the Jaruzelski team would struggle, not only with a chaotic and unruly domestic situation,

but also with the effects of losing its pre-1981 international status. Though Western sanctions effectively froze PRL-West relations and became linked to the evolution of the Polish internal developments, the state of war also had significant consequences on PRL-East relations. Despite the fact that the Polish 'normalization' was a satisfactory answer to Soviet security interests in Eastern Central Europe, it was only after a long period of time that the PRL returned to its number two place within the socialist community. Throughout martial law and after its lifting, the Kremlin leaders remained far from confident that the crisis had been weathered. In the short-term, the Polish Generals had efficiently contained the 'waves of anarchy' which had threatened to flood all over the bloc. But in the long-term, large questions marks still remained. It is partly because of this, that the Polish leadership, aside from its concern to resume normal relations with non-communist countries, was very careful to do everything to consolidate its standing in the eyes of Moscow and its allies. This meant, among other things, pursuing a domestic and foreign policy in line with that of the Soviet Union. Though these objectives were in no way different than from those which the PRL had always pursued, they took on a particular importance in the post-martial law period. "For Poland the most urgent thing to do was to recapture its position within the socialist community. Without this you cannot be reckoned with on the international arena", remarked the Polish Foreign Minister Orzechowski.[6] The urgency of this task form part of Warsaw's 'external normalization', on par with attempts to re-shape a Polish *Westpolitik* heavily compromised with the imposition of a state of war. All the same, this process was a reaction to the events taking shape in the Soviet Union. It was not a worked out brand of *Ostpolitik*, or a new form of Polish policy-making towards its

eastern ally. Indeed, the present situation and the degree of changes in the USSR seem to offer the Polish leadership an opportunity to develop such a policy, which in the long-run could have marked effects on the PRL's geo-political situation.[7]

Notwithstanding the fact that a return to the *status quo ante* was unrealistic, Warsaw was still compelled to restore a semblance of 'socialist normality', based upon force and repression. With the changes emerging in its eastern neighbour, it began adapting some of its policies to the 'new mood' introduced by Mikhaïl Gorbachev. In this, the 'reformist trends' affecting nearly the whole of the Socialist Bloc provided Jaruzelski with an ideal opportunity to shape Polish internal developments in accordance with the new ideology. Faced with continual domestic problems and in light of Western intransigence, Jaruzelski decided to play the 'Polish experiment card'. It must be of course stressed that he had very little else to do. The situation in the PRL after 1980 precluded any return to the forms of ruling which had existed hitherto. It is unquestionable that the short-lived Solidarity experience was the precursor and the originator of the radical changes which would take place less than a decade later. With it, the system had entered what Staniszkis called "the baroque phase of the system called 'really existing socialism".[8] By developing the Polish brand of 'socialist renewal', General Jaruzelski was in effect hoping to score successes both at home and abroad. Domestically, concessions would strengthen his position among the Polish population and further contribute to strengthening the process of 'normalization'. Externally, it would bring him closer to the Soviet line and be a persuasive argument in convincing the West that Poland under Jaruzelski was the forerunner of great changes in

the Soviet bloc. However, all along, this new tactic was being impeded by the slow progress in the domestic situation. Besides, it very doubtful whether the Polish Generals were in fact reform-minded when they set out to militarize Polish society. With an enfeebled Party and a distrustful and unco-operative population, Warsaw's plans were seriously constrained. A dramatic economic state further limited the level of real changes taking place quickly, the more so when the ruling establishment systematically clung onto the idea that economic reforms were possible without political ones.

The years of 'normalization' then, were a process by which the Polish authorities strove to restore the primacy of the communist system and at the same time alter some of its precepts to render this 'renewal' more palatable to the nation. Throughout though, it was obvious that the policies pursued by Jaruzelski would inevitably lead to some dramatic changes into the traditional political set-up. It is of course a matter of speculation whether the General was an advocate of the reforms from the very beginning. That something had to change was obvious, but whether the ruling establishment was eager to introduce far-reaching changes in the PRL is more disputable. The truth was that the enormous pressures put on the authorities, both domestically and externally, compelled the latter to seek some solution which would at last answer many of the grievances expressed by the Polish society. Unable to shake off the influence of both the Church and the large 'opposition', the Polish régime was slowly compelled to resort to entirely new approaches in its policy-making. Its aims remained the same - to stay in power - but its means differed greatly from past habits. In this, not only were internal events determinant but also many of the subsequent moves it made were the

direct result of external developments. Without Gorbachev, it is doubtful whether the PRL leadership would have gone as far as it has in striking a 'social contract' with the Polish population in the way it did in April 1989. After a period of uncertainty resulting from the successive leadership changes in the Soviet Union, the Polish ruling establishment was confronted with a task for which, despite forty years of holding the reins of power, it was unprepared. For the first time, Warsaw seemed to have been given *carte blanche* to handle its internal problems. With the new mood and all its implications, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was concerned above all with its own problems. Any signs of trouble in its European condominium would be a setback for Soviet policies and greatly jeopardize its domestic and international efforts to push on with profound reforms. Calm was the order of the day. The Kremlin simply required loyalty and stability from its allies. Thus, as long as these conditions were fulfilled, the East Central European leaders were in a sense free to implement policies in line with those expounded by the Kremlin. Since conditions varied throughout the Bloc, specific approaches had to be developed. In the case of the PRL, Jaruzelski was then compelled to formulate a new strategy of rule, given the apparent greater leeway of action offered to him by the CPSU First Secretary. In the absence of a coherent and decisive policy, with little signs that it knew what to do, the Polish régime was therefore at first unable to formulate an effective policy-making. Only by the end of 1988, as a result of domestic and foreign constraints, did it begin to make bold moves to improve the overall situation. Apart from the Soviet factor, the attitude of Western states towards Warsaw also made necessary the elaboration of a new strategy. Above all, Warsaw sought to woo back Western support. This was inevitably unproductive as long as the

Polish domestic environment continued to exhibit the characteristics of a police state. Since Western perceptions and actions seemed greatly influenced by the degree in which the Polish authorities were conducting a dialogue with the Church and Solidarity, Jaruzelski was drawn inexorably in finding a compromise with the forces opposing him. When he finally took the decision to accept the realities of the new Polish socio-political set-up, and agree to a concrete and open dialogue with the various actors on the Polish stage, he was at last reacting not only to a domestic necessity, but also to international pressure.

Indeed, the whole 'normalization' process epitomized the complex relationship between domestic and foreign policy-making in the PRL. It was a process which took place on two levels: internally and externally. At the same time, it was heavily determined by two sets of concerns: political and economic. And it was a process taking place against the background of East-West relations. Practically all the issues which were at hand during the period 1981-1987 took place within a framework where domestic and foreign interaction remained inseparable. One may try to represented in the following schematic way. Each arrow denotes the interaction between the various determinants influencing the overall Polish policy-making. Again, this simplistic diagram is obviously inadequate to explain in full the complex nature of the relation between all the components shown here. At the same time, it serves the purpose of making it clearer. The point of intersection in the middle of the diagram should be seen as showing the core of the foreign-domestic process.

Polish 'Normalization': 1982-1987.



The two main tenets of 'normalization' touched directly upon the internal situation - the return to socialist normality - and the external one - the return of a pacified and stable PRL in the socialist community and the resumption of normal relations with non-communist countries. The various stages of this process, *pacification*, *national conciliation* and *socialist renewal* were all elements of this domestic/foreign dichotomy characterizing the PRL's policy-making process. Again, as far as political and economic questions were concerned, they had to evolve in both a domestic and foreign environment. The political developments within the country had a

crucial significance for the attainment of economic support, in whatever form and from wherever. For the West, the *sine qua non* for a resumption of pre-1981 relations with Socialist Poland was the extent to which the Polish authorities were prepared to implement a dialogue between the various socio-political forces within the country. Only when some progress was made in this area (the various amnesties among other things), were Western governments willing to engage into some fruitful dialogue with Warsaw. Nothing illustrates this better than President Bush's 'new policy towards the PRL' in the wake of the Round Table Agreements in April 1989, stating publicly his resolve to take steps to help the economic and political liberalization of Socialist Poland. Yet, even then, this was a slow process. It really began unfolding as a result of the alteration in the superpowers' relations, and was part of the broader East-West context. Yet, its implications have had paradoxical consequences. Nowhere was it more striking than in Polish-Soviet relations. It is not an exaggeration to say that future events in the PRL will play an important role in determining the viability and duration of *perestroïka* in the Soviet Union. In many ways, the fate of those two countries have colluded. With the 'state of war card' having been played, the Polish authorities have been left with very little indeed to use as the ultimate means of ensuring their own survival and the continuity of the system. 'Normalization' *à la polonaise* had confirmed John Paul II's comments shortly after December 13, 1981, when he had remarked that *rząd który uczeka się do siły jest słaby* (a government which uses force is weak). Relying on sticks, the Jaruzelski régime had underestimated the strength and vitality of a society determined to fight the hegemony of a political system alien to its national character. Though combining overall a greater ability and shrewdness than their predecessors, the Polish authorities under

Jaruzelski have been inevitably forced to give in in many areas. This has dramatically reduced their capital of 'carrots' to hand out at various times, and when needed. In the event of a new crisis arising, similar in intensity to the 1980-1981 era, the Polish problem would require this time, a non-Polish solution. But such a development would almost certainty torpedo the whole of Gorbachev's policy, both at home and abroad. Though, the Soviet First Secretary would be reticent to employ military force, he also would be forced to do so. After all, he was not elected to preside over the disintegration of the 'Soviet European Empire'. But, if driven to do so, the costs this time would be incalculable in terms of his policies, and would represent a major setback for East-West relations. In this sense then, one can easily conclude that the official propaganda's euphoric description of present Soviet-Polish relations is in fact warranted. What is happening in the PRL is of vital importance to the Soviet leaders. Although the socio-political evolution which has taken place in the PRL over a six-month period has been truly remarkable, the results of the Round Table Agreements will remain in the balance. Unless some dramatic and effective means of salvaging the Polish economy and improve living standards emerge, the possibility of another explosion will subsist. This danger will increase in direct proportion with the duration of a stagnant situation. In this respect, international relations once again are destined to have an important role to play. A lot will depend on Western motivation and determination in 'helping' the PRL solve some of its outstanding problems. Of course, without profound lasting changes in the PRL's socio-political life, no amount of aid from capitalist countries will have any real effect. Yet, even a reduction of Polish debt instalment repayments may be conducive to alleviating this financial burden on the Polish economy. In turn, this

may allow more governmental funds to be injected in specific areas badly in need of capital. That the West has a role to play is undeniable. The question is, how. The Polish authorities are well aware of the pitfalls of a policy of dependence on the West and it will do everything it can to avoid a repetition of Gierek's mistakes. On the other hand, they are also aware that for a 'restructurization' of the economy, there has to be accompanying steps in the political sphere, without which very little will be achieved. Their dilemma thus remains what it was in the years following the imposition of a state of war: how to stay in power and at the same time satisfy society's aspirations, two apparently contradictory goals in a system where democratic means of ruling have been non-existent for over forty years. A failure in either would have untold consequences, not only for the Polish nation, but also for the Soviet Union, for Europe and for East-West relations. What is now happening in the PRL is thus of fundamental importance. The fate of this country, situated in the heart of Europe, as it approaches the Twenty First Century should remind us of a slogan popular in the 1830s: *Polska jest skazana na Wielkość* - Poland is condemned to be Great.

Chapter 9 Notes

1. Jan B. Weydenthal and Bruce Porter, *The Polish Drama 1980-81*, Toronto, Lexington Books, 1983, p. 139.
2. *Rzeczpospolita*, 19/1/1989.
3. Jerzy Urban, 'The interdependence of Polish home and foreign policy', Press release of the PRL's Embassy in London, Lecture given at the RIIA, Chatham House, 17 February 1987.
4. Janusz Symonides, 'problemy polityki zagranicznej na IX nadzwyczajnym zjeździe PZPR', *Spraw Międzynarodowych*, 1981 (8), p. 7.
5. Norman Davies, *The Heart of Europe*, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 43-44.
6. *Życie Warszawy*, 9/1/1987.
7. Edmund J. Ośmanczyk in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, No. 23, 7/6/1987, urges the need for such a <u>new</u> Polish policy towards the Soviet Union.

8. Jorge Luis Borges once wrote that Baroque is an example of style which exhausts its own possibilities and borders on becoming a caricature of itself. The final stage of any art is baroque when it reveals and destroys its own means of expression". Staniszkis *Telos*, Winter 1982/83, p. 87.

APPENDIX A.

PZPR Plenums/Conferences/Congress, July 1981 - December 1987.

1st KC	18-19th July 1981	[during 9th Congress.] Elected members of Politburo and Secretariat
2nd KC	11th August 1981	Discussion on the means to counteract the deteriorating socio-economic situation and Part activity after 9th Congress.
3rd KC	2/3rd Sept. 1981	Party's tasks in shaping the position of workers' self-management in socialist enterprises in conditions of the economic reform.
4th KC	16/17th Oct. 1981	Political situation in the country. Appeal against strikes. Resignation of Kania. Jaruzelski elected 1st Party Secretary.
5th KC	28th Oct. 1981	Current situation in country and main lines of party activity.
6th KC	27/28th Nov. 1981	Party's tasks in weathering the crisis, New economic reforms.
7th KC.	24/25th Feb. 1982	Presentation of draft declaration 'What are we fighting for, where are we heading'.
1st PZPR National Ideological Conference	2/3rd April 1982	
8th KC.	22/23rd Ap. 1982	Discussed realization of 9th Congress resolution in the sphere of the crisis.
9th KC.	15/16th July 1982	On youth.
10th KC.	27/28th Oct. 1982	Socio-economical development for 1983-1985.
11th KC (+NK ZSL).	20/21st Jan. 1983	Workers and peasants.
12th KC.	31st May 1983	Socio-political situation and the activity of the Party. Results of the KC Commission set up to explain reasons and course of social conflicts in the history of PRL.
13th KC.	14/15th Oct. 1983	Ideological activity of the Party.
14th KC.	18/19th Nov. 1983	Party action in the realization of socio-economic goals.
15th KC.	18th Feb. 1984	To work out the organizational and programmic assumptions for

		a national conference of delegates.
2nd PZPR National Delegates Conference	16th March 1984	
16th KC.	2/3rd June 1984	The leading role of the working class.
17th KC.	26/27th Oct. 1984	On the strengthening of the socialist state.
18th KC.	21/22nd Dec. 1984	Economic reform and the strengthening of the state.
19th KC.	13/14th May 1985	The role and tasks of the intelligentsia.
20th KC.	12/13th June 1985	Of the efficiency of the political and organizational activity of the Party.
21st KC.	3rd Aug. 1985	Party tasks in the Sejm elections.
22nd KC.	5 & 11th Nov. 1985	The PZPR contribution to the Sejm elections.
23rd KC.	20/21st Dec. 1985	Tasks of the Party in the socio-economic development of the country / preparations for the X Congress.
24th KC.	31 Jan/1 Feb 1986	National Education Problems. / Programme Project PZPR.
25th KC.	13/14th March 1986	Thesis for the Xth Congress. / Cadre policy of the Party.
26th KC	7th June 1986	Draft discussion of Xth Congress.
Xth PZPR Congress	29th June 1986	
2nd KC.	24th July 1986	Tasks of the Party in implementing the Xth Congress resolution.
3rd KC.	16th Dec. 1986	The speeding up of the standards of quality in the economy / New stage of the reform.
4th KC.	22nd May 1987	On the role the basic Party organizations.
5th KC.	8th Oct. 1987	Second stage of economic reforms / Announcement of referendum.

The Militarization of the PRL's Government in 1984: an overview.

Military Council of National Salvation (WRON):
Chairman: General Wojciech Jaruzelski
Members: Lt General Florian Siwicki (*Defence Ministry*)
Lt General Tadeusz Tuczapski
Lt General Eugeniusz Molczyk
Admiral Ludwik Janczyszyn
Major General Czesław Kiszczak (*Interior Ministry*)
Major General Tadeusz Hupałowski (*Local economy, environment*)
Major General Czesław Piotrowski (*Mining and Energy*)
Major General Józef Baryła
Major General Włodzimierz Oliwa (*Country's Administration*)
Major General Henryk Rapacewicz
Major General Józef Uzycki
Major General Tadeusz Krępski
Major General Longin Łozowicki
General Michał Janiszewski (*Chief of Cabinet Office*)
General Jerzy Jarosz
Colonel Tadeusz Makarewicz
Colonel Tadeusz Garbacik
Colonel Roman Les (retired)
Lt Colonel Jerzy Kłosiński
Lt Commander Mirosław Hermaszewski

Director General and Inspector in Chief of Government Control:
Brigadier Marian Ryba

Director General of The Planning Commission attached to the Cabinet:
Major General Jan Zieliński

Chairman of Chief Control Office:
General Tadeusz Hupałowski

Director General of the Ministry Of Administration:
Brigadier Edvard Drzaga

Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Communications:
Brigadier Leon Kołatkowski

Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Education:
Major General Jan Czapla

Deputy Defence Ministers (6 Major Generals):
Józef Baryła - *Chief of the Main Political Committee of the Army.*
Eugeniusz Molczyk
Zbigniew Nowak
Mieczysław Obieczyński
Tadeusz Tuczapski
Józef Urbanowicz

Ministry Of Interior Under-Secretaries of States:
Major Generals Władysław Ciastoń and Władysław Pożoga
Brigadiers Lucjan Czubiński, Konrad Strazewicz and Stanisław Zaczkowski

Commander-in-Chief of the People's Militia:
Brigadier Józef Beim

Voivodships:
Major General Mieczysław Dębicki (Warsaw)
Major General Roman Paszkowski (Katowice)
Brigadier Mieczysław Cygan (Gdańsk)

Other counties - Heads of Governing Committees:
Colonels Ryszard Urliński (Elbląg); Kazimierz Buczma (Kalisz); Zdzisław Mazurkiewicz (Koszalin); Alojzy Wojciechowski (Radom); Janusz Kowalski (Siedlce); Bogusław Jazwiec (Tarnobrzeg); Walerian Mikołajczyk (Zielona Góra)

APPENDIX C

Proclamation on the Introduction of Martial Law issued 13 December 1981 by the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic.

Guided by the need to ensure an increased degree of protection for the basic interests of the state and the citizens, in order to create conditions for the effective upholding of calm, harmony, and public order, and for the reinstatement of violated social discipline, and also bearing in mind the guaranteeing of possibilities for the efficient functioning of the authorities, the state administration, and the national economy, and acting on the basis of Article 33, paragraph of the Polish People's Republic's Constitution, the Council of State has introduced martial law.

In connection with this, during the period of time during martial law remains in force, the public is informed of the following:

1. The convening and holding of all kinds of gatherings, marches, and demonstrations is banned, as well as the organizing and conducting of public gatherings and artistic entertainment and sporting events, without obtaining prior consent from the appropriate regional office of state administration, with the exception of religious services and rituals, taking place on the premises of churches, chapels, or other places designated exclusively for these purposes.
2. The dissemination of all kinds of publications and information, by any means, is banned as is the public display of works of art and the use of all kinds of printing equipment without first obtaining the permission of the appropriate office.
3. The right of workers to organize and to hold strikes and protest actions is suspended.
4. Persons who are in public places are obliged to carry an identity document and in the case of school pupils of 13 years of age or more, their school identity card or a provisional identity card.
5. The duty has been introduced to obtain prior permission from the appropriate state administration body for a permanent sojourn in a border area and from the local Citizen's Militia for a temporary stay in such an area.
6. Tourism, as well as sailing and other sports is prohibited on both inland and coastal waters.

Moreover, for the duration of martial law, as far as the general duty to defend the Polish People's Republic is concerned, the following was decided:

1. Recruits recognized as fit for military service, as well as people in the reserve, regardless of their service can be called up at any time by a decision of the Minister of National Defence.
2. Designated units of state administration and of the national economy which carry out tasks of particular importance for the defence and security of the state have been militarized. This means that persons employed by these units are subject to special duties about which these persons will be notified by the management of their enterprises.
3. Persons assigned to serve in specified civil defence units can be put under the obligation to carry out active service in civil defence for such period of time as is required by their task.
4. Citizens can be required by the appropriate local bodies of

state administration and bodies of military administration to make specific personal and financial contributions to the defence of the state.

For the duration of the state of martial law, insofar as the interests of maintaining public peace, law, and order requires, the authorized state administration offices may also:

1. Introduce a limitation on freedom of movement of inhabitants in specified times and places through the introduction of a curfew or a prohibition on the arrival in or departure from specified voivodeships, towns, and parishes.
2. Introduce the obligation to obtain prior permission from the appropriate regional state administration office to change one's place of residence by moving to another locality for a period exceeding 48 hours and an obligation to report to the militia immediately upon arriving in a new place of residence.
3. Suspend the activities of those associations, trade unions as well as social and vocational associations whose activity threatens the security of the state, with the exception of Churches and religious associations.
4. Introduce censorship of mail of all kinds, telecommunications, and telephone conversations.
5. Place an obligation on owners of radio transmitters, as as well as transceiver sets to hand them in for safe-keeping in designated places.
6. Require the owners of firearms of any kind as well as hunting and sporting guns and owners of ammunition and explosives to hand them over for safe-keeping in designated places.
7. Ban the taking of photographs and films as well as television pictures of specified buildings and in specific places or regions.
8. Prohibit the wearing of specific uniforms and badges.
9. Stop or limit the work of specified communication equipment and postal communications and telecommunication services.
10. Suspend or limit the transport of persons and objects by means of road, rail, and water, as well as motor vehicle traffic on public roads.
11. Stop or limit the movement of persons and goods through border crossing points.

For the duration of the period that martial law is in force, all persons transgressing the principles, orders, duties and limitations being introduced will be subject to more stringent penal regulations applied by summary and accelerated court proceedings.

People over 17 years of age, in relation to whom there are justified suspicions that, if they remain at liberty, they will engage in activity which threatens the security of the state, may be interned in isolation centres for the duration of state of martial law, on the basis of a decision by the voivodeship commandant of the Citizen's militia.

People fulfilling military service, service in military units and service in civil defence, will be tried before military courts for offences committed in connection with that service, in accordance with the regulation which apply to soldiers on active military service during a war.

It is also announced to the public that, in case of a collective or individual threat to the life, health, or freedom of citizens or to public or personal property of considerable value, and also threats to or the occupation of buildings belonging to the state administration

and political organizations and major edifices and installations of the national economy or buildings or objects important for the defence or security of the state, in addition to the individual and collective action by Citizens' Militia functionaries and other formations set up to protect public law and order, units and sub-units of the Armed Forces may be brought in. All these forces are authorized to use means of direct coercion in order to restore calm, and public law and order.

All citizens are called upon to observe absolutely the introduced bans, orders and limitations, to carry out the other obligations imposed and also to obey all orders of the proper authorities, issued in order to guarantee calm and public law and order and to strengthen social discipline.

Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic.

Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Source: *Trybuna Ludu*, 14 December 1982.

APPENDIX D

Selected high-level visits to and from the PRL 1982-1987.
(Excluding all Western visits)

State-Party visits are underlined

To the PRL		*From the PRL*
	1982	
		11;I;82 Wojna heads Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee to France
		29;I;82 Wojna, Vienna
11;II;82	Hungarian Foreign Minister	31;I;82 Czyrek, Paris, FCP Congress
		1;III;82 Jaruzelski to Moscow
		29;III;82 Jaruzelski to GDR
		5;IV;82 Jaruzelski to CSSR
		21;IV;82 Jaruzelski to Hungary
17;V;82	Rusakov	11;V;82 Rakowski in Austria
9;IX;82	Col. Gadhafi	20;V;82 Jaruzelski in Bulgaria
		4;VI;82 Jaruzelski in Romania
		6;X;82 Olszowski in Columbia/ Venezuela
		10;XI;82 Olszowski in India
		14;XI;82 Olszowski in Kuweit
		Jaruzelski in Moscow (Brezhnev's death)
		20;XII;82 Jaruzelski in Moscow
	1983	
		4;I;83 Prague meeting of WTO
16;VIII;83	Honecker	12;IV;83 Olszowski in Angola
26;X;83	Kadar	28;VI;83 Moscow Conference of Party leaders
25;XI;83	Chebrikov	
30;XI;83 (CMEA)	Husak	19;X;83 Jaruzelski in Berlin
		15/30;XI;83 Olszowski in Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, Indonesia, Thailand.
	1984	
2;IV;84	Zhivkov	13;II;84 Jaruzelski in Moscow (Andropov's death)
9;IV;84	Angolan visit	4;V;84 Jaruzelski in Moscow
6;VI;84	Ceaucescu	10;VI;84 Olszowski in Afghanistan
27;V;84	North Korean President	12;VI;84 Jaruzelski in Moscow (CMEA)
23;VI;84	Nicaragua	14;VI;84 Olszowski in Mongolia
2;VII;84	Yugoslav President	15;IX;84 Olszowski in Cuba
		9;XI;84 Jaruzelski 6-hour visit to Hungary and a couple

			of hours in CSSR
6;VIII;84	Kampuchean President of Council of Ministers	16;XI;84	Jaruzelski in East Berlin
		13;XII;84	Jaruzelski in CSSR
19;IX;84	Afghanistan		
12;XI;84	South Yemen		

1985

		11;II;85	Jaruzelski in India
		4;III;85	Jaruzelski in Bulgaria
		12;III;85	Jaruzelski in Moscow (Chernenko's death)
26;IV;85	Gorbachev attends WTO Renewal	11;VI;85	Olszowski in Austria
		20;VI;85	Olszowski in Italy
7;V;85	Rizkhov	8;VII;85	Jaruzelski in Yugoslavia
		28;VII;85	Olszowski in Helsinki (CSCE)
		20;IX;85	Jaruzelski in Cuba
		25;IX;85	Jaruzelski at UN
		21;XI;85	Prague meeting of Party leaders
		22;XI;85	Jaruzelski in Romania
		1;XII;85	Jaruzelski in Lybia
		2;XII;85	Jaruzelski in Algeria
		3;XII;85	*Jaruzelski meets Mitterand in Paris*
		4;XII;85	Jaruzelski in Tunisia
		5;XII;85	Orzechowski in Moscow
		9;XII;85	Orzechowski in Finland

1986

22;I;86	Hungarian Foreign Minister	18;II;86	Messner in USSR Orzechowski in Greece
17;III;86	Soviet Foreign Minister	25;II;86	Jaruzelski attends 27th CPSU Congress. Visits Vilno on 18th
28;III;86	Kadar	7;IV;86	Orzechowski in FRG
27;V;86	Husak	14;IV;86	Messner in CSSR
13;VI;86	Zimbabwe President	3/8;V;86	Orzechowski in Egypt/ Malta
16;VI;86	Mongolia Foreign Minister	15;V;86	Orzechowski in Mexico
30;VI;86	Gorbatchev attends Xth PZPR Congress	5;VI;86	Sejm delegation to PRC
		10;VI;86	Jaruzelski in Budapest (WTO)
		6;VIII;86	Orzechowski in Moscow
		4;IX;86	Messner in Hungary
		5;IX;86	Orzechowski in CSSR
		20/20;IX;86	Jaruzelski in Mongolia, North Korea, PRC
		9;X;86	Messner in GDR
		23;X;86	Orzechowski in Australia & Philippines
		10;XI;86	Jaruzelski in Moscow (CMEA)
		19;XI;86	Orzechowski in Japan

		20;XI;86	Gorywoda in PRC
		16;XII;86	Orzechowski on Belgium

1987

		12;I;87	Jaruzelski in Italy
		2;II;87	Orzechowski in Iran
		9;II;87	Orzechowski in Moscow
		3;III;87	Czyrek in USA
9;IV;87	Zhivkov	11;IV;87	Messner in Egypt
5;V;87	Ethiopian Foreign Minister	21;IV;87	Jaruzelski in USSR
		29;V;87	Jaruzelski in Berlin (WTO)
		2;VI;87	Orzechowski in Sweden
		28;VI;87	Jaruzelski in Japan
8;VII;87	Ceaucescu	16;IX;87	Jaruzelski in GDR
		1;XI;87	Jaruzelski in Moscow
23;VII;87	Cambodgian visit	10;XI;87	Orzechowski in PRC
		11;XI;87	Jaruzelski in Greece
10;IX;87	USSR Defence Minister	15;XI;87	Orzechowski in North Korea
		2;XII;87	Jaruzelski in Hungary
		8;XII;87	Orzechowski in UK
		10;12;87	Berlin WTO Leaders Meeting

APPENDIX E

Laws passed by the Sejm from January 1982 to December 1983.

1.	January 25, 1982	Law on Specific Law Regulations during the State of War.
2.	January 26, 1982	Law on Teachers' Charter.
3.	February 26, 1982	Law on Social Economic Planning.
4.	- " -	Law on Prices.
5.	- " -	Law on establishing the Office of Minister of Prices
6.	- " -	Law on Financial Economy of State Enterprises.
7.	- " -	Law on the Taxation of Socialized Economic Entities.
8.	- " -	Banking Law.
9.	- " -	Law on The Statute of the Polish National Bank.
10.	- " -	Law on State Statistics.
11.	- " -	Law on the Right to engage in Foreign Trade Activities.
12.	February 27, 1982	Amendments to the Law on Old-Age Pensions for Miners and their Families.
13.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on Orders and Decorations.
14.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on Old Age Pensions for Workers and their Families.
15.	- " -	Law on The Setting up of the Honourific Title "Deserving Docker of the PRL".
16.	- " -	Law establishing the State Atomic Agency.
17.	March 26 1982	Law on the Conservation of Forests and the Protection of Cultivable Land.
18.	- " -	Law on the Regrouping of Agricultural Holdings.
19.	- " -	Amendments to the Civil Code and Abrogation of Laws Regulating the Economic Property of Farmers.
20.	- " -	Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure.
21.	- " -	Amendments to the Polish People's Republic Constitution.
22.	- " -	Law on the State Tribunal.
23	- " -	Law on the Uniformity concerning the Deadline for People's Regional and People's Councils' Terms.
24.	May 4, 1982	Law on the National Council of Culture and on the Fund for the Development of Culture.
25.	- " -	Law establishing the Office of the Ministry of Culture and Arts.
26.	- " -	Law on Higher Education.
27.	May 26, 1982	Law on Special Entitlements for Combattants.
28.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on establishing the Office of the Ministry for Combattants.
29.	- " -	Law on the Bar.
30.	- " -	Amendments to the Penal Law and the Law on Petty Offences.
31.	July 6, 1982	Law on Law Councillors.
32.	- " -	Law on Principles of Conduct of Business Activity in Small Industry by Foreign Corporate Bodies and Natural Persons on the

		Territory of the PRL.
33.	- " -	Law on the Land and Mortgage Registers.
34.	- " -	1982 Budgetary Law.
35.	September 16, 1982	Co-operative Law.
36.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on the Practise and Organization of Crafts.
37.	- " -	Law on Employees of the State Administration.
38.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on Costs of Court Proceedings in Civil Cases.
39.	October 8, 1982	Law on Trade Unions.
40.	- " -	Law on Socio-Professional Farmers' Organizations.
41.	October 9, 1982	Amendments to the Law on Combating Speculation.
42.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on the Alimentary Fund.
43.	October 26, 1982	Law on Procedures against People evading work.
44.	- " -	Law on Procedures in Youth cases.
45.	- " -	Law on Education in Sobriety and against Alcoholism.
46.	December 3, 1982	Amendments ot the Regulations on renting Premises.
47.	December 14, 1982	Law on Pensions for Old-Age pensioneers and their families.
48.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on War and Army Invalids Pensions and their Families.
49.	- " -	Law on the Social Insurance of Individual farmers and their Families.
50.	- " -	Law on the Employment of Graduates.
51.	- " -	Law on the Protection of State Secrets.
52.	- " -	Law on Changes in Special Law Regulations during Martial Law.
53.	December 18, 1982	Amendments conerning the Special Law Regulations during Martial Law.
54.	- " -	1983 Budgetary Law.
55.	December 29, 1982	Law on the Office of the Finance Ministry and the Treasury Office.
56.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on Fees in Penal Cases.
57.	- " -	Amendments to the Law on the Structure of the Board judging Petty Offences and Code of Petty Offences' Procedure.

Source: *Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy 1981-1983*, PWE, Warszawa, 1984, pp. 92-94.

* As a comparison, in the period between May 22, 1986 to May 27, 1987, 13 Laws only were passed by the Sejm.

APPENDIX F

Selected Non-CMEA Visits to the PRL since December 1981.

None in 1982 and 1983.

1984 (6)

18;II;84	UN General Secretary, Perez de Cuellar.
16;X;84	Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold Gratz.
22,X;84	Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou *(First NATO State visit since 1982).*
29;X;84	Finnish Foreign Minister, P. Vaeyrynen.
3;XI;84	UK Minister of State at Foreign Office, Malcolm Rifkind.
21;XI;84	*Postponement of West Germany's Foreign Minister's visit.*
20;XII;84	Italian Foreign Minister, G. Andreotti.

1985 (7)

6;III;85	West Germany Foreign Minister, D. Genscher.
11;IV;85	UK Foreign Minister, G. Howe.
1;V;85	*Postponement of Belgian Foreign Minister's visit.*
28;V;85	Italian Prime Minister, Benitto Craxi *(2 hour visit on his way to Moscow).*
10;VI;85	Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe *(First visit for 18 years).*
	Postponement of Irish Foreign Minister's visit scheduled in July.
20;VI;85	*Postponement of Spanish Foreign Minister's visit.*
	Norwegian Foreign Minister postpones visit due on October 6th.
28;VI;85	Egyptian Foreign Minister, Esmat A. Meguid.
3;IX;85	Dutch Foreign Minister, F. Bolkestein.
7;XII;85	Head of the SPD, Willy Brandt.

1986 (4)

13;VI;86	President of Zimbawe, S.B. Banana.
20;VI;86	Argentinian Vice-President, V. Martinez.
30;X;86	Former West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt.
6;XI;86	Indian President.
	Senator Robert Kennedy refused entry into the PRL.

1987 (22)

15;I;87	Japanese Prime Minister, Nakasone.
28;I;87	US Dept. Secretary Of State, John Whitehead.
5;II;87	UK Minister of State at Foreign Office, Timothy Renton.
3;III;87	Spanish Foreign Minister, Ordonez.
10;III;87	Chinese Foreign Minister *(First for 33 years).*
2;IV;87	Indian Foreign Minister.
10;IV;87	French Foreign Minister.
3;V;87	Canadian Foreign Minister.
16;V;87	Thailand Foreign Minister.
17;V;87	Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemanns.
18;V;87	Mexican Dep. FM, Ricardo Vallero.
22;V;87	Senator Robert Kennedy.
21;V;87	Private Visit by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
26;V;87	FRG Finance Minister, M.Bangemann.
4;VI;87	Chinese 1er and 1st secretary.
8;VI;87	John Paul II *(3rd visit).*
24;VI;87	Moroccan Foreign Minister; Columbian Foreign Minister.
31;VIII;87	Dutch Foreign Minister.
4;IX;87	Uruguay Foreign Minister.
20;IX;87	Frantz Vranitzky, Austrian Federal Chancellor.
26;IX;	US Vice-President George Bush.
2;XI;87	Dannish Foreign Minister.
23;XI;87	Australian Foreign Minister.
26;XI;87	Austrian Foreign Minister.

APPENDIX G

Governmental Changes in the PRL, 1981-1987:

a) State Council.
b) Council Of Ministers.
c) Government

(* denotes new nomination)

STATE COUNCIL

	1981	1982 *Oct*	1983	1984
Chairman				
	Jabłoński	Jabłoński	Jabłoński	Jabłoński
Deputy Chairmen				
	Młyńczak	Młyńczak	Młyńczak	Młyńczak
	Secomski	Secomski	Secomski	Secomski
	Tomal	Tomal	Tomal	*Struzek
	Ziętek	Ziętek	Ziętek	Ziętek
Secretary				
	Duda	Duda	Szymanek	Szymanek
Members				
	Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski
	Grendys	Grendys	Grendys	Grendys
	Kempara	*Kania	Kania	Kania
	Kołodziej	Kempara	Kempara	Kempara
	Marszałek-Mln.	*Klafkowski	Klafkowski	Klafkowski
	Ozga-Michalski	Kołodziej	Kołodziej	Kołodziej
	Reiff	MarszaLek-Mln.	Ozga-Michalski	Ozga-Michalski
	Rog-świostek	Ozga-Michalski	Morawski	Morawski
	Szafrański	*Morawski	Rog-świostek	Rog-świostek
	Szczepanski	Rog-świostek	*Stawski	Stawski
	Wroński	Szafrański	Szafrański	Szafrański
		Wroński	Wroński	Wroński

	1985 *Dec.*	1986 *Nov.*	1987 *Sept.*	1988 *Jan.*
Chairman				
	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski
Deputy Chairmen				
	*Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski
	*Komender	Komender	Komender	Komender
	Mlynczak	Mlynczak	Mlynczak	Mlynczak
	*Szelachowski	Szelachowski	Szelachowski	Szelachowski

Secretary				
	‡Surowiec	Surowiec	Surowiec	Surowiec
Members				
	‡Ciborowski	Ciborowski	Ciborowski	Ciborowski
	‡Gacek	Gacek	Gacek	Gacek
	‡Jonkisz	Lipski	Legatowicz	Jonkisz
	Jonkisz	Jonkisz	Lipski	Legatowicz
	‡Lipski	Morawski	‡Legatowicz	Lipski
	‡Miodowicz	Nawrocki	Morawski	Morawski
	Morawski	Secomski	Nawrocki	Nawrocki
	‡Nawrocki	Stefanski	Secomski	Secomski
	‡Secomski	Szymanski	Stefanski	Stefanski
	‡Stefanski	‡Uziemblo	Szymanski	Szymanski
	‡Szymanski	Zawadzki	Uziemblo	Uziemblo
	‡Zawadzki		Zawadzki	Zawadzki

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

	1981	1982	1983	1984
Prime Minister	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski
Deputy Prime Ministers				
	Jagielski	‡Komender	Komender	‡Gorywoda
	Jedynak	‡Kowalczyk	Kowalczyk	Komender
	Mach	Madej	Madej	Kowalczyk
	Madej	Malinowski	Malinowski	Malinowski
	Malinowski	‡Obodowski	Obodowski	‡Messner
	Ozdowski	Rakowski	Rakowski	Obodowski
	Rakowski	‡Szalajda	Szalajda	Rakowski
				Szalajda
Chairman, Supreme Chamber of Control				
	Moczar	Moczar	‡Hupalowski	Hupalowski
Chairman, Planning Commission				
	Madej	‡Obodowski	Obodowski	‡Gorywoda
Minister without porfolio, responsible for trade union affairs				
	Ciosek	Ciosek	Ciosek	Ciosek
Member of Government Presidium and Government plenipotentiary for the economic reform				
	Baka	Baka	Baka	Baka

	1985 *Dec.*	1986 *Nov.*	1987 *Sept.*	1988 *Jan.*
Prime Minister				
	Messner	Messner	Messner	Messner
Deputy Prime Ministers				
	‡Gertych	Gertych	Gorywoda	Koziol
	Gorywoda	Gorywoda	Gwiazda	Sadowski
	‡Gwiazda	Gwiadza	Koziol	Szalajda
	‡Koziol	Koziol	‡Sadowski	
	Szalajda	Szalajda	Szalajda	
Chairman, Supreme Chamber of control				
	Hupałowski	Hupałowski	Hupalowski	Hupalowski
Chairman, Planning Commission				
	Gorywoda	Gorywoda	Gorywoda	‡Sadowski
Head of the office of the Council of Ministers				
	Janiszewski	Janiszewski	Janiszewski	

GOVERNMENT

	1981	1982	1983	1984
Admin./Loc. Econ./				
Protect. Envir.	Kępa	‡Hupałowski	‡Oliwa	Oliwa
Agri./Food Ind.	Wojtecki	Wojtecki	‡Zięba	Zięba
Chem./Light Ind.	Knapik	‡Grzywa	Grzywa	Grzywa
Communications	Majewski	Majewski	Majewski	Majewski
Const./Build.	Brzostek	‡Kukuryka	Kukuryka	Kukuryka
Culture/arts	Tejchma	‡Żygulski	Żygulski	Żygulski
Domestic Trade	Łakomiec	Łakomiec	Łakomiec	‡Kędzierska
Finance	Krzak	‡Nieckarz	Nieckarz	Nieckarz
Foreign Affairs	Czyrek	Olszowski	Olszowski	Olszowski
Foreign trade	Karski	Nestorowicz	Nestorowicz	Nestorowicz
Forestry/timber	Kozłowski	Kozłowski	Kozłowski	Kozłowski
Health & Welfare	Szelachowski	Szelachowski	Szelachowski	Szelachowski
Education	Faron	Faron	Faron	Faron
Interior	Milewski	Kiszczak	Kiszczak	Kiszcak
Iron/steel/Eng	Szałajda	‡Łukosz	Łukosz	‡Maciejewicz
Justice	Zawadzki	Zawadzki	Zawadzki	‡Domeracki
Labour/Wages	Obodowski	‡Bury	‡Ciosek	‡Gebala
Mining/Energy	Piotrowski	Piotrowski	Piotrowski	Piotrowski
National Defence	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	‡Siwicki
Raw Material	Szyr	‡Antosik	‡Woźniak	Woźniak
Science/HiEduc.	Nawrocki	‡Miśkiewicz	Miśkiewicz	Miśkiewicz
Transportation	Zajfryd	‡Kamiński	Kaminski	Kamiński
Religious aff.	Kuberski	‡Łopatka	Łopatka	Łopatka
Maritime Economy	Bejger	‡Korzonek	Korzonek	Korzonek
Head Office prices	-	Krasiński	Krasiński	Krasiński

	1985	*1986*	*1987*	*1988*
Agricu./Food Ind/				
Forestry.	Zięba	Zięba	Zięba	Zięba
Chem./Light Ind.	Grzywa	Grzywa	-	-
Communications	Majewski	Majewski	Majewski	-
Const./Territ.&				
Communal man.	‡Niewiadomski	‡Bajszczak	Bajszczak	-
Culture/arts	Żygulski	‡Krawczuk	Krawczuk	Krawczuk
Domestic Trade	‡Jóźwiak	Jóźwiak	Jóźwiak	Jóźwiak
Envir. Protec.&				
Natural ressour.	‡Jarzębski	Jarzębski	Jarzębski	‡Michna
Finance	Nieckarz	‡Samojlik	Samojlik	Samojlik
Foreign Affairs	‡Orzechowski	Orzechowski	Orzechowski	Orzechowski
Foreign trade	‡Wójcik	Wójcik	Wójcik	‡Gwiazda
Health & Welfare	Cybulko	Cybulko	Cybulko	‡Kommender
Education	Michałowska-Gumowska	Michałowska	Michałowska	-
Interior	Kiszczak	Kiszczak	Kiszczak	Kiszcak
Iron/steel Ind.	Maciejewicz	Maciejewicz	Maciejewicz	-
Industry				Bilip
Justice	Domeracki	Domarewski	Domarewski	Domarewski
Labour/Wages	Gebala	Gebala	‡Pawlowski	Pawlowski
Mining/Energy	Piotrowski	‡Szlachta	Szlachta	-
National Defence	Siwicki	Siwicki	Siwicki	Siwicki
Raw Material	Woźniak	Woźniak	Woźniak	-
Science/HiEduc.	Miśkiewicz	Miśkiewicz	Miśkiewicz	-
Transportation +				

naviga/Comaun, 87	Kamiński	Kamiński	Kamiński	Kamiński
Religious aff.	Łopatka	Łopatka	Łopatka	‡Loranc
Maritime Economy	‡Nowotnik	Nowotnik	Nowotnik	-
Head offive Scient./Tech				
Progress & impl.	‡Tott	Tott	Tott	Tott

Politburo Changes 1981-1988.

1981 (July)	1982 (Oct.)	1983 (Sept.)	1984 (Oct.)
MEMBERS (New members underlined):			
Kania	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski
Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski
Czechowicz	Czechowicz	Czechowicz	Czechowicz
Czyrek	Czyrek	Czyrek	Czyrek
Grzyb	Grzyb	Grzyb	Grzyb
Jaruzelski	Kałkus	Kałkus	Kałkus
Kubiak	Kubiak	Kubiak	Kubiak
Labecki	Messner	Messner	Messner
Messner	Milewski	Milewski	Milewski
Milewski	Olszowski	Opałko	Opałko
Olszowski	Opałko	Porębski	Olszowski
Opałko	Porębski	Romanik	Porębski
Porębski	Romanik	Siwak	Romanik
Romanik	Siwak	Wozniak	Siwak
Siwak	Wozniak	Olszowski	Wozniak
DEPUTY MEMBERS:			
Główczyk	Bejger	Bejger	Bejger
Mokrzyszczak	Główczyk	Główczyk	Główczyk
	Kiszczak	Kiszczak	Kiszczak
	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak
	Siwicki	Siwicki	Orzechowski
			Siwicki

1985 (Dec.)	1986 (Nov.)	1987 (Sept.)	1988 (Jan.)
Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski
Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski
Czechowicz	Baryła[May85]	Baryła	Baryła
Czyrek	Czyrek	Czyrek	Czyrek
Grzyb	Główczyk	Główczyk	Główczyk
Kałkus	Kiszczak[Jun86]	Kiszczak	Kiszczak
Kubiak	Messner	Messner	Messner
Messner	Miodowicz[Jun86]	Miodowicz	Miodowicz
Opalko	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak
Porębski	Muranski	Muranski	Muranski
Romanik	Orzechowski[Jun86]	Orzechowski	Orzechowski
Siwak	Porębski	Porębski	Porębski
Wozniak	Siwicki[Jun86]	Siwicki	Rakowski
	Stępien	Stępien	Siwicki
	Wozniak	Wozniak	Stępien
			Wozniak
			Baka
Bejger	Bejger	Bejger	Bejger
Głowczyk	Ferensztajn[Jun86]	Ferensztajn	Gorywoda
Kiszczak	Kubasiewicz[Jun86]	Kubasiewicz	Kubasiewicz
Mokrzyszczak	Michałek[Jun86]	Michałek	Michałek
Orzechowski	Rembisz[[Jun86]	Rembisz	Rembisz
Siwicki			

Central Committee Changes 1981-1984.

1981	1982 *sept.*	1983 *Sept.*	1984
FIRST SECRETARY:			
Kania	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski
SECRETARIES:			
Czyrek	Barcikowski	Barcikowski	Barcikowski
Kubiak	Czyrek	Czyrek	Bednarski[Nov83]
Michałek	Główczyk	Główczyk	Czyrek
Milewski	Gorywoda	Gorywoda	Główczyk
Olszowski	Michałek	Michalek	Michałek
Wozniak	Milewski	Milewski	Milewski
	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak
	Orzechowski	Orzechowski	Porębski
		Swirgon	Swirgon
			Stępień[Feb84]
KKP CHAIRMAN:			
Urbanski	Urbanski	Urbanski	Urbanski
CKR CHAIRMAN:			
Morawski	Morawski	Morawski	Morawski

Central Committee Changes 1985-1988.

1985	1986	1987	1988
FIRST SECRETARY:			
Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski	Jaruzelski
SECRETARIES:			
Bedbarski	Baryla[Dec85]	Baryła	Baruła
Czyrek	Bednarski	Bednarski	Ciosek
Główczyk	Ciosek	Ciosek	Cypryniak
Michałek	Cypryniak	Cypryniak	Czyrek
Mokrzyszczak	Czyrek	Czyrek	Główczyk
Porębski	Główczyk	Główczyk	Michalek
Swirgon	Michalek	Michałek	Porębski
Wozniak[Nov85]	Porębski	Porębski	Wasilewski
	Wasilewski	Wasilewski	Wozniak
	Wozniak	Wozniak	
CKKP CHAIRMAN:			
Urbanski	Mokrzyszczak (CKKP+CKR=CKKR)	Mokrzyszczak	Mokrzyszczak
CKR CHAIRMAN:			
Morawski			

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Kultura (Paris-based monthly of the Polish emmigration)
Nowe Drogi (PZPR main theoretical monthly).
Polityka (pro-Party weekly).
Rzeczpospolita (government's daily).
SprawyMiędzynaraodowe (Polish Institute of International Affairs - PISM - monthly).
Trybuna Ludu (PZPR national daily).
Tygodnik Masowsze (underground Solidarity weekly)
Tygodnik Powszechny (independent Catholic weekly).
Zbiór Dokumentów, (Collection of documents - PISM)
Życie Warszawy (Warsaw daily).

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(*Abbreviations used:*

IBWPK: Instytut Badania Współczesnych Problemów Kapitalizmu
MON: Wydawnictwo Ministerswa Obrony Narodowej
ND: Nowe Drogi
PISM: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
PWN: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe
SM: Sprawy Międzynarodowe)

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